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Abstract 
In mid-1997 the Cabinet of the Howard government decided to approve the 
negotiation of explicitly preferential trade agreements, overturning a 
political consensus that had developed over the preceding five decades that 
trade policy should be non·discriminatory. The move indicated a 
fundamental shift in the intent of trade policy, from being primarily a tool 
for productivity-enhancing domestic economic reform to become much more 
closely integrated with the government's domestic and international 
political aims. 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess how and why this polit,-y shift, with its 
far-reaching implications for economic development, occurred. In seeking to 
develop an account of the Howard government's decision to negotiate 
preferential trade agreements, two propositions regarding state behaviour 
and trade policy formation are examined. The first, which was espoused by 
the Howard government itself, is that the decision to negotiate preferential 
trade agreements was a pragmatic response to a changing international 
policy environment characterized by faltering progress toward multilateral 
trade liberalization and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements. 
The second proposition, which owes much to work in the field of political 
economy, is that trade policy is driven and shaped by the demands of 
politically influential material-based societal interests. 
In examining these propositions this study concludes that the international 
environment is a necessary, but not in itself a sufficient, factor in explaining 
the policy shift. Similarly, although organized economic interests were 
important in helping implement the government's decision to negotiate 
preferential trade agreements, they did not drive it. 
Instead, the evidence gathered indicates that the Howard government's 
decision to negotiate preferential trade agreements, though influenced by 
developments in international trade policy and supported by some private 
iii 
The Power to Deal 
interests, was driven by partisan political considerations. The findings of 
this study indicate that Prime Minister John Howard and senior colleagues 
viewed trade policy primarily as an instrument to help advance geopolitical 
goals and domestic political and electoral ascendancy rather than as a 
means to drive economic development and reform, and used it to that end. 
In executing this strategy Howard and his advisers were aided by a political 
institutional architecture in which an electorally-successful prime minister 
could wield substantial trade policym.aking authority - an arrangement that 
fostered policy entrepreneurship of the kind that led to the negotiation of 
the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement. 
IV 
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Note on references 
In addition to the extensive use of secondary sources, this study is informed 
by interviews with almost 30 current and former politicians, political 
advisers, public servants, academics and industry lobbyists. All have given 
generously on their time. Some have requested anonymity. For the purposes 
of this study, I have cited information gained through interviews by 
reference to the name of the interviewee and the year of the interview. For 
example: (Kunkel, 2005). 
\Vhere reference is made to a direct quotation from an interview, it is 
indented: 
The US business community was much more focused on what it could 
get out of an FTA with Australia than the Australian business 
community was on what it could get out of one. And I think this is 
something that they've learned from and probably will be a bit better 
in the case of China and Japan but it really took them a long time -
Thawley, 2006 
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1. TRADING OFF PREFERENCES 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
In mid·1997 the Cabinet of the Howard government decided, with little 
fanfare, to approve the negotiation of explicitly preferential trade 
agreements, overturning a consensus that had developed since 1942 that 
trade policy should be non·discriminatoryl. The move, contemporaneous 
with decisions to implement a pause in tariff cuts on imports of automotive 
and textile, clothing and footwear goods2, indicated a fundamental shift in 
the intent of trade policy. The priority of trade diplomacy changed from the 
pursuit ofnon·discriminatory trade liberalization as a means to enhance 
productivity to become much more closely integrated with the government's 
domestic and international political aims. 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess how and why this policy shift, with its 
far·reaching implications for economic development, occurred. The 
intersection of domestic interests and international relations inherent in 
trade policy mean the mix of motives and political calculations 
underpinning any policy shift is likely to be complex, and theoretical 
literature directs attention to both exogenous and endogenous factors. Of 
particular interest for this study are two propositions. The first is that, 
faced with faltering progress toward multilateral trade liberalization and 
the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), the Howard 
government in the late 1990s had little choice but to pursue PTAs itselfl. 
1 With the notable exception of the ~.\ustralia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations agreement and several 
agreements to grant preferential access to the exports of some developing countries, successive Australian 
governments have generally adhered to the basic multilateral tenet of non-discrimination (Snape et.aL, 1998: 
7; Crawford, 1968: 598-9). The core commitment to moving towards non-discrimination came with the 
adoption of Article VJ! of the Mutual Aid Agreement with the United States in 1942 (Snape et.al., 1998: 11). 
It is important to note the distinction between non-discrimination and protectionism. During much of the 
post-war period .. -\ustralia's trade policy was marked simultaneously by a general adherence to non-
discrimination and the erection and maintenance of substantial trade barriers. 1bis is discussed in more detail 
in pages 6 to 9. 
2 The Coalition government announced on 5 June 1997 that there would be a pause in the program of tariff 
cuts scheduled for automotive imports between 2000 and 2005, and on 10 September 1997 announced a 
similar decision regarding the program for tariff cuts affecting imports of textile, clothing and footwear 
imports (Ireland, 1997). 
3 In an echo of system-centred theories of international relations such as neorealism (see Waltz, 1979) and 
liberal institutionalism (see Krasner, 1978 and Keohane and Nye, 1989) that seek to explain state behaviour in 
1 
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The second proposition, which owes much to work in the field of political 
economy, is that trade policy is driven and shaped by the demands of 
politically influential economic interests4. This study sets out to test both 
these propositions in the course of developing an account of how and why 
such a significant shift in Australia's trade policy occurred. 
This investigation is undertaken using the first three PTAs negotiated by 
the Howard government, and in particular the agreement struck with the 
United States government that came into effect on 1 January, 2005, as a 
case study in trade policymaking. In my work as a journalist and political 
staffer I developed a fascination with the policy making process, particularly 
why some ideas become formally adopted as government policy while most -
whatever their merit - do not. The case study approach adopted here 
enables me to take full advantage of the skills and experienced I have 
developed through my work, harnessing them within a scholarly framework 
to test ideas and propositions about how policy is made. I am under no 
illusion that this approach will provide grounds to develop a new theory of 
policy-making, but it can serve to shed light on existing ideas of how policy 
is developed, test theories and help identify trends in policy-making. 
The shift in trade policy that is the focus of this study was significant 
because of its potential to affect the nature and degree of Australia's 
integration with the global economy and the pace and direction of domestic 
economic reform. During the 1980s and early 1990s a bipartisan political 
consensus had emerged around the policy response to globalization5. This 
terms of power relations and interactions with other state and non-state actors, senior members of the 
Howard government argued that that the change in policy direction they undertook was a pragmatic response 
to the proliferation of preferential trade agreements during the late 1990s (Kunke~ 2002; Downer, 2008). 
4 Demand-side theories assign prime causal significance in government policy change to the economic 
interests of societal actors. See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1995), who postulated that industry 
lobby groups offer policy-contingent funding to politicians, who in tum make policy choices that best serve 
their interests in being elected or re-elected ... Another model, advanced by Brock and fvfagee (1978), holds that 
politicians would commit to a level of tariff protection that maximizes their support from protectionist 
interests while limiting their exposure to accusations of being 'bought off and inflicting additional costs on 
consumers. Mayer (1984: 301) argued that trade protection would be set at the optimum tariff for the median 
voter. 
5 There are many different definitions of globalization. Jvfost acknowledge the greater movement of people, 
goods, capital and ideas as well as the development of transnational networks of production, trade and 
finance as economic integration has intensified. The process has also transformed political practice with the 
2 
1be Power to Deal 
had as its centrepiece the liberalization of the economy, including non· 
preferential approaches to trade such as the reduction of tariffs and 
vigorous engagement in multilateral efforts to liberalize trade (GATT, 1994b: 
13·15). Trade policy and international trade commitments were viewed as 
tools to advance productivity·enhancing domestic economic reform. But by 
the end of the last decade this consensus had been fractured and replaced by 
a new orthodoxy, with both the major political parties endorsing overtly 
discriminatory trade polices that sat awkwardly with their continued 
rhetorical commitment to multilateral and non·preferential trade 
liberalization. In June 1998 the World Trade Organization drew attention to 
a slowdown in the pace of trade liberalization in Australia, characterised by 
growing export assistance, a pull· back on unilateral tariff cuts, a growing 
threat of contingency measures and the development of a more activist 
industry policy (WTO, 1998: ix). 
Neither of the major political parties has challenged the central proposition 
that for Australia, a middling economy reliant on trade for much of its 
growth, multilateral liberalization offers the greatest potential economic 
benefit. With serious doubts raised about the compatibility of multilateral 
and preferential trade policies, the question is why and how this change in 
trade policy came about. As the main title of this thesis, The Power to DeaJ6, 
suggests, at least part of the explanation is that, with progress in the Doha 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations virtually stalled, governments have 
been attracted to the negotiation of other forms of trade agreements. But 
the title also hints at another, more compelling explanation rooted in the 
way the Howard government viewed and used trade policy as a tool to 
manage foreign relations and shape the domestic political contest. As will be 
argued in detail later, striking deals on preferential trading arrangements 
with selected countries was seen by the Howard government as a way to 
emergenc,e of transnational iss:ties and non-state acro:rs -and changes in the \Y"'ays governments interact Woods 
(2000: 1-19). See also, for example, ;\rndt, (1989), Howells and Wood (1993) or Harris (2002). 
6 Of course, deal making is not only a characteristic of preferential trade agreements; the multilatecal Uruguay 
Round \.Vas itself a massive deal But the title is intended to highlight the capacity of Prime 1v1in.ister John 
Howard and his govemment. by virtue of the characteristics of .. ~ustralia's political institutional architecture, 
to drive a shift in trade policy toward a heightened emphasis on negotiating trade deals for primarily political 
purposes, regardless of their economic significance or cost 
3 
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help cement favourable relations in a way which would serve to enhance 
national security and trade while at the same time discomfiting the Labor 
opposition. 
1.1.1 A CHANGING WORLD 
Since the late 1990s there has been a rapid growth in the number of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs)7 that have been embarked upon or 
negotiated in the west Pacific region8. Australia has been part of this shift to 
heightened regional PTA activity - of70 such agreements that were 
negotiated or proposed in the region between 1997 and 2006, 12 involved 
Australia9. 
The particular significance of this activity is that, for most of the 1990s, 
governments in the western Pacific economies, including Australia, were 
largely spectators to the emergence and expansion of regional trading blocs 
in Europe and the Americas based upon the negotiation of PTA.s (Lincoln, 
2004: 159). At the same time that the United States was negotiating the 
discriminatory N01th America Free Trade Agreement and the European 
Union was looking to expand its membership eastwards, Australia and 
other nations in the western Pacific were examining ways to enhance trade 
liberalization through non-binding and non-discriminatory mechanisms 
such as Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Following the 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round the Keating government set as 
a major long·term priority the further integration of Australia into the Asia 
7 Though these agreements carry the nomenclature of free trade agreements (in \VTO parlaace they are 
referred to as regional trade agreements), they are in essence preferential agreements that provide trade 
liberalization measures such as tariff reductions and modified quota arrangements on a preferential basis, 
privileging parties to the agreement over :non-members. The ambit of such agreements can also extend to 
investment facilitation measures and economic and technical cooperation (Park et al, 2005). In this stu.dy> to 
more accurately reflect their discriminato1y impact; such agreements will be referred to as preferential trade 
agreements (PTJ\.s). 
3 For the purposes of this study, the west Pacific is defined as encompassing rhe nations of north"e:ast Asia 
Qapan, China, Republic of Korea), south-east Asia (the to-member ASE'>N group) and Oceania, including 
.r\usttalia~ Ne\V Zealand and the Pacific island nations, 
9 Since 2000 J\ustralia has embarked upon negotiations for preferential trade deals wirh a number of trading 
partners h1cluding Singapore (\.vhich came into effect in July 2003)~ Thailand, the United States, and 
discussions fox preferential trade deals with China, 1v1alaysia, the _,\ssociation of South East .,:\sian Nations, 
Chile, India,Jap:an, Korea~ Indonesia and the Gulf Co-operation Council. 
4 
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Pacific region, including trade liberalization on a non·discriminatory basis 
through APEC's process of open regionalism (GATT, 1994b: 15)10• 
Not that Australia is a stranger to preferential trade arrangements11 . The 
history of the nation's trade policy has been marked by the tension between 
conflicting impulses: on the one hand, the internationalism and 
multilateralism that arguably commenced in 1942 with A.rticle vlI of the 
:tvl.utual Aid Agreement and has continued in the post·\Vorld \Var Two era 
as successive Australian governments have endeavoured, with varying 
degrees of commitment and success, to negotiate trade outcomes through 
the multilateral forums of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and its successor organization, the World Trade Organization (\v'TO) 
(Snape et.al.1998: 11). On the other hand, preferentialism was a marked 
feature of trade policy in the pre· World War Two period, when Australia 
was a signatory to the system of imperial preferences embodied in the 
Ottawa Agreement, while protectionist policies intended to screen local 
industries have been a feature of trade policy for much of the period since 
Federation. 
The post· World War Two period witnessed a remarkable expansion in 
international tradel2, accompanied by the development of a formal 
multilateral framework for trade liberalization - the GATT. Australia, 
emerging from the discriminatory system of mutual preferences that had 
bound much of its trade to Britain before and during the war, was an early 
w But \.vh.ile much attention was paid by the Keating government to non .. dlsctitr.inatory approaches to trade 
liberalization there were, as \.Vil1 be discussed later, those who advocated the negotiation of PT_,~s as an 
alternate strategy, 
11 There is a distinction to be drawn bet\veen bilate:talism, which refers to transactions between tv.ro parties, 
and preferentialism, which indicates a measure of discrimination by participants against non-participat1ts. In 
trade terms, a bilateral agreetnent need not be preferential: that is, the conditions agreed to by th.e signatories 
apply to non~signatories as well But a preferential agreement confers specific priviiegeS"or advantages on its 
members, and c:an :include bilateral as well as multi-party agreements . .tin example of a non-discriminatory 
bilateral trade agreement is the 1957 ,>\ustralia-Japan Trade Agreement (Wart, 1967: 21 S-17) while the 
Austtalia-New Zealand Closer Economic Reilltionslup agreement is a preferential agreement (Capling, 2004: 
20; Snape, Gropp and Luttrell, 1998: 463-65). Australia maintained a rigorous bilateral trade strategy, which tt 
claimed was non-discriminatory, throughout its participation in the Uruguay Round and subsequentAPEC 
efforts to achieve open regionalism, to tackle the "'diversity of barriers which "'\usttalia faces in overseas 
markets (GATT, 1994b: 15). 
12 
.._.\ccording to \Vorld 1'rade Organization statistics, sffice 1950 world trade has grown at an annual average 
rate of 6 per cent~ and by 1997 total trade volumes were 14 times greater than they were in 1950 (\\?TO, 
2003). 
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but cautious player in the multilateral arena, while simultaneously 
pursuing bilateral agreements in Asia and eastern Europe - some 
discriminatory and some consistent with GATT principles of non· 
discrimination (Snape et al, 1998: 449). Included in these were two bilateral 
trade deals struck outside the multilateral framework - a non·preferential 
arrangement with Japanrn and a preferential deal with New Zealand14 
(Capling, 2004: 20). The growth in international trade and the increasingly 
significant links developing between economies - often referred to as the 
process of globalization - provided the backdrop for an anti·protectionist 
consensus that had been slowly developing in Australia from the 1960s, and 
which helped drive successive waves of tariff cuts in 197315 and during the 
1980s and early 1990s, such that by 2001 the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development declared that Australia had the lowest 
barriers to trade and investment of all its member countries (OECD 2001: 
118). The tariff cuts of 1988 and 1991 coincided with Uruguay Round 
negotiations in which Australia adopted a leadership role in its efforts to 
liberalize agricultural trade (Snape et al, 1998: 372; GATT, 1994b: 3·4). 
1.1.2 CLINCHING DEALS 
The developing interest of the Howard government in negotiating PTAs in 
the late 1990s, notwithstanding continuing involvement in the multilateral 
trade liberalization process, marked a re·balancing of trade policy effort 
from non·discriminatory to preferential16. It indicated a shift in the 
11 Both the Trade Agreement signed with Japan in July 1957 and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
signed w--ith Japan in June, 1976 were non-di:scrim.lnatory (see Watt~ 1967~ 2-15-17). Australia negotiated a 
plethora of bilateral agreements during the post-\var period, including with the Soviet Union, East Germany 
and North \Tietnam, but all were w'ithin the embrace of the multilateral system and on -a }vfost Favoured 
Nation basis (see Capling, 2001: 70, 231). 
14 _.\ trade agreement benveen ~r\.ustralia and Nc\V Zeal:and -V.'as included in the 1933 Ottawa Agreements and 
the New Zealand-.Austtalia Free 'frade Agreement formalising and extending this relationship came mto force 
in Jamw:y 1966. But negotiations for the preferential Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship, 
"\\<1llch is the basis of cur.rent trade relations benveen the two nations, were not launched until lvlarch 1980 
(see Snape, Gropp and Luttrell, 1998, 463-65). 
15 The trade liberalising effect of the large 25 per cent across the board tariff cut introduced by the Whitlam 
government in July 1973 would have been very subsr211tial were it not for the introduction of import quotas 
fot motor vehicle and textile, clothing and footwear manufacturing that trebled the a.heady-high ievels of 
effective rates of protection for those sectors ( .. --\nderson and Gamaut, 1987: 3, 52). 
lt In 1994 the Keating government stated its commitment to the G .. \TT and trade liber;i,lization on a non-
discriminatory basis, with efforts at the multilateral and regional level complemented by a ''rigorous non-
discriminatory bilateral trade strategy" (GAIT, 1994b: 15). 
6 
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intellectual basis for trade policy, such that the domestic economic benefits 
to be conferred on a nation that reduces its own trade barriers were judged 
to be less compelling than the political and economic advantages to be 
gained as part of a deal in which trade partners exchange "concessions" on 
access on a preferred reciprocal17 basis (Snape et al, 1998: 377). 
In its public statements, the Coalition government insisted that it shared 
with its Labor predecessors the view that multilateral trade liberalization, 
particularly in agriculture, delivered the greatest potential trade benefits 
for the liberalizing country (Vaile, 2005b; DFAT, 2003: xiii). A rhetorical 
commitment to multilateral trade liberalization remained at the centre of 
Australia's trade policy (DFAT, 2003: 53). But in seeking to legitimize its 
shift in trade policy emphasis, the Howard government argued it could 
accord pre·eminence to multilateral liberalization while simultaneously 
seeking to expand trade access through alternate avenues. Echoing the 
"competitive liberalization" case for PTAs mounted by United States Trade 
Representative Bob Zoellick, the Howard government argued that the 
negotiation of PT As could complement multilateral approaches to 
liberalization by maintaining the momentum of trade liberalization while 
broadening and deepening the areas of economic activity covered by trade 
liberalization agreements (Vaile, 2004; DFAT, 2003: 53·9; Eisley, 2004: 
248)18• 
17 LDeralization undertaken under the auspices of the G_,\TT ;W''fO has as one of its central norms the 
notion of reciprocity {Keohane, 1986) ... c\.ccording to Keohane, reciprocity involves ~·exchanges of toughly 
equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such .a 
way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad" (Keohane, 1986: 8). Keohane further distinguishes 
ben.veen two forms of reciprocity; specific, which involves an exchange of items of equivalent value between 
specified partners in a strictly delimited sequence; and diffu.se) in which the definition of equivalence is less 
precise,_ the sequence of events le.st: narro,~dy bound and the parties to an exchange are a group rather than 
particular actors (1986: 4). Jn trade policy terms~ specific reciprocity elicits a conditional ~fost Favored?'\ at.ion 
(MFN} treatment, while diffuse reciprocity supports the GA TT doctrine of multilateral and non-
discriminatory liberalization realized through unconditional 11FN treatment among member states (l'" anai, 
2001). The PTAs negvriated by the Howard government had characteristics of specific reciprocity as 
described by Keohane but~ because they were negotiated outside the auspices of GA~rr, any measures to 
liberalize trade were limited to the signatories to the particular PTA, 
18 This is a contentious clahn, with considerable debate about whether preferential bilate:ralism can be 
reg.arded as a building block or stumbling block for trade liberalization. See, for exrunple, Fimlliy (2002), 
Lincoln (2004) and Capling (2004) for arguments that preferential trade agreements impede multilateral 
iiberilizarion; and Oxley (2003), Vaile (2004), Kunkel (2002) and Desker (2004) for arguments supporting 
prefere:ntial trade agreetnents as stepping stones to multilateral liberalization. 
7 
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1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF AUSTRALIA'S SHIFT IN TRADE POLICY 
During the 1980s and early 1990s Australian trade policy was organized 
around two complementary themes, multilateral and unilateral trade 
liberalization. Multilateral trade policy, underpinned by non-discriminatory 
trade principles, had its origins in the 1942 Mutual Aid Agreement with the 
United States, and was int<mded to reduce barriers to trade, particularly in 
agricultural products, through the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). During the 1980s and early 1990s 
the Australian Government also embarked upon a program of unilateral 
tariff cuts. In May 1988 the Treasurer, Paul Keating, issued an economic 
statement in which he detailed an average reduction in manufacturing 
tariffs of around 20 per cent (Keating, 1988: 85). This was followed up three 
years later by Prime Minister Bob Hawke who, in his Building a 
Competitive Australia statement, outlined a program of tariff cuts that 
would bring general tariffs down to 5 per cent by July 1996, while those 
applying to passenger motor vehicles would be reduced from 35 per cent to 
15 per cent by the turn of the century and the maximum tariff for textiles, 
clothing and footwear would be cut to 25 per cent in 2000 (Hawke, 1991: 94). 
These two policy approaches - multilateralism and unilateralism · formed 
part of a general policy program to promote economic growth that was 
supported by politically· significant elements of the parliamentary 
leadership of both major political parties. The policy included market-set 
prices and exchange rates, outward-looking and anti·protectionist trade 
reforms and the promotion of domestic competitiveness through 
deregulation (l\1aclntyre and Jayasuriya, 1992: 3). 
These policies largely stood in contrast to the approach to trade pursued by 
governments in the preceding decades19. For most of its history since 
Federation, Australia had tended to pursue trade policy on the basis of 
bilateral and preferential agreements. For much of the pre· ·world War Two 
19 \Vith the exception of the W'hitlarn government's decision for a tmilateral, across-the-board 25 per cent cut 
in tariffs in July 1973 (Snape et al, 1998: 24). 
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period this reflected its status as a former British colony with still close 
political ties to the United Kingdom and the British Empire - a relationship 
highlighted by the decision in 1932 to enter into a series of bilateral, 
preferential trade agreements with other Empire member countries under 
the so·called Ottawa Agreement. As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Four, the agreement established a preferential trading system within the 
Empire intended to offset some of the effects of rising protectionism in the 
United States, which was in turn triggered to a considerable extent by the 
effects of the Great Depression and the attendant response by the US 
Congress to pass the Smoot· Hawley Act, which severely restricted trade 
(Snape et a.I, 1998: 450). 
1.2.1 AUSTRALIA AND MULTILATERALISM 
The history of Australia's trade diplomacy at the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade is a complex one. Early on its economic structure meant 
that its position was somewhat anomalous when compared with those of 
many other founding members. The importance of its primary industry 
meant its greatest interests lay in liberalizing agricultural trade, a policy 
that drew little support from the industrialized nations that dominated the 
GATT in its first few rounds (Capling, 2001: 65). Australia developed a 
'midway' position in which, while advocating liberalization of agricultural 
trade, Australia also fought to retain the right to use tariffs to protect the 
manufacturing sector. The three elements of its approach to GATT 
negotiations during the 1960s were (i) the protection of industries deemed 
economic and efficient; (ii) opening up foreign markets for agricultural 
exports; and (iii) retaining the right to impose tariffs on manufactured good 
imports (Snape, et al., 1998: 2, 367; Capling, 2001: 23; Pomfret, 1995: 194). 
GATT negotiations were approached by successive governments with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm, reflecting in part the ambivalence felt about 
the multilateral approach to trade. On one hand, there was recognition that 
a rules·based trade system offered some protection for smaller nations from 
the arbitrary actions of big economies, but simultaneously there was 
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concern about the effect of the principles of Most Favoured Nation OVIFN) 
status and non·discrimination on one of Australia's few bargaining points in 
international trade negotiations - preferences (Capling, 2001: 31 ·4; Snape et 
al., 1998: 363). 
The establishment of the GATT did not displace bilateral trade negotiations 
by Australia, but these bilateral agreements were generally negotiated 
within the framework of MFN principles and prominently, as in the case of 
the Japan and UK agreements, specifically sort to eliminate past 
discrimination in trade policy practice. Under its auspices, Australian 
officials negotiated bilateral deals with a number of countries, including an 
agreement in 1947 with the US to reduce customs duties for a number of 
products including beef, mutton, veal, lamb, butter and wool (Crawford, 
1968: 390). In subsequent years Australia also negotiated bilateral deals 
with many other nations including Japan, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Korea, Canada, the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia (Capling, 2001: 70; 
Snape et al, 1993: 460·68). Even amidst the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round and hopes for the development ofnon·discriminatory trade 
liberalization at the regional level under the auspices of the APEC open 
regionalism process, the Keating government did not downplay the 
importance of bilateral trade efforts. In a report to the GATT in 1994 the 
government noted the importance of the GATT multilateral trading system 
to the nation, and described APEC's open regionalism process as a longer 
term priority, but insisted that these efforts would be complemented by "a 
rigorous non·discriminatory bilateral trade strategy" (GATT, 1994b: 15). 
The common thread running through the Keating government's position 
was a commitment to non·discrimination in trade, whether agreements 
were bilateral, regional or multilateral. 
Thus the period of the 1980s and early 1990s, during which Australian 
trade policy was organized around two complimentary themes, multilateral 
and unilateral trade liberalization (GATT, 1994b: 3·4), stood in contrast to 
Australia's approach to trade diplomacy during the preceding decades, 
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marked as it was by protectionism, limited engagement with multilateral 
trade liberalization and participation in preferential trade agreements, 
largely negotiated on a bilateral basis. 
The subsequent shift to Australia's current trade policy setting, 
characterized by parallel multilateral and - significantly · preferential 
approaches to opening trade, was relatively sudden and stark. The ideas, 
debates and personalities that have driven this change have often operated 
out of public view, the effects of their efforts publicly visible in a scattering 
of events such as the 1997 federal Cabinet decision to open the door to the 
possibility of negotiating PTAs, and the subsequent negotiation of PTAs 
with Singapore, the United States and Thailand. V\'hile much of the activity 
that drove the change of trade policy largely occurred out of the public eye, 
its political, economic and strategic implications are significant. 
Economically, one of the more important effects of the shift in trade policy 
has been its impact on Australian government initiatives to unilaterally 
reduce trade barriers, particularly to reduce tariffs. Upon coming to office 
the Howard Government exhibited a reluctance to adhere to the timetable of 
unilateral tariff cuts detailed by Prime lVlinister Hawke in his 1991 Building 
a Competitive Australia statement (Hawke, 1991). As noted earlier, in 1997 
Prime Minister Howard announced that there would be a five·year pause in 
scheduled tariff cuts for imports of automobile and TCF products from 2000 
before resuming in 2005. In his response to the Productivity Commission's 
recommendation that the general tariff be reduced to zero by 2003, 
Treasurer Peter Costello said the general tariff could be removed "when 
there are clear and substantive benefits, including trade benefits, in doing 
so" (Costello, 2000). 
Costello's response made it clear that the Howard government did not share 
with its Labor predecessor the view that the priority of trade policy was to 
help drive domestic economic reform. Instead, it was to be regarded 
primarily as a tool to achieve political goals. Explaining the decision to 
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pause the scheduled tariff cuts, Treasurer Costello said: "We consider there 
would be benefit in holding these current arrangements for the present and 
moving to withdraw them at a time consistent with trade and fiscal 
objectives'' (Costello, 2000). This was, as former Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer. a political rather than economic point, reflecting the political 
perspective that informed the Coalition's approach to issues of trade 
liberalization: 
It's a political view which many people in the political class subscribe 
to. But no economist would. Getting rid of tariffs is an essential 
micro-economic reform for Australia. This proposition that somehow 
unilaterally reducing our tariffs gave us less leverage with other 
countries is true. That is true. We don't have as much to bargain as 
we would otherwise have. - Downer, 2008. 
A reluctance to eliminate tariffs except in the context of multilateral or 
preferential trade agreements was one of the characteristics of the shift in 
trade policy engineered by the Howard government. 
1.2.2 TRADE FLOWS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
PTAs explicitly discriminate between trading partners. By affording 
preferential market access to those participating in the arrangement, PTAs 
interfere with the functioning of the marketplace. Where unilateral actions 
such as tariff cuts and multilateral trade liberalization through GATT/\VTO 
processes operate on an MFN basis, preferential trade agreements 
potentially influence the direction as well as the intensity of trade flows. For 
instance, exporters from nations that are signatories to a PTA may find that 
the preferential treatment they receive (such as duty-free market access) 
gives them a competitive edge over producers outside the agreement. Among 
the economic consequences of such an arrangement may be that consumers 
within PTA·protected markets face higher prices for goods than would be 
the case ifthe PTA did not exist. 
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Because of their discriminatory nature, preferential trade agreements also 
have a political dimension qualitatively different from multilateral and 
unilateral approaches to trade liberalization. The very act of expressing 
interest in negotiating a PTA with a particular country or group of nations 
can be interpreted by other nations as a barometer of the relative 
importance the Australian government attaches t-0 relations with various 
countries. The economic effect of PTAs, such as diverting trade from one 
country to another, may also have consequences for international relations, 
particularly where Australia is an important market or supplier for a nation 
outside the terms of a PTA (Capling, 2004: 80·83). 
Trade can be a source of friction in political relations between countries, as 
Australia's own experience in two recent trade disputes with the United 
States can attest. One, involving the export of Australian automotive 
leather products to the US, escalated when the Australian government 
refused a US government offer to mediate the dispute outside the \.VTO's 
disputes process. The other dispute, involving US plans to place import 
restrictions on Australian and New Zealand lamb, provoked loud, but 
ultimately fruitless, condemnation from senior members of the Australian 
Government (Capling, 2001: 173-76). In both cases the trade disputes sent 
reverberations through the political relationship between the two allies and 
brutally demonstrated the limits of Australia's influence on US trade policy 
despite the closeness of the alliance. Particularly important in this regard 
has been the idea that preferential trade agreements have a 'domino effect' 
on trading relations, such that the negotiation of a preferential trading 
agreement affects not just the parties to the agreement but also those 
trading partners left outside the terms of the agreement (Scollay, 2001: 
1147-48; Findlay, 2002: 609; Lloyd, 2001: 236). The economic costs of being 
excluded from the terms of a preferential agreement are primarily those of 
trade diversion: the loss of market share to producers encompassed within 
the agreement and reduced access to competitive imports (Findlay, 2002: 
609). The 'domino effect' refers to two particular responses by trading 
partners to their exclusion from a preferential trading agreement. These are 
13 
The Power to Deal 
to either negotiate their own preferential agreements with the parties to the 
original agreement in order to secure equal or greater access, or to negotiate 
preferential agreements with other nations excluded from the original 
agreement to compensate for its trade diversion effects (Scollay, 2001: 1147· 
48). 
Another significant effect of PTAs is their potential to create domestic 
political and economic schisms, particularly where such agreements are 
subject to exclusions or conditions, such as the Australia-United State FTA, 
which completely excluded the sugar trade and phased in US tariff cuts on 
beef imports over 18 years (Garnaut, 2003b: 21; Findlay, 2002: 608; Chase, 
2003). PTAs can create protectionist constituencies based upon the 
protection of preferential market access provided by such agreements 
(Frankel, 1997: 212-14), while at the same time increasing import costs for 
consumers and delivering little to those sectors or industries left outside the 
terms of agreements. 
The negotiation of PT As has also been criticised for their potential to 
hamper trade, undermine efforts to advance multilateral trade 
liberalization, introduce issues onto the trade agenda that do not enhance 
efficiency or welfare and challenge the legitimacy of the global, rules-based 
trading system. Trade economists have warned that the proliferation of 
PT As is creating a 'spaghetti bowl' of trade preferences and rules of origin 
clauses that, in an era of increasingly globalized production, complicates 
trade and increases transaction costs and opportunities to distort trade 
through administrative reclassification and corruption (Panangariya, 1999: 
30·1; Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996). 
Additionally, concerns have been expressed about whether such agreements 
contribute to or undermine the establishment of global free trade, including 
by increasing incentives for PTA members, and sectoral interests within 
them, to protect privileged trade access, and by diverting scarce resources 
away from the negotiation of multilateral, non·discriminatory trade 
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agreements (Frankel, 1997: 209-16; Panagariya, 1999: 3-46; Findlay, 2002). 
One of the virtues of PTAs espoused by advocates is that they may expand 
the range of issues negotiated by trade partners beyond those included in 
multilateral negotiations, such as labour and environmental standards. But 
critics such as Bhagwati (1993: 43·4) and Panagariya (1999: 38) question 
whether provisions in such areas actually enhance trade efficiency or 
economic welfare. Irwin (2005: 252·53) suggests that the PTA.s being 
negotiated currently are different in character t-0 the "pernicious 
bilateralism" of the 1930s because the momentum is toward removing 
barriers to trade rather than increasing trade discrimination, and may 
contribute to the multilateral liberalization of trade. These and other 
arguments have been vigorously debated by policymakers and trade 
economists over the last two decades. The core debate is whether, in their 
impact on trade and efforts to achieve global free trade, they are building 
blocks or stumbling blocks to trade liberalization20. As is discussed in detail 
later, many of these arguments have been echoed in the domestic debate 
over the Howard government's PTA policy agenda, with ideas and evidence 
being drawn from the international debate. Among arguments deployed by 
the Coalition and PTA advocates were that Australia, as a small nation, had 
little choice but to conform with the changing international trade policy 
environment (the so-called Theory of the Unimportant Country: Garnaut, 
2003); that PTA<i could deliver greater benefits by deepening economic 
integration with trading partners (Panagariya, 1999: 38); and that they 
could actually contribute to the goal of global free trade by building political 
momentum for liberalization21. 
To summarise, not only does Australia's shift in trade policy raise 
fundamental issues relating to the drivers of economic reform and 
development, including improved access to global markets for commodity 
and service exports, broadening the nation's economic base and the exposure 
20 There is an extensive literature on the issue. See~ for example, Irwin (2005)> l~'nmkel (1997: 207-27), 
Bhagwati (1993), Bergsten (1995), de Melo and Panagariya (1993), Krugman (1993) and Panagariya (1999: 
19~31). 
21 The so-called Competitive Liberalization argument advanced by former GSTR Bob Zoellick and others 
(Frankel, 1997: 220-27; Bergsten, 1995; Irwin, 2005: 252). 
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of industry to international competition, it also brings to the fore the explicit 
use of trade policy as an instrument to manage external political relations 
and to enhance the government's domestic political standing. 
1.3 How AND WHY THE TRADE POLICY SHIFT OCCURRED 
So why did this fundamental shift in Australian trade policy occur, and how? 
It is argued here that domestic political considerations, more than economic 
interests, drove the policy shift in the context of a conducive international 
trade polii:.,'Y environment. 
1.3.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Enormously important and far-reaching developments transformed the 
international economic and political environment during the 1990s. Among 
these were the end of the Cold War, strengthening regionalism in Europe 
and the Americas, China's protracted economic development, increasing 
political and economic interaction among the economies of East Asia, the 
increasingly international character of production, capital flows and the 
provision of services, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and diverging trade 
policy priorities between many developed and developing nations (Kunkel, 
2002; Scollay, 2001; Drysdale and Ishigaki, 2002, DFAT, 2003 and l'vlilner 
and Keohane, 1996). 
The hopes and expectations of many politicians, bureaucrats and economists 
regarding the ability of the multilateral trading system to deliver consistent 
and on·going trade liberalization were raised following the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 and the 
establishment of the ·world Trade Organization in 1995 (Capling, 2004: 26; 
Kenyon, 2005), with some arguing that the system was one of the most 
significant developments in international affairs in the twentieth century 
(Oxley, 2003: 168). A particular source of optimism for Australia and other 
agricultural product exporting nations was the inclusion of agriculture in 
the multilateral trade liberalization agenda (DFAT, 2003: 57). 
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The rapid expansion of the membership and agenda of the WTO following 
the Uruguay Round had the effect of adding to the complexity and difficulty 
of multilateral trade liberalization negotiations (DFAT, 2003: 51). For 
governments seeking to deliver short-term trade policy outcomes this could 
be politically off-putting. The difficulty of commencing a new round of 
multilateral trade liberalization negotiations was manifested in the collapse 
of the \VTO talks in Seattle in 1999, the fitful start to the Doha Round in 
2001 and the failure to conclude an agreement in mid·2008. 
Other developments served to reinforce a diversion of attention from the 
multilateral arena in Europe and North America. In the former, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the reappearance of a swathe of independent states 
in Eastern Europe preoccupied the European Union, while in the Americas 
attention was concentrated on the negotiation and implementation of the 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and subsequent discussion 
for a similar agreement encompassing the entire western hemisphere. In 
Asia the pain of the 1997 financial crisis shook confidence in multilateralism 
and gave political succor to advocates of the development of East Asian 
regionalism22. The economic and political rise of China also challenged 
established trade and security patterns in East Asia and the Pacific, with 
particular strategic implications for the United States and Japan (Drysdale, 
2003: 1). 
The result of these developments - a hiatus in multilateral trade 
liberalization, the coagulation of trading blocs in Europe and the Americas, 
and increasing interest in regional approaches in Asia - was to create an 
environment conducive to the negotiation of PT As. But, according to 
Drysdale (2003), it was the 1997 Asia financial crisis and the complex 
political response in the region to the role adopted by the US that crucially 
changed the context and led to one of the most significant political 
developments in this regard: Japan's initiative in 1998 to contemplate 
22 During the 1990s _.-\ustralian efforts to be included in regional forums such as the periodic A.sia~Europe 
summits and the ASEAc'-' plus 3 (.'1.SEAc'\i,Japan, China and South Korea) were repeatedly rebuffed, largely 
as a result of opposition from ~falaysia and lndonesia (Gan:rn.ut, 2002: 124). 
17 
The Power to Deal 
negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement with the Republic of Korea. Up 
to this point in the post·war period, Japan and the Republic of Korea had 
been staunch supporters of the multilateral approach to trade liberalization, 
which they saw as offering the best prospects for opening markets for their 
exports, particularly in Em'ope and the United States (Lloyd, 2001: 234). 
Japan's and the Republic of Korea's insistence on non-discrimination in 
international trade and economic dealings was a central reference point in 
East Asian trade diplomacy (Drysdale, 2003: 12). Their dramatic switch in 
trade policy in 1998, driven to a significant degree by concerns - underlined 
by the negotiation of NAFTA - that US interest in multilateralism and in 
East Asia was waning, therefore reverberated within East Asia, the Pacific, 
and throughout the world trading system (2003: 12). 
The shift in Japanese trade policy helped encourage China - which was 
simultaneously working toward accession to the WTO - to become an 
enthusiastic participant in ASEAN plus 3 talks as a bulwark against any 
US efforts to 'contain' it strategically. The pursuit of PT As by Japan and the 
Republic of Korea - two of Australia's most important regional trading 
partners · helped smooth the political path for Australia to also seek a 
preferential trade deal with ASEAl'\f as well as other nations, including the 
United States, Singapore and Thailand (Capling, 2004: 21). 
It is within this international trade policy environment that the shift in 
Australia's trade policy must be contextualised. However, as is argued in 
this study, the international environment has been a necessary, but not in 
itself sufficient, factor in explaining Australia's policy shift. The 
international context cannot, by itself, explain why the policy shift occurred 
when it did, the form it took, how it developed and how and why the 
Australian government selected potential PTA partners. The answers to 
these questions are to be found at the domestic level. 
1.3.2 THE DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF TRADE POLICY CHANGE 
The Economic Context 
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Before a consideration of the domestic drivers of trade policy change, it is 
important to set out how the structure of the economy has evolved, 
particularly since the dismantlement of many of the protectionist trade 
baniers and the commencement of moves to liberalize the economy. 
As indicated earlier, during much of the post·war period Australian 
industry, particularly manufacturing, developed behind high tariff walls. 
The protectionist policy succeeded in fostering growth in the manufacturing 
sector, which between 1900 and 1970 expanded at a rate 50 per cent faster 
than the rest of economy, so that by the 1960s it accounted for 30 per cent of 
gross domestic product and employment <Anderson and Garnaut, 1987: 12). 
But despite this growth Australian manufacturers struggled to establish 
significant markets abroad. During the 1970s and 1980s exports of 
manufactures other than processed primary products were dwarfed by the 
export of commodities from farming and mining (Anderson and Garnaut, 
1987=22·3). By 1994, however, the Keating government claimed that the 
trade liberalization and de-regulation policies of both it and the Hawke 
government had, since the mid-1980s, helped promote an increase in 
manufacturing exports, so that in the 10 years to 1992 exports of machinery 
and equipment as a share of total exports had more than doubled to reach 
about 9 per cent (GATT, 1994a: 15). The successive waves of trade 
liberalization undertaken by the 'Whitlam, Hawke and Keating governments 
had lowered effective rates of assistance to the manufacturing industry from 
35 per cent in 1970 to less than 5 per cent in 2007 (Parker, 2007: 3). 
As Parker (2007: 4·5) notes, the progressive opening of the Australian 
economy has been associated with a change in the sectoral composition of 
the economy. The relative economic significance of manufacturing has been 
in long·term decline since reaching a peak of around 30 per cent of gross 
domestic product in the late 1950s and 1960s (ABS, 2005). Manufacturing's 
relative share of national output fell to 11.9 per cent in 2000-01 (ABS, 2005), 
and the most recent figures indicate it fell to 10.1 per cent in 2007-08 (ABS, 
2008). Agriculture as a share of GDP has charted a similar course over the 
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past 100 years, accounting for 19.4 per cent of GDP in 1900-01 and hovering 
between 20 and 30 per cent for much of the first half oflast century 
(including a Korean War-induced peak of 30 per cent in 1950-51 when world 
wool prices soared) before sliding to less than 4 per cent of GDP in 2000-01 
(ABS, 2005). The resources sector, reflecting the effect of strong 
international demand for minerals, metals and energy, has expanded 
strongly since 2001-02 and accounted for 7.8 per cent of GDP in 2006-07 
l>\BS, 2007). 
The relative decline in manufacturing and agriculture has been in large part 
a product of the enormous expansion of the services sector, which has grown 
from 24 per cent of GDP in 1950-51 to reach above 70 per cent of gross 
national output in 2004-05 (ASR, 2006). As the Productivity Commission 
points out (2003: 17), it is not that manufacturing has been in decline in 
absolute terms, but its rate of growth has been outstripped by the other 
sectors, particularly services. Between 1962-63 and 2001-02, manufacturing 
share of total GDP fell from 25.5 per cent to 13 per cent while in the same 
period the contribution of the services sector grew from 57.4 per cent to 77 
per cent. In terms of employment, manufacturing accounted for 25.6 per 
cent of the total workforce in 1966-67 but just 11.9 per cent in 2001-02, 
while in the same period, the proportion of workers employed in the services 
sector climbed from 64.3 per cent to 82.4 per cent. 
As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, the manufacturing and 
agriculture industries played pivotal and contrasting roles in the contest of 
ideas regarding protectionist policies. But structural changes in the 
economy and within the industries themselves meant their influence waned 
relative to other sectors. Not only did their relative economic importance 
diminish, but the divergence of interests between export·oriented firms and 
those producing primarily for domestic markets undermined unity around a 
particular policy position. 
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Historically; the manufactm·ing sector has been the principal focus of 
protectionist trade policies, particularly high tariff barriers (Anderson and 
Garnaut, 1987: 40·51). It might be argued that the relative decline of 
manufacturing as an employer, due in part to a rapid improvement in 
productivity23, helped explain why governments were able to institute tariff 
cuts from the early 1970s onward. But, as Anderson and Garnaut point out, 
there were other forces at work that make cha1ting the sources of policy 
change more complex. They argue that the decline in protection for most 
manufacturing industries in the 1970s was surprising given the pressure 
experienced by the sector at the time, with rapid growth in real wages, 
demand for intersectoral adjustment arising from the impact of the early 
1970s mining boom and increasing competition from east .A..sian 
manufacturers (1987: 4). That this pressure did not lead to widespread 
increases in protection, they argue, was attributable to a developing climate 
of opinion in favour of freer trade, including among export·oriented 
industries such as agriculture (ibidJ. 
As is argued in detail later, ideas and interests not based on commercial 
considerations loomed large in the development ofpreferentialism in 
Australia's trade policy, and private interests played a somewhat 
subordinate role rather than driving the policy change. 
Private Interests24 
Private interests have been, and continue to be, complex players in the 
formation of Australian trade policy. Theories in the political economy 
literature emphasize the economic distributional impact of trade policy, with 
private interests directing or influencing government to enact or sustain 
1'3 "-\ccording to a Productivity Commission analysis, manufacturing output doubled between 1967 ~68 and 
2001-02 despite its declining share of the \Vorkforce because over the sru:ne period productivity improved at 
an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent compared with average annual productivity gro-.....rth of just L2 per cent 
in the ser;rices sector (Produt..--tivity Commission, 2003: 28., 39), 
-~H The tenn private interests is use.cl to denote the .interes(s of commercial operations" including publicly~listed 
and privately-owned companies, small and medium enterprises (including farms) and groups representing rhe 
interests of sectors or of factors of production (including peak business and employer groups and unions). 
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policies that confer upon them commercial advantage25, They help explain 
the on-going agitation by car manufacturers to halt the phased reduction of 
motor vehicle import tariffs and increase federal government concessions 
and assistance21l. The role of private interests in driving trade policy has 
come under intense scrutiny from a critical international political economy 
perspective. Working from this standpoint, George and McGibbon (1998) 
called into question the effects of what they dubbed neo-liberal foreign policy 
and the pursuit of more open trade agreements entailed in the APEC 
doctrine of Open Regionalism, arguing that APEC's "globalizing agenda" 
could have devastating economic and social effects on the poor of the Asia-
Pacific region. Following this strand of critical IPE, writers in the Journal of 
Australian Political Economy such as Ranald (2006) and Blackwood and 
McBride (2006) accused the Howard government of serving the interests of 
commercial corporations in negotiating the AUSFTA27_ 
But, as is shown in detail in Chapter 7, there is little evidence that private 
interests - either individually or through representative bodies such as the 
Australian Industry Group - were a major influence on the Coalition 
government's decision to embrace of the negotiation of PT As as part of its 
trade policy. In the private sector some advocates of PT As were active from 
2i Such demand-side theories :assign prime causal significance in government policy change to the economic 
interests of societal actors. See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1995), "''ho postulated that industry 
lobby groups offer policy-contingent funding to politicians, who in tum make policy choices tlillt best serve 
their interests in being elected or re-elected. ,\nother model, advanced by Brock and Magee (1978), holds that 
politicians would commit to a level of tariff protection that maximizes their support from protectionist 
interesrs while limiting their exposure to accusations of being 'bought off' and inflicting additional costs on 
consumers, 1v1ayer (1984: 301) argued that trade protection V/ould be set at the optimum tariff tOr die median 
voter. 
26 See, for example, the submission made by the Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries to the Bracks 
review of the automotive industry in 2008, and the reaction of the chamber and major carmakers such as 
General ?vlotors.Holde:n to the tevie\:\-"s recommendation that vehicle import tariffs be reduced (Skulley, 
2008). 
?! From yet another strand of IPE, the focus is instead on how the negotiation of such agreements would 
affect_,"\ ustralia's relations in the };.sia Pacific region as \vell :as future prospects for regional and multilateral 
co-operation 011 trade and security. Bisler (2004: 258) condern:rted},ustralia's pursuit of PT .. -1.s as inimical to 
regional economic co-operation while others criticized the Ho;x.·ard government for prioritizing the security 
relationship with the US to such an extent tlillt in negotiating the AUSFI'A it stnu;k a deal that actually 
harmed national interests by putting .,_-i_ustralian industry at a disadvantage compared with US competitors 
(Weiss, ct. al 2004; O'Connor, 2003; Capling, 2004; Conley, 2005), or by undermining the international rules, 
based trade system,. embodied in the World Trade Organization, upon which the nation's eAyorters relied 
(Dieter, 2006). Significant though the issues raised in IPE lite.'<lture are regardit1g the effect of the Howard 
government's trade policy on the integrity of the global and regional tr:ade system as well as its consequences 
for regional rel:acions, such concerns fall outside the ambit of this study, 
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the early 1990s28, but such agitation as there was appeared to have limited 
impact, with advocates "sort oflaughed or booed out of some venues for 
daring to raise it" (Millership, 2005). 
There is also little evidence to suggest that private interests were influential 
in the selection by the Australian government of potential PTA partners. As 
is shown in Chapter7, although some private interests suggested that 
Australia should negotiate PTAs with Thailand and the United Arab 
Emirates there is no evidence that such urging influenced the Coalition 
government in its selection of PTA partners, which applied much broader 
criteria to the process than mere commercial interests alone (Downer, 2008; 
Raby, 2005). Indeed, according to the·then Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer, who had portfolio responsibility for trade, private interests did not 
figure in the selection process, which took in a much broader sweep of 
considerations: 
Not so much them (private interests) having to tell government. It's 
pretty obvious. You just look at Australia's trade patterns and you 
can see ... and in the size of economies and their geographic location 
and the strategic importance of countries - Downer, 2008. 
This is not to say that there has been no initial commercial interest in the 
negotiation of agreements, but that the decision to embark upon the 
negotiation of these agreements was overwhelmingly driven from within 
government. 
The evidence suggests that private interests did not drive policy change but 
played a significant role in supporting and help implement the Howard 
government's shift in trade policy. Though they appeared to have little role 
in convincing the former government to negotiate PTAs, or in its selection of 
potential PTA partners, they provided information and support during 
negotiations, and were advocates for these agreements within industry and 
in the broader community. The three preferential trade agreements 
2B lbe _,\ustralian Industry Group1s executive director (international) Leigh Purnell urged the consideration of 
PTAs from the early 1990s but received little support or interest either from government or other :industry 
groups (Mmership, 2005). 
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negotiated by the government that are encompassed by this study (with 
Singapore, the United States and Thailand) attracted public and private 
support from industry. The one which attracted most interest was the 
AUSFTA, the negotiation of which was publicly advocated by a range of 
private firms acting individually and as a coalition formed under the banner 
of the Australia United States Trade Alliance. The composition and 
intensity of this support varied with each agreement, depending on domestic 
economic circumstances and the commercial significance of the partner 
economy or economies. 
Domestic Political Factors and the Role of Ideas 
In addition to private interests, a number of other domestic factors, 
including those arising from the domestic political contest, have been 
important in shaping the Australian Government's trade policy. These 
include the governing Liberal Party· National Party coalition's drive for 
election and re·election, the effect of the political competition on Opposition 
trade policy and structural and political factors shaping the representation 
of private interests at the national level and their aggregation within 
government (including the bureaucracy). 
One of the factors opening the way for preferential trade agreements to 
become central in Australian trade policy strategy was the political contest 
between Australia's two major political parties, the Australian Labor Party 
and the Liberal Party of Australia, in the lead·up to the 1996 federal 
election. By this time the Liberal Party had been in Opposition for 13 years. 
During this period it had seen successive Labor governments undertake 
economic reforms that had been advocated within its own party forums for 
many years. 
Influential groups in both the major parties had shared, to a considerable 
extent, an economic orthodoxy which viewed increased integration with the 
global economy as fundamental to development and called for a policy 
prescription that included government deregulation and the lowering and 
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eventual abolition ofba1·riers to trade (Garnaut, 1994: 51·2; Hyde, 2002). 
Within both Labor and the Coalition such views were controversial and the 
policy prescriptions they gave rise to were a source of considerable internal 
disagreement and tension. As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 629 
the·then Opposition Leader John Hewson had to overcome significant 
dissent in order to secure Coalition backing for the ambitious reform agenda 
he took to the 1993 federal election. Under Keating's leadership Labor 
exploited this, mounting a politically·effective campaign built around the 
portrayal of the Coalition as zealots of economic rationalism (Snape et al, 
1998: 31). In doing so Labor effectively sounded the death·knell of the 
bipartisan approach to economic reform, such as it existed, and delivered a 
substantial blow to the influence of those pushing a reformist economic 
agenda. 
It was in this environment that John Howard came to lead a Coalition 
desperate for electoral success. By the time he led it to victory in 1996 he 
had refashioned its political message by turning the focus away from 
economic issues and on to Keating's social agenda, turning the accusation of 
ideological zealotry back on Labor. For the 1996 election the Howard· led 
Opposition adopted a campaign strategy characterized by limited policy 
pronouncements. Nevertheless, the search for policy difference led the 
Liberal Party t-0 advocate a trade policy that, while continuing to emphasize 
the economic importance of multilateral trade liberalization to Australia, 
also canvassed "new dimensions" in Australia's bilateral trade relationships 
(Howard, 1995: 46). Cabinet's decision in mid·l997 made it apparent that 
these new dimensions would possibly include the negotiation of preferential 
trade agreements, a development reinforced by the uncertain prospects of 
trade liberalization at the multilateral level. 
Thus it was that although sections of the trade bureaucracy worked 
strenuously to start a new round of multilateral trade liberalization 
negotiations under the auspices of the \VTO (Garnaut, 2002: 124), the 
29 See ppl24-26. 
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relative lack of progress at the multilateral level encouraged senior 
government ministers and their advisers to seek alternative avenues of 
trade policy action, including an increased emphasis on pursuing market 
access on a bilateral basis 30, Underpinning this was skepticism among 
senior members of the Howard Government, particularly the prime minister, 
regarding the effectiveness of the multilateral approach in international 
relations, and wariness about the constraints and obligations on national 
action that the multilateral approach often demands (Garran, 2004: 17). 
Such skepticism was compounded by the view of the Howard government 
that trade policy should, in the case of key international relationships, 
contribute towards foreign and strategic policy goals. Such a stance was a 
clear brnak with the doctrine of the strict separation of trade and foreign 
policy adopted by successive Australian governments over several decades. 
Under the terms of this doctrine Australia had developed strong trade links 
with many nations with which it had a difficult political relationship, 
including Iran, Libya, Iraq and several member states of the Soviet Union. 
The qualified and conditional nature of the application of this doctrine was 
made explicit by the government in its 2003 foreign affairs and trade White 
Paper in which, under the heading "Strengthening Olu' Alliance with the 
United States" it advocated a preferential trade agreement with the United 
States as a means of enhancing the political relationship between the two 
nations (DFAT, 2003: 91). Trade policy couched in such terms assumed an 
important domestic political dimension, particularly in the wake of terrorist 
attacks on the United States in 2001 and in Bali in 2002, when security 
became a potent political issue. The Howard Government was deft in using 
the negotiation of a PTA with the United States to burnish its credentials as 
a reliable guardian of Australian security, particularly by enhancing 
Australia's most important alliance. 
3-0 .. rls Trade ~1inistcr Tim Fischer place,d cons1derahle emphasis on dealing with trade issues on a bilateral 
basis (Rees, 2000: 253-54). 
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The negotiation of preferential trade agreements, particularly in an 
environment where little progress was being made toward trade 
liberalization at the multilateral level (Garnaut, 2002: 124), was also 
politically attractive because it conveyed a sense of government activism. 
Conveying such an impression was not only important for the government 
as a whole in forestalling politically· driven accusation of policy inactivity, 
but was also important for the ambitions of individual trade ministers, their 
advisers and depart.mental officials. Developing and maintaining a high 
public profile is seen as important for ministers not only in securing and 
advancing their position within the ministry, but also within their 
constituency and broader electorate. The particular appeal of PTAs is that 
each one can provide multiple opportunities to attract media and public 
attention with "announceables"31 - on the commencement of a scoping study 
into the viability and benefits of a PTA, on the results of such a study, 
making regular progress reports on PTA negotiations and, most 
prominently, on signing of a negotiated trade agreement. Each step gives 
the ambitious politician ample opportunity to appear on the national 
political stage. 
The ambitions of politicians were not the only factors at play in the advocacy 
of PTAs. Within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade the merits of 
a trade policy involving the negotiation of PT As was advocated by several 
officials, for a mix of reasons. Partly they were seen as a viable alternative 
path for expanding Australia's export markets. For ambitious officials, the 
advocacy of such policy also served to heighten their profile within the 
department and, perhaps, enhance the regard with which they would be 
considered by their colleagues, managers and political masters. PTAs were 
also propounded within the bureaucracy as a way to give policy shape to the 
government's general policy position of an increased focus on bilateral trade 
initiatives. Finally, for bureaucrats such agreements served a purpose 
31 '~>\nnounceables• is the term used -u..1thin government and ::he bureaucracy to denote public announcements 
(which can be fur such things as policy, funding, appointments, reports and findings or colliborarionsj that 
can be made by ministers and other politicians. 
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similar to that served for politicians - conveying an impression of activity 
(Gyngell, 2005; Kenyon, 2005). 
A similar mix of motives underpinned the support for PTAs within 
Australia's business community. Particularly for certain industries, PTAs 
held out the prospect of faster and more advantageous access to markets 
than would be delivered through multilateral trade liberalization, as well as 
offering the prospect of access to cheaper imports, lower barriers to trade in 
services and the harmonization of at least some regulatory standards. PTAs 
also had the potential to splinter interests and undermine support for 
multilateral trade liberalization. PTAs create new interest groups that gain 
rents from their special position in foreign markets, such as by diverting 
import demand from the member economy to them, or by obtaining a 
privileged position in a foreign market (Findlay, 2002: 608). A PTA can 
effectively splinter the support of exporters for multilateral liberalization by 
reducing the potential gain from moving to global free trade relative to the 
cost of organizing and lobbying to achieve it. As Findlay observes, the ability 
to organize a coalition supporting global free trade is weakened (2002: 608). 
And many of those critical of the Howard government's trade policy found 
themselves to a considerable extent marginalized or muted. As is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Seven, reports by economists that cast doubt 
over the potential benefits of proposed PTAs were suppressed or ignored, 
and their authors on occasion denigrated. Potential critics within industry 
were effectively bought off by either the prospect of achieving some gains, 
however small, through PTAs32 or by the payment of government assistance 
or subsidies33 Furthermore, the erstwhile tripartite support for trade 
liberalization developed by governments in the 1980s and early 1990s was 
32 Such as the beef industry) which supported the"'"1.USFT.i\ and 1ts tariff''snapback" pravisions on VS beef 
imports despite publicly calling for ~i.u,."'lttalia's exclusion from such safeguards during negotiations (CCA, 
2003). 
ll Follo'\\".ing the refusal of the US government to include any tnarket access conce.ssions for -:\ustrilliru.:t sugar 
producers in the }1.llSFf~-\ the Coalition government announced a $444 million Sugar Industry Reform 
Package, including payments of up to $100,000 for farmers who decided to leave the industry. }t,<J11oundng 
the package, th_e-then Prime J).fulister John l:fo'\vard said it '\Vas a direct .result of the failure to secure improved 
marker access for Australian-produced sugar in the A.USFTA (AAP, 2004b). 
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dissipated by changes in government consultative arrangements in which 
organized labour was marginalized, such as the Australian Council of Trade 
Gnions losing its position on the government's Trade Policy Advisory 
Council. 
In sum, the argument put forward in this study is that in setting Australia's 
trade policy the Coalition government accorded priority to trade policy 
measures that, while offering short·term prospects for limited 
improvements in market access, supported key strategic objectives and 
complemented the political goal of re·election. 
More broadly, the study seeks to illuminate the importance of domestic 
political factors including the influence and ambition of individual actors in 
and outside government and tactical political advantage in the electoral 
competition in shaping Australian trade policy. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the next chapter a detailed examination of the analytical tools to be used 
in this study is undertaken. An assessment is made of existing theories of 
trade policy formation· those in which the drivers of trade policy are to be 
found at the international or systemic level, and others which attribute most 
explanat-0ry power to domestic factors such as the interplay of government 
and material-based societal interests. The discussion then considers theories 
that promise to provide insights into political and trade policy behaviour 
that is not solely tied to economic interests, including the concepts of norms 
and identity in shaping actor behaviour, and the importance of ideas and 
their advocacy. In this regard, theories about political institutions and their 
importance in shaping political action and policy behaviour, including the 
capabilities they confer on policy communities and policy entrepreneurs in 
influencing government behaviour, provide insights into the how policy 
entrepreneurs and the ideas they espouse can shape policy. 
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A discussion of the methodological approach to be adopted in the study is 
provided in Chapter 3. Attention is paid to the theoretical underpinnings of 
the qualitative interview· based approach used in gathering primary data 
from key sources of information. In this discussion the limitations of such an 
approach, including the inherent bias in the selection of interview subjects, 
the difficulty of reifying information provided, and the caution in drawing 
conclusions from such a limited spread on information sources are 
acknowledged, and strategies to address these shortcomings are outlined. 
In Chapter 4 "The International and national trade policy context", the 
international and domestic political antecedents to the trade policy shift 
that is the focus of the study are examined. Of interest for the purposes of 
this study is the evolution and texture of trade policy and ideas about trade 
in the context of far·reaching developments in the international trade 
environment. Of particular concern are the factors that underpinned the 
persistence and reinforcement of trade protectionism during the 1950s and 
1960s in the face of multilateral efforts through GATT to reduce barriers to 
trade in manufactured goods, and the subsequent political consensus 
embracing trade liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the 
context of the landmark Uruguay Round negotiations. Both phases in the 
development of Australian trade policy warrant examination for what they 
might indicate about the interplay of international and domestic factors in 
shaping trade policy. 
This line of inquiry is developed further in Chapter 5, "Australia: policy 
taker or policy maker?", in which the contribution of international and 
domestic factors in encouraging the Coalition government to pursue 
preferential trade agreements are examined. Particular attention is paid to 
the argument, mounted by the Howard government and others, that the 
negotiation of PTAs was by and large a pragmatic response to changes in 
the international environment, particularly the proliferation of PTAs and 
the uncertain prospects for multilateral liberalization. 
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In Chapter 6, "PTAs: The political imperative", the discussion builds on this 
to consider the domestic political forces that contributed to the trade policy 
shift, not least the threat to the trade liberalization consensus of the late 
1980s and early 1990s posed by discontent with the social and economic 
impact of increased openness to international trade and competition. The 
operation of such forces is scrutinized in the light of the political 
institutional architecture and how that shapes the policy development 
process. 
In Chapter?, "A matter of interests", the role ofmaterial·based interests in 
the development and implementation of preferentialism in the Howard 
government's trade policy is examined. Particular attention will be paid to 
the effect of the political and institutional structure in helping determine 
how, and to what extent, private interests have shaped trade policy. 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
The theoretical approach adopted in this study, while not underestimating 
the part played by the international policy context, nevertheless aims to 
draw particular attention to the ability of individual political actors to 
develop and advocate ideas to help drive policy change. This involves an 
appraisal not just of international political and economic structures, or of 
domestic economic interests, but also of the domestic political architecture 
and how institutions shape the ability of individuals and groups to intervene 
in and influence the policy process. As l\1ilner (1999: 100) points out, the role 
of policymaker preferences in bringing about policy change, and the 
conditions under which policymakers change policy ideas, has been largely 
underspecified. 
\iVhile international circumstances were conducive to an increasing 
emphasis on preferentialism in trade policy, it is argued in this study that 
the shift was fostered and driven by domestic factors and considerations. 
Preferential trade agreements were primarily used by the Howard 
government as measures to support its domestic and international political 
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strategies rather than primarily as a means to enhance trade or economic 
reform. They formed part of the government's strategy to portray itself to 
voters as a more competent manager of both the economy and international 
relations than its Labor opponent - a message given added potency amidst 
the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001 and Bali in October 
2002. From this perspective, the act of successfully concluding a preferential 
trade agreement with another country was more significant than the actual 
content of such an agreement. vVhat enabled the government to have such a 
narrow focus was a potent blend of electoral success, political institutional 
arrangements and structural changes in the economy. Successive election 
victories, particularly the defeat of Labor in 1998, enhanced the political 
authority of the prime minister and the institutional arrangements of 
government and parliament meant he encountered few institutional 
constraints in exercising it. Trade policy, along with the many other policy 
tools available to government, were used to help ensure that the run of 
election victories continued. 
It is not the intention of this study to adjudicate on the merits - economic or 
otherwise · of the trade policy adopted by the Coalition government, or to 
join the debate on whether or not preferential trade agreements contribute 
to freer trade. But the arguments and claims advanced by the government 
in support of its trade policy, and those mounted by critics to attack it, form 
part of the examination of how the shift in trade policy, the focus here, came 
about, and why it developed in the way that it did. 
32 
The Power to Deal 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
During much of the 1980s and early 1990s trade policy was focused on 
multilateral approaches to trade liberalization, particularly active 
involvement in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. \Vhen the Round 
was concluded in late 199334 it was hailed as the biggest reform of the 
international trading system since the establishment of the GATT and a 
high point for the multilateral approach to trade liberalization (\VTO, 2005). 
Yet less than 10 years later Australia's trade policy effort had shifted 
markedly from an overwhelming focus on multilateralism and non-
preferentialism to an embrace of the negotiation of preferential trade 
agreements. While the shift in policy emphasis has been dramatic, the path 
by which it has occurred is not: the change in Australian trade policy is 
shown here to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. There have been 
few signal pronouncements or events to mark its course, lending the task of 
charting and analyzing the policy change an archaeological quality. 
The argument here is that the change in Australian trade policy has been 
driven primarily by domestic political actors pursuing individual and group 
policy preferences in international and domestic political circumstances 
conducive to such a shift. This is not to assert a reductionist, 'great man' 
theory of history, in which uniquely gifted individuals are able to transcend 
social and political constraints to impose their will. On the contrary, it is not 
the extent to which these actors stand apart from others that renders their 
actions significant and meaningful, but the context of socially· constructed 
norms and practices, including institutions, within which they exist and 
operate (Hopf, 1998: 172·7 4). '''hat Hopf describes as the intersubjective 
social context not only bestows meaning on their actions, it is the crucible of 
identity, from which arises their interests and preferences. Furthermore, 
34 111e 1Jruguay Round negoti.ations were concluded on 15 December, 1993, and the resulting agreements 
were officially signed at the T\Jatrakesh ministerial meeting in ~-\pril, 1994. 
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these institutions and norms, plus material resources, shape individual and 
group action by enabling some forms of behaviour and constraining others. 
While domestic political actors are identified as a primary causal influence 
on policy change in Australian trade policy, this argument is not confined to 
a single variable or level of analysis. Changes in the international trade 
policy environment have been necessary but, by themselves not decisive, 
explanatory factors. At the domestic level the importance of various causal 
factors has varied over time, depending on political and economic 
circumstances. For the purposes of this study an approach is taken that 
emphasizes the importance of variables that operate across the state-society 
distinction in explaining policy variation. This form of contingent analysis 
does not lend itself to the development of a single, unified, parsimonious 
explanation of policy change. 35. 
In sum, the theoretical approach demanded by the argument and analysis 
undertaken here is one that enables the identification and analysis of 
agents of trade policy change at the domestic level, particularly in the 
behaviour of political actors. This policy behaviour is to be comprehended 
within the context of institutions, norms and material factors, operating at 
both the international and domestic level, that enable and constrain such 
behaviour. Easing the explanatory burden on this theoretical approach is 
the role of the state as an intervening or mediating variable between the 
international and domestic environments. This makes the statB or, more 
accul'ately, government;is, the site of policy action as it sits at the nexus of 
both international and domestic forces. 
33 Take, for instance, the difficulty encountered by neorealist approaches to international relations in 
pro,/id1.ng an account of the cooperative behaviour of states (BclL 1977') and the difficulty encountered by 
hegemonic stability theory 1n accounting for the persistence of a US ftee trade policy in the 1980s and 1990s 
despite a decline in the United States' relative hegemony, 
36 The distinction between state and go"""Crnment (discussed in greater detail on pp26-9). is that the former is a 
set of representative institutions that structure state-society tel:ations, of which government - comprising the 
executive, the legislature and the bureaucracy - is part (Bell and Head, 1994: 4). 'While sysrem-leirel theories 
regard states as actors, the vie\v taken in this study is that states do not act, whereas governments~ like other 
social actors, do, In terms of agency and structure, the state is the structure that simultaneously enables and 
constrains the behaviour of social actors, including government. 
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A theoretical issue central to the argument being mounted in this study is 
the nature of the relationship between agency and structure. The definition 
of this relationship is central to the conception of state and state·society 
relations. The next section of this chapter proceeds from a discussion of 
alternative conceptions of the state and state·society relations to an 
elucidation of the theoretical approach to agency, the state and state·society 
relations that underpin the argument mounted in this study. 
2.2 THEORIES OF THE STATE: AGENCY AND A STATE-SOCIETY 
APPROACH 
The concept of the state remains contested ground (Krasner, 1984: 5·6). 
Central to competing conceptions of the state are differences in the 
understanding of relations between state and society. Particularly 
important for the analysis being undertaken here are differing views about 
the role of agency and state·society relations in explaining state behaviour. 
Three major theoretical conceptions of the state have been applied to the 
study of state foreign economic policy behaviour: system-centred, society· 
centred and state·centred (Ikenberry et al, 1988: 1). 
In system·centred approaches, most clearly associated with neorealist and 
liberal institutionalist 37 theories ofinternational relations, the state is 
viewed as a unitary, rational actor pursuing outcomes distinct from those of 
domestic society. This state autonomy, often expressed in terms of 
sovereignty (Waltz, 1979: 95·6), is constrained by its attributes or 
capabilities relative to other states (\Valtz, 1979: 91 ·99; Krasner, 1976 and 
1978: 10·13). System·centred approaches share a view of the state as a 
unitary actor that stands separate from society, although constrained by 
domestic and international factors and structures (Krasner, 1978: 12· 13; 
\Valtz, 1979: 91 ·99; Ikenberry, 1986:55). Even where, as is the case in liberal 
institutionalist and dependency literature, there are conceived to be 
>7 In the neorealist concep!ion states are considered to be unitary, rational actors operating 1n an -anarchic 
environme.'tt in which they seek, above all, to maximize :r.tarion:al security (see \V'altz:~ 1979). From the 
neoliberal or liberal institutionalist perspective the beha·viour of states as conceived by neorealists is qualified 
in two important ways: non-state actors oper-.ate to constrain the international behaviour of states, and states 
have multiple objectives, of which security is just one (see Keohane and Nye~ 1989). 
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multiple interactions between states involving both state and non-state 
actors (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 34, 25), theoretical propositions regarding 
state behaviour are derived solely from the interrelationships and 
interactions among nation-states. So, while domestic factors may constrain 
the action of states, it is the international environment - primarily the 
struggle for survival in it - that drives and shapes state action (Waltz, 1979: 
134). But Waltz is careful to draw a distinction between the aims and 
actions of states on the one hand, and the outcomes of their actions on the 
other (1979: 65). This distinction is the basis of his differentiation between 
theories of international relations and theories of foreign policy (1979: 72). 
The former, though bearing on the foreign policies of nations, explains only 
what international conditions national policies have to cope with. A theory 
of international politics cannot in itself say how the coping is to be done. 
Concerned with explaining or predicting patterns in a large number of cases 
across time and space, the systems-level approach does not explicitly 
address policy processes within states. Indeed, according to Waltz, to 
attempt to understand world politics by examining the aims, policies and 
actions of individual states is to embark upon description rather than 
analysis because the enormous number of causal variables involved make 
meaningful explanation impossible (Waltz, 1979: 65). Liberal 
institutionalism relaxes some of the key assumptions of neorealism, 
including those regarding the state monopoly of contact between societies 
and the realist hierarchy of issues in which security comes top (1989: 249) 
yet, as in neorealism, state-society relations do not figure as an explanatory 
variable for the international behaviour of states. The assumption of 
functional similarity of states made by these system-level approaches, and 
their subsequent determinism regarding state behaviour, means they offer 
no insight into the policymaking process, which is treated as a 'black box' 
(Ikenberry et al, 1988: 2). 
Coming from the other end of the analytical telescope are society·centred 
theories in which state policies are viewed as either reflecting the 
preferences of dominant classes or groups in society, or as the outcome of 
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the struggle for influence among political actors, either individuals or 
groups (Ikenberry et al, 1988: 1·2). In the political economy literature this 
approach has spawned theories of trade policy based upon the competing 
preferences ofmaterially·based societal groupsas. ':Vhether these material 
interests are based upon factors of production, sectors of the economy or 
economically· derived social classes, these explanations share a view of the 
state that has its roots in the pluralist model of politics. From this view the 
state is essentially reduced to a role as either a referee between competing 
social groups, or as a cipher for the preferences of a dominant social group 
(Krasner, 1978: 28·30). This approach rests on two principal assumptions: 
that final policy choices are systematically related to their potential 
economic effects; and that these economic effects can be derived from 
standard neoclassical models of the economy (Nelson, 1988: 800). In common 
with system·centred approaches, these society·based explanations do not 
explicitly address the role of the domestic policy process in their frame of 
analysis. 
The third conception of the state, dubbed by Ikenberry, Lake and 
Mastanduno as state·centred, emphasizes the institutional structures of the 
state and the capacities of political and administrative officials occupying 
positions within it (1988: 2). In common with Katzenstein (1978a: 17·18: 
1978b: 296·323), Ruggie (1982: 392) and Krasner (1978: 31·34), Ikenberry et 
al argue that the state is a critical intervening variable between 
international economic forces and domestic societal interests on one hand, 
and foreign economic policy on the other. Clarifying this further, the 'state' 
is not conceived of as an entity in its own right, with its own preferences and 
goals (Milner, 1997: 253). Embodying social norms and institutions39, the 
state structures social relations but is not itself an actor. It is, though, a site 
"See, for example, l'vfilner (1999: 95), Frey (1984, 30-2), Grossman and Helpman (1995: 668), Ikenberry 
(1986: 57 ·8), Hillman (1989), Krueger (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1995), Meier (1990) and McKeown 
(1984). 
39 They define norms as collective social facts that coordinate social behaviour and defi.."le identity 
(Katzenstein} 1996: ix; Hopf~ 1998: 172). Institutions are held to embody fomuli.zed ox codified norms and 
affect the aggregation of interests and the behaviour of social actors (Katzenstein, 1996: 3; Garret and Lange, 
1996: 52). Both concepts are discussed in greater detail further in the chapter. 
37 
The Power to Deal 
of agency, notably the contest between social actors with competing 
preferences. 
It is this final concept of the state that is adopted in this study. This study 
contends that the state is not an autonomous actor but a set of 
representative institutions that structure state·society relations. Further, a 
distinction is drawn between the state and government. Government is part 
of the state apparatus (Bell and Head, 1994: 4). States do not act, 
governments (and other social actors) do. Government, comprising the 
executive, the legislature and the bureaucracy, in this context is considered 
to be a social actor and, like any social group, its coherence varies depending 
on the issue and circumstance. In terms of agency and structuxe, the state is 
the structure that simultaneously enables and constxains the behaviour of 
social actors4o. The social norms and institutions that make up the state's 
structure are crucially enabling conditions but do not themselves determine 
behaviour (l'vfacintyre, 2003:102; Cox, 1995: 33). To be sure, these 
institutions and norms, embodying the ideas that underpinned their 
creation, persist over time (Goldstein, 1988: 181) but they are not 
immutable (Ikenberry et.al, 1988: 12). As Goldstein observes, in the short· 
term, institutions and norms can impose significant constraints on social 
actors but over time they can be changed through social action (Goldstein, 
1988=186). However, the distinction between agency and structure should 
not be overstated. They are recuxsively related · each is both a condition for, 
and consequence of, the other. Actoxs constantly draw on social structures in 
ordex to act, and in acting they either reproduce or transform those 
structures. Neithex can be reduced to the other (Lewis, 2002: 18·19; Cox, 
1995; Hopf, 1998: 172·73). The structuxe·agency relationship is intrinsically 
historical - all social activity takes place in the context of pre·existing social 
structures. These structures are the (often unintended) product of past 
actions that confront actors, including policy makers. That social structures 
4n J<'ollow~g Sibeon (1999: 139~41) and Le~'is (2002: 17-18), agency is the capacity to act upon situations. It is 
the property of actors, which are entities able to formulate and implement decisions. Structure refers to the 
conditions '\1.rithin which :actors operate, encompassing 110.ttns -and institutions, that both facilitate and 
const:r-ain the behitviour of actors, 
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pre-exist implies that they have a degree of autonomy from human agency, 
and can both facilitate and constrain human agency, and can affect the way 
in which actors behave. For instance, language is an aid in communication, 
but actors may find themselves constrained in the use of a particular 
language in a certain environment. Social structures exert a causal 
influence over actors because a) they pre-exist current social actors and are 
relatively autonomous from current social activity; and b) they embody a 
particular distribution of vested interests and resources. By virtue of their 
place in the social hierarchy actors are endowed with certain resources and 
incentives, arising out of the past actions of others, and that will influence 
the decisions they make (Lewis, 2002: 19-20). 
This conception of agency and structure necessarily thrusts state-society 
relations and the policy process into the centre of analysis. It is the 
behaviour of social actors (both individuals and groups), simultaneously 
facilitated and constrained by social structures, that drives change. In this 
study of policy change, the focus of analysis is the policy choices of social 
actors and their interaction with the norms and institutions that structure 
the policy process. 
2.3 NORMS, IDENTITY, INTERESTS AND PREFERENCES 
Scholars seeking to explain the foreign economic policy behaviour of nations 
by recourse to domestic, rather than systemic, factors have often focused on 
the economic interests of societal actors as a primary causal factor. As early 
as 1935 Schattschneider was emphasizing the importance of interest groups 
in shaping trade policy, a theme subsequently elaborated by others 
developing a political economy approach to trade policy including 
Kindleberger (1951) and Gourevitch (1977). In one branch of the political 
economy literature this approach has developed into a demand-side model of 
policy·making in which trade policy, particularly industry protection, 
reflects the economic interests of societal actors. This model has at its base a 
society-centred view of the state in which, to varying degrees, the state 
plays a neutral or minor mediating role between interests and policy (Meier, 
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1990: 187). Drawing on Olson's (1965) public choice model of interest group 
formation, political economists have used the demand·side model to explain 
protectionist policies as due in large part to the demands of domestic 
economic actors 0Vfilner, 1999: 95; Frey, 1984, 30·2; Grossman and Helpman, 
1995: 668; Ikenberry, 1986= 57·8). In the Australian context, there have 
been those, like Ranald (2006), Mendes (2003) and Jones (2002), who argue 
that policy has been developed to serve the interests of economic actors such 
as private corporations and other business actors. According to Ranald, the 
AUSFTA was negotiated to serve corporate interests, particularly US-based 
transnational corporations, while both Mendes and Jones hold that both 
Labor and Coalition governments have been swayed by actors such as think· 
tanks or economists to enact policies that serve the interests of the private 
sector. Implicit in this approach is a political model of economic pluralism, 
in which policy outcomes are a function of political conflict, shaped by actor 
preferences, w eighted by the market power of competing actors and their 
propensity for collective action (Garrett and Lange, 1996: 49). Though 
demand·side theorists differ in the degree of autonomy they envisage for 
state· based actors41, they are alike in ascribing prime causal significance to 
the economic interests of societal actors policy change occurs because 
different coalitions of interests manage to gain power and impose their 
preferences on society (Meier, 1990: 187). 
While accepting the importance of interests in shaping action42, what is less 
clear from the above theories is how interests are identified and defined and, 
related to this, how societal actors and the state interact. In the political 
41 For example, Grossman and Helpman (1995) postulated that industry lobby groups offer policy-contingent 
funding to politicians; \¥·ho in tum make policy chojces that best serve their interests in being elected or re-
elecred. ,\nother model, advanced by Brock and Magee (1978), holds that politicians would commit to a b•el 
of tariff protection that ma..ximized their support from protectionist interests w-hile limiting their exposure to 
accusations of being 'bought off and inflicting additional costs on consumers. l\1aye;r (1984: 301) argued that 
trade p.rotecrion would be set at the optimum tariff for the median voter. Ruggie (1982:392) envisaged the 
state as playing a mediating role between intemationii markets and society in the postwar period. The 
"embedded liberalism" of the postwar international economic order embodied a compromise between the 
strictures of free trade and the social adjustment costs produced by trade liberalization, and governments 
played a key role in enacti.'flg and sustaining this compromise by moderating the volatility of cross-border 
transaction flo\VS and making social investments and p.rovi.diug safety nets and adjustment assistance (Ruggie; 
2003). 
42 _,\ccording to riopf (1998: 176) both constructivism and neotealism share the assumption that interests 
imply choices. 
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economy approaches outlined above, actor interests are defined either in 
economic (in the case of social actors) or political·economic terms (in the case 
of policymakers). In the case of the former, these economic interests have 
been further defined regarding the relationship of individuals and groups to 
the factors of production (for example Rogowski, 1989; Mayer, 1984; Midford, 
1993; Scheve et al, 1998; Blackwood and 2006) or sectors of the 
economy (for example Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Krueger, 1990; 
Hathaway, 1998; Chase, 2003). From this view the policy preferences of 
societal actors are deduced from potential changes in their income arising 
from different trade policy settings. Policymakers are assumed to act in the 
interests of the dominant social class or group, either because they 
themselves are of that class or group, or because they seek or rely upon the 
support of that class/group to maximize the likelihood of their election or re· 
election (see, for example, Brock and Magee, 1978: 246-50; Blackwood and 
McBride, 200G; Ranald, 2006). The limitations of this approach have also 
been raised in relation to realist explanations of the foreign policy behaviour 
of nations. In the post-Cold \Var environment defining the national interest 
which foreign policy is supposed to protect and advance has become 
significantly more problematic than simply strategic competition with the 
Soviet Union and the prevention of global nuclear conflict (Ruggie, 1998: 
878). 
While it is accepted that interests imply choices (Hopf, 1998: 176) what is 
less satisfactory is the narrow definition of interests asserted in this 
approach. Particularly problematic is the implicit assumption that social 
actors have a singular interest, that this interest is defined overwhelmingly 
in economic terms, and that it is readily identifiable and comprehensible to 
each actor. Each assumption appears unsafe. It is apparent that individuals 
may simultaneously hold multiple, often conflicting, interests, depending on 
their social identity. For instance, a politician acting as a government 
minister might have a preference for a policy strategy that enhances the 
government's likelihood of being re·elected, but as a potential leadership 
rival the same politician might prefer a policy that inflicts political damage 
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on the party leader or other leadership competitors. Further, as a 
representative of a geographically-defined constituency the same politician 
may prefer policy that maximizes benefits to a politically significant 
segment of his or her particular electorate. A politician might also have 
preferences for policies that he or she conceives to be in his or her own 
economic interests, or to be in the interests of nation as a whole. 
An important insight from the field of inquiry known as constructivism is 
that actor identity43 is a central determinant of interests. The social identity 
of an actor is grounded in norms (collective social facts - Katzenstein, 1996: 
ix) that inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish. 
Norms are collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given 
identity (Jepperson et al, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). They 
either define identities (constitutive norms) or regulate behaviour for 
already·constituted identities (regulatory norms). Taken together, these 
norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular 
environment and how they will behave (Jepperson, et al, 1996). Identities 
defined and regulated by norms provide a measure of predictability and 
order in social relations, and 'strongly imply a particular set of interests or 
preferences regarding choices of action or actor' (Hopf, 1998: 175). Actors 
have multiple identities, each of which implies different interests (Hopf, 
1998: 199). As in the example cited above, a policymaker may 
simultaneously have several identities · of a government minister, a 
political party member, a member of parliament, a shareholder, a primary 
producers, a familial identity and class or socially·based identities. 
For the individual, identity tells you who you are, tells others who you are, 
and tells you who others are (Hopf, 1998: 175). Furthermore, it generates 
and shapes interests in the sense that you cannot determine what you want 
until you know what you are (Jepperson et al, 1996). Identity implies a set 
of interests and consequent preferences and action. To illustrate this point 
43 The concept of identity used here has its roots in social psychology, where it refers to the images of 
individuality and distinctiveness held and projected by an actor, and formed and modified over time through 
relations with others Gepperson et al, 1996). 
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Hopf argues the identity held by a nation, and those around it, of it being a 
great power implies a different set of interests and preferences to those held 
by a nation that identifies itself, and is identified by others, as a European 
Union member (Hopf, 1998: 175). 
Political interests are defined both by constitutive norms (who actors 
identify themselves as and who they are defined by others as being) and by 
the regulatory norms that define, constrain and coordinate political 
behaviour (F'innemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). To illustrate the point, 
reference can be made to the similarities and differences between the 
behaviour of Bob Hawke and Paul Keating as Australian prime ministers. 
They were both faced with roughly the same constraints arising from the 
regulatory norms that define the role and functions of the prime ministerial 
office, including being leader of the majority political party in the House of 
Representatives, chairing Cabinet, representing Australia internationally 
and being the lead government representative to the electorate. But the 
different ways in which they conducted themselves in office indicated the 
differing identities (constitutive norms) they possessed. Hawke's leadership 
style was to allow individual ministers a significant measure of autonomy 
within defined parameters (Kelly, 1992: 658), while Keating adopted a more 
vigorous and aggressive posture in which he left those around him in no 
doubt about what he thought (Weller, 2003: 712: Kelly, 1992: 658). 
As Katzenstein points out, these norms make both cognitive and 
behavioural claims on actors, but it is when norms become institutionalized, 
such as in government, the legal system, the bureaucracy and the media, 
that they shape the interests and policy choices of actors in the executive 
and legislative arms of government, as well as in broader society (1996: 19). 
It is by examining the role of institutions that the analysis can move from 
the autonomous actions of actors with identity-based interests interacting in 
a highly competitive environment to a greater understanding of the 
identities and interests they possess. 
43 
The Power to Deal 
2.4 INSTITUTIONS 
Explaining the policy choices of government depends not only on the 
interplay of interests and preferences but also, as discussed in the preceding 
section, on norms. A particularly important set of norms are those 
aggregated and given coherence in institutions44. Institutions are 'persistent 
and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural 
roles, constrain activity and shape expectations' (Keohane, 1990: 732). These 
rules, knowledge of which is shared by across a particular community or 
society, structure social relations (Milner, 1997:18), including political 
behaviour. Institutions affect outcomes by shaping the identities, incentives 
and capabilities of political and economic actors (Macintyre, 2003: 18; 
Skocpol, 1995: 105). They provide the background of mutual understandings 
and habitual practices that orient and limit the ability of other parties to 
comprehend practices (Ashley, 1987: 414). Institutions also provide the 
structure or framework within which social actors operate. It is important to 
draw a distinction between institutions and organizations: the former 
provides the structure of rules and shared understanding within which the 
latter acts (Milner, 1997: 18). An illustration of this is the relationship 
between the aggregation of norms that constitute the institutions of 
sovereignty and parliamentary democracy, on one hand, and political 
parties such as the Australian Labor Party, which compete within the 
framework provided by these institutions. 
Domestic political institutions comprise the set of formal and informal rules 
that structure the domestic political contest. They shape the process by 
which domestic actor preferences are aggregated (Milner, 1997: 18), and 
they structure relations among these actors, privileging some as against 
others (Tehelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). Domestic political institutions also 
structure the process by which governments are selected and function, the 
extent and manner in which interest groups interact with governments, and 
the behaviour of political actors, both individually and as groups. 
44 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) draw a distinction bet\veen norms ;and institutions in terms of 
aggregation: norms define single standards of behaviour, \Vheteas institutions emphasize the '\vays in which 
such behavioural rules a structured together and interrelate. 
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Institutions shape both the process by which policy45 is formed and the way 
it is enacted. 
In the following discussion attention is given to the effect of domestic 
political institutions in determining who is involved in government policy 
decision·making, and how. Arguably the greatest influence in the policy 
process rests not with those who propose policy but with those who are able 
to veto it, and the discussion begins with an examination of how this power 
is distributed in Australia's domestic political institutional architecture. The 
discussion then proceeds to an examination of how the distribution of this 
veto power affects the aggregation and pursuit of private interests. 
2.4.1 DISTRIBUTION OF VETO POWER 
Political institutions form the political architecture of a nation, and in 
democracies such as Australia they include electoral rules setting out the 
procedures by which governments are elected and replaced, constitutional 
rules determining the division of power between the executive and 
legislative branches of government, and limits on the power of each (World 
Bank, 2002: 100). Institutions also set limits on the arbitrary use of power 
by governments by delimiting property rights between the public and 
private sectors, and by enforcing those rights (ibid: 100). There are both 
formal political institutions, consisting of sets of rules backed by sanctions 
and mechanisms of enforcement, and informal, consisting of shared values 
and norms, such as those shared within a policy community46. 
What is of particular interest here is the effect of political architecture on 
who is involved in policy decision·making and how such decisions are made. 
In this respect the distribution of veto power (the formal institutional 
authority to reject legislation) within Australia's political architecture is 
45 In its bro~dest sense the term 'policy' denotes ideas people have for addressing particular problems or 
issues. For the purposes of this stu.dy policy includes, but is not confined to, laws or regulations adopted by 
governments, or agreen1euts entered into by them. It can also :refer to artic\ilated ideas about interttions: as 
-well as :routine pracrice.s of administration . 
.u ""-\ policy community is defined as a communiry with a common interest in a particular policy field or 
functional activity and a shared belief S)'"Stem, code of conduct and established pattern of beha'V'iour (Davis et 
al, 1993: 144; Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 158). 
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critically important47 •. There are five variables of political architecture 
affecting the distribution of veto power: the relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches of government; the structure of the 
legislature; the nature of the party system; the national political form; and 
judicial review (Tsebilis, 1995: 293; World Bank, 2002; Reilly, 2003: 2). In 
Australia's parliamentary system the executive and legislative branches of 
government are combined - executive government is formed from a majority 
in the lower chamber of the legislature48. The dual·chamber structure of the 
legislature is such that the government of the day commands a majority in 
the lower house, where bills regarding budget appropriations and taxation 
originate. The upper house has the power to amend legislation directly or 
seek amendments from the lower house. \Vhen a disagreement arises 
between the two houses that cannot be resolved a bill may be laid aside or, 
in certain circumstances, parliament dissolved and a general election called. 
Australia's party system consists of a few, broad-based, disciplined political 
parties. These parties are relatively stable, aggregate a broad range of 
preferences and exhibit a high degree of internal discipline49. This coherence 
means the government is usually able to command a majority in the lower 
house of parliament, where money bills are proposed. Australia's national 
political form is a federation, compromising a federal government and eight 
state and territory governments, each with a separate jurisdiction. However, 
these jurisdictions are not discrete. For instance, the Australian 
Constitution provides that the federal Parliament alone can make laws 
regarding international and interstate trade, foreign affairs, defence, 
immigration, taxation, banking, insurance, marriage and divorce, currency, 
~7 Theorists such as Tsebilis (1995) emphasized the impact the number of veto players (individuals or groups 
whose agreement is required for policy change) in a political system can have on government decision-
making, pa.nicularly policy change. 1'sebilis hypothesized that the greater the number of veto players the less 
likely change is to occur. 
48 In his analysis of ~~ustralia's political institutions, Castles (2000) applies Lljphart's e..."l:ecutive-parties and 
federal-unitary taxonomy. The executive-parties dimension relates to die capacity for majority governments to 
prevail over rival parties, while the federal-unitary dimension refers to the ability of government to prevail 
over other independent political actors such as other levels of government, the judiciary or statutory 
authorities. Castles finds that A.ustmlia's institutional arrangements are a hybrid comprising a majoritarian 
executive government in a federalist sLructu...re (2000: 5). 
49 Parliamentary systems promote party discipline because voting against one's own gove,.rn:ment can bring it 
do"*'n and result in new elections~ the outcome of which may be uncertain for both the government and the 
individufil government Ml' (rsebilis, 1995: 313). 
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weights and measures, post and telecommunications and invalid and old age 
pensions, while the states and territories have jurisdiction over areas 
including some taxation, local government, roads, hospitals and schools 
(ApH, 2002). In practice the Commonwealth and state and territory 
governments often operate in the same policy area, either in parallel, 
cooperation or conflict. A salient example is the health system, where state 
and territory governments are responsible for the operation of public 
hospitals, for which the Commonwealth provides significant funding. 
Uncertainty about the delineation of responsibility between the different 
levels of government has given rise to frequent disputes and policy conflicts 
(Parnell, 2005). Though bills, once passed, become Acts of Parliament and 
part of the law, their validity may be tested in court. In particular, the High 
Court of Australia may hear challenges to the validity (either legal or 
constitutional) oflegislation and interpret the constitution. Successful 
challenges may acquire legal force through either setting precedents in law 
for lesser courts to follow and apply, or by being codified in amended 
legislation. The distribution of political power along each dimension - the 
majoritarian form of executive government and the dispersal of power 
through a federalist structure - forms what Castles (2000: 5) describes as a 
compound republic. 
2.4.2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS 
The more widely veto power is dispersed the more vulnerable policy 
decision·making is to the intervention of groups with more narrowly·defined 
interests (Macintyi-e, 2003: 25)50• As Olson (1965) argues, smaller groups 
organized around narrower interests are easier and less costly to form and 
operate than larger groups, and are better able to advance their interests. 
The more veto power is dispersed, the greater the opportunity for groups of 
narrowly·defined interests to intervene in the policy decision·making 
process by capturing or influencing one or more of the veto·wielding actors 
or groups. As a result, interest groups often find it more effective to 
50 To put it another way: tbe policy stability of :a political system increases with the nu.."!lber of veto players 
(I'sebilis, 1995: 313) because policy change becomes more difficult. The more veto players there are, the 
broader and more diverse the support base for policy -change must be. 
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concentrate their lobbying efforts on specific actors or groups in the 
decision-making process rather than trying to persuade large sections of the 
community. As described earlier, political institutions determine how the 
formal powers of policy initiation, amendment and ratification are 
distributed between domestic actors involved in the policy process. This 
means that the domestic contest is not only over policy preferences but 
institutional preferences - actors will prefer institutions that privilege their 
interests in the policy process (Milner, 1997: 237·42). A further 
consideration is that the number of veto players varies according to the 
issue (Tsebilis, 1995: 307). Tsebilis cites as an example independent central 
banks, which have delegated to them the power to set interest rates because 
of an agreement among political actors that the importance of speed of 
adjustment makes it inappropriate to leave such a function at the mercy of a 
decision·making process marked by multiple, incoherent veto players. 
Such institutional preferences are held not only by societal actors, but also 
actors within the executive and legislature. In their theory of bureaucratic 
politics Allison and Zelikow (1999) argue that government officials and 
agencies as well as politicians have their own non·altruistic policy 
preferences, and public policy is as much the outcome of self·interested 
contests within government as outside it51. The constructivist approach to 
explaining societal actor behaviour further refines this by drawing attention 
to the role of actor identity in giving rise to interests. Socially·constructed 
identities are the most proximate causes of choices, preferences and actions 
(Hopf, 1998: 17 4), and this applies equally to elected politicians and 
appointed officials. 
Relevant to this is the contingent nature of political authority wielded by 
prime ministers and cabinets. lVIuch of the ostensible coordinating and 
decision making capacity they possess may be segmented and divided, 
residing with discrete policy communities, compromising cabinet sub-
5: Contesting this view, Gyngell and \Vesley (2003: 6-7) argue models of .r\usttalian foreign policy making that 
depict competition between government departments as <rdownright misleading''. They hold that the \Vork of 
government departments is ove!\VheL-ni.."tgly collegial. 
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committees, inter-departmental committees, quasi-autonomous agencies 
and 'affected interests', whose decisions are 'rubber stamped' by the full 
cabinet (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 50). It is therefore necessary to 
identify the policy community as a potentially critical site of policy decision-
making, as political contests over the membership of policy communities can 
be significant in shaping the policy choices of government. 
But the importance of policy communities for government is not only as a 
source of ideas. They can also operate as mechanisms for consultation, a 
means of advocating and legitimating government decisions and as a means 
to shape public debate by controlling who is and is not part of the 
community. The constructivist approach draws the analytical focus to a 
deeper level, where the political contest is over institutionalized norms and 
collective identities, given that it is these norms and identities that 
establish the interests that in turn propel political action (Katzenstein, 1996: 
22). The contingent nature of interests arising from politically-contested 
identities is important to the analysis of the behaviour of political actors and 
their participation in the policy process. By breaking the policy process into 
sectoral and sub-sectoral components, the related concepts of policy 
r.ommunities and policy networks52 have helped broaden and deepen the 
analysis of the role played by societal actors in policy decision-making 
(Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 162·62). A crucial characteristic of such 
policy communities and coalitions of interests is their role in shaping and 
reinforcing ideas and norms that in turn inform policy preferences. 
The institutions of the state also ascribe potentially decisive roles to 
individuals and organizations ('\.tkinson and Coleman, 1992: 163; Davis et 
al, 1993: 15). As Davis et al. argue, politicians are more than just simple 
conduits for economic and other interests. Likewise, bureaucrats cannot be 
s2 There is a definitional debate over the terms policy commtw.ity and policy ne-rarork, ~1th some arguing 
poliL"Y communities are more stable and restrictive in membership than networks, ¥rhile others use the term 
network to describe the nature of links within policy cornmun:ities (.c~tkinson and Coleman~ 1992: 158). In this 
study policy community is used and is defined as a stable net\Votk with restricted membership -..vhose 
members interact regularly and, over rime, deve1op -interdependent relationships leading to an empl1asis on 
consensus seeking and negotiated outcomes (Neville, 2004). 
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assumed to follow political direction absolutely, and the procedures of 
political institutions can substantially affect the policy choices adopted 
(1993: 15). 
2.5 POLITICAL ACTORS AND PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY 
Institutional analysis, particularly the effect of institutions in determining 
who is involved in policy decision making, and how, is important to the 
study being undertaken here. As defined in the last section, institutions 
provide the normative framework or structure within which governments 
and individual political actors operate. In this section the analytical focus is 
sharpened to examine more closely institutional factors affecting the 
behaviour of groups and individuals within government. The discussion 
begins with a consideration of attempts to provide a group· level analysis of 
policy decision making within government before turning to an examination 
of factors influencing the policy behaviour of individual political actors 
within government. 
An important debate in public policy literature is around the issue of 
whether policy is developed and implemented in a top·down, hierarchical 
manner, or in a 'bottom·up' process (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995: 156·58). 
Encapsulated in this debate are critical ideas about the perpetual feedback 
loop between policy development and implementation (that is, in the process 
of implementation issues arise that require policy adjustment as part of a 
continual learning process) and the ability of public servants at all levels of 
the bureaucracy to shape policy through the process of implementation (Hill, 
1997). The neat analytical divide drawn between policy development and 
implementation, where the former is surrounded with politics while the 
latter is an administrative task (Thomas and Grindle, 1990), does not really 
exist because the very task of policy implementation involves policy 
development, a point emphasized by Lipsky in his concept of the street· level 
bureaucrat (1993). As Alford (2008: 359) points out, what may seem like 
technical, administrative decisions can be loaded with political ramifications, 
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and the directives bureaucrats receive from politicians often involve 
considerable leeway around implementation: "The line between politics and 
administration has been very difficult to draw. Politicians don't always 
(often?) frame crisp, clear stable mandates to hand over to bureaucrats for 
administration". According to Gyngell and Wesley, the fact·value distinction 
that underpins the politics-administration divide is almost impossible to 
make and, in practice, the demands and practicalities of office mean the 
distinction between elected and appointed officials is blurred in several 
respects: the sheer volume of work means officials are frequently delegated 
to make value-laden decisions on a minister's behalf, while the selection of 
'facts' upon which a decision is to be based is shaped by the values and 
prejudices of the official or officials involved (2003: 42). 
This is particularly relevant to this study given, it will be argued, the 
importance attached by the Howard government to the very act of 
negotiating a PTA, as much as or more than the actual content of any such 
agreement. 
2.6 IDEAS AND POLICY CHANGE 
In the political science literature there are widely varying accounts of how 
policy changes. For neorealists and liberal institutionalists it is forces 
operating at the systemic level that drive policy change53, and the domestic 
policy mechanisms through which this change is expressed are not of 
explanatory importance. Another tradition puts the site of policy change at 
the domestic level (often referred to as the endogenous approach to policy 
change). One of the prominent themes in this approach is to relate policy 
change to its economic effects: the final policy choices of government are 
systematically i·elated to the economic effects of the policy, and these 
economic effects can be derived from neoclassical models of the economy 
(Nelson, 1993: 282; Haggard and \Vebb, 1994: 8). Much of the work in this 
field has been particularly concerned with tariff formation, other 
protectionist trade policies and the rent-seeking behaviour of economic 
53 See, for example, Waltz (1979: 19, 96) and Keohane and Nye (1977). 
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actors (Nelson, 1988: 797) and is commonly referred to as demand·side 
approaches to policy formation54 • Economic crises have also been advanced 
as possible drivers of policy change. For example, Rodrik (1992: 88·9) argues 
that economic crises may give policymakers greater opportunity for reform 
by enabling them to blame such crises on current economic settings while 
others argue that crises reduce such opportunity (Haggard, 1995). 
The theoretical approach adopted in this study, while not seeking to 
underplay the part played by the international policy context, nevertheless 
aims to draw particular attention to the role of individual political actors, 
imbued with multiple identities and interests and operating within an 
intersubjective context composed of shared norms, develop and advocate 
ideas to help drive policy change. This is an area of trade policy formation 
which has received comparatively little attention in the political economy 
literature (Nelson, 1988: 799). As Milner (1999: 100) points out, the role of 
policymaker preferences in bringing about policy change, and the conditions 
under which policymakers change policy ideas, has been largely 
underspecified. 
2.6.1 IDEAS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY 
While much of the political economy literature has been concerned with the 
contest between interests in developing trade policy other approaches to 
public policy, particularly those concerned with the policy process, have 
examined the role of individuals and ideas in policy change. 
1vfodels of the policy process such as Kindon's 'garbage can solutions' (where 
policy·makers draw from a pool of policy ideas to address specific issues as 
they arise) and Lindblom's incrementalist model (in which policy develops 
by increments as adjustments are made to existing policies to meet 
emerging problems) (Davis et al, 1993= 164·5, 172·3) offer alternative 
conceptions of the policy process to those offered by pluralist and rational 
choice approaches. Both these models highlight the 'puzzling through' 
54 Examples of this include work by Grossman and Helpman (1995), Brock and Magee (1978), Mayer (1984) 
and Scheve and Slaughter (1998). 
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aspect of policy development, encapsulating the idea that governments not 
only wield power, they also puzzle55, Kingdon (1984: 131) makes the 
interesting point that political scientists, accustomed to concepts such as 
power, influence, interests and strategy, miss the importance of the content 
of ideas in government decision-making (arguably the same could be said of 
many politicians and observers of the political process). The approaches also 
highlight the potential for service users and providers to identify their needs 
through continuing interaction, so that policy demand can be stimulated by 
supply as well as vice versa (Considine, 1994: 259). 
The considerable shortcoming of this analysis, though, is its assumption 
that there are unproblematic goals or needs to which policy provides a 
solution. The norms and identities that underpin interests and preferences 
are politically contested. The very process of identifying a problem that 
requires a policy 'solution' is politically charged, as constructivist analyzes 
of policy formation indicate. The identities that actors possess, and that give 
rise to interests, preferences and action, are politically contested (Reus-Smit, 
2001: 216-221). The normative or ideational structures that give identity 
meaning both legitimize and constrain actor behaviour. This perspective 
provides an insight into how the ideas, values and beliefs of political actors 
can shape, and are influenced by, social structures, and how this interplay 
affects government policy. In particular it loosens the straitjacket imposed 
by the assumption that the policy preference of actors is systematically 
related to the anticipated economic outcomes, and opens up the possibility of 
actor interests arising from multi-dimensional identities with not only 
economic but also social, political and cultural facets. 
According to Smith (1995), ideas always have an institutional context, just 
as institutions have ideas embedded in them. From this perspective much 
political decision-making can be illuminated by focusing on the history of 
institutions, the role of ideas in shaping them and the role of institutions in 
55 Puzzle here is used to denote the idea of policy making as a learning process. Gove:tnments constantiy 
de\.'1.se, :apply, rev-ie;,v and re-design policy solutions. 
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shaping actions. While acknowledging the explanatory importance of 
institutions, Florina (1995) nonetheless argues that ideas play only a 
supplemental, not a fundamental, role in politics. Fiorina invokes a positive 
theory of institutions perspective in which it is assumed there is rational 
agency, preferences are taken as given, and explanations are based on 
interests rather than ideas. From this viewpoint ideas are used as 
justifications, rationalizations and instruments of persuasion by those 
seeking to advance particular interests. Though ideas and interests are 
intertwined, interests spawn ideas whereas ideas unsupported by interests 
are likely to lose out. There is merit in both views, and there is a way to 
close the gap between Fiorina on one side and Goldstein and Smith on the 
other. That is to consider the actions of policy entrepreneurs. 
2. 7 POLICY ENTREPRENEURS 
The idea of the policy entrepreneur has at its core the role of individual and 
group political actors as a key variable in the policy process (MacKenzie, 
2004: 369). In particular, policy entrepreneurs are conceived of as agents of 
change in the policy process, acting to identify issues and get them onto the 
agendas of key decision·makers, and advocating particular policy ideas. 
Policy entrepreneurs, whether individuals or societal groups such as 
advocacy coalitions or policy communities, put the site of policy-making 
action at what Kunkel (2001) describes as the interface of state·society 
relations. These entrepreneurs, and those (individuals and groups) they 
enlist to support or oppose a policy preference, are important actors in the 
policy process. Engaged in political contests against one another, these 
entrepreneurs can be central drivers of policy change and innovation. The 
mechanisms by which they act to achieve this can vary greatly, from direct 
advocacy and lobbying of policymakers and those implementing policy 
through to mass public campaigns. The important point here is to 
acknowledge the ability of individuals, within the relatively tightly 
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constrained foreign policy decision-making process56, to shape Australian 
trade policy. 
The key skill of a policy entrepreneur is to 'sell' his or her policy idea to an 
audience, often exploiting political circumstances that are congenial to the 
idea they are advocating (MacKenzie, 2004: 369). In many instances this 
audience may be a politician, particularly a political leader, who is receptive 
to an idea and its surrounding arguments, that advances a particular 
economic or political interest or preference (as per Fiorina). Factors that 
could constrain or determine the ability or willingness of a politician to 
embrace a particular policy idea include the political institutional structure 
and the particular political dynamics it has helped shape. For example, in 
the early 1970s the receptiveness of the Whitlam Labor Government to 
proposals advanced by the chairman of the Tariff Board, Alf Rattigan, to 
lower Australia's levels of industry protection, was due in part to a belief 
that the system of protection had favoured their political opponents, and 
that its removal would generate economic growth, providing more revenue 
from which to fund the government's expansive plans for social spending 
(Pincus, 1995: 72). 
But it must be acknowledged that the concept of policy entrepreneur, which 
is most often applied to examinations of the policy process in the United 
States, is seen as more problematic when transferred to the Australian 
institutional setting. 
In Australian public policy literature a vigorous debate has developed 
concerning the degree to which bureaucrats are, and should be, :responsive 
to the needs and directions of ministers and the government. To a 
considerable extent this debate had its origins in the move by governments 
56 f!ill (2003) admonished that Westminster~style political systems often accord little mom for societal actors 
to be involved i:n the foreign policy process. ~.\ccording to Hill, while the foreign policy process is broadly 
pluralist, formal accountability amounts to a 'light and loose' set of obligations on the executive, TI1e circle of 
active participants in the foreign policy process remains tightly limited, though 111ey may internalize an 
ideology of responsibility. The relationship between foreign policy~m-aking and domestic constituencies, he 
argues, is unpredictable) and can erupt in damaging ways. The limitations on societa1 actor involvement in the 
.._r\..ustralian trade policy process '\Vill be examined in detail later in this study. 
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from the early 1970s to assert their political authority over the bureaucracy, 
primarily by interposing a tier of advisers directly accountable to ministers 
into the relationship between politicians and public servants (Rhodes and 
Wanna, 2008; \Valter, 2006). As Mulgan (2008: 345) observes, the issue is a 
hardy perennial of public policy debates not only in Australia but across all 
modern representative democracies. Its relevance for this study is what it 
suggests about the scope for individuals - bureaucrats, political staffers and 
ministers themselves - to act as policy entrepreneurs. 
Government ministers draw their authority from the principle of democratic 
legitimacy: the fact that, in the Australian political system, they are chosen 
by the voters via parliament endows them with the democratic right to 
impose their own directions on government departments, and gives non· 
elected public servants a concomitant obligation to follow such directions 
(Mulgan, 2008: 346). But in the past two decades there has emerged the 
'public value' approach to public administration which has been taken by 
some as a normative project in which non·elected public officials are urged 
to develop a political role and build coalitions both inside and outside 
government to support their initiatives (Rhodes and \Vanna, 2008: 367). 
According to this approach07, which has its origins in the United States, 
public managers are both obliged, and uniquely able to, identify and press 
for the adoption of policies that maximize public value in alignment with 
political legitimacy and sustainability, as well as operational feasibility 
(:VIoore, 1995: 71; Alford and O'Flynn, 2008: 4). In this regard the public 
value concept appears close to that of the bureaucrat who acts as a policy 
entrepreneur in pushing for the adoption by government of a particularly 
proposition. But, according to Rhodes and Wanna, attempts to transpose the 
public value approach from the US political system to a Westminster style of 
government are fraught with problems: 
Public value was envisaged for American government, not Westminster 
parliamentary government, so it should be transplanted with great care. 
57 First detailed by 1:fatk 1foore in 1995 in Creating Public l/ab:<e: Strategic 1Vf.anagement in Government. 
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The hierarchy of a strong executive with disciplined political parties and 
neutral public officials [in the ·westminster system] is markedly different 
from the divided executive, weak party system and elected or partisan 
public officials of the United States - 2008: 367. 
The public value approach, according to its critics, has limited relevance for 
a political system where policy·making legitimacy is highly centralized. 
Cabinet ministers are not just one among many competing actors, according 
to Rhodes and \Vanna, but are the pre·eminent actors, and are the fulcrum 
of decision making: "They are the dominant actors in the public managers 
authorizing environment, and their political rationality takes precedence, 
especially over managers and management" (2008: 367 · 68). On the face of it, 
such a conception appears consistent with a strict interpretation of the 
principle of bureaucratic responsiveness in which there is little room for 
policy entrepreneurship by non-elected officials. But, as the study of the 
origins of the AUSFTA undertaken in Chapter Seven shows08, not all 
officials face such constraints - a point taken up by Mulgan, who argues 
that the tradition of 'frank and fearless' policy advice is not incompatible 
with the principle of democratic responsiveness. 
Indeed, the centralization of decision-making authority in a \Vestminster 
system could arguably make the task of the policy entrepreneur simpler in 
Australia than the US, in that potentially only a limited number of actors -
the prime minister and Cabinet - need to be convinced in order for an idea 
to be enacted as policy. Of course, building coalitions of support outside 
government could make such acceptance more likely but, as is shown in 
Chapter Seven, this may not be necessary or effective. Arguably, the DFAT 
officials who (as will be shown in Chapter Six, pp 175·83) in 1996 and 1997 
built upon the Coalition's policy of'aggressive bilateralism' to propose 
criteria for the negotiation of PTAs were being both responsive to the needs 
of the government of the day as well as entrepreneurial in suggesting ways 
.:.s ~-\ccording to some accounts~ the /i GSFT~~ had its origins in the :ag1tation by a senior staffer in P.rime 
IViinister Howard's office (see pp205-16). 
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to take standing policy further. But, as will be examined in greater detail in 
Chapter Seven, perhaps the non-elected officials in Australia's 'Westminster 
system that are best placed to exercise the kind of discretion envisaged 
through the public value approach are ministerial staff (Mulgan, zoos: 34 7; 
Rhodes and Wanna, zoos: 369). 
In the Australian political institutional environment there are relatively few 
institutional constraints on the executive pursuing this policy course, 
particularly where the political leader is electorally successful (Weller, 2003), 
(though policy choice can still be constrained by political circumstances such 
as whether it is a new government that may feel insecure about its level of 
support). Furthermore, the institutional apparatus that embodies the idea 
of multilateral liberalization (such as maintaining a permanent 
ambassadorship to the World Trade Organization and a multilateral trade 
secretariat within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) may be left 
intact, thus protecting the politician from accusations of abandoning 
multilateralisrn while in practice diverting negotiation resources from the 
multilateral to the bilateral level. In the process institutions may be altered 
or developed to support this new policy direction, including the development 
of dedicated bilateral trade negotiation sections within the existing trade 
bureaucracy and the engineering of new coalitions to support this policy 
emphasis59• Ideas can therefore be simultaneously employed in the 
supplemental way identified by Fiorina, but in the process, ideas are also 
embodied in institutional arrangements, as argued by Goldstein and Smith. 
Policy entrepreneurs can be individuals or group actors, and the ideas or 
policy preferences they advance arise from interests that are based, as 
constructivist analysis indicates, on a shared identity, Furthermore, as 
interdependency theory suggests, such identities and interests may cross 
state boundaries and be pursued by transnational actors. The stateso, which 
S'J Important here is the: capacity of goverrunents to use its agenda-setting ability to politically organize societal 
interests rhat benefit from a particular policy setting and to disrupt or disorganize those interests that oppose 
it ('\:elson, 1993; 306). 
60 ~..\.."tother aspect of discussions of the state that 1,vill not be pursued here relate to the danger of reification in 
ascribing characteristics to 'tbe sn11e'~ thereby imbuing an abstract concept v.ith corporeal substance. 
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is the focus ofinterest group action, cannot be conceived of as a unitary, 
neutral actor. It encompasses a variety of actors (politicians, bureaucrats) 
who may have disparate, and often conflicting, preferences. Institutional 
arrangements will accord them varying abilities to pursue policy preferences 
depending on their relationships with other actors and the position they 
occupy in the institutional structure. 
2.7.1 GROUP POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Policy communities are another form of policy entrepreneurship. They can 
be thought of as communities built upon a common interest in a particular 
policy field or functional activity and a shared belief system, code of conduct 
and established pattern of behaviour (Davis et al, 1993: 144; Atkinson and 
Coleman, 1992: 158). Essential assumptions underlying the concept of policy 
committees are that the policy making process is fragmented, that access to 
the policy process is to a significant extent determined by government and 
institutional structures, that policy community members interact regularly 
and over time develop shared values, that within the community there are 
agreed rules of conduct and that power within communities is not 
distributed evenly. Restrictive definitions of policy communities limit them 
to communities formed by government, which has the virtue of relatively 
easy identification of those individuals and organizations that constitute 
such communities. 
Such a restrictive definition leaves out policy communities that may not 
have formal representation on government·appointed advisory bodies, but 
which nonetheless may exert some influence on the identification of areas 
for government policy action and the range of policy instruments and 
choices available to government. Such policy communities may be self· 
organising and may comprise individuals or organizations with specialist or 
technical knowledge, andlor influential networks in the public or private 
sectors. A recent example in Australia is the \Ventworth Group of 
Concerned Scientists, which was convened by a non-government 
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organization, \Vorld Wildlife Fund Australia, to lobby for reform in the 
management of Australia's natural resources, particularly water. In 2003, in 
concert with the National Farmers' Federation and the Australian 
Conservation Foundation, it lobbied for water use and management issues 
to be put on the agenda of the annual Council of Australian Governments 
(CoAG) meeting. At its meeting on August 29, 2003, CoAG agreed to the 
development of an Intergovernmental Agreement for a National \Vater 
Initiative. It is difficult to gauge the impact of the Wentworth Group on this 
outcome but its activity, including the development of links with other 
organizations, exemplifies the potentially dynamic nature of policy 
communities. 
But as Atkinson and Coleman note, the existence of policy communities 
alone does not necessarily indicate influence. The content of relationships 
within policy communities is important, including their level of integration, 
their degree of exclusivity or openness and their level of unity (1992: 161). 
As significant are the links policy communities have to the institutional 
decision-making apparatus of government. 
A sub-group of the policy community is the neo·corporatist structure of 
interests. In this model of state·society relations governments not only 
consult with interest groups and representative organizations, but also 
delegate some of their authority to these groups (Grant, 1985: 3). According 
to Grant neo·corporatism is essentially a process of interest intermediation 
between the state and society, in which policy is negotiated between 
government and interest groups and is implemented in collaboration with 
these groups. Neo·corporatism is usually discussed in the context of policies 
to facilitate economic structural adjustment which typically involve a mix of 
government exhortation and financial inducement rather than direct 
intervention (Grant, 1985: 14). In Australia an example of this approach 
was the series of Prices and Incomes Accords struck between the Hawke 
Labor government, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and employer 
groups. According to Schmitter, such arrangements arise where no one set 
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of interests has sufficient capacity to impose its preferences directly or 
indirectly on opposing interests (Schmitter, 1985: 36). In this setting of 
imposed bargaining, governments have the capacity to make an 
'independent' contribution to a negotiated settlement. 
While such neo·corporatist arrangements are not apparent in Australia's 
contemporary trade policy apparatus, the neo·corporatist perspective 
nevertheless provides some useful insights regarding the structure and 
actions of organized interests. Among these insights are that there are 
hierarchies among interest groups; that such groups do not just passively 
receive the already-formed interests of members but may in fact actively 
identify and form member interests61; that interest groups may not simply 
transmit member preferences to government but may act to govern member 
behaviour, particularly where they possess devolved responsibility from 
government for the implementation of agree policy; that government is not 
simply an arena for the contest of societal interests, or another actor in this 
contest, but may be actively engaged in shaping the activities of interest 
groups; and that interest groups cannot always be seen as external actors 
exerting pressure on government, but may be brought through institutional 
channels into sharing responsibility with government for policy formulation 
and implementation (Schmitter, 1982: 260). An example of this is the way 
agricultural groups were recruited by the Keating Labor Government to 
contribute to Australia's representation at the concluding negotiations of the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. According 
to t.he·then Australian Trade l\!linister, Senator Peter Cook, during the final 
three·week period of negotiations in Geneva he held daily and, occasionally 
twice daily, meetings with Australian agricultural lobby groups to discuss 
negotiating tactics and agree on a coordinated approach on themes to be 
pursued simultaneously at a government·to·government level and at a 
private sector level (Cook, 2005). According to Cook, this developed a sense 
of shared responsibility between government and the agricultural sector for 
the negotiated outcome, which was important when it came to gaining 
61 In this regard interest associations may be seen to act somev;rhat like policy entrepreneurs (see -section 3.5), 
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domestic political support for the agreement. Cook said the agricultural 
sector played a pivotal role in publicly supporting the Uruguay Round 
agreement and securing Opposition support for the legislative instruments 
needed to implement the agreement. 
While the concepts of policy communities and advocacy coalitions indicate 
ways in which public and private interests and groups may interact to shape 
policy, it is less explicit about the ways in which individual actors, including 
prime ministers, ministers and senior government bureaucrats and advisors 
can act to recruit support for (or opposition against) a policy. 
2.7.2 INDIVIDUAL POLICY ENTREPRENEURS 
In this regard the concept of the individual policy entrepreneur is important. 
As Hill (2003) points out, humans always have choices, no matter how 
loaded the dice may be in one direction or another. Their choices and 
intentions matter. At the same time, they do not operate in a vacuum, and 
the institutions and structures within which they operate will shape how 
they view the world, what choices they make and their capacity to achieve 
or block change. A challenge of the study being undertaken here is to 
comprehend the role of individuals in the shift of Australian trade policy, 
and this necessarily involves considering the role of ideas, learning and 
preferences in policy changes. As is discussed in Chapter 4, changes in ideas 
and preferences regarding industry protection occurred as individuals and 
groups learnt about the economic costs incurred in providing such protection. 
For groups such as farmers and miners, it was not so much that their 
interests changed, but increasing knowledge of the cost of protection 
changed their policy preferences so that they better served their interests. 
Individuals such as Tariff Board chairman Alf Rattigan and economist Max 
Cordon became policy entrepreneurs by publicly exposing the economic costs 
of protection and advocates of a reduction in tariff barriers to trade 
<Anderson and Garnaut, 1987: 69). 
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The concept of policy entrepreneur offers a means of comprehending the 
impact or influence such individuals may have in shaping policy that goes 
beyond the power and authority ascribed to their position in Australia's 
political architecture. In essence a policy entrepreneur is an individual who 
seizes the opportunity provided by political circumstance to advance a policy 
idea. Examples include Garnaut's advocacy of Australian trade 
liberalization and increased economic integration with East Asia in his 1989 
report to the Federal Government and, in the early 2000s, the advocacy of a 
preferential trade agreement between Australia and the United States by 
the-then Australian ambassador to the United States, Thawley (vValker, 
2004). The means by which policy entrepreneurs might advance their ideas, 
and their motives for doing so, can be very mixed, from public campaigns 
intended to generate broad societal support for policy change in the public 
interest through to personal lobbying of key decision-makers. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
System-centred analyses of international relations, while highlighting the 
influence that major economies can have in shaping the global policy context 
within which a nation such as Australia operates, are nonetheless of limited 
use in trying to examine the domestic factors that contribute to policy 
change, which is the subject of this inquiry. 
Instead, recourse is made to theories which offer some insight into the 
domestic economic and political processes. Central to the approach taken in 
this study is to view of the state as a set of representative institutions that 
structure state-society relations. Moreover, there is a distinction to be 
drawn between state and government. Government is part of the state 
apparatus, and its actions, like those of other social actors, is 
simultaneously enabled and constrained by the structure of the state. Of 
particular interest is the role of institutions, embodying norms and rules, 
that form the political architecture within which the contest of interests and 
ideas is played out. In this regard, government can be conceived of as a 
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social actor with multiple identities and interests, and its coherence can 
vary depending on the issue and circumstance. 
At one level, the political architecture and the distribution of veto power 
influences the formation of interest groups, as those with interests in 
common balance the costs of organization against the possible benefits to be 
gained from coordinated action. The political architecture can also accord 
individuals acting as policy entrepreneurs the capacity to intervene in and 
influence government decision-making, taking part in the contest of ideas 
and interests. 
The theoretical approach adopted in this study, while not seeking to 
underplay the part played by the international policy context, nevertheless 
aims to draw particular attention to the role of individual political actors, 
imbued with multiple identities and interests and operating within an 
intersubjective context composed of shared norms, to develop and advocate 
ideas to help drive policy change. This is an area of trade policy formation 
which has received comparatively little attention in the political economy 
literature (Nelson, 1988: 799). As lVIilner (1999: 100) points out, the role of 
policymaker preferences in bringing about policy change, and the conditions 
under which policymakers change policy ideas, has been largely 
underspecified. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
.Many analyses of trade policy and how and why it changes have as their 
focus systemic factors operating at a national or international level, such as 
the relative military and economic power relationships between nations (for 
example Kindleberger, 1973, and Gowa, 1994) or the economic interests of 
broad societal groups based on their relation to the means of production 
(such as Grossman and Helpman's 'protection for sale' hypothesis or Brock 
and .l\,1agee's model of the interaction of politicians and rent·seeking 
interests (1978)). Many of these accounts are based upon an analysis of US 
trade policy, but these approaches have also helped inform investigations 
into Australia's trade policy that, to varying degrees, have as their 
analytical focus the actions of individual and group political actors located 
within the international trade policy environment and the domestic political 
institutional architectures2. 
In the analysis of trade policy change in Australia several approaches have 
been adopted that rely, to varying degrees, on accounts of the role and 
actions of individual politicians, bureaucrats and other societal actors. Some 
have adopted a narrative approach (see, for example, Edwards (1983), Watt 
(1967: 215· 18) and Rattigan (1986)) while others have adopted a political 
economy approach in which accounts of the actions of individual political 
actors are analyzed within the context of international economic and policy 
forces as well as the actions of domestic economic interest groups and the 
influence of domestic political structures (see, for example, Anderson and 
Garnaut (1987), Glezer (1982), Capling (2001) and Bell (1997)), These 
approaches have involved the use of a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, particularly the use of trade and other 
62 See, for example, Anderson and Gamaut's account of protectionism in ,,.\ustralia based upon a combination 
of public atid priv"ilte interest theories (1987:39), Be_lYs (1997: 232) argument rhat th.e policy ascendan.cy of 
export-oriented sectors, combined v.d.th the 'colonisation' of the trade bureaucracy by neoliber-alisr ideology, 
undeipinned the push for ttade liberalization, -and the case mounted by Wiess, 'Thw:bon and lv1athews (2004) 
that local subsidiaries of US-based firms helped drive the negotiation of the z\ lJSFL\. 
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macroeconomic data to ascertain the structure of the economy and the 
composition and scale of trade flows, and interpretations of the statements 
and actions of political actors, using information obtained through 
interviews as well as secondary sources such as published speeches, 
announcements and media statements. 
In order to explore and support the argument advanced in this study that 
the actions of individual political actors in the domestic political process are 
important to explaining the change in Australia trade policy since the early 
1990s, a methodology is required that: 
• identifies the international political, economic and trade policy 
environment within which this change occurred; 
• makes explicit the structure and influence of the domestic political 
institutional framework: 
• explains the process by which societal interests are identified and 
aggregated; and 
• enables an analysis of the accounts provided by the domestic political 
players of their own behaviour. 
At its core this study is concerned with questions about individual agents -
seeking to understand why political actors behave in the ways that they do, 
given the particular social, political, economic and institutional constraints 
within which they operate. In order to answer these questions a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research techniques will be used 
to obtain and analyze information. In this chapter the approach to be used 
in this study is described, and the reasons for its use are argued in the 
context of alternative approaches. The particular problems and pitfalls of 
the approach used are identified, and the measures undertaken to address 
these difficulties are discussed. 
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3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND TRADE POLICY 
The fundamental methodological debate in social inquiry between 
behaviouralists and those who advocate an interpretative approach to 
understanding social behaviour is well established (Stoker, 1995: 14). The 
core claim ofbehaviouralists is that it is possible and necessary to 
undertake social inquiry using methods of hypothesis formulation and 
testing developed in the natural sciences (Paris and Reynolds, 1983: 22·25). 
In application, this approach has been characterized by accounts in which 
the causes of behaviour are viewed as external to the individual and can be 
identified and measured. The self· description of those being studied is not 
sought, and regularities and laws of behaviour can be developed that apply 
universally to all social groups (Michrina and Richards, 1996= 4, 19). 
In contrast, the interpretative approach accords primary explanatory 
importance to individual volition. It assumes that all knowledge is 
subjective and is the product of shared agreement between members of 
specific groups, and that individuals are agents capable of thinking about 
their own actions and beliefs and can deliberately alter their own behaviour 
(Paris and Reynolds, 1983: 167·8). 
Much analysis of trade policy in the post·war era has been behaviouralist in 
orientation, seeking to explain the trade policy preferences and behaviour of 
governments, societal groups and individuals with reference to systemic 
factors including military, economic and political rivalry between nations 
and the redistribution of wealth within a society associated with changes in 
trade policy. A prime example of this approach was to explain policies of 
trade protectionism in the US as the outcome of competition between rival 
interest groups (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Krueger, 1990; Frieden and 
Rogowski, 1996: 40). Among the difficulties of this approach has been the 
challenge of explaining substantial differences in the trade policy behaviour 
of nations that have a similar economic structure and face the same 
international conditions. 
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These difficulties encouraged many scholars to consider explanations of 
trade policy that take into account the effect of domestic factors, particularly 
social institutions which, being the creation of social interaction, have 
brought renewed attention to the idea of individual agency OM:ilner, 1997: 
Chs 1and2; Hillman, 1989; Ganett and Lange, 1996; :Milner and Keohane, 
1996). But there are limits to agency· individuals and social groups cannot 
act as they please. The constructivist approach, with its emphasis on the 
importance of norms, including those formalized in institutions, from which 
arise identity and interests, shines a light on the way in which institutions 
and identity both facilitate and constrain behaviour. Inter-subjectively 
defined positions simultaneously confer and delimit authority, resources 
and capabilities. In turn, this trend has brought with it increased attention 
to the techniques and procedures of interpretative inquiry. \Vhile the actions 
of social agents can be observed, the inferences to be drawn from their 
behaviour need to be informed by a thorough understanding of the 
normative. institutional and cultural context within which these actions 
take place (Hopf, 1998= 174). 
In tackling the research question of how and why Australia's trade policy 
shifted to embrace PTAs despite wide acknowledgement that multilateral 
trade liberalization was welfare maximising, use is made of a combined 
approach that encompasses the systemic· level analysis of behaviouralism 
and the insights into individual and group behaviour arising from an 
interpretative approach. 
Quantitative data, such as trade flows between nations, the number and 
terms of multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements, the number 
and duration of prime ministerial visits to certain countries and the 
composition of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's (DFAT's) 
Trade Policy Advisory Council, for example, can be used to help establish 
important facts, such as the character of the international trade 
environment, and some indicators as to who, and in what circumstances, 
may have been consulted in developing trade policy. Such data can also be 
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used to help assess agent explanations of policy action, such as the use of 
trade flow statistics to examine the claim that in assessing potential PTA 
partners one of the key criteria applied by government was the strength of 
Australia's economic relationship (expressed in terms of trade flows) with 
that particular nation. 
3.3 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 
The key steps in conducting qualitative research include identifying who 
constitutes the 'community' of research subjects; determining who will be 
sample subjects from this community, and why; establishing the approach to 
be taken to subject interviews; and the process of data use and analysis. 
3.3.1 SELECTION OF INFORMANTS 
The broad community or 'group' that is the subject of the research being 
undertaken here are those who were, or sought to be, involved in the 
formulation of Australian Government trade policy63. This group included 
participants involved in the trade policy process by dint of the publicly 
elected or appointed position they held as well as those who, because of their 
expertise or the interests they represented, sought to influence or shape 
trade policy. These actors included elected members of the executive, 
appointed members of the executive, elected members of the legislature 
(who may or may not have also been members of the executive), industry 
group officials, businesspeople, academics, commentators and community 
adivists. As noted by lYiichrina and Richards (1996: 45) the selection of 
informants is not random, because not all potential participants will have 
had, or have sought to have, some influence on the formation and 
implementation of Australian trade policy. 
63 
""\s was made clear in the previous chapter? the scope of this study is limited to the ttade policy formulated 
and pursued by the Australian Government. Because trade policy has implications for the entire ecru:iomy an 
enormous range of public -and private actors have trade policies, includh1g state governments, federal 
government departments, pohrical parties, companies, inrerest groups and community organizations. These 
policies are only considered in so far as they relate to the behaviour of these various actors in seeking to 
shape or influence the ~o\ustralian Government's trade policy. 
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3.3.1.1 GOVERNMENT ACTORS: THE EXECUTIVE 
The division of authority and responsibility within executive government 
through institutions such as the l\'Iinistry, Cabinet and government 
departments means that, in theory, prime trade policymaking authority and 
responsibility is invested in certain positions and bodies. The trade minister, 
nominated by the prime minister and appointed by the representative of the 
Australian monarch, appears, at least in structural terms, to carry prime 
trade policymaking responsibility. But this may be contingent on the 
political and administrative structure of government (for example, whether 
the trade minister is a member of Cabinet and whether trade is a stand· 
alone department or part of a combined department, such as is DFAT in 
Australia) (GATT, 1994a: 20·1). Another factor affecting the influence of the 
trade minister on policymaking is his or her political stature and authority 
within the ministry. The current situation in Australia, in which the trade 
minister shares a department with the minister for foreign affairs, stands in 
contrast to the position in an earlier time of John McEwen who, as trade 
minister, administered a separate trade department. Furthermore, the 
involvement of other ministers (including the prime minister) in trade policy 
may vary according to circumstance and issue. For instance, the prime 
minister may be involved in setting the overall trade policy direction and 
the implementation of particularly politically sensitive aspects of the policy, 
while other ministers may seek little direct say in policy formulation but 
may be concerned about implementation affecting areas of their 
responsibility (for example, the health minister may be concerned with the 
negotiation of trade agreement provisions affecting the operation of 
Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme). 
More than 25 people were interviewed for the research undertaken hete, 
including fout former trade ministers, more than five current and former 
trade bureaucrats, several trade economists and academics involved in trade 
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policy debates, numerous industry representatives and lobbyists and several 
journalists covering trade policy issues64. 
3.3.1.2 GOVERNMENT ACTORS: THE LEGISLATURE 
The involvement of elected members of the legislature who are not members 
of the ministry can be equally complex and contingent. Parliament has two 
standing committees that scrutinize the trade agreements that are the 
outcomes of trade policy: the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) 
and the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. There are 
also parliamentary committees that may be established on an ad hoc basis 
t-0 inquire into specific aspects of trade policy, such as the Senate Select 
Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the United 
States of America, which sat from 11 February to 5 August, 2004. 
Membership of these committees is at the discretion of Parliament, and the 
composition usually roughly reflects political party representation in each 
house. For example, of the Joint Senate Committee on Trade's (JSCOT's) 16 
members during the period researched, eight were Liberal Party MPs, six 
were Labor l\:IPs, one was a National Party 11P and one was an Australian 
Democrats 11P. Some effort is also usually made to ensure committee 
members are from a number of Australian states. In addition to committees, 
members of the legislature may also seek to influence trade policy through 
activities in Parliament, including the presentation of bills or amendments 
to legislation, participation in parliamentary debates and the tabling of 
petitions. 
Outside the parliamentary chamber there are many other ways 11Ps seek to 
intervene in the trade policy process. Government MPs outside the ministry, 
and their non-government counterparts, may seek to publicly or privately 
lobby ministers and bureaucrats about aspects of trade policy, including on 
behalf of constituents. Further, by convention, whoever has responsibility 
64 See £ippendix 2 for more detail on inten,..ie\vs. 
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for trade policy in the Opposition will receive some briefings relating to the 
portfolio from departmental officials (at the discretion of the government). 
The approach taken to selecting and studying such actors was as follows: 
• to examine and analyze the publicly available transcripts of, and 
submissions to, the parliamentary committee inquiries into aspects of 
trade policy; 
• on the basis of this analysis, to conduct follow· up interviews with 
both MPs and those making inquiry submissions where it was 
deemed this would shed further light on the process of trade policy 
formation and implementation; 
• to analyze the speeches, announcements and statements made by 
MPs, including ministers, both within and outside Parliament, 
regarding Australia's trade policy; and 
• on the basis of this analysis, to conduct follow·up interviews with 
such MPs where it was deemed this would shed further light on the 
process of trade policy formation and implementation. 
3.3.1.3 NON-GOVERNMENT ACTORS 
As indicated earlier, there are also many non-government actors outside 
Parliament who are, or seek to be, involved in the trade policy process. Some 
are invited members of a government·designated policy community, 
sometimes by virtue of their representative position within the community. 
Others may be part of a more loosely conceived advocacy coalition, while 
some may make no claim to represent any interests other than their own or 
public interests. And there are policy experts who are involved in policy 
commentary in a variety of ways. 
3.3.1.4 BUSINESS, ACADEMIA AND COMMUNITY ACTORS 
Several businesspeople are part of government·designated policy 
communities established to provide advice (and possibly support) in the 
formulation and implementation of government trade policy. These policy 
communities include the 15·member Trade Policy Advisory Council (TPAC), 
appointed by the government to provide a business perspective on trade 
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issues to the trade minister, the WTO Advisory Group (\VAG) (established 
to advise the trade minister on multilateral trade policy), the Agricultural 
Trade Consultative Group (ATCG), the Automotive Council (AC), the AFTA· 
CER Business Council, the APEC Business Advisory Council and the APEC 
Australia Business Forum and the Foreign Affairs Council. The membership 
of these bodies is typically a mix of lobbyists, businesspeople and academics. 
For example, the Trade Policy Advisory Council6° includes among its 12 
officio members ten businesspeople, one academic and one lobb;yist66 • 
Constraints of time and resources meant it was not feasible to try to 
interview all members of these policy communities. Instead, the approach 
taken was first of all to assess which policy committees undertook work that 
was most relevant to the study. Also, where possible, advantage was taken 
of common membership of policy comm unities, advocacy coalitions and 
representative organizations, to interview subjects on the influence exerted 
on trade policy by these different forms of participation in the process. 
Regarding the assessment of which policy communities were most relevant 
to the study, and to what depth their activities should be investigated, it 
was decided that TPAC, WAG, ATCG and AC were most relevant. This 
assessment was made on the basis of the shift in the Australian 
Government's trade policy emphasis toward the negotiation of preferential 
trade agreements. TP AC was selected on the basis of its designation by the 
government as its pre·eminent source of trade policy advice from the 
business community. It was thought important to know what advice this 
body was providing to the trade minister regarding the government's trade 
policy settings. WAG was included in the study because of its focus on 
advice to the government from the business and non·government 
65 In establishing the committee, rhe government specified that the committee members were selected on the 
basis of their business expertise rather than as representatives of particular industries, 
66 ~:U:guably, using the constructivist approach to ascribe to actors multiple identities, the academic (the 'lice-
Chancellor of the University of Wollongong) and the lobbyist (t.li.e President of the National Farmers' 
Federation), could also be considered business people, one in education and the other in primary production. 
likewise, t..lie chief economist of the ~-\ustralia and New Zealand Banking Group rn1ght be c011sidered to 
bring the identities of both a banking industry member and an econotr.ist to the table, Given that the 
University of Wollongong vice-chancellor's field of academic expertise "\¥--as as a nav>il research scientists, it is 
likely that he was included as a person with interests in the cxporr of education services~ 
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community regarding multilateral trade issues. Again, it was considered 
important to determine what advice this committee provided to the trade 
minister regarding multilateral trade policy, and what role it played in 
policy development and implementation. Both the ATCG and the AC were 
also included because of the strategic political and economic position of 
these industries in Australia - farmers and rural communities as an 
important political constituency for the Coalition government, and the 
automotive industry as an important driver of manufacturing and 
employment. 
A number of features in the study's design have, it is argued, compensated 
for the necessarily restricted set of interview subjects. The first of these was 
the use of multiple sources, so that assessments of a policy community's role 
and performance in the policy process were sought not only from members of 
the policy community but also those in the policy process who dealt with it, 
including ministers, ministerial advisers, bureaucrats and non·government 
l\1Ps. These assessments were considered together with the accounts of 
policy community members. The selection of policy community members for 
interview was guided by the demands of efficiency. JVfany policy community 
members figured in multiple roles in the study. For example, the chairman 
ofTPAC, Geoff Allen, was also chair of WAG. TPAC member Peter Corish 
was also President of the National Farmers' Federation, vVAG member 
Leigh Purnell was also a senior official of the peak industry body the 
Australian Industry Group, as was Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry executive director Peter Hendy. ·while this process meant the 
assessment of the role of these policy communities was necessarily based on 
selective information, it is argued here that the diversity of resources they 
represent was sufficient to make some appropriately qualified findings. 
As noted in the last chapter, advocacy coalitions are much less well·defined 
than policy communities, and possibly much less stable in membership. For 
the purposes of this study membership of advocacy coalitions is defined as 
those who support a common idea or policy prescription. In this study it is 
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possible to discern an advocacy coalition formed around the idea of 
negotiating preferential trade agreements, involving members of the 
business community, academics and the bureaucracy. i\nother advocacy 
coalition formed around a shared skepticism about PTAs, including their 
political and economic impacts. 
Business actors were also selected for their role as a representative of a 
business, industry or group of industries. In addition to their designated 
role in policy communities, representatives of peak business organizations 
such as the NFF, AiG, ACCI and BCA have also acted as public advocates 
for the trade policy positions determined by their organizations. This 
advocacy has involved making submissions to parliamentary inquiries, 
making speeches, issuing media statements, consultation with members and 
commissioning or undertaking trade policy research. Interviews have been 
conducted with representatives of each of the peak industry organizations, 
as well as with representatives of affiliated business groups such as specific 
agricultural producer groups, automobile industry organizations, mining 
industry groups and service industry organizations. Elected business 
representatives are also business practitioners, and a point has been made 
in interviews to obtain responses taking into account both broad industry 
interests as well as the concerns of particular businesses. 
Two other potentially important actors in the trade policy process are 
members of the media and community actors. But, for reasons that are 
discussed later in this study, it was only in the latter stages of policy 
implementation, particularly public debate on the merits of specific PTAs, 
that these actors became important. For the purposes of this study, their 
role largely hinged on the way the consideration of their possible reaction to 
a trade policy outcome (such as, for example, negotiated preferential trade 
agreement) affected the formulation and implementation of trade policy. In 
this sense, it was not the behaviour of these actors, but their anticipated 
reaction, that may have been a factor in shaping trade policy. 
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3.4 COLLECTION OF DATA 
An important consideration and constraint affecting the research was the 
availability of potential informants for interview, particulm·ly high·ranking 
politicians and public officials. The qualitative method involves loosely· 
structured, intensive interviews based on open-ended questions and 
informal probing (Devine, 1995: 138; :Michrina and Richards, 1996: 50·1). 
Interviews are generally lengthy, and are intended to facilitate discussion of 
issues in a semi·structured or unstructured manner. Such interviews are 
open and flexible, allowing the informant to elaborate on their values and 
attitudes, and to account for their behaviour. The aim of research of this 
kind s to explore subjective experiences and the meanings attached to these 
experiences. 
Constraints of access and time meant that interviews with some subjects 
were not as lengthy or as open·ended as desirable. But the accounts of other 
subjects, supplemented by secondary sources such as published speeches, 
interview transcripts, press releases and so on, have, it is argued, helped to 
compensate for this handicap to enable a reasonably well·founded and well· 
rounded analysis of individual policy behaviour within the constraints of 
time and resources that are inevitable in an inquiry of this nature. 
The politically sensitive nature of this research, particularly given the 
controversy that surrounded the decision to negotiate a PTA with the US, 
meant some subjects were reluctant to be identified and others were 
guarded in their comments. For this reason, interviewees were offered the 
choice of anonymity and many interviews proceeded on the basis of 
anonymity, with any attribution to be the subject of discussion at a later 
date. In most instances the interviews were tape recorded, though in some 
cases recording was suspended for particular sections of the discussion. In a 
small number of cases interviewees indicated that if they were to be tape 
recorded they would be far more circumspect in their responses. In these 
instances the decision was made that the quality and depth of information 
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was more important than the manner of its recording, and the entire 
interview was recorded in written note forms7. 
3.5 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Among the criticisms of qualitative research is that it produces data that 
are unreliable, difficult to evaluate and not generalisable (Devine, 1995: 
145). Not least of these concerns is the possibility that informants may 
deliberately or accidentally provide false information in interviews (Rein, 
1976: 34). For example, interviewee recall of what decisions were made at a 
particular meeting, and who was present, may be incorrect or incomplete. 
The use of qualitative research techniques rightly imposes a heavy burden 
on the researcher to establish the validity and plausibility of the analysis 
and interpretation made based on data which itself may be contestable. 
3.5.1 DATA RELIABILITY 
The reliability of data gathered through interviews, whether through the 
use of qualitative or quantitative techniques, should be scrutinized. The 
vagaries of imperfect recall, misinterpretation, deliberate or inadvertent 
misinformation and concern about the consequences of revealing certain 
information can all affect the reliability of the data collected through 
interview. An additional problem can be the tendency of some to provide a 
generalized account of their experiences, omitting the detail and complexity 
of their actions and motivations. 
To address these issues use is made of multiple sources, providing multiple 
observations, to test and interrogate information provided in interviews. For 
instance, the claim by former Trade Minister Peter Cook that during the 
final three weeks of negotiation of the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 
Geneva he held daily meetings with representatives of the National 
Farmers' Federation was tested through interviews with DFAT officials and 
NFF representatives involved in these negotiations, These accounts are also 
67 The author is proficient in Pitman 2000 shorthand, enabling detailed notes to be made of interviews. 
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tested, where possible, against secondary sources of information such as 
public speeches and statements and testimony to parliamentary committees. 
3.5.2 INTERPRETATION 
A distinct challenge of qualitative research is that of constructing an 
understanding based on an interpretation of the data. This challenge is 
magnified by the realization, as explained earlier, that the actual process of 
data identification and collection is itself based upon, and guided by, 
interpretation. Yet, as described by Geertz (1987), the process of developing 
understanding based upon interpretation can be rigorous, repeatable, open 
to correction and amenable to comparison. It begins with a picture of the 
whole, which leads the investigator to look for symbolic forms through 
which, and in which, the conceptions of the individual and society are 
articulated and displayed (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1987: 26). Interpretation 
leading to understanding is not based on special powers of intuition or 
empathy but on careful inquiry. By making explicit the method and course 
of their inquiry the researcher gives others sufficient information to follow 
their path, if not necessarily to come to the same conclusions. 
Being explicit about the process by which sources of information were 
identified and data collected will, it is hoped, help the reader understand the 
interpretations of the data arrived at through this study. The validity of 
these interpretations, it is hoped, is further advanced by using the following 
techniques in the process of data collection and analysis: 
• asking the informant for their reaction to the interpretation drawn by 
the researcher, and recording any reinterpretation; 
• making the interpretation as explicit as possible by, for example, 
identifying majority and minority views on a certain topic; 
• by doing justice to the context of the interview; 
• assessing the internal consistency of an account to establish whether 
an analysis is coherent with identified themes; and 
• establishing external validity by checking findings with other studies. 
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Each of these techniques has been applied to the analysis and interpretation 
of the data gathered in this study. Each interviewee, where practicable68, 
was contacted following the initial interview for a discussion about the 
information they gave and the interpretation(s) made by the author. The 
context of each interview, particularly where the interviewee's professional 
obligations affected their capacity for candour, was taken into account in 
interpreting the information they provided. Specifically, where a subject did 
not feel able to talk candidly about a particular topic, or would make only 
guided or oblique references to it, was itself a source of observable 
information that could be interpreted. In subsequent discussions with each 
interviewee any internal inconsistencies in their accounts would be raised 
for their comment, and their reply recorded. Finally, as discussed earlier, 
the accounts of interview subjects were cross·referenced with each other, 
and with other sources of information including media reports, public 
statements and speeches, economic data and other publicly·available 
information. 
3.5.3 GENERALIZABILITY 
Because of their limited number and differences in scope, it is impossible to 
generalize from intensive qualitative interviews in the way that can be done 
from quantitative research (Devine, 1995: 145). The researcher must be 
cautious and tentative about drawing inferences from qualitative research. 
The applicability of findings drawn from this study to the formation of trade 
policy at any other point in Australian history must perforce be heavily 
qualified and limited. Yet, as Devine (1995: 145) argues, rarely is the 
sample of interviewees so unrepresentative, or the interpretations so 
misleading, that any generalizations are wholly specious, and qualitative 
research can point to future areas for quantitative inquiry. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Having established in the theoretical framework (Chapter 2) and the 
methodological approach (Chapter 3) supporting the argument mounted in 
68 In :a limited numbet of instances the author '\\':as only able to gairt rime for one interview and, in t\vo 
instances, the interview subject died before follow-up discussions could be conducted. 
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this thesis, in the following four chapters these concepts and methods are 
applied to an examination of how and why Australia's trade policy has 
developed to include the negotiation of preferential trade agreements. 
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ANTECEDENTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Power to Deal 
From the early political battles between protectionists and free traders to 
the participation in an international system of British Empire preferences, 
the maintenance of high tariff barriers during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
subsequent dismantlement of much of this tariff wall and the current 
pursuit of both multilateral and preferential trade agreements, the nation's 
trade policy has had several alterations of course. 
These shifts have taken place against the background of substantial 
changes in the international environment, including the end of the British 
Empire and the emergence of the United States as a major world power. 
They have also occurred amidst an evolution in the structure of the domestic 
economy from one primarily based on agricultural production to one in 
which the services sector has become predominant. 
It was argued in Chapter Two that theories which sought to explain policy 
shifts by reference primarily to changes in the international environment or 
to the competing demands of domestic economic interests provided an 
inadequate account of the factors shaping Australia's trade policy. That 
proposition is developed in this chapter by examining how the contest of 
ideas regarding trade policy has evolved since Federation, taking into 
account developments in the international environment as well as changes 
in the domestic economy. 
One of the constants of trade policy debates over this period has been the 
contest between competing principles · protection or free trade, 
preferentialism or non·discrimination. Linked to this has been the tension 
between two central and, at times, conflicting conceptions of trade policy as 
a means to help manage international relations and as a tool to foster 
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economic development. Arguably, the more dominant of these in the past 
100 years has been to view trade diplomacy primarily as part of the nation's 
foreign policy apparatus, but the alternate conception of trade policy as a 
lever to advance economic reform, both domestically and internationally, 
has at times been very influential. 
The examination of the development of Australian trade policy from 
Federation to the early 1990s undertaken in this chapter charts this contest 
of ideas taking into account the role of private interests in lobbying for 
protection, the way policy entrepreneurs were able to promote ideas for the 
unilateral reduction of protection, and the interaction between the 
international trade policy environment and the trade policy strategies 
adopted by successive Australian governments. This will set the ground for 
the detailed examination of Australia's trade policy during the 1990s and 
early 2000s that is the focus of this study. 
4.2 FROM FEDERATION TO OTTAWA 
One of the earliest political debates of Australian nationhood centred on 
industry protection and free trade. The Constitution upon which Australia 
came into being as a federal nation had as one of its basic principles free 
trade between the erstwhile colonies, and it invested sole tariff setting 
power in the new federal parliament (Griffiths, 1998: 7). The constitution 
also obliged parliament to set the first Australian tariff within the first two 
years of Federation, virtually ensuring that tariff policy was a dominant 
issue in the first federal election (Griffith, 1998: 7; Kelly, 1992: 5). 
When federal parliament first convened in :May 1901, its members aligned 
into three major parties formed around trade policy - the Alfred Deakin· led 
Protectionists, George Reid's Free Trade Party and Labor, which was 
divided on the issue69• Underlining the prominence and importance of the 
69 Of the 75 members of the House of Representatives~ it is estimated that 33 supported the Protectionist 
government, 26 the Freetrade Opposition and 16 joined the Labor Party caucus~ 6 of whom -.vere free traders. 
In the upper house, the Freettade Opposition had 17 of the 36 senators, the Protectionists 11 and Labor 8, of 
whom at least 1 was a free trader (Griffith, 1998: '.'). 
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trade debate, Deakin's Protectionists formed the first government and the 
Freetraders the first Oppositon. Griffith (1998) argues that the eventual 
political triumph of the Protectionists, when they merged with the 
Freetraders in 1909 to form the Liberal Party under Deakin's leadership, 
was driven largely by the concern oflandowners and businessmen about the 
increasing political power of organized labour rather than a settlement of 
the free trade-protectionist debate. But the political effect of the merger, in 
concert with growing support for protection within Labor, was to confirm 
protectionism as an integral part of what political commentator Paul Kelly 
has described as the Australian Settlement. According to Kelly (1992: 1 ·2) 
the five pillars of the Settlement could be summarized as \:Vrute Australia, 
industry protection, wage arbitration, state paternalism and imperial 
benevolence. In Catley's view, the Labor Liberal consensus on protection 
was based in large part on a trade·off of industry protection in return for 
fair and reasonable wages (1996: 48). 
The political orthodoxy of protectionism was confirmed in the early 1920s 
when the newly·emergent Country Party, which initially criticized 
protection as a burden on primary producers, came to support protection in 
exchange for a system of statutory marketing bodies, public subsidies, price 
fixing and industry levies (Kelly, 1992: 6). Though the costs of protection 
received occasional acknowledgement, such as in the Brigden Committee 
report of 1929, which noted that the burden of tariffs fell on the industries 
that formed much of Australia's economic backbone, including wheat, wool 
and mining, the policy was justified on nation·building grounds, particularly 
the need for Australia to develop a manufacturing industry (Kelly, 1992: 6; 
Snape et al, 1998: 2; Pomfret, 1995: 191). As Catley observes (1996: 48), a 
marked feature of Australian protection in this period was its use to 
promote industrialization within an imperial structure. In a sign that trade 
policy was not seen purely as a means for national economic development 
but also as a tool for helping manage international relations became 
increasingly apparent through Australia's participation in an imperial 
system of preferences. 
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In 1930 the United States, through the Smoot· Hawley Act, rapidly 
increased its import protection, triggering retaliation from trading partners 
in western Europe. Great Britain abandoned its long·term commitment to 
free trade and instead sought to establish a system of preferential trade 
agreements across its empire. The imperial preferential trade system, which 
included Australia, was formalized in the 1932 Ottawa Agreements. Under 
this system, described by Crawford (1968: 319) as "clearly bilateral in 
character", Australia and the other dominions gained preferential access to 
the British market for their wheat and other agricultural products in 
exchange for granting preferential access for manufactured exports from the 
United Kingdom. The effect was to increase markedly Australia's export 
dependence on Britain at the expense of other trade relationships, 
particularly with Japan and the United States (Capling, 2001= 13·14). 
In the immediate aftermath of World War Two Australia enjoyed a 
favourable international trading environment. A world-wide shortage of 
goods and commodities meant Australian exports were in demand and 
attracted high prices. Coupled with its own quotas on imports from hard 
currency sources, the situation delivered Australia balance of payment 
surpluses (Snape et al, 1998: 3). But by the mid 1950s the situation had 
reversed dramatically. Australia's balance of payments had slumped into 
deficit, driven by the increased availability of imports and a sustained fall in 
commodity prices (Harris, 1987: 53). This change in Australia's trading 
environment occurred within a context of changing politics surrounding 
trade. As a signatory to the 1932 Ottawa Agreement, Australia was 
committed to a system of imperial preferences governing its trade with the 
United Kingdom70. But the rise of United States' economic and strategic 
importance during and after \Vorld War Two not only ushered in a change 
in Australia's strategic alliances, it also forced Australia to rethink its 
trading environment. The United States, keen to unlock international 
70 ~,\s a dominion~ _,\ustralia \Vas a founding member of the Commonwealth whet1 it was formalized by the 
Statute of Westminster 1931. 
84 
The Power to Deal 
markets for its exports, sought the elimination of systems of trading 
preferences and the reduction of tariffs (Harris, 1987: 59). 
For Australia, for whom the United States was a major trading partner and 
strategic ally, accommodating the United States' trading agenda meant a 
shift from a preferential approach to trade policy (as embodied in the 
Ottawa Agreement) to one which had multilat.eralism as its centre·piece. 
One of Australia's foremost trade bureauCl'ats, Sir John Crawford, argued 
that the decision key to this shift was Australia's acceptance of the 1942 
Mutual Aid Agreement proposed by the United States, which looked to the 
elimination of systems of preferences and the reduction of tariffs (Crawford, 
1968: 3, 8; Harris, 1987: 59). The agreement not only specified the terms of 
mutual lend·lease arrangements to support the joint war effort, but also 
entailed a broader commitment t-0 the elimination of trade discrimination 
and the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, challenging Australia's 
protectionist policies and participation in the Commonwealth system of 
preferences (Crawford, 1968: 3). It was in this international political context 
that Australia became one of the original signatories to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was to form the 
institutional basis for the multilateral approach to international trade 
liberalization in the postwar period. Arguably, Australia's participation in 
the establishment of the GATT was for a mix of economic and political 
reasons. The GATT member countries comprised markets for 80 per cent of 
all Australian imports and exports, and Australia's trade policy bureaucracy 
argued the merits of a rules· based trade system in providing some 
protection for smaller, weaker nations such as Australia against the actions 
of more powerful economies. Furthermore, through the Mutual Aid 
Agreement, Australia had made a commitment to a system of multilateral 
trading relations that found expression in the rules of GATT (Crawford, 
1968: 8). And, having signed up to the GATT, it was argued that any 
attempt by Australia to withdraw would seriously harm relations with the 
United States and the United Kingdom, both of whom were strong 
supporters of the agreement (Capling, 2001: 34, 40). In this environment 
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trade policy arguably served both economic development and international 
relations purposes simultaneously. 
GATT, similar to the Bretton Woods institutions for international monetary 
management which established the rules for commercial and financial 
relations among the world's major developed nations, embodied a desire to 
prevent a return to the chaotic conditions of unrestrained economic 
nationalism that had marred the interwar period (Crawford, 1968: 8; Irwin, 
2005: 207·09). According to Uruguayan diplomat Julio Lacarte Muro, who 
participated in the 1947 negotiations in Havana for the establishment of the 
International Trade Organization (which was aborted by the US Congress 
but found expression in the GATT), there was a shared purpose among 
those involved to avoid the economic nationalism and protectionism that 
were seen to have fuelled international tensions and contribute to the 
outbreak of World War Two (Muro, 2008). Muro said the two pillars of the 
GATTIWTO, the MFN clause and national treatment, were fundamental 
principles in achieving this aim. 
But the nature and strength of Australia's commitment to GATT and the 
principles of multilateral liberalization it embodied was, at times, 
questionable. Australia, along with New Zealand, sought to establish for 
itself an exceptionalist position within the GATT framework. It sought to 
identify itself as a developing country, given the significance of agricultural 
exports to its economy. This developing country status then formed the basis 
of a refusal to reduce trade barriers manufactured good imports, on the 
grounds of protecting the development of a nascent domestic manufacturing 
sector (Pomfret, 1995: 190·91; Snape et al, 1998: 2, 363; Capling, 2001: 23). 
It was an awkward position that encapsulated the uncertainty of successive 
governments about the GATT on several levels. There was recognition of the 
benefits of a rules·based international trading system in providing 
protection for smaller economies (Capling, 2001: 34), and the desirability of 
Bretton Woods·style institutions such as the GATT in helping ensure that 
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the economic circumstances that contributed to the outbreak of World War 
Two would not be repeated. But there was also a significant wariness about 
the effects of international obligations, particularly those involving nations 
with much greater bargaining power and differing trade interests. The 
position highlighted the tension between alternate conceptions of trade 
policy as a tool of development and of helping managing international 
relations. 
This reflected, in part, the norm of reciprocity in trade negotiations 
espoused by the United States and embodied in the GATT. The GATT has 
as one of its central norms the.notion of reciprocity (Keohane, 1986). 
According to Keohane, reciprocity involves "exchanges of roughly equivalent 
values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions 
of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad" 
(Keohane, 1986: 8)71. According to Capling (2001: 28), this approach owes 
much to the US Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, which delegated 
trade negotiating authority to President Franklin Roosevelt to negotiate on 
bilateral basis with other countries and then implement reductions of up to 
50 per cent in tariffs in exchange for compensating tariff cuts by trading 
partners. It formed much of the basis for the norm of reciprocity which 
subsequently underpinned negotiations in the GATT. For Australian trade 
negotiators trying to open markets for agricultural exports while 
simultaneously trying to maintain protection against manufacture imports, 
71 Keohane further distinguishes between two ionns of reciprocity; specific, whkhittvolves an c:..chang:e of iJ.i:ms of equivalent valve 
between specif.led partners in a strictly di?lirniterl sequence; <:t."'ld diffuse, in which the definition of equivalence is less precise, the 
sequence of events less narrowly bound and the parties to an exchange are a group rather than particular actors (1986: 4). An important 
c..1u.racteristic of diffuse reciprocity is that it involves confurmance to generally accepted standards ofbehaviour in an emdronment of 
norms involving rights and obiigatinns. The two forms of reciprocity, though distinct, are related. According to Keohane specific 
reciprocity precedes, a.l\d can fonn the basis of, diffuse reciprocity. Countries that successfully engage in exchanges involving specilic 
reciprocity over a period of time Ctm generate a trust based on mutua:l experience. Il--is in tum can encourage rcciproca~ transactions that 
are sequential, rather than stridly simultaneous, giving rise to a SJ$l"1TI of debts and credits that 00.vclves behavioural ncrmr< In trade 
terms, specific reciprocity elicits a c:onditionaJ !>.fost Favored Nation (Mfl\.f} treatment, while diffuse :reciprocity supports the GA IT 
doctrine of multilateral and norH;ilscriminatory h'beralization realized through unconditional t.1FN treatment among member states 
('{anai,2001). 
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the notion of reciprocal trade deals - particularly on an MFN basis - held 
limited appeal (Capling, 2001: 31). 
It was not just political considerations that shaped Australia's trade policy 
stance. In addition to the .American influence on the structure of 
international trade, Australian governments became increasingly unhappy 
with the economic impact of the preferential system erected by the Ottawa 
Agreements, not least because of the declining value of Australia's 
preferences in the British market and the need to find additional export 
markets (Crawford, 1968: 321). By the early 1950s UK goods imports were 
accorded preference margins of between 7.5 and 20 percentage points, while 
comparatively few Australian exports received preferential access to the 
British Market (Snape et al, 1998: 450). In 1956 the terms of the agreement 
between the Australian and British governments were renegotiated after 
Australia threatened to terminate it (Snape et al, 1993: 450·52). This 
became an important precursor to the negotiation of one of Australia's most 
important trade agreements, with Japan, the following year (Capling, 2001: 
61). Former Ambassador to the vVTO, Don Kenyon, said the negotiation of a 
treaty with Japan was part of Australia's response t-0 the realization that 
the system of Commonwealth preferences was doomed, particularly as a 
consequence of the 1955 Treaty of Rome (Kenyon, 2005). The formal retreat 
from the system of British preferences wa·s marked by the negotiation of a 
new United Kingdom· Australia trade agreement in late 1956 (Crawford, 
1968: 343·46). 
4.3 THE 1957 AUSTRALIA-JAPAN AGREEMENT TO THE HAWKE 
ASCENDANCY 
For much of the period between 1957 and the election of the Whitlam 
government in 1972 Australia's trade policy was marked by the 
maintenance of high tariff barriers. It was during this period, as tariffs on 
manufactured goods began to recede across the developed world, that 
Australia's exceptionalism on protection (along with that of New Zealand) 
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became increasingly obvious, such that by 1970 it had, aside from New 
Zealand, the most heavily protected economy in the OECD (Anderson and 
Garnaut. 1987: 6). 
During this period the view of trade policy as a tool of national economic 
welfare gained prominence, and with it a contest emerged between policy 
entrepreneurs and the ideas they advanced about which was the best policy 
prescription. Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s Australia's trade policy 
was dominated by National Party leader and minister for trade and 
industry John McEwen and his policy of all·around protection, which was 
intended to foster the development of a domestic manufacturing industry 
behind high tariff barriers (Kelly, 1992: 43; Capling, 2001: 72·3). The policy 
came under increasingly critical scrutiny during the 1960s from the Tariff 
Board, under the leadership of Alf Rattigan <Anderson and Garnaut, 1987: 
69), The Australia.n Financial Review under the editorship of Max Newton 
and economic analysis of the cost of protection undertaken by economist 
Max Corden. Their work provided the intellectual and political foundation 
for an advocacy coalition encompassing economists, academics, public 
officials, journalists, business people and politicians that formed around the 
principle of tariff reduction (Kelly, 1992: 44). The newly-elected Labor leader, 
Prime :Minister Gough vVhitlam, launched the first major assault on the 
protectionist orthodoxy when, in 1973, he unilaterally reduced tariffs across 
the board by 25 per cent (primarily to help stem inflation) and established 
the Industries Assistance Commission (Kelly, 1992: 44; Garnaut, 1994: 63·4; 
Warhurst, 1996: 248). Some have argued this move was in effect thrust 
upon the Whitlam government by changes in the economic environment, 
particularly the declining growth rates of those nations pursuing an import· 
substituting industrialization strategy behind high tariff walls (Pomfret, 
1995: 191), while according to Snape et al (1998:24·5) it was a measure 
intended to restrain inflation by increasing imports, and was based on the 
recommendation of a committee, chaired by Rattigan, given the specific task 
of investigating ways to boost imports. And in 197 4 a Green Paper argued 
exporters such as farmers were disadvantaged by tariffs, not only by higher 
89 
The Power to Deal 
import prices for farm inputs but through the general equilibrium effects on 
the level of costs throughout the economy (Anderson and Garnaut, 1987: 72). 
In this environment effective rates of assistance began to come down, 
though much more sharply in agriculture than manufacturing. Between the 
late 1960s and the early 1980s, effective rates of assistance for agriculture 
fell from around 20 per cent to less than 10 per cent. These developments lit 
the path for more general acceptance among key industrial and political 
groups of the economic case for the benefits of unilateral liberalization 
(Rattigan and Carmichael, 1996; Anderson and Garnaut, 1987). Warhurst 
makes the case that the move, and attendant meastu-es such as forming the 
Rattigan committee and the establishment of the Industries Assistance 
Commission actually reflected i.Vhitlam's commitment to the market and 
opposition to industry protection (Warhurst, 1996: 247·48). He argues that 
W'hitlam should rightly be seen as being in the vanguard of the wave of 
trade liberalization undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s, and cites the Labor 
leader's decision to establish the IAC, appoint anti·protectionist Rattigan as 
its head and place it under his direct ministerial control to back his point. 
Another significant initiative was to strip the departments of trade and 
industry of many of their industry assistance responsibilities (Cap ling, 2001: 
87). 
Despite this initial success, the anti·protectionist advocacy coalition found 
that its efforts to make further inroads into Australia's tariff defences 
largely thwarted over the following decade. This was the product of a 
number of factors, not least the reluctance of the Fraser government, elected 
in late 1975, to unilaterally reduce tariffs further. Underpinning this was a 
combination of political and trade concerns, including the potential political 
cost to the Coalition government from deeper tariff cuts. Linked to this was 
a reluctance to abandon the McEwenist policy of all·round protection that 
politically had served the Coalition so well. Country/National Party leader 
Doug Anthony wanted to follow McEwen's tactic of broadening his party's 
political base using protection to try and enlist support from the textile, 
clothing and footwear industries, the mining sector and graziers (Kelly, 
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1992: 45). Intensive political lobbying by the most highly protected 
industries · automobile manufacturing and the textile, clothing and 
footwear sector - in resisting tariff cuts was assisted by growing 
international competition from East Asian manufacturers (Garnaut, 1994: 
64). A further hindrance to progress was internecine conflicts within the 
ruling Coalition and between the departments of trade and foreign affairs 
(Capling, 2001: 90·93). Fraser, Anthony and some ofthefr key allies in 
government, including Treasurer Phillip Lynch, found themselves 
increasingly pitted against an advocacy coalition that was not only 
demanding an end to protection but also broad·based indirect taxation, 
deregulation of the financial system and a decentralized wage fixing system 
(Kelly, 1992: 47·50). The coalition, reflecting an expanding awareness about 
the implications of increasing economic integration 'IVith the global economy, 
drew support from think·tanks including the Centre for Independent 
Studies, the Institute for Public Affairs and the Australian Institute for 
Public Policy as well as The Australian Financial Review. Included in its 
number was Fraser government minister John Howard and his adviser 
John Hewson, both future leaders of the Liberal Party. (Kelly, 1992: 48·9). 
The failure to make any inroads on reducing agricultural protection in 
Europe and the United States through the Tokyo Round of the GATT 
underlined a generally fruitless period in Australian trade policy, bookended 
as it was by two significant trade agreements: the 1957 treaty with Japan72 
and the negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement with New Zealand73, 
launched in 1980 and completed in 1983. 
72 Trade Agreement Signed in Jttly 1957, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in June, 1976 
· Wa\I, 1967, 215-17). Australia negotiated a plethora of bilateral agreements during the period, sucli as with 
the Soviet Union, East Germany and North \ 1ietnam, but all were within the embrace of the multilateral 
system and on a Most Favoured Nation basis (see Capling, 2001: 70, 231j. 
73 A trade agreement between _:\usttalia and New Zealand was included in the 1933 Ottaw--a Agreements and 
the New Zealand-;\ustralia Free Trade Agreernent fortllitlising and extending this relationship came into force 
in January 1966. But negotiations tOr the ,.\ustralia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship, which is the 
basis of current trade relations benveen the two nations) were not hunched until Jvfarch 1980 (see Snape, 
Gropp and Luttrell, 1998, 463-65). 
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4.4 HAWKE TO THE END OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
In the early 1980s, despite a 25 per cent across·the·board tariff cut 
introduced in 1973, Australia still lagged behind most other OECD 
economies in its volume of trade as a percentage of GDP (Anderson, 1995). 
Japan was firmly established as Australia's major export market, the 
United States was the nation's biggest source of imports, and the developing 
economies of South· East Asia were emerging as a major source of trade. The 
composition of Australia's trade was also changing. Growing demand for 
Australian minerals and energy products, coupled with increasing services 
trade, saw the relative importance of agricultural exports decline, though 
Australia still remained out of step with other industrialised countries in its 
reliance on primary exports (Anderson, 1995). At the same time Australia 
was becoming more exposed to pressures associated with the growing 
internationalisation of its economy. The increasing international integration 
of financial markets, in particular, was exerting extreme pressure on 
mechanisms of exchange rate control that since Federation had been among 
government's most important economic levers (Kelly, 1992: 84·94). 
Australia's managed float, it was feared, may become unsustainable as 
increasingly large volumes of funds flowed in and out of the economy. The 
Hawke government faced a choice between floating the currency or a 
massive re·regulation of the financial markets. 
By the early 1980s the need for structural reform of the Australian economy 
had gained recognition (Garnaut, 1994: 56·7). The structure that had 
developed following World vVar Two was under increasing pressure from a 
corrosion of the per capita natural resource endowment because of 
population growth, a large, unfavourable shift in world demand for primary 
products (including increased agricultural protectionism and changes in 
demand for metals), low productivity levels and the economy's incapacity to 
take advantage of technological changes in manufacturing and services 
(Garnaut, ibid). Faced with these pressures, the Hawke Government 
undertook to reform the economy, its first step being to float the currency. 
This move had its origins in an accumulation of domestic factors. vVhen it 
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came to office in 1983 ,a majority of the ALP was hostile to the idea of 
financial deregulation, and dismissed support for it as free market dogma 
(Kelly, 1992: 79, 59)74. Yet, within nine months deregulation would be 
embraced by the same party with enthusiasm. This remarkable turn-around 
came about as a result of institutional factors (assuming the fiscal 
responsibilities of executive government), interests (a coalition of mining, 
farming and financial industry interests supporting deregulation) and ideas. 
The advocacy coalition that had its roots the anti-protectionist push from 
the late 1960s, and which had gathered momentum and broadened its 
agenda during the late 1970s and early 1980s, found in the Hawke 
government a receptive ear. According to Garnaut, who served as an 
economic adviser to Prime Minister Hawke, the political leader recognized 
and accepted the implications of globalization, including the economic 
effects of deregulating the financial system, floating the exchange rate, 
reducing tariffs and restructuring key industries such as automobile 
manufacturing, textiles, clothing and footwear, and steel production 
(Garnaut, 1994: 65). During his tenure at the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (first as advocate and later as president) Hawke had demonstrated a 
willingness to attack at least some elements of the protectionist structure 
that had evolved in the post-war period. The future prime minister helped 
orchestrate a campaign against. the resale price maintenance measure 
under which manufacturers could set a minimum retail price on the goods 
they supplied to retailers, arguing that it forced consumers to pay inflated 
prices (Hawke, 2005). 
In The End of Certainty Kelly (1992) traces the origins of the Hawke 
Government's deregulation of Australia's financial system and the currency 
float to a decision by Hawke's predecessor Malcolm Fraser to hold an 
inquiry into financial deregulation. The inquiry, undertaken at the urging of 
Fraser's two principal economic advisers Ed Visbord and John Rose, was led 
by Sir Keith Campbell and in its 1981 report recommended in favour of 
74 
._-\ccording to Y.loward, who \.vas Treasurer in the Fraser govcromentt Hawke and Keating borh campaigned 
strongly against the admission of foreign banks as a co:ncession of sovereignty (Howard, 2006). 
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deregulation. Despite some minor reforms, including the decision to allow 
foreign bank entry, and the zeal of some its members for deregulation75, the 
Fraser Government failed to implement most of the reforms recommended 
by Campbell before it lost office in l\llarch 1983 (Howard, 2006; Kelly, 1992: 
78·9). By the time the Hawke Government embarked on the policy of 
financial deregulation in December 1983, it had the support of an influential 
and ready· made advocacy coalition backing the move. One of its members 
was Ross Garnaut who, writing in 1982, urged a future Labor government 
to resist strong pressures to retain or extend protectionism because of the 
damage it caused to standards of living. particularly among the poor 
(Garnaut, 2001: 49·50). Instead, he argued, a committed social democratic 
government should seek freer international trade by, in the first instance, 
converting import quotas into tariffs (ibid;. According to Kelly the coalition 
was conditioned by the Campbell Report and included the commercial banks, 
the Reserve Bank, significant sections of Treasury and the weight of official 
economic advice (Kelly, 1992: 76·9). In addition Treasurer Paul Keating, 
using his skills of persuasion and policy entrepreneurship, was able to win 
the support of the ALP-which had attacked the Campbell Report and 
foreign bank entry· the Victorian and New South \Vales state governments, 
export, farming and mining industry groups, and the acquiescence of the 
ACTU. According to Hawke, many of the economic reforms implemented by 
his government went against the grain oflong·held attitudes within the 
union movement, but were accepted and supported by the ACTU leadership 
as necessary to underpinning long·term competitiveness and prosperity 
(Hawke, 2005)76. 
Kelly argues that the decision to deregulate the financial system pushed the 
Australian economy onto a path of internationalization, delivering a huge 
75 Including the-then Treasurer John Howard (Howard, 2006). 
76 
"!be Prices and Incomes Accord agreement struck be,tween the I.abor government and the r\ustralian 
Council of Trade Unions helped secure union acceptance of the Labor government's economic reform 
agenda. Under the agreement the government and the .. -\C'I1J presented joint arguments to the Conciliation 
and ,,,\rbittation Com..'llission to award a single :national \\~age. increase that wuuld seek to maiut'a.in, but not 
increase; the real value of wages as a mechanism to help control inflation and deliver economic gro..,,v"th and 
job creation (Edwards, 1996: 201; Kelly, 1992: 60-61). 
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. blow to the protectionist orthodoxy that had dominated the nation's trade 
policy for much of the twentieth century (Kelly, 1992: 87). Hawke 
understood that these changes, which would boost economic efficiency and 
productivity, would be congenial to a liberalizing trade agenda, even if they 
were not primarily intended to address trade issues (Cook, 2005; Kenyon, 
2005; Field, 1997). According to Cook, the Australian government did not 
move to cut tariffs and restructure protected industries because of the 
Uruguay Round: '\Ve did it unilaterally, and we did it because we thought it 
was good economic policy'. The effect, Field argues, was to improve 
Australia's credibility on trade policy heading into the Uruguay Round: 'We 
were putting our money where our mouth was by saying we wanted barriers 
to come down across the board, not only in areas that were a direct interest 
to us but in areas that were clearly going to hurt us, at least in a short·term 
structural adjustment sense' (Field, 1997). While the act of deregulation set 
the general policy direction, other events and individuals were important in 
shaping its development in trade policy. 
4.4.1 A MULTILATERAL OUTLOOK AND THE CAIRNS GROUP 
One of these was the appointment of John Dawkins as Trade l\1inister 
following the December 1984 federal election77. Dawkins was a senior 
member of the government, as illustrated by his membership of the 
politically·powerful Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet, and a 
committed economic reformer (Capling, 2001: 106). When Labor first came 
to office in 1983 it was suspicious of the Department of Trade. According to 
one departmental official, the department was seen by Labor to be a 
Country Party secretariat (Field, 1997). The Hawke Government's first 
trade ministBr, Lionel Bowen, betrayed little interest in the portfolio and 
embarked on a process to pare back the department's policy functions, such 
as reducing its Overseas Trade Policy operation (Field, 1997). His successor, 
Dawkins, came to the portfolio with what appeared to be more complex and 
contradictory attitudes and goals. On one hand, he initially continued 
Tr Dawkins was Trade J'vli.'lister from December 1984 to July 1987. 
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Bowen's policy of cutting the Trade Department back7B, yet he also enjoyed 
the opportunity provided by the portfolio to strut the international stage 
(Field: 1997). According to Field it was during 1985, when the scope of 
Labor's economic reform ambitions was being developed and the prospects 
for a new multilateral trade grouping (the Cai:rns Group) were firming, that 
Dawkins became increasingly enthusiastic about the political possibilities of 
the trade portfolio (Field, 1997). 
The basis for the Cairns Group had been evolving for several years, but it 
gained shape at two key gatherings in 1986, firstly at Montevideo, attended 
by officials from Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 
and an expanded meeting at Pattaya (Capling, 2001: 107). Dawkins and 
senior trade officials brought these nascent groups together and formalized 
the Cairns Group of non ·subsidising agricultural exports in a meeting in 
Cairns in August 1986 (Capling, 2001: 107). The group was a coalition of 
fourteen governments interested in agricultural trade liberalization: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay. 
The significance of this was not only that the group represented a 
substantial new political bloc (accounting for 25 per cent of world 
agricultural trade) at GATT to force agricultural issues onto the agenda for 
the Uruguay Round, but also it served to help bring trade issues to political 
prominence in Australia. In both aspects, according to Field, Dawkins was 
crucial: 
[Dawkins] came to see a role and identified for himself a role in early 
1986 in the run up to the Uruguay Round. And I have to say, without 
Dawkins we would never have got the Ministerial Cairns group going 
the way we did, never, never. Dawkins understood that sort of 
publicity aspect of it. It was also a device for him to gain Hawke's 
attention on trade issues. I guess it 'legitimized' his authority in 
setting the trade policy agenda within Australia from that time 
78 Field speculates that this ;x.-as partly due to his membership of the Expenditure Re\":iew Committee and 
hence, a desire to set an e.o::ample to his ministerial colleagues (fape 1: 17). 
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forward which, once he was convinced of the need for reform and the 
method, was very important in empowering us as Trade bureaucrats · 
Field, 1997. 
\Vhile Dawkins played a key role in establishing the Cairns Group, it was 
his ministerial successor Michael Duffy, Minister for Trade Negotiations 
from July 1987 to April 1990, who is credited by former Ambassador to the 
GATT Alan Oxley as being more important in building the coalition into a 
formidable lobbying group during the early stages of the Uruguay Round 
(Oxley, 2005). 
Former Ambassador to the vVTO, Don Kenyon, said that by the time the 
Cairns Group was formed Australia's trade policy under the Hawke 
Government had become 'dry, dry'. Kenyon ascribes much of the shift to a 
change in international circumstances, particularly in changes in the trade 
policies of the United States and the members of Europe's Common Market. 
The Tokyo Round (1973 to 1979), because it did not detail tariff cuts in 
agriculture, was deemed a dismal failure for Australian trade policy, and 
underlined a bleak outlook for agricultural trade liberalization: 
The US were getting fed up with the Europeans, and the US by that 
stage had its own agriculture subsidies program up and running. 
That is what set us up in 1980 on the multilateral track: the 
realization that we did not have any other way to go. It was 
circumstances (that drove the shift to multilateralism) · Kenyon, 2005. 
lVIuch of the opposition to preferential trade arrangements - and support for 
multilateral trade liberalization was informed by a general equilibrium 
perspective, and the view that those who advocated protection did not take 
account of its effects in undermining allocative efficiency and hampering 
economic development. Crudely, general equilibrium theory denotes an 
approach to the examination of an economy which seeks to encapsulate and 
take account of all relevant variables. Applied to the analysis of markets, 
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ideally all agents involved in exchanges with each other should be included, 
and all their sales and purchases should be included in analytical models 
(McKenzie, 1990: 1). The normative view underpinning this approach is that 
changes in one part of a market or economy will have knock·on effects for 
the rest of the market/economy. The general equilibrium pe1·spective holds 
that there are a myriad of inter·relationships within markets/economies 
that determine the way in which policy changes in one part of the trading 
system have spillover effects in other parts (Dee, 1994: 8). 
As a tool of economic policy analysis, general equilibrium modeling - which 
had its origins in the work ofWalras and Cournot in the nineteenth century 
(Hicks, 1964: 392) - has been extensively applied to questions of trade, 
including the economic effects of protection (Shoven and Whalley, 1984). In 
Australia general equilibrium modeling became an important tool for 
advocates of multilateralism in seeking to influence trade policy by trying to 
demonstrate the benefits of trade liberalization. It was used extensively by 
the Industry Assistance Commission and its successor organization, the 
Industry Commission, to analyze the effects of cuts in industry protection. 
The IAC and the IC both published analyses of the welfare effects of 
reductions in protection both for the national and global economies which 
both informed, and provided support for, programs of tariff cuts (Dee, 1994: 
25·8). For example, in its general equilibrium analysis of the reductions in 
protection announced by the Australian government in May 1988, the IC 
projected it would lead to lower prices, higher employment, greater 
productive capacity and higher real GDP than would have been the case if 
the protection had been left in place (Dee, 1994: 25·6). 
International institutions also lent force to the anti· protection position. The 
Bretton Woods institutions created in the wake of vVorld War Two -the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the GA TT - were 
established to ensure a stable trade and economic world environment. The 
founding principle of the IMF and GATT- non·discrimination - was 
embodied in both institutions and reflected international dialogue regarding 
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ways to ensure that the chaotic international trade and economic conditions 
that helped plunge the world into a global war would not be repeated. The 
1930s were marked by a retreat into protectionism, led by the world's 
largest trading nation, the United States. A collapsing sharemarket, 
plunging prices and spiraling unemployment convinced US legislators in 
1930 to pass the Smoot· Hawley Act, which called for one of the highest 
tariffs in US history (Shlaes, 2007: 95). Intended to protect farmers 
struggling with low commodity prices from competition from agricultural 
imports, it provoked a storm of foreign retaliatory measures: among them, 
France and Italy imposed tariffs on US automobiles, Australia and India 
legislated new duties on imports, Canada raised its tariffs three times and 
the Swiss boycotted US goods (Shlaes, 2007: 99). The Act, and the 
international response to it, contributed to a drastic decline in international 
trade. US imports from Europe declined from a 1929 high of$US1,334 
million to just $US390 million in 1932, while U.S. exports to Europe fell 
from $US2,341 million in 1929 to $US784 million in 1932. Overall, the value 
of world trade fell by 66 per cent between 1929 and 1934 (US Department of 
State, 2007). Not only did Smoot· Hawley help undermine international 
trade, it did nothing to foster trust and cooperation among nations in either 
the political or economic realm and contributed to conditions favourable to 
nationalist and militaristic movements. For at least some proponents of 
multilateralism, the fear was and remains that protectionism could 
exacerbate international tensions over trade and threaten the international 
trading system that has developed since World War Two (Salvatore, 1987: 
2)79, 
Kenyon said the arguments mounted by members of the academic 
community in support of multilateralism proved correct, but what drove the 
bureaucracy to focus on trade liberalization at the multilateral level was the 
force of circumstance. According to this view a confluence of ideas and 
events including the end of the Cold \Var, increasing globalization and the 
"According to Muro (Z008) the norms of non-discrimination embodied in the 'WTO and supported by its 
disputes settlexnent mecf...anism, are as relevant and necessary now as they would lunre been in the 1920s and 
193Gs in helpmg avert armed conflict over trade. 
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political dominance of the Rcaganfrhatcher model of neo-liberal economics 
in much of the English-speaking world encouraged many countries that 
were usually protectionist in outlook to embrace the apparent opportunity 
for multilateral trade liberalization offered by the Uruguay Round: 
The Uruguay Round was the high water mark ofmultilateralism in 
Australian trade policy. By the end of the Uruguay Rcund countries 
that had gone into it as wet protectionists came out as dry market· 
oriented. Even Brazil - Kenyon, 2005. 
When the·then Australian Prime lViinister Bob Hawke announced in lVIarch 
1991 the third round of tariff cuts for Australian industry in 18 years 
(Snape et al, 1998), the move was hailed by leading political commentator 
Paul Kelly as bringing an end to a century of protectionism in Australia 
(Kelly, 1992). Garnaut, an influential advocate of Australian economic 
liberalization, described the cuts as more significant than 'the end of the 
British Corn Laws that earned Peel and Cobden a dozen pages in our high 
school history books' (Kelly, 1992, p666). 
Significantly the cuts, which were announced in the midst of the 1990·91 
recession, were supported by the Coalition opposition, which could have 
made great political capital out of the move, given its implications for job 
losses and painful industry restructuring. That the Coalition did not take 
this course and indeed, under the leadership of John Hewson, advocated 
even more far·reaching unilateral trade liberalization, was due in large part 
to the influence of ideas about economic reform that had been championed 
within Liberal Party forums by the so·called Dries so. Figures such as Bert 
Kelly and John Hyde had long championed free market and anti· 
protectionist ideas that gained considerable support within the Liberal 
Party during the 1980s. They had their echo in Britain and the United 
States in the market·based approach to economic reform and deregulation 
undertaken by the Reagan and Thatcher governments broadly denoted by 
the term nee-liberalism. Though not a unified economic theory or political 
'° The Dries are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 (pp 126-28). 
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philosophy, neo·liberalism came to be most coherently espoused in the so· 
called Washington Consensus, a set of economic policy proposals that gained 
general support among leading international economic organizations 
including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Among the 
principles underpinning the consensus were the redirection of public 
spending away from subsidies, brnadening the tax base, allowing interest 
rates to be determined by the market, trade liberalization (particularly the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions on trade), the liberalization of 
foreign direct investment, the privatisation of state·owned enterprises and 
the abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition 
(Williamson, 1990: 1·3, 7·20). Garnaut argued that the move to transform 
Australia into an open, market·rnsponsive economy predated the 
development of neoliberalism in the economic policies of the Reagan and 
Thatcher government, and had its origins in the domestic political and 
economic debates (1994: 51·2). The local significance of the Reagan and 
Thatcher neo·liberal agendas was their influence on economic principles 
espoused by the Coalition: 'the Reagan-Thatcher influence was most 
significant in its effect on Australian conservative parties - getting them to 
move from opportunistic defence of the status quo to economic rationalism' 
(Garnaut, 1994: 52). This transformation meant the Hawke government 
enjoyed bipartisan support for many of its far-reaching economic reforms 
and gave it the political freedom to attack tariffs. Significantly, Hawke 
explicitly linked multilateral trade liberalization with domestic economic 
management, and highlighted the importance of internally-generated 
pressure for reform based upon a robust educative process in which the 
costs and benefits of differing industry policies were closely analyzed and 
debated (Hawke, cited in Snape et.al. 199S: 415·18). In less than two 
decades an edifice of tariffs that had given much Australian industry, 
particularly manufacturing, some of the world's highest levels of protection 
from international competition (l\foGillivray, 1997), had been largely broken 
down. In the euphoria of the moment, with the low protection path receiving 
vigorous support from both major political parties, it seemed the momentum 
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behind trade liberalization would roll right over the remaining bulwarks of 
protection. 
4.4.2 APEC 
The tariff cuts announced by Hawke took place against a backdrop of 
international optimism about the possibility and benefits of international 
trade liberalization. The spectacular economic growth achieved by the 
export·oriented economies of East Asia inspired widespread confidence in 
the economic pay·off of inc,Teased trade liberalization (Pomfret, 1995) and 
fostered a global 'rush to free trade' (Rodrik, 1994 cited in Milner, 1999: 92). 
During the 1980s and 1990s commercial production and investment 
networks in the western Pacific region integrated at a pace well in advance 
of the development of a regional political architecture, a process referred to 
by Chia and Pangestu (2006: 123·4) as market-driven (as opposed to policy· 
driven) integration. Between 1985 and 2001 the intra·East Asian share of 
world trade (excluding Japan) virtually tripled from 2.2 per cent to 6.5 per 
cent. Over the same period the intra· European Union share of world trade 
declined from 21. l per cent to 20.2 per cent, and the intra· North American 
Free Trade Agreement share increased from 8.1 per cent to 10.1 per cent 
(Chia and Pangestu, 2006: 125). A central feature of this accelerated 
economic integration in the western Pacific region has been a sharp growth 
of trade in intermediate goods and components (Drysdale, 2003: 7), much of 
it occurring in the absence ofEU·style regional agreements or bilateral 
ti·ading arrangements (Lloyd, 2001: 234·35). 
In the late 1980s optimism about the benefits of trade liberalization and the 
desire to foster trade expansion on a non·discriminatory basis among Pacific 
rim countries found expression in the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum. Though considerations of space preclude a 
detailed discussion of APEC here, it is important to note the central role 
played by the Australian government in instigating i\PEC. On 31 January 
1989, while on a visit to the Republic of Korea, Australian prime minister 
Bob Hawke publicly flagged a possible meeting of regional leaders to discuss 
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the establishment of an intergovernmental forum for economic co·operation, 
APEC (\Voolcott, 2003: 232). The·then secretary ofDFAT, Richard Woolcott, 
was appointed by Hawke as his special envoy to visit officials and 
government leaders throughout the region and gain their support for a first 
ministerial meeting of APEC in November 1989. According to Woolcott the 
building of support for APEC was an exercise in effective diplomacy, 
identifying and r€solving potential obstacles to the participation of several 
nations, particularly Indonesia, Japan, China, the United States and 
Malaysia (Woolcott, 2003: 241). One of the features of APEC that enabled it 
to win the participation of a broad spectrum of nations in the region was its 
non·prescriptive nature, encapsulated in its organizing idea of'open 
regionalism'. In its economic and trade dimension, open regionalism meant 
the promotion of trade liberalization on a non·discriminatory basis (Terada, 
2004). Though the proposal had obvious implications for trade policy, it was 
largely driven in Australia in its initial stages from within the department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet rather than DFAT (Kenyon, 2005). Any hope 
that APEC would form the core of a trade grouping was undercut by 
reluctance among East Asian countries to see it as any more than 
mechanism of consultation (Capling, 2001: 102). In 1994 APEC set an 
ambitious program for voluntary liberalization in the Asia Pacific region 
which had at its core the concept of concerted liberalization - that by 
liberalising unilaterally, but in concert with others, each participating 
economy would benefit more than if it liberalized in isolation (Scollay, 2001: 
1136)81. In a point that is returned to in the next chapter, a proposal by the 
chair ofAPEC's Eminent Persons Group, C. Fred Bergsten, that trade 
liberalization in the region be advanced through a network of preferential 
trade agreements between member countries was rejected. It was an 
outcome that, according to some, marked the beginning of the end of US 
enthusiasm for APEC. In the end, the EPG recommended, among other 
measures that, consistent with its goal of open regionalism, APEC extend its 
81 The potential for this approach to enhance economic '\Velfare was judged -within the Productivity 
Commission to be condi rional and qualified. J\. Co:mmission paper waru.ed of the danger that partial 
liberalization could move resources further au.ray from the pattem they '\Vould achieve ID. an env-ironment of 
no protection, leading to economic welfare losses (Dee, Hardin and Schuele, 1998: 13). 
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regional liberalization to non-member countries 'on a mutually reciprocal 
basis' (Bergsten, 1997: 9) 
4.4.3 THE END OF URUGUAY 
By the time Peter Cook, Australian Trade Minister from 24 March 1993 to 
30 January 1994, was appointed Trade Minister the Uruguay Round 
negotiations were in their final stages. Australia's trade policy parameters 
were clearly settled, having been established by Dawkins, and the main 
task was to manage the tactics to achieve the best possible outcome for 
Australia (Cook, 2005). 
Becoming trade minister was a bit like joining a religious cult and 
finding you were the leader. All of the acolytes were looking to you to 
deliver the Holy Grail. I didn't choose to exercise any authority over 
the settled parameters or try to change them. I agreed with them, and 
they were an article of faith within the Government and within the 
Cabinet · Cook, 2005. 
One of the key aims was to maintain as much cohesion in the Cairns Group 
as possible, and Cook instituted a system in which Australian ambassadors 
in Cairns Group member nations were required to maintain close contact 
with their host governments in order to keep him apprised of how each 
country viewed the process. The Australian government's ambition was, 
through the Cairns Group, to have the maximum possible input into the 
Uruguay Round outcome, even though, as it turned out, the US and 
European countries came to an agreement on agriculture in separate talks. 
Through the Uruguay Round the Australian· led Cairns Group proved an 
effective, if not always harmonious, coalitions2. ·while it failed to achieve the 
establishment of a market-oriented system for international trade in 
agricultural products, it has been credited with ensuring that the round did 
not end up with a series of market· sharing deals between the major 
82 Fot a thorough account of the Cairns Group during the Uruguay Round, see Capling, 2001: 118-45. 
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economic powers from which the rest of the world would be excluded 
(Capling, 2001: 144). 
For many of those involved in the negotiations, the Uruguay Round 
represented a success for Australian trade policy (Kenyon, 2005; Cook, 2005), 
but it was met with a degree of disappointment, partly because expectations 
had been so high. 
It (the Round) made me into a committed multilateralist because we 
got fabulous results in agriculture in terms of rules (though not 
market access), putting agricultural subsidies to rest, getting people 
to commit to reduced support arrangements, getting rid of quotas, 
converting all those non-tariff barriers into tariffs, the services 
agreement, TRIPs ... A.11 that stuff was extraordinary in terms of the 
GATT, and all the people who were aficionados - ministers, 
bureaucrats, thought it was a great achievement, but when the 
broader community looked at it they thought 'W'by isn't it better than 
this? Why not go bilateral again?' - Kenyon, 2005. 
Despite the unmet expectations, the Keating government did not face 
significant political opposition or criticism regarding the Uruguay Round 
outcome. According to Cook, an important reason for this was the process 
adopted during the final stages of the negotiations, when key private sector 
representatives, particularly from the agricultural industry, were co·opted 
into the negotiation process. For the final three weeks of the negotiations 
Cook and an entourage of ministerial advisers and departmental officials 
traveled to Geneva, and ensured that private sector representatives were 
also in attendance. Cook held daily, sometimes twice daily, meetings with 
them at which the details of an integrated strategy were constantly 
reviewed and fine-tuned. Cook, his government officials and the private 
sector representatives would co-ordinate meetings with their counterparts 
from other nations. At the daily meetings they would share information, 
identify who should be lobbied and devise tactics (Cook, 2005). 
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How much it achieved I'm not sure but it certainly shared the 
ownership of the result. Because part of the political issue here was 
that there was going to be a compromise from absolutist goals at the 
end of the day, and getting the balance of that right was pretty 
critical for domestic political consumption. We didn't want a 
perception to emerge that somehow we'd back·flipped or backed away 
or softened. It was pretty important w<t had shared 
responsibility ... and when we got back to Australia they were all very 
good. They all had a lot of positive things to say and they were very 
useful too in talking to the·then Howard·led opposition about getting 
the implementing Bills through · Cook, 2005. 
As is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven regarding the AUSFTA, the 
recruitment of interest groups in the negotiation process meant that they 
felt shared responsibility for the outcome and became advocates for the deal 
to their members. In this way successive governments were able to secure 
the support of politically influential groups for the trade deals they 
negotiated, helping mute opposition. 
Another factor likely to have contributed to the acceptance of the Uruguay 
Round outcomes was the fact that much of tariff reduction required under 
the agreement was already being undertaken unilaterally. Under the 
Uruguay Round agreement Australia bound 96 per cent of its tariff lines, up 
from 20 per cent, covering 96 per cent of manufactured goods and 100 per 
cent of agricultural products (\VTO, 1998: 26). But according to government 
estimates, for only 20 per cent of tariff lines did these commitments exceed 
cuts being implemented unilaterally (WTO, 1998: 25). 
4.4.4 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE-THE DFAT MERGER 
By 1986 the Department of Trade was, in terms of size, much smaller than 
it had been in its hey·day under McEwen. Dawkins, as a member of the 
government's Expenditure Review Committee, was trying to set an example 
for his ministerial colleagues by cutting numbers in the department. By 
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1986 the combined representation of the department and Australian Trade 
Commission83 comprised 164 Australia·based staff, a cut of 36 positions 
since 1975 (Harris, 1986: 71), with the overwhelming number involved in 
trade promotion and marketing operations. Just 23 Department of Trade 
staff were posted overseas for trade policy and trade relations purposes 
(Harris, 1986: 7 4) and the inaugural Cairns Group meeting was run out of 
the division's budget (Field, 1997). According to Field (1997), prior to 
amalgamation the Department of Trade's multilateral trade group had just 
43 staff(Field, 1997). The Uruguay Round negotiations, which commenced 
in September 1986, threatened to impose an unsustainable burden on the 
budget, personnel and resources of the Department of Trade (Field, 1997; 
Capling, 2001: 112). It was against this background tbat the then 
Department of Foreign Affairs secretary, Stuart Harris, championed the 
merger of the departments of trade and foreign affairs. 
That there were only 43 people in the [multilateral trade group] prior 
to amalgamation ... says that prior to the amalgamation the 
Department of Trade was imploding in the period 1984·1986-1987, 
becoming less and less able to undertake its function. Had we not 
been amalgamated with Foreign Affairs we would never have been 
able to service the [Uruguay] Round [negotiations] because if we had 
to go to Cabinet for specific sums of money Treasury and [the 
Department of [Finance] and the ERC [Expenditure Review 
Committee] would have cut us to pieces. vVe would never have got the 
resources. So, in that sense, the amalgamation was the saviour of 
Trade and the saviour of Australian trade policy and the engine of our 
effort in the Uruguay Round - Field 1997. 
The merger, which occurred in July 1987, was a major development in 
Australia's management of its international relations, and took place in the 
context of a broader government push to restructure the public service 
8'.l 1'he }1ust:ralian Trade Commission was fomied in 1985 to take over the export promotion and marketing 
activities formerly administered "Within the Trade department (E:Iarris~ 1986: 68). 
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aimed broadly at achieving greater bureaucratic efficiency, policy 
coordination and responsiveness, but also with the more specific objectives 
of giving ministers more control over their departments and reducing the 
pressures on federal Cabinet (Harris, 2002: 225). Regarding issues more 
specific to foreign affairs and trade, among the key ideas behind the 
amalgamation was an end to the compartmentalisation of foreign policy and 
foreign economic policy, an end to counterproductive turf wars between 
departments and an increase in the resources available for developing and 
implementing trade policy (Capling, 2001: 111). 
In his assessment of the amalgamation in 2001 Harris argued that, on 
balance, it had delivered substantial benefits by increasing the resources 
available for the pursuit of Australian trade interests and through the more 
effective use of Australia's overseas posts in lobbying for international 
support for Australian policy (Harris, 2002: 234). DFAT deputy secretary 
Geoff Raby argues the merger has enabled government to pursue 
substantial policy agendas in trade, including the negotiation of multiple 
preferential trade agreements: 
That is partly because we are not hamstrung by dreadful interagency 
arguments betlveen trade and foreign affairs. We were constantly in 
the trenches before 1987 and I wonder if we would have been able to 
do APEC if we had not been one department. So much of this stuff is 
international diplomacy, but in the trade area, and you need to be 
able to pool your resources together, your posts, your ambassadors, to 
do trade liberalization. They also have to believe, they have to know 
that this is their job, that this is what they are working for, and then 
you can harness a global network. I think we are much more nimble 
and creative and influential as a result of this · Raby, 2005. 
Another significant consequence of the merger is that, under the Coalition 
government, trade was represented by two ministers at Cabinet (Raby, 
2005). But the amalgamation has also prompted concerns about its impact 
on trade policy, including a dilution of experience and knowledge in the area 
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of trade policy and the tendency to turn trade policy into a flywheel for other 
areas of government policy, particularly strategic relationships (Capling, 
2001: 112; Kunkel, 2002: 249; Cook, 2005). A detailed assessment of the 
impact of the merger on Australia's trade policy after Uruguay will be 
undertaken later in this study, but it was seen as an important development 
in providing Australia's trade negotiators with the resources they needed to 
support their work during the Uruguay Round. 
A key factor helping ensure that the merger of the departments went as 
smoothly as it did was an apparent consensus among the new department's 
senior officials about the priority attached to multilateral approaches to 
trade policy (Kenyon, 2005; Harris, 2005). By the mid·1980s many in the 
Department of Trade who had earlier driven and implemented Australia's 
bilateral trade policy had either left or shifted their approach to embrace 
multilateralism (Kenyon, 2005). So much so that by the time of the merger 
'you simply did not suggest preferential trade agreements, they were seen as 
absolutely contrary to the national interest' (Harris, 2005). 
4.5 PREFERENTIALISM DOES NOT DIE 
As discussed earlier, during the 1980s and early 1990s efforts at the 
multilateral level were complemented by significant unilateral trade 
liberalization initiatives, including two rounds of tariff cuts, such that by 
2001 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development declared 
that Australia had the lowest barriers to trade and investment of all its 
member countries (OECD 2001: 118). Though the causes and circumstances 
of this unilateral approach to liberalization were complex, a significant 
factor was the work undertaken by the anti·protection advocacy coalition84 
from the mid·l960s in preparing the political ground by encouraging and 
informing public debate on tariff reduction. 
By choosing to float the currency and deregulate the financial system the 
Hawke Government exposed Australia to the disciplines of global markets 
i4 ~~s referred to on p 72, 
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and international competition, forcing upon it microeconomic reforms 
including financial deregulation, the reduction of industry protection, labour 
market de·regulation and market pricing and privatisation in 
telecommunications, transport and energy (Garnaut, 2004 and Kelly, 1992). 
Domestically, the tariff cuts implemented by the Hawke Government in 
1988 and 1991 unleashed the imperative for greater productivity and 
efficiency in Australian industry while internationally they increased the 
pace of Australia's economic integration with global markets. The result, 
according to Garnaut, was one of the most sustained periods of economic 
expansion in the nation's history (Garnaut, 2004). The growth, Garnaut 
argues, had its basis in the policies of financial deregulation and reduction 
in protection made in the 1980s and early 1990s, accompanied by 
productivity-raising domestic reforms that were in turn facilitated by lower 
barriers to international transactions. 
But even as proponents of economic liberalization celebrated Hawke's tariff 
cut decision, advocates of a more conservative approach which called for a 
more gradual reduction in tariffs and other trade barriers were being heard. 
One of the rallying points of this counter proposition was reciprocity in trade 
negotiations. A key argument was that Australia needed to retain tariffs in 
an environment in which many trade partners and competitors were 
persisting with various forms of protection and barriers to trade (Kelly, 1992, 
pp666·68; Downer, 2008). This argument has often found expression in 
terms of international market failure and 'fair' trade, and the idea that, in 
the absence of universal economic liberalization, Australia is not competing 
on a 'level playing field'85. According to McGillivray (1997) the market-based 
approach to trade policy championed by Garnaut, which includes the 
unilateral dismantling of tariff barriers, does not work because the 
operation of markets is distorted by both tariff and non-tariff barriers. In 
particular, Ravenhill (1991) raised doubts about the merits of a market-
85 For example, in t.h.e lead-up to the 2004 federal election the South ~'1-usttalian Farmers' Federation and the 
Western ~\usttalian Farmers Fede.ration (Inc) inserted advertisements in national newspapers claiming that 2 
million ~r\usualian jobs were at risk from national competition policy because "the playing field is not level 
Our trading partners don't play by the same rules": The Australian, \Vednesday, ,;:\ugust 25, 2004, p7, 
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based approach to liberalization in an international environment marked by 
immobile and underemployed resources, limited access to proprietary 
technologies, dirty floats, continuing protectionism and oligopolistic market 
structures. 
Internationally, the multilateralist orthodoxy that asserted itself in 
Australian trade policy during the 1980s also faced challenge, with 
developments in Europe and North America marking a renewed enthusiasm 
for PTAs. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 opened the way for the 
European Union to expand its membership t-0 include eastern European 
nations. In the western hemisphere the US, Canada and Mexico signed 
NAFTA and negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
commenced, while in Asia ASEAN declared the establishment of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area. These activities fuelled speculation that world trade might 
be fractured by the development of three continental trading blocs: one in 
the Americas centred on the US, one in Europe based upon the European 
Union and one in the Asia Pacific centred on Japan (Frankel, 1997: 11; 
Snape, et al, 1998: 458). These concerns resonated in Australia because the 
Asia Pacific region had no strong institutional ru·chitecture linking the 
North American economies with those of East Asia and the Pacific in the 
way that the l\1arshall Plan and NATO linked the US and Europe (Edwards, 
1996: 462-63). Within days of successfully wresting the prime ministership 
from Bob Hawke, Paul Keating was preparing for the early 1992 visit by US 
President George Bush amid concerns that the North American superpower 
may have been reassessing its strategic engagement with the Asia Pacific 
region. In his first meeting with President Bush on New Years Day, 1992, 
Prime Minister Keating voiced concern about the development of a tripolar 
trading world based around the US, Europe and Japan, and urged the need 
for the US to augment its relations in the region. based on a series of 
bilateral alliances that formed spokes in a wheel with the US at the centre, 
by making APEC the basis of a regional institutional architecture (Edwards, 
1996: 463). 
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Among the developments fuelling concerns about the descent of the global 
trading environment into three separate trading blocs, the most striking 
was the US about-face from its long·standing reluctance in the post·war 
period to participate in preferential trade agreements. Frankel argues this 
policy shift, which was first signaled in the early 1980s, had it origins in the 
expansion of the European Community (1997'. 5). For most of the postwar 
period the US had tolerated the development of European economic 
integration on a regional and preferential basis as a means of securing 
political stability and peace in the area, and had responded to such 
developments by maintaining the momentum of trade liberalization at the 
multilateral level through the GATT. But in 1982 this changed when the US 
encountered resistance at a GATT ministerial conference in Geneva for a 
new round of multilateral negotiations at a time when growing 
international competitive pressures were helping undermine domestic 
support for freer trade (Frankel, 1997: 5). The US responded to the rebuff by 
swiftly negotiating PTAs with Israel and Caribbean nations and beginning 
discussions with Canada, and this willingness to contemplate PTAs 
persisted during and beyond the Uruguay Round, encapsulated in the view 
that any progress toward removing trade barriers was good, regardless of 
whether it happened multilaterally or on a preferential basis. In the US 
there was a growing sense that its global economic preponderance was in 
decline, and that therefore it might have more to gain through a preferential 
trade agenda than simply continuing to champion multilateral liberalization 
alone. 
It was in this environment that the US government approached the Hawke 
government in the mid·1980s about the possibility of negotiating a PTA. By 
overturning its long-standing refusal to participate in regional trade 
agreements the US signaled an apparent weakening in its commitment to 
the multilateral trading regime (Bergsten, 1997: 2). It also came at a time of 
rising non·tariffbarriers to trade in 1985 the OECD estimated that the 
number of such barriers had quadrupled between 1968 and 1983 (Salvatore, 
1987: 1) - amid concerns that the recession that hit developed nations 
112 
The Power to Deal 
between 1980 and 1982 fuelled a revival of protectionist attitudes among 
OECD member countries (Corden, 1987: 57). It has been suggested that, 
aside from any overt desire to negotiate a bilateral trade deal with Australia, 
the US government was floating the possibility of bilateral trade 
agreements as a way to put pressure on negotiations at the multilateral 
level (Snape, 1986). The·then Minister for Trade, John Dawkins, in 
December 1985 commissioned a study of a possible Australia·US PTA 
(Snape, et al, 1998: 458). The study, undertaken by Snape, warned of the 
import diversion costs of such an agreement, and its possible impact on 
trade relations with other nations and on the viability of the multilateral 
trade system. It concluded that Australia's interests would be best served by 
pursuing trade liberalization on a broad front - preferably multilateral but, 
if progress at that level was unsatisfactory, then regional. Accepting the 
study's findings, Dawkins decided not to pursue the American offer. 
The possibility of an Australia ·US FTA was again advanced in 1992 when a 
State Department official, Robert Zoellick (to become USTR in 2001) 
proposed an AUSFTA as one of a series of regional trade 'spokes' with the 
US as the 'hub' (Raby, 2005). The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
commissioned a study into Australia's possible participation in regional 
trade agreements which reaffirmed that the nation's interests lay in the 
expansion of an open multilateral trading system, with the caveat that 
PTAs should be considered where efforts at the multilateral level faltered 
(Snape et al, 1998: 472). Among reasons cited for rebuffing the Zoellick 
proposal was that America's political sales pitch (that Australia would be 
one of a number of spokes centred around the US) was unappealing (Raby, 
2005). Also, Australia was deeply immersed in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations and did not want a distraction from its efforts there, and linked 
to this was a concern about the impact of such an agreement on the cohesion 
of the Cairns Group. As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven, in 
the late 1990s the Howard government similarly rebuffed approaches from 
the Clinton administration for an AUSFTA, judging it prudent to await the 
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outcome of the US presidential election in 2000 before embarking on such a 
move (Kunkel, 2005; Downer. 2008). 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
By the end of the Uruguay Round of GA TT negotiations Australia's trade 
policy had developed in ways that even the most optimistic of free trade 
advocates over the preceding 92 years of the nation's history may not have 
envisaged. The edifice of protectionism that had been a virtual constant of 
national policy was under serious assault and the preferentialism that had 
marked Australia's approach to trade for much of the twentieth century was 
being overshadowed by an apparent enthusiasm for multilateral and 
unilateral approaches to trade policy. 
International economic and political conditions provided the arena in which 
these changes occurred, and they were influenced, to varying degrees, by 
ideas generated offshore. For example, the protectionist reaction of many 
economies to the Great Depression created the political and economic 
environment in which Australia signed up to the Imperial system of 
preferences centred on Great Britain. But Australia's participation was not 
merely a function of international forces, because what sustained the policy 
was a level of domestic political comfort with, and support for, the Empire. 
The importance of this was manifest in Australia's persistence with its 
membership of the system for 14 years after it struck the Mutual Aid 
Agreement with the United States, despite the increasingly unfavourable 
impact it had on Australian trade in hampering access to cheaper imports 
and more favourable export prices. 
A brief appraisal of Australian trade policy since Federation shows that 
engagement with trade liberalization in general, and multilateral trade 
liberalization in particular, has been a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Despite the initial political cleavage between Free Traders and 
Protectionists, industry protection was an uncontroversial policy for much of 
last century. The post·war trend toward lower protection among advanced 
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industrial economies played little role in deliberations over changes in tariff 
policy within Australia until well into the 1970s. Australia's involvement in 
GATT until the Uruguay Round focused more on the rules of trade rather 
than tariff reductions, particularly in manufactures. 
The causes of the shift in Australian trade policy during the 1980s toward 
the embrace of unilateral and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization 
cannot be assessed except in the context of the broader program of economic 
reform that the nation was going through. The accumulation of pressures 
from continued regulation of the economy, identified in the. Campbell Report 
commissioned by the Fraser Government, made it increasingly difficult for 
governments to avoid reform. Yet the Coalition government in the early 
1980s was attached to the general economic orthodoxy that had prevailed 
for much of the previous 50 years, and resisted the urge for change (Howard, 
2006)86. VV'ben the Hawke government came to office in 1983 it gave no 
indication that it would proceed much differently from its predecessor in 
economic reform, yet within nine months it made a series of momentous 
decisions that set the Australian economy on a path that, among other 
things, opened the way for unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization 
policies. But the speed with which this change occurred, and the alacrity 
with which it was adopted by the Hawke government and influential 
members of the community, owes much to the way the intellectual ground 
was prepared over many years by an advocacy coalition for reform within 
government, academia and business. The steady accumulation and 
recognition of evidence about the costs and economic distortions of 
protection within government, business, academia and the broader 
community meant that change, when it came, had a ready-made support 
base. 
sc In a response to a question from the author about the le,rel of enthusiasm within the Fraser gove:r:runent 
for the :reforms recommended by the Campbell Reportt Hov..rard1s terse reply '\vas: ''Nonet• (Parliament 
House, May 31, 2006). Howard went 011 ro say that the Campbell Report was one of the mosnvidely adopted 
:reports on economic reform in ,;\ustralia' s history. 
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Changes in the international environment, including the growing mobility of 
capital and the evolution of increasingly global production networks, framed 
the circumstances in which Australia's trade policy developed in the 1980s. 
But the nature and timing of the policy response to such changes owed 
much to domestic factors, not least the accumulation of a support base for 
change within academia, business, politics and the community. 
This was not the end of the matter though. By the end of the Uruguay 
Round the multilateral orthodoxy within government, particularly within 
DFAT, appeared to be well·established. But, even before the negotiations 
had concluded, concerns about the degree of emphasis on multilateralism in 
trade policy began to resurface. Following the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round there was uncertainty about the future course of trade liberalization. 
The US, particularly through its leadership of the APEC Eminent Persons' 
Group, sought to establish discriminatory trade liberalization in the Asia 
Pacific region, a move resisted by many economies in the Western Pacific 
(Bergsten, 1994). This was part of what came to be seen as a broader retreat 
by the US from its former position as the foremost international champion 
of multilateral free trade. In Australia, similar uncertainty about the future 
ofmultilateralism in trade meant there was an increasingly receptive 
audience for some of the ideas regarding preferentialism re·emerging in the 
US. Following the Uruguay Round, within DFAT the thoughts and efforts of 
several key officials remained focused on multilateral approaches to trade 
liberalization, seeking to build on the inclusion of agricultural issues in the 
Uruguay Round to launch a new round of multilateral negotiations under 
the auspices of the WTO. But an undercurrent of skepticism about what 
further gains could be had through multilateral approaches was also 
gathering strength. 
Growing uncertainty about the future path of multilateral liberalization and 
hints by Prime Minister Paul Keating that Australia might consider the 
negotiation of preferential trade agreements showed that the success of 
Uruguay had not brought an end to the tension in trade policy between the 
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competing principles of protection or free trade, and of preferentialism or 
non-discrimination. It is argued in this study that underpinning this contest 
were two central and sometimes conflicting conceptions of trade policy as 
either primarily a means to help manage international relations or as a tool 
to foster economic development. In the Hawke and Keating governments the 
latter view was ascendant but, as is discussed in the next chapter, changes 
in the international policy environment helped undermine this position. 
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5. AUSTRALIA: POLICY TAKER OR POLICY MAKER? 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1990s the political costs of the e:iqiosure of the Australian 
economy to international markets began to assert themselves. Industries 
that had been sheltered for decades behind high tariffs had to undergo 
difficult restructuring that saw many factories close and thousands of jobs 
lost. The pain of this process was exacerbated by the effects of the 1991 
recession. vVhile the two events were contemporaneous rather than directly 
causally related, they were largely conflated in a swelling discontent 
regarding globalization and Australia's greater integration with the global 
economy. This discontent increasingly challenged ideas, institutions and 
norms that had developed among the leadership group of both major 
political parties as well as sections of the bureaucracy, academia, industry 
groups and the media around economic liberalism87, including the unilateral 
reduction of trade barriers. It formed a backdrop for the political contest 
within and between the major political parties during much of the decade, 
such as in 1993 when the incumbent Keating government was able to 
engineer an unlikely victory by, in part, portraying its Coalition opponent as 
dogmatically committed to driving the pace of economic restructuring even 
harder88. 
In examining the trade policies of smaller nations like as Australia, 
attention needs to be paid to causal factors operating at the international 
level, such as relative differences in national power89, the operation of 
a: Economic libernlism is used here to denote a pro-market orthodoxy chru:acterized by deregulation of 
markets, divestiture of public-o'\.vned industries and the reduction of barriers to trade, During the 1980s and 
1990s this approach had powerful advocates in both the Liberal and Labor parties, including (from Labor) 
Bob Hawke, Paul Keating and John Dawkins, and (among the Liberals) John Hewson, John Howard and 
Peter Costello. 
88 During the 1993 federal election campaign the John H~"Son~led Coalition comnUtted to cutting tariffs to 
'negligible' levels by 2000. Labor seized on the policy to mount a protectionist argument that \vhile it would 
maintain tariffs, including for the hard hit textiles, clothing and foo't\vear industry~ at 5 per cent on 20005 the 
Coalition 1.vould reduce them to -;rirtually zero (Snape, ct.al., 1998: 31). 
"For example, Baldwin (1987: 96-99) argues the multilateral trading system embodied in the GA1T (of 
which .Australia was a member) was founded a:od developed under the hegemonic .influence of the lJS, But 
structu:ral changes in world ptoduction have brought about a decline tu the dominant economic position of 
the US, affecting its support for multilateral open trade :jbid, 110-11 ). 
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multinational organizations like the \VTO and APEC90, international capital 
flows91 and the influence ofideas92 · generated both domestically aml 
internationally - in response to global developments and their domestic 
impact. But equally, such exogenous factors are filtered and interpreted 
through domestic political and economic structures and contests. The focus 
of this chapter is on how both external and endogenous factors helped 
weaken political commitment to economic liberalization and contributed to 
the embrace of preferential trade agreements as part of Australia's trade 
policy. 
International factors and pressures helped set Australia on the path of 
economic liberalization in the early 1980s. The system of exchange rate and 
financial controls that had been used by successive governments to protect 
Australia's financial system during the post·war period was coming under 
severe pressure in the early 1980s due to the increasing international 
integration of financial markets. The externally·generated shock of huge 
volumes of currency flow in and out of the economy made existing 
arrangements increasingly untenable and confronted the newly·elected 
Hawke government with a stark choice to either float the currency float or 
re·regulate. But, as Woods (20oo: 4) points out, the globalization of finance 
that has seen an international marketplace for currencies develop is not 
merely an artifact of technology and the development of sophisticated 
financial instruments, but also of government policies: the increased 
globalization of finance in the 1970s was made possible by government 
decisions to give market operators more freedom and abolish postwar 
capital controls. Hawke and Keating were both inclined towards 
deregulation even before winning office, influenced by their own experiences 
with industry as well as by arguments advanced by policy entrepreneurs 
such as Sir Keith Campbell, who recommended financial deregulation in a 
report which (as noted in Chapter Four) the Fraser government 
% See, for exatnple, f\-1ansfield e1 al (2003), and Raven.hill (2D04). 
" Garrett (1996) and Hiscox (2004). 
92 See, for example, Goldstein (1988), lvlilner (1999), Glezer (1982), Garnaut (2003), Mack and Ravenhill 
(1994) and Capling (1997). 
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commissioned but largely ignored (Edwards, 1996: 205·08). Once in 
government Treasurer Keating appointed a committee to review the 
Campbell recommendations. But even before it reported in 1984 Hawke, 
Keating and the·then Reserve Bank of Australia governor Bob Johnston had 
won the political battle against Treasury secretary John Stone to float the 
currency (ibidJ93 , a decision with massive knock·on effects across the whole 
economy, setting it on the path of liberalization. In this way the currency 
regime connected an external economic shock with a policy to liberalize the 
economy. As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, consequent 
extensive industry restructuring helped realize rapid gains in productivity94, 
but the attendant dislocation in employment - exacerbated by the early 
1990s recession · unleashed political forces that damaged the liberalizing 
orthodoxy. Coinciding with the stagnation of multilateral trade 
liberalization efforts post· Uruguay, the effect on trade policy was to put an 
increasing focus on bilateral bargaining and preferentialism. 
The advancing globalization of financial markets and production was 
conducive to the decision by the Hawke government to act against the 
prevailing protectionist and preferential orthodoxy and set Australia on the 
path of economic liberalization. This chapter examines post· Uruguay Round 
developments in ideas about, and attitudes toward, multilateralism and the 
approach to trade liberalization embodied in the institutional norms of non· 
discrimination are examined with a view to establishing the extent to which 
such factors helped shape trade policy under the Howard government. 
5.2 AUSTRALIA AND MULTILATERALISM POST-URUGUAY 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Australia has been a constant, if not always 
significant, participant in multilateral approaches to trade policy since the 
Second \Vorld \Var, initially through GATT and later the \VTO and APEC. 
93 Howard (2006) argued that the greater contribution to introducing financ1al de-regulation and floating the 
cunency was made by Hawke and Johnston, rather than Keating, neglecting the key role played by economics 
adviser l\.oss Gamaut~ who was a strong advocate of deregulation and liberalization. 
94 ~.\ccording to a Productivity Commission analysis, between 1993~94 and 1998-99 producti·vity expanded at 
a record rate; with nntlti-factor productiviry increasing at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent and labour 
producthrity gro\vin.g annually by ~.2 per cent O)roductiv:ity Co1nm:ission, 2003b: xiii-A•rii), 
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Capling (2001) posits that the vigor of Australia's participation, and its 
success in pursuing its policy goals, has varied, but successive governments 
have attached sufficient value to the process to maintain their involvement. 
One set of explanations for the Australian government's increasing 
willingness to negotiate preferential trade agreements owes much to the 
view that Australia is a policy taker and that, faced with frustratingly slow 
multilateral progress toward trade liberalization, Australian governments 
were forced to pursue regional and bilateral preferential trade 
arrangements. Variants of this view have been expressed by many involved 
in the development and implementation of Australian trade policy since the 
mid·1990s. Senior government ministers and officials have expressed the 
view (Downer, 2008; Fischer, 2005; Raby, 2005; Calvert, 2006; Thawley, 
2006) that Australia's trade policy developed in the way that it did as a 
pragmatic response to changes in the international trade policy 
environment that threatened to put the nation at a disadvantage vis a vis 
economic or political rivals (Downer, 2008; Kunkel, 2005; Fischer, 2005; 
DFAT, 2003; Calvert, 2006; Thawley, 2006; Garnaut, 2003). Implicit in this 
view, dubbed by Garnaut (2003: 14) the Theory of the Unimportant Country, 
is the idea that Australia has little or no influence over the structure of the 
international trading system, which is shaped and defined by greater 
powers. 
As discussed in the last chapter, the ways in which Australia's trade policy 
has been conceived and implemented owes much to the influence of 
international political and economic structures: from the state-based system 
of negotiating trade agreements through to the establishment of 
transnational systems of preferences such as those built through the UK· 
centred Ottawa Agreement and the development of multilateral negotiating 
entities such as GATT and the \VTO. The central feature of Australian trade 
policy arising from these influences is that trade policymaking is sited 
firmly with the national government. The wide array of government and 
non-government actors that participate in, or seek to shape, Australia's 
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trade policy may participate in parallel international organizations such as 
multilateral industry groups like the Cairns Group Farm Leaders forum 95, 
but the primary focus of their policy·shaping activities is the Australian 
government and, most particularly, its political leadership. 
The trade policies adopted by Australian governments from the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round to the negotiation of the AUSFTA, the period which 
is the focus of this study, is best underst-0od from the viewpoint of the 
relative autonomy of national governments. But, because governments 
operate in an international system of states, they are affected by the actions 
of others. In trade, the compulsion to participate in trade negotiations arises 
primarily from the anticipated costs of not taking part when, because of the 
integrated nature of trade, any decisions made or arrangements entered 
into are likely to have a material effect on a nation. This can include, at the 
multilateral level, involvement in devising and implementing rules 
governing trade in goods and services or, at the regional or bilateral level, 
losing out in the race for markets against rival producers. See, for example, 
de Jonquieres (2000), Eisley (2004) and Findlay (2002). As former Foreign 
l'vfinister Downer put it, Australia 'didn't have to do it [negotiate PTAs]. We 
could have just been passive, [but] it just seems improbable Australia would 
have done that, actually. It would have been a little eccentric to take the 
view that in no circumstances would we negotiate a FTA' (Downer, 2008). 
5.3 THEWTO 
For those involved in developing and implementing Australian trade policy, 
one of the most promising results of the Uruguay Round was the negotiation 
of a framework agreement for agricultural trade, with disciplines in the key 
areas of domestic support, market access and export subsidies (Capling, 
2001: 144). While the end result was less than the Australian-led Cairns 
Group of agricultural exporting countries had aimed for, it was a significant 
95 The forum consists of fanning industry representatives from the 17 Cairns Group member countries. In 
.r\ustralia's case~ the representative organization is the National Farmers' Federation, 
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innovation in a GATT system that, until then, had been marked by little 
concrete progress toward agricultural trade liberalization. 
The very breadth of the Uruguay Round outcomes, comprising 19 formal 
agreements, 24 decisions, eight understandings, and three declarations 
(Ruggiero, 1995) meant there was significant work for nations, individually 
and collectively, to do. Not only was there a new organization, the WTO, to 
establish and a new disputes settlement process to be bedded down, nations 
also had to ensure their trade arrangements were compliant with their 
GATT commitments and negotiations in the number of areas including 
financial services trade, the movement of natural persons and 
telecommunications services were on·going (Ruggiero, 1995). There was 
general recognition of the need for a lull in the pace of multilateral trade 
negotiations following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round to allow the 
results to be consolidated and for governments to replenish their trade 
negotiation resources (Kenyon, 2005; Capling, 2001: 143; Ruggiero, 1995), 
with a new round of negotiations for services and agriculture to begin within 
five years. 
Even before the Uruguay Round had concluded, considerable uncertainty 
was emerging about a future round, exacerbated by increasing debate 
internationally about the relative merits of multilateral, regional and 
bilateral approaches to trade liberalization (Grinspun and Cameron, 1993: 
17), Fuelling this was the development of substantial regional trading 
arrangements in Europe and North America. Even before the Uruguay 
Round agreements were formally signed in April 1994 the North America 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), then the world's largest 'free' trade area, 
came into effect. The NAFTA negotiations had been running parallel with 
the Uruguay R-0und talks, and were seen by some as emblematic of a 
growing US interest in developing bilateral and regional approaches to 
trade liberalization96 and a rejection of trade liberalization based on the 
MFN principle that had been a feature of US trade policy for most of the 
96 As early as 1982, when prospects for a new G1\TT round were uncertain, the-then l.JSTR \X-'illiam Brock 
suggested a regional approach to l'''I~c\s as an alternative instrumenr to achieving global free trade (Panagariya, 
1999: 157). 
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post·World War Two period (Panagariya, 1999: 155·56; Eden and l\folot, 
1993: 220). NAFTA, of course, was not alone. It largely coincided with the 
acceleration of economic integration being undertaken in Europe following 
the end of the Cold War. In East Asia economic integration was increasing, 
largely driven by commercial arrangements such as regional production 
networks than as a result of government policies or institutional 
arrangements (Chia and Pangestu, 2006: 123·26). Although developing at 
roughly the same time, the trading blocs emerging in North America and 
Europe were fundamentally different approaches to trade liberalization 
(OECD, 1995: 13·14), and occurred largely independently of one another and 
of policy trends in the rest of the world (Anderson and Blackhurst, 1993: 2). 
These processes of regional integration raised concerns that a ti-i·polar 
global trading system was developing, based on a unified Europe, a North 
American bloc and a Japan·based trade region (Grinspun and Cameron, 
1993: 17), and sparked i-enewed intei-est in much of the world in regional 
trading arrangements (Anderson and Blackhurst, 1993: 2·3). Feeding into 
this was debate about whether such regionalism was beneficial or 
antithetical to the multilateral approach to libei-alization97• 
Significantly, in Australia these developments were viewed with a mix of 
interest and concern, drawing out tensions inherent within the trade policy 
community between committed multilateralists and those more willing to 
contemplate the negotiation of bilateral or regional trade agreements. Even 
before the Uruguay Round concluded thei-e was some degree of disillusion 
expressed with the outcomes of multilateral approaches to trade 
liberalization. For trade officials such as Peter Field, Graeme Thompson and 
Don Kenyon the results of the Round, particularly bringing agricultural 
trade and attendant export subsidies within the rules ofGATT, made it a 
97 Observing these trends in 1995 the OECD judged that NAFTA and the while two fundamentally 
different approaches t\\'o trade liberalization, were both compatible \vith multilateral liberalization and had 
actually been a positive development in liberalizing international trade (OECD, 1995: 13-14, 88). But others, 
such as Bhagwati: and Panagariya, viewed such attangetnen.ts as a flawed instrument of liberalization 
(Panaga1iya, 1999: 158-60), or as exacerbating inequality between nations and within countries (Grinspun and 
Camexon. 1993: 3~23), 
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success. The effect of the success was to transform the outlook of at least 
some trade officials, who had gone into the negotiations doubtful about their 
value but who emerged as strong advocates of the multilateral approach: 
The Uruguay Round was an enormous endeavour, so much was 
achieved, and it certainly made me into a committed multilateralist 
because we got fabulous results in agriculture in terms of rules -
Kenyon, 2005. 
But heightened expectations about what could be achieved through the 
process, and subsequent disappointment when the results fell short, helped 
feed interest in alternate approaches: 
As officials who were primarily involved in the negotiations, we felt 
that we got more than we really expected. But the hype and 
expectations created in the political classes about what the 
multilateral system could deliver meant that what it actually did 
deliver was less than was expected, and took longer than expected, 
and that drove revisionism - Kenyon, 2005. 
Those committed to the multilateral approach and keen to build on the 
results of the Uruguay Round pushed for a new multilateral round to 
commence at least by the turn of the century (Raby, 2005). In 1995 then 
Trade Minister, Bob l.VkMullan, published Hlin11ing lrfarkets, written by his 
then trade advisor Geoff Raby, which canvassed a multipronged approach to 
trade liberalization - multilateral, regional and bilateral. But after flirting 
with the idea, McMullan reverted to a commitment to multilateralism and a 
new WTO round as the only way to achieve substantial liberalization, 
particularly in agriculture. In February 1996 the minister hosted a 
conference in Sydney, Future Directio11s for the Multilateral Tradi11g 
Sy.9tem, and it arrived ata consensus in support of a new round (Raby, 
2005). But these efforts were frustrated by reluctance internationally to 
commence a new round, as evidenced by the failure ofWTO ministerial 
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talks in Geneva in 1998 and Seattle in 1999 to achieve agreement on the 
launch of a new round. 
5.3.1 FORMATION OF THE WTO 
With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round ofGATT negotiations, agreement 
was reached on several fronts that substantially changed the nature of the 
multilateral trade negotiation organization. During the course of the round 
the size and scope of the GATT expanded so that, by the time of its formal 
conclusion in 1994, 123 countries were participating in the negotiations and 
the agenda had broadened well beyond goods to include services and 
intellectual property issues, as well as the creation of the WTO itself (WTO, 
2006a; Vaile, 2006b). 
As preparations proceeded for the next round of trade negotiations under 
the auspices of the new WTO, the number of participating countries 
continued to grow, as did the scope of the agenda. By the time the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) was launched in November 2001 about 100 
issues covering everything from tariff rate quotas and export credits 
through to trade-related investment and intellectual property measures, 
environmental issues and special provisions for developing and least 
developed countries were on the agenda for negotiation by 143 nations98. As 
the \VTO itself acknowledged, the length and difficulty of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations led to considerable skepticism that similarly ambitious 
negotiations could ever be successfully undertaken again (vVTO, 2006a) and, 
with progress on the DDA appearing only fitful by mid·2006, those doubts 
were echoed by some involved in the formulation and implementation of 
Australia's trade policy. 
Despite the inauguration of the WTO in January, 1995, the conditions for 
the initiation of a new multilateral round of trade negotiations were 
inauspicious. Faltering American leadership of, and enthusiasm for, 
9s Soort after the DDA was formally launched several countries, most notably China (WT'O accession on 11 
December 2001), have joined the \"'VTO, and as at 11December2005 its 1nembership had reached 149 
member nations ('Xl'ro. 2006b). 
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multilateral trade liberalization robbed the new organization of much of its 
impetus, as did the pre·occupation of many other economies, such as in 
Europe, with more regional concerns. 
It is often argued that the move towards the negotiation of bilateral 
preferential trade agreements is a consequence of the size and breadth of 
the \VTO membership, and the wide scope of its agenda, which has 
hampered, if not stymied, the negotiation of further multilateral trade 
liberalization, forcing governments, including the Australian government, to 
pursue other opportunities, like PTAs99. According to former DFAT 
secretary Ashton Calvert his department devoted considerable resources to 
the launching of a new multilateral round during the second half of the 
1990s, and the frustration felt when the Seattle meeting in 1999 failed was 
profound and deep (Calvert, 2006). 
Former Trade Minister Tim Fischer, former Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer and John Kunkel, a policy adviser to both Fischer and Trade 
Minister Mark Vaile, argue this was a compelling factor in deliberations 
within government, particularly Cabinet, over the shape of Australia's trade 
policy. According to Fischer, Prime Minister John Howard was particularly 
critical of the VITO and its ability to deliver improvements in trade 
liberalization: 
Very sharp set of internal utterances, not so much in Cabinet but 
around the PM's office and interface we had, questioning the 
multilateral, reflecting the criticism from many parts of the economy 
wrapped up in that process that there was no such thing as a level 
playing field - Fischer, 2005. 
If you talk to a number of different governments post· Uruguay Round 
you can see, though you would not want to concede this publicly, that 
99 The causal chain, according to some, is the reverse, For instance, Bhagwati (2002) and Garnaut (2003) 
argue that the diversio:n of political effort into negotiari:ng P1'~~S has robbed the \V!O's -liberalization agenda 
of its momentum. 
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that is a forlorn hope, that in the next 50 years you are probably not 
going to achieve a global free trade agreement. It wasn't that we 
didn't think the multilateral approach was good. '\Ve did think it was 
good. It's just that we were open·eyed and realistic about what could 
be achieved. And so we decided [that in order] to supplement our 
efforts to gain greater market access and a better and freer trading 
environment for Australia we should see if we could negotiate 
bilateral free trade agreements, and we did - Downer, 2008. 
The important thing to remembei· is the international context within 
which the decision [to pursue PTAs] was taken. Even [former \VTO 
Director-General] l'V[ike Moore, an arch multilateralist, said that ifhe 
had been trade minister, he would have decided the same thing. In 
the absence of multilateral progress, and APEC running into the sand, 
this thing [the negotiation of PTAs] came up - Kunkel, 2005. 
In its 2003 foreign and trade policy \\'bite Paper the Howard government 
professed a commitment to multilateral liberalization as the best possible 
outcome for Australia, but argued that with progress in the Doha Round 
likely to be slow, PTAs offered a faster route to market access gains (DFAT, 
2003: 58·9) while reinforcing multilateral efforts. Despite the negotiation of 
three bilateral PTAs and the pursuit of several more, the·then trade 
minister Mark Vaile insisted the Australian government's commitment to 
the multilateral process as the best path to trade liberalization had 
remained unshaken: 'Freeing up trade through the World Trade 
Organization remains our highest trade priority' (Vaile, 2006a). 
But there was a wariness expressed by Howard and some of his senior 
ministers about multilateral institutions and the extent to which they might 
impose quite onerous obligations with little in the way of return. For 
example, during a visit to London in 2003 Howard was disparaging about 
the European Union at a business function: 
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It is a law of political behavior. You give regulation·making authority 
to a supra·national bureaucracy which is effectively accountable to 
nobody, you get a lot of extra regulations ... bureaucracies of that kind 
have to do something to justify their existence and they generate new 
rules - Howard, cited in Taylor, 2003. 
And the same year, Australia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, said: 
Some multilateral institutions will remain important to our interests. 
But increasingly multilateralism is a synonym for an ineffective and 
unfocused policy involving internationalism of the lowest common 
denominator. - Downer, cited in Tingle, 2003. 
These comments were made in an international context characterized by an 
increasingly muscular unilateralism in United States foreign policy, 
particularly following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York. 
A willingness to 'go it alone' had become an increasingly marked feature of 
discussions in the United States, particularly within Congress, regarding 
foreign policy since the early 1990s. Traub (2006: 40·3) notes the scarifying 
effect the bloody failure of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in 
Somalia in which 18 US soldiers died - had on attitudes within the United 
States towards the UN and multilateral obligations. In 1998 the Helms· 
Biden Bill, which demanded stringent reforms in, and limitations of, the UN 
in exchange for payment of a back· log of dues, embodied much of the fear 
and loathing felt by many US legislators and their constituents regarding 
the global body and perceived incursions on United States sovereignty and 
independence arising from multilateral arrangements (ibid, 146·68). Senior 
officials in the newly-elected Bush administration shared many of these 
concerns. Bush's national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney had little 
patience with universalist values and their embodiment in international 
treaties and laws. In an essay setting out her views, Rice argued with 
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disapproval that when foreign policy was driven by values humanitarian 
interests and the needs of the international community subsumed pursuit of 
national interests, meaning that the United States could only legitimately 
exercise its power when it did so "on behalf of someone or something else" 
(ibid, 170). 
Putting this view into practice, in its first eight months in office the Bush 
administration affirmed that the United States would not ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty with Russia, repudiated the International Criminal Court 
and opposed proposed pacts to control small arms sales and biological 
weapons as well as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (ibid, 171). As 
Garran (2004: 108-09) points out, the dilemma confronting a dominant 
power such as the US is that the material capability that helps underpin its 
role as an international leader in building inter-state co-operation and 
establishing a multilateral institutional architecture cannot be exercised 
unilaterally without threatening the credibility of the very system it helped 
c1·eate. The extent to which the US responded to the terrorist attacks as a 
great power rather than a systemic leader undermined co-operation and 
multilaterahsm in international affairs (Garran, 2004: 109). In a seminal 
statement in September 2002 setting out the national security strategy of 
the US, President Bush made it clear that his nation was prepared to 
unilaterally launch preventive attacks against people and nations it 
considered to pose a threat (Garran, 2004: 127-30). 
In publicly backing the Bush doctrine and committing Australian troops to 
the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Howard government 
implicitly put the value of Australia's security relationship with the US 
above that of a robust multilateral system that placed limits on state 
behaviour. It was a position of qualified multilateralism, in which support 
for multilateral co-operation was conditional on the extent to which it 
satisfied national policy goals rather than a commitment to multilateralism 
per se. The Bush administration's stance complemented the Howard 
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government's view that, in the political sphere, there had been an excessive 
emphasis and reliance on multilateral processes particularly the United 
Nations and its related bodies by the Hawke and Keating governments 
(Calvert, 2006). 
This position was a point of attack on the Howard government's PTA trade 
strategy and its possible impact on multilateral trade liberalization and the 
health of the international trading system by critics such as Ross Garnaut, 
Ann Capling and David Trebeck. Garnaut (2003: 17) argued that tho 
negotiation of PTAs by Australia not only undermined progress toward 
global free trade in the Doha Round but contributed to the proliferation of 
such agreements internationally. According to Capling, multilateralism and 
PTAs were not, as claimed in the 2003 DFAT White Paper, merely 
alternative and complementary paths to the same goal but were in fact 
substantively different (2004: 15), and the latter fundamentally undermined 
the rules-based non·discriminatory basis of the \VTO that was important for 
small and medium countries such as Australia. Trebeck100 (2003) objected 
that efforts to negotiate PTAs were diverting trade negotiation resources 
away from the multilateral Doha negotiations, and warned that a PTA with 
the US that involved compromises on important agricultural issues had the 
potential to undermine Australia's negotiating position at the Cairns Group 
and the WTO. The government responded to such objections by insisting 
that the negotiation of PTAs complemented efforts to achieve multilateral 
trade liberalization and, indeed, could often reduce trade barriers faster 
than the WTO, as well as covering areas including investment, competition 
policy and regulatory issues that are beyond the scope of the WTO (Vaile, 
2006b)101 . According to the·then Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, the 
Joo As managing director of ,_.\.CII~ Consu1ring, Trebeck \Vas commissioned by the Rural Industries Research 
and Development Cotporation to prepare a study on the economic impact of a PTA between ~-\ustralia and 
the lJnited States. T'he Howard government refused to release his report> which found that the economic 
benefits of such an agreement fo.r -"4..ustrnlia were Hvery finely balanced" (frebeck, 2003; Woldring, 2007). 
W'hen the report was leaked, Trade l\linister Mark Vaile criticised its findings and a separate report from the 
Centre for International Economics, commissioned by DF .. i..T, estimated the agreement"'k"'Ould deliver a net 
welfare gain ro ,-\ustralia of$US 9.9 billion over 20 years (CIE, 2001: vii). 
mi Though the Doha Development Round agenda, will ch was formally approved in 2001) has expanded the 
scope of the \VTO to covet many of the issues enwnerated by \ 7 aile, especially investment and intellectual 
property. 
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Howard government understood the arguments being mounted by Garnaut, 
Trebeck and others, but believed the dichotomy being described between 
bilateral PTAs and multilateralism was a false one: 
You have the multilateralist versus bilateralist debate, which I think 
is a bit of a false debate. It's a debate which is mainly waged by 
people who are kind of liberal internationalists who believe 
everything should be done on a multilateral basis and there is 
somehow something soiled about doing agreements on a bilateral 
basis. It's a bit of an ideology and for someone like me, much more of 
a national interest pragmatist, I have no problems with 
multilateralism. They say that people like me object to 
multilateralism or I'm against multilateralism. I'm against wasting a 
lot of time on something that is never going to work. And if I know 
this policy is not going to work then it's not the right policy. 
Multilateralism sometimes does work and sometimes it doesn't. A 
multilateral outcome is usually a very good outcome if you can get 
everyone to agree but the problem is that it is so difficult to do that -
Downer, 2008. 
The response underlines the qualified and skeptical nature of the Howard 
government's attitude toward efforts to achieve multilateral liberalization in 
the Doha Round during the early 2000s, a view reinforced by the global 
proliferation of PTAs. The government's policy response to this international 
environment ·to itself enter into the negotiation of PTA.s - reflected in part 
the belief that Australia had limited ability to shape the international trade 
policy environment (Garnaut, 2003: 14·16). 
5.4 PROLIFERATION OF PT As 
Flowing from this was that if other countries pursued PTAs Australia had 
little choice but to join in or risk being placed at a competitive disadvantage 
in international markets (DFAT, 2003: 59; Calvert, 2006, Downer, 2008). 
The rising number of preferential trading agreements being negotiated 
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globally, including within the Asia Pacific region, since the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round has been identified by several trade policy participants and 
observers, including those within the Australian government, as an 
important factor driving the increased emphasis on the negotiation of 
preferential trade agreements in Australian trade policy (DFAT, 2003: 59; 
Downer, 2008; Fischer, 2005; Oxley, 2005; Kunkel, 2005; Hawes, 2005; Raby, 
2005; Banks, 2005; Davis, 2005; Findlay, 2002). Throughout its 46·year 
existence from 1948 to 1994 the GATT received notifications of 124 PTAs. 
Since the WTO's inception there have been an additional 240 such 
agreements notified and, taking into account those signed but not yet in 
force, being negotiated or under consideration, the number reached 398 by 
10 February, 2008 (\VTO, 2008). It is noteworthy that the East Asian region 
which, before the end of the Uruguay Round had few such agreements in 
place, was expected to have about 70 deals by the end of 2006. 
The proliferation of these agreements, involving many important trading 
partners, has changed Australia's trade policy landscape since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO. It has 
brought the primacy of multilateral liberalization.into question, not least 
because, as discussed above, of increasing concern about the viability of the 
multilateral approach. The rise of PT As has also brought to the fore issues 
not raised by multilateralism. The intrinsically discriminatory nature of 
PTAs has meant that trade policy has acquired foreign relations dimensions 
that were absent from trade policy devised within a largely non-
discriminatory frameworkrn2. PTAs introduce a range of considerations 
around who should be approached for a PTA and why, what might be the 
political ramifications of not negotiating a PTA with some countries, what 
effect other PTAs might have on existing market access and calculations 
regarding the costs and benefits, political and economic, of joining or being 
ic2 Of course there are foreign relations implications in non-discriminatory trade policy·, Even though a 
signatory to the W-YO and its 1\1FN and national treatment principles Australia_, like many other rtations, has a 
long history of extending special trade concessions over and above those provided for under (J-i\ TI and the 
W'TO to nations in its region1 particularly least developed and developing countries, Fo.t: example, the South 
Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Ji.g:r:eement gives the South Pncific Forum island rmtions 
free and untestricted access to the "\ustrilian market for all products, on a non-reciprocal basis (\TIO~ 1998: 
31"2). 
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excluded from regional PTAs. John Howard himself indicated in late 2003 
that he was alert to the dangers posed by discriminating between countries 
when he told an audience of investors in London that Australia had derived 
great economic benefit from simultaneously developing and maintaining 
close relations with major trading partners including the US, China, Korea 
and Japan: 
So our links with North Asia are enormous and they remind 
audiences in Europe and they remind Australians that the future for 
our country lies not in making choices, but rather aggregating the 
opportunities that the world gives us - Howard, 2003. 
But at the very time he made these remarks, the·then prime minister and 
his government continued to push ahead with a trade policy that was 
inherently discriminatory. 
One approach to trying to understand the Howard government's policy 
response t,o the international proliferation of PTAs is through game theory. 
Joining a PTA may be viewed as a 'safe haven' strategy, adopted when 
trading partners are doing the same (Dee and Sidorenko, 2006: 217). Lloyd 
(2001: 236) argues the costs for Australia of not participating in PTAs are 
costs of exclusion the loss of preferences over other outside exporters in 
member markets, and the cost of competing on less favorable tei;ms than 
exporters from member countries1°3. The challenge posed by such 
agreements is captured by i\.lan Winters in his oft·cited remark: 
Regional (preferential) trading arrangements are like street gangs: 
you may not like them but if they are in your neighborhood, it is safer 
to be in one. - cited in Findlay, 2000: 1. 
rn3 Lloyd also notes that exclusion from a PT~.\ may benefit imports because there are no trade diversion costs 
(2001; 236), But, he argues, for a counttyvzith lour trade barriers such as Australia, these be:nefits are not likely 
ro be substantial, 
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This is the so·called domino or bandwagon effect (Findlay, 2002: 609; 
Kunkel, 2002: 245; Ravenhill, 2004: 64), in which anticipated effects of trade 
agreements between two other nations on the trading conditions of 
businesses based in a third are as important as actual outcomes in shaping 
trade policy strategy. From this viewpoint PTAs may be regarded as a form 
of insurance against multilateral failure (Goldsworthy, 2001: 228). In its 
2003 foreign and trade policy \Vhite Paper, Advancing the National Interest, 
the Australian government flagged just these concerns: 
Many other countries are in the process of negotiating or seeking free 
trade ag1·eements with our trading partners. This could pose risks to 
our interests if our competitors were to gain preferential access to our 
export markets ... Inaction as others negotiate free trade agreements 
could risk an erosion of our competitive position in those markets -
DFAT, 2003: 59. 
According to former Foreign Minister Downer, there were both offensive and 
defensive grounds on which to pursue PTAs: 
One offensive, that is, to gain better access to that market and 
secondly defensive, so that your competitors in that market don't 
negotiate a FTA and gain an advantage over you. In relation to the 
US, for example, a FTA between the US and Chile without a similar 
agreement between Australia and the US would have given Chilean 
exporters of wine a very significant advantage in the American 
market - Downer, 2008. 
\Vhat is of interest here is not so much how well-founded or otherwise such 
concerns may have been, but what it says about how the Australian 
government of the day conceived trade policy, including what factors were 
considered important in framing such policy. The eclectic collection of PT As 
negotiated by the Howard Government appears to give only partial 
affirmation to the domino effect as an explanation of its trade policy. For 
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instance, even before the Singapore· Australia FTA, Singapore had so few 
barriers to trade in goods that it could hardly be argued that SAFTA was 
necessary to protect market access. Similarly, in negotiations of the 
AUSFTA there was no suggestion that Australian exporters were in 
imminent danger of being squeezed of out of existing US markets by PTAs 
struck with other countries. The most plausible such threat might come 
from the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FT.Ar\), including 
as it does major agriculture exporters Brazil and Argentina. But at the time 
of writing in late 2008 the likelihood of the FTA.A. delivering significant 
reductions in US trade barriers to agricultural products from Latin America 
still appeared distant104. 
V\'hat the AUSFTA does point t-0 is the primacy of considerations other than 
the purely economic in shaping trade policy. This is not necessarily new. In 
1989 Harris addressed what he saw as a misconception that foreign policy is 
something used to help agricultural trade policy. The reality, Harris argued, 
is that agricultural trade policy, and trade policy as a whole, is an integral 
part of Australia's foreign policy, because a) foreign policy is a means of 
achieving domestic objectives (including the prosperity of the agricultural 
sector); b) effective pursuit of Australia's international objectives requires a 
strong economy, and agriculture contributes substantially to that strength; 
and c) a stable international order, including in agricultural trade, is critical 
for Australia's peace and economic progress (Harris, 1939: 1). The merging 
in the mid·l980s of the departments of trade and foreign affairs arguably 
reinforced this interrelationship, not least because of the ministerial 
seniority attached to foreign affairs. 
In setting out his government's reasons for negotiating the AUSFTA, John 
Howard cited a number of motives, reflecting in part the difficulty of trying 
to separate trade and foreign relations considerations. On occasion Howard 
Hl4 The difficulty of getting the US to ngree to :agri(:li].tural trade liberalization in the absence of a reciprocal 
move by the EC has dogged the Doha Round negotiauons and was underlined by the difficulties /rnstralian 
negotiators encountered in trying to win improved access for ... \ustralian agricultural products in the 
,\USFfA. 
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asserted the deal was pursued and struck purely for economic reasons, and 
his government would not have signed it if it failed to deliver real economic 
gains105. But Downer makes it clear that PTAs were also viewed as a means 
of significantly strengthening political relations between trading partners 
(Downer, 2008). Though the former prime minister rejected suggestions that 
trade should be used as a lever in its strategic alliance with the United 
States (Howard, 2005), in reality the strategic relationship between the two 
nations was central to the AUSFTA (Howard, 2003b; Kelton, 2006: 6) - a 
proposition underlined by the his government's decision to sign the 
agreement despite the failure to win significant concessions on trade access 
for agricultural products106. The US government was more transparent in 
the importance it attached to strategic considerations when negotiating 
PTAs, including that with Australia. During the 1990s there was a revival 
in what is called linkage politics in the US, expressed as a strengthening 
nexus in US trade policy between strategic and economic interests (Kelton, 
2006: 3; Hartcher, 2003). Such a connection was already apparent in the 
negotiation of NAFTA and underpinned the priority accorded to the 
negotiation of the FTAA (Higley, 2001). But the policy approach was 
espoused most forcefully by USTR Bob Zoellick in 2003, when he declared 
that among the selection criteria for potential US PTA partners was their 
potential for collaboration in areas of strategic concern for the US (cited in 
Kelton: 3). 
5.5 APEC 
Developments at APEC in the early 1990s were also conspiring to frustrate 
the efforts of multilateralists in Australia's trade policy community. While 
10s 'fypical of such explanations was this pronouilcement in mid-2004: "The reasons \Vhy I'm supporting this 
Free Trade Agreement is not to bolster the American alliance -it's got nothing to do with that it's got 
everything to do with the fact that it will be good for .L\usttalia because the .American economy is the most 
powerful economy the world has eYer seen, A.nd, as the years go by, the """\merican economy \Vill be more 
important to .,\ustt:afu., it won't be less important .. \nd to use the language of the young, it's a no brainer in 
my view for us to sign that :agreement because it will bring benefits to ,:\ustralia" - Howatd, 2004a. (See also 
Howard, 2003b). 
100 In January 2004 Nationals leader John .1\nderson declared that: 11! cannot see how ,;\ustralia can agree to a 
free trade agreement that did not include a fair and reasonable approach to sugar/' (Forbes, 2004). But ;,,vhen 
access to the US sugar market was excluded from the :\USFf:\~ .:\nderson argued that it would be pointless 
to reject the proposed agreement and the market access gains made in other areas just because sugar w.i.s 
excluded from the tenns of the agreement 
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some advocates of APEC were keen to advance its credentials as a forum to 
generate support for multilateral trade liberalization through its concept of 
open regionalism107, there was concern within sections of the trade 
bureaucracy that, because it lacked any capacity to enforce member nations 
to comply with commitments made under its auspices, APEC would not 
'deliver' on trade liberalization: 
You go from Bogor in 1993, which raised utterly unrealistic 
expectations for APEC, and the slow dawning that APEC is not going 
to deliver on the trade liberalization agenda, and it is not going to 
deliver on trade liberalization because it is not a trade negotiation 
body, there is no mechanism for APEC to deliver. APEC messes 
around with EVSL and things, but it gets nowhere, none of it - Raby, 
2005. 
But such criticism could be judged as being overly harsh, given some 
measure of progress among APEC members toward greater trade 
liberalization. In a mid·way assessment of progress toward the Bogor goals, 
APEC found that, since its inception, average applied tariffs among member 
economies had dropped from 16.9 percent in 1989 to 5.5 percent in 2004 
while tariff and customs regimes had become more transparent with 
publication on·line of a database of tariff schedules, concessions, 
prohibitions and other information <APEC, 2008). Lower trade barriers have 
helped boost intra-APEC trade in goods and services, which more than 
tripled between 1989 and 2003 and accounts for an ever-growing share of 
APEC economies' GDP· from 13.8 percent in 1989 to 18.5 percent in 2003 
(ibid). At a meeting of senior officials in Lima in lVfay 2008 the 21 member 
economies committed to cutting the average customs tariff to 5 per cent in 
2010, with complete removal by 2020, 
107 Open regionalism was defined as outward-oriented :regional tr,-;.de liberaliz-ation that is consistent -....'1th the 
principles of G_,-\ TT and not to the detriment of other ec011omies (Elek, 1994: 212; Holmes and Falconer, 
1992: 124). 
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There were efforts within APEC forums to impart momentum to both the 
Uruguay Round negotiations and future multilateral trade liberalization 
programs. In November 1993 the APEC Eminent Persons Group 
recommended that the forum should pursue regional trade liberalization on 
terms consistent with GATT, and should seek to 'ratchet up' the process of 
global trade liberalization by, in part, setting a target date for the 
achievement of free trade in the region (EPG, 1993). In the Bogor 
Declaration made by APEC leaders in November 1994, the forum committed 
itself to a GATT·consistent goal of free and open trade and investment in 
the Asia Pacific no later than the year 2020, with industrialized economies 
agreeing to reach the goal by 2010 <APEC, 1994). But the chair of the 
Eminent Persons Group, C. Fred Bergsten, had argued that the way APEC 
member countries should proceed in order to attain the free trade goal not 
only within the APEC region but also within the WTO, was to initially 
establish APEC as a preferential trading bloc. Non·member countries would 
be invited to join in return for discriminatory trade concessions (Bergsten, 
1997)108. Australia's nominee on the EPG, former Labor New South Wales 
premier Neville \Vran, who was a lawyer by training, was deterred from 
supporting the US proposal when it became apparent the two countries 
would be isolated on the issue (Edwards, 2006). Bergsten's proposal fed into 
suspicions that the US government's interest in, and support for, APEC and 
its goal of open regionalism was limited and qualified, a perception further 
underlined when the establishment of one regional preferential agreement, 
NAFTA, was quickly followed by the opening of negotiations, at the US 
government's behest, for a Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
Ironically, APEC's strong public advocacy for trade liberalization consistent 
with GATT principles, and the commitments made at Bogor to achieve trade 
liberalization among APEC countries, was used by those skeptical about, or 
hostile to, multilateral commitments to advance their case. The non· 
prescriptive nature of the Bogor commitments, with nations free to advance 
lfzB. Despite this, Bergsten said that those such as Bhagwati and Saxonhouse \vho accused him of wanting 
~,\PEC to form a P1'.z\_ rather than pro1note global liberalization we:te in error (Bergs.ten, 1997). 
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to the agreed goals at a pace and sequence of their own choosing highlighted, 
some argued, a fatal flaw in APEC's structure, namely its non-binding and 
open-ended nature in which nations were not subject to any overarching 
structure of rules, as is the case in the WTO. Ravenhill (2004: 61-3) argued 
that the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis helped expose fundamental 
disagreements among APEC member countries not only about the forum's 
principle objectives (trade liberalization or the facilitation of economic 
development) but also how liberalization was to be achieved (unilaterally or, 
as advocated by Bergsten, on a negotiated preferential basis). Two pillars 
supporting the APEC approach were trade and investment liberalization 
and facilitation and economic and technical co-operation for capacity 
building among less developed members (Chia and Pangestu, 2006: 127). 
But the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization scheme, intended to 
accelerate APEC-wide liberalization across a number of specific sectors, 
foundered, feeding doubts about APEC's ability to achieve the Bogar goals of 
free trade and investment by developed country members by 2010 and by 
developing member nations by 2020 (Chia and Pangestu, 2006: 127). As 
Harris (2002: 129-31) argues, much of the criticism of APEC arose from a 
focus, particularly by the United States, on achievements in trade 
liberalization as the forum's principle or only criterion of success. By this 
measure, the failure of the EVSL initiative to meet its objectives reflected on 
the effectiveness of APEC itself. But, explains Harris, at least part of the 
failure of EVSL was because its negotiating premise was specific reciprocity, 
an approach favored by the United States but at odds with the broad 
acceptance of diffuse reciprocity in the region - an acceptance which 
underpinned the widespread pursuit of unilateral liberalization. 
According to Ravenhill (2004, 63, 68), these unresolved differences robbed 
APEC of much of its momentum as key member states diverted significant 
resources to other policy priorities. As Harris (2002: 130) notes, while trade 
facilitation and liberalization efforts were pursued through APEC, alternate 
approaches were also being developed or considered, including the 
establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (largely in response to the 
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negotiation ofNAFTA), discussion for a Japan·Korea free trade area, the 
development of an Asian trading bloc and initiatives by the United States to 
negotiate bilateral free trade agreements and special investment 
arrangements. Harris argues that during the 1990s APEC helped foster 
among its members - with the notable exception of the United States 
recognition that trade liberalization in itself delivered benefits and strong 
support for the GATTl\'VTO process. 
In assessing international forces that helped fuel support in Australia for 
the negotiation of PT:As, Ravenhill argues that APE C's increasingly 
apparent inability to deliver rapid progress on trade liberalization was 
much more significant that any perceived shortcomings of the \VT:O, because 
by the time the Seattle talks collapsed numerous bilateral deals in the 
region were already being proposed (2004: 63, 68). It is a view echoed by 
Kunkel, who says that the first real signs of a change in Australia's trade 
policy did not manifest themselves until late 1998, when the APEC meeting 
in Kuala Lumpur 'ran into sand' and the-then UST:R Charlene Barshevsky 
approached Trade Mi:rtister Tim Fischer with a proposal to establish a PTA 
encompassing the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Chile (Kunkel, 2005; Fischer, 2005). In the view of one senior trade official, 
the Bogor declaration had raised unrealistic expectations about what APEC 
could achieve, and as the decade wore on there was a slowly dawning 
realization that APEC was not going to deliver on the trade liberalization 
agenda (Raby, 2005). Others (Lloyd, 2001; de Jonquieres, 2000; Bisley, 2004) 
are inclined to put more emphasis on the W'TO's slow rate of progress rather 
than any perceived shortcoming of APEC in explaining the shift. According 
to Drysdale (2003), the emergence of new regionalism in East Asia was 
triggered by events surrounding the East Asian financial crisis, including 
the response by the United States: a loss of faith in APE C's capacity to deal 
with emerging problems, the increasing resort to preferentialism elsewhere, 
and the failure of the WTO talks at Seattle to launch a new round - a 
development seen as central to APEC's own liberalization agenda. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
A large and growing literature has developed around two key themes 
regarding the proliferation of PTAs since the mid·1990s: firstly, what is 
driving this process and secondly, whether it contributes to, or detracts from, 
global trade liberalization. The issues discussed in this chapter have fallen 
int-0 the first category- in particular, how the Howard government 
responded to this development, including the ideas and norms that have 
underpinned it. 
Several system·level theories suggest that the seeds of the proliferation of 
PTAs are to be found in the multilateral institutions themselves. For 
instance, Freund (2000) argues that the reduction in tariffs through 
multilateral agreement has meant that the potential market share gains for 
a low· tariff nation (such as Australia) from joining a PTA outweigh the cost 
in economic efficiency arising from trade diversion, while :Mansfield and 
Reinhardt (2003) suggest nations are negotiating PTAs as a way to improve 
their bargaining position with other nations and as an insurance against the 
continued stalling or collapse of the vVTO. Such considerations figured 
prominently in the Howard government's advocacy of PT As, including 
concerns about the slow rate of progress in Doha Round negotiations and 
the potential for Australian exporters to lose markets if commercial rivals 
have access to preferential trading arrangements under PTAs that they do 
not. 
International developments, particularly a waning enthusiasm for 
multilateralism among US policymakers amid intensifying regionalism in 
Europe, helped create an international environment conducive to the 
negotiation of PT As. These developments and their effect on the 
development of trade liberalization policy in the A.sia Pacific region provided 
a policy context that was congenial to the rebalancing of trade policy being 
undertaken by the Howard governn1ent away from what it saw as an over-
reliance on the multilateral path to trade liberalization. Developments in 
international trade policy, particularly in US tl·ade policy, resonated with 
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the conditional approach to multilateral engagement evident in the views of 
senior policymakers in the Howard government. 
In interviews conducted for this study, former foreign minister Downer and 
former prime ministerial adviser John Kunkel voiced considerable 
pessimism about prospects for a successful conclusion of the Doha Round of 
vVTO trade negotiations any time soon, and in 2003 both Howard and 
Downer gave voice to skepticism about the effectiveness ofmultilateralism 
and wariness of the obligations and entanglements that might arise from 
making multilateral commitments. 
Simultaneously, the proliferation of PTAs engendered two clear responses. 
One, as voiced by Downer in an interview with the author and articulated 
by DFAT in its 2003 policy White Paper, was the concern that Australian 
exporters would be at a commercial disadvantage if the government decided 
not to negotiate PTAs itself. As Downer put it, there were both offensive and 
defensive grounds on which to negotiate preferential trade deals: to gain 
better access to markets and to ensure that competitors do not get an 
advantage. The second response was to view PTAs as a tool to strengthen 
international strategic relationships. This was apparent in the negotiation 
of the AUSFTA, which was ratified even though it fell short of achieving the 
sort of outcomes some senior government ministers considered to be 
fundamental. Nationals leader and deputy prime minister Anderson had set 
"a fair and reasonable approach to sugar" as basic to achieving agreement, 
but the fact that access to the US sugar market was excluded entirely from 
the deal did not stop it going ahead. Striking such a deal with such a key 
strategic ally was more important than the content of the agreement itself. 
Underpinning this was a realist view of international relations, in which 
relativities of power define political relations between nations, and a 
sophisticated mercantilist understanding of trade, in which the principle of 
reciprocity- an exchange of'concessions' between two or more parties - is 
central (Dee and Sidorenko, 2006: 207). This reflected the idea that trade 
policy was less a tool of domestic economic reform and development, as had 
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been championed by the Hawke and Keating governments, than an arm of 
foreign policy and the management of international relations. 
This contrast in trade policy emphasis between the successive federal 
governments helps explain the differing response of the two governments to 
similar international circumstances. In 1990, when the Uruguay Round 
negotiations were suspended, the· then Australian government did not take 
up the option to pursue PTAs while the Howard government, when faced 
with similar concerns about progress toward multilateral trade 
liberalization in the late 1990s, did. Of course, the significant change in the 
international trade policy environment during the 1990s was conducive to 
the shift in trade policy emphasis. But it was not just exogenous factors that 
helped weaken political commitment to economic liberalization and 
contributed to the embrace of preferential trade agreements as part of 
Australia's trade policy. As is argued in the next chapter, domestic factors 
not least calculations of strategic gain in both domestic political contests 
and international relations - were key. It is to the domestic sources of trade 
policy, particularly the role of ideas, institutions, identities and interests, 
that the discussion now turns. 
144 
Tue Power to Deal 
6. PTAS: THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the lead·up to the 1996 election the Howard·led coalition's trade policies, 
as with many other aspects of its plans for government, were publicly 
articulated only in the broadest terms109. In his pre·election manifesto The 
Australia I Believe 111 (1995)110, John Howard indicated a Coalition 
government would increase the focus on opportunities to develop trade at 
the bilateral level. But, in policy terms, there was little indication of a 
significant move away from the bipartisan support that had underpinned 
the Australian government's pursuit of trade liberalization almost 
exclusively through multilateral negotiations111 during the 1980s and early 
1990sl12. 
However, trade policy was not quarantined from a broader realignment of 
policy as Howard sought to unseat the Keating· led Labor Party from 
government. Howard, sensing unease within the electorate about the 
economic and social impact of the economy's closer integration with world 
markets, and with pace and direction of change advocated by Keating, 
sought to exploit it politically by offering a much more incremental recipe he 
judged would appeal to the conservative tendencies of voters. For example, 
where Keating advocated much closer engagement with Asia, particularly 
Indonesia, Howard talked of 'restoring balance' to foreign policy by 
emphasizing the importance of traditional relationships with Britain and 
W9 .:ls noted by Williams (1997: 147-49) the How,u:d-led Coalition pursued a strategy that entailed releasing 
policies during the course of the federal election campaign rather than, as '\\-'as the case v-'ith John ffewson's 
Fightback! b:fanifesto, having policies ill the public domaill months before the campaign began. 
1w Howatd and one of his advisers lvf:ichael I/Estrange (who succeeded _,_,1_.shton Calvert as secretary of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in January 2005) developed and issued the manife,to in late 1995 in 
an attempt to help ward off the mounting pressure from the media and the government for greater policy 
detail (Williams, 1997: 149)" 
111 The significant exception being the continued work on bilateral trade liberalization between .t\.ustralia and 
New Zealand, based upon the 1983 Closer Economic Co-opetati.on agreement 
112 'Those advocating the negotiation of bilateral :and regional trade agreernents, particularly in the wake of the 
collapse of the 1982 G.A TT ministerial meeting in Geneva, encountered resistance on two key grounds: 
strong doubts about ./rustralia's ability to successfully negotiate increased access to key markets in Europe. the 
LTWted States and East Asia o:n a bilateral basis, and the opposition of two of its most important trading 
partners, Japan and South Korea, to disc:riroinatory trade agreements (Capling, 2001: 99-100). 
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the US. He sought to turn Keating's image as an agent of change into an 
electoral liability, not by disowning the economic reforms that Labor had 
implemented (many of which he supported), but by attacking the pace and 
management of change. This message was encapsulated in Howard's 
declaration that he wanted Australians to be 'relaxed and comfortable'll3 
about their country and its place in the world. ·where Keating talked of the 
need for reconciliation with the nation's indigenous population, and to re· 
consider the nation's history and identity as part of becoming a republic, 
Howard sought to soothe the electorate and reassure voters that there was 
nothing wrong with their reluctance to address such issues, and that such 
revisionism was uncalled for and unnecessary. This was not just an 
approach and judgment based upon 'gut feel'. Detailed polling conducted by 
the federal Liberal Party's in·house pollster Mark Textor in 1995 and early 
1996 identified disenchantment with the Keating government among lower 
paid socially conservative sections of the electorate, who were not only angry 
that promised tax cuts had been replaced by new taxes, but who felt left out 
of Keating's political agenda which had indigenous land rights, the republic 
and relations with Asia at its rhetorical centre (\Villiams, 1997: 52). 
The practical effect of this on government policy was to change the vantage 
point from which it was to be assessed and to encourage a re·appraisal of 
where it might be leading. For trade, in particular, it meant reconsidering 
policy means and objectives, including the use of trade policy as a tool to 
drive domestic economic reform and the desirability of a policy setting that 
valued multilateralism to the virtual exclusion of all alternatives. 
This chapter examines the political and institutional framework that 
facilitated the Howard government's shift to a trade policy in which the 
negotiation of PTA.s became a political goal. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the evolving international trade policy environment became 
increasingly conducive to the pursuit of PTAs from the late 1990s. But, as 
has been argued, international circumstance alone did not make the shift in 
m Interview on Four Camers, ,,>,BC TV, 20 February, 1996. 
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Australia's trade policy inevitable. In 1997, when federal Cabinet formally 
authorized the pursuit of PTAs, no such deals involving Australia were 
imminent. The most likely prospect at the time, of a PTA with ASEAN and 
New Zealand, faced two significant hurdles - the opposition of Malaysia and, 
to a lesser extent, Indonesia, to such a deal involving Australia, and the 
Asian economic crisis that developed in late 1997, which had the effect of 
putting an indefinite hold on any such plans. 
Domestic political factors were critical in shaping the Howard government's 
trade policy, but they had little to do with the needs or hopes of economic 
interest groups such as farmers or manufacturers, nor were they based upon 
the ambitions of a discernible policy community regarding the pace and 
shape of national economic development. Rather, it is argued, Australia's 
trade policy under the Coalition government was the product of an amalgam 
of the political calculations and inclinations of senior government members, 
particularly the prime minister, whose policy-making authority was 
amplified by the political institutional architecture, electoral success and 
conditions of strong national economic growth. 
The discussion is divided into three sections. The first examines the origins 
of the Liberal Party's bilateral approach to trade policy in the lead-up to the 
1996 federal election, how that melded with efforts to position the Coalition 
politically to win office, and what implications that had for the subsequent 
direction of trade policy development. 
In the second section trade policy development is viewed through the prism 
of institutional analysis, particularly the way the structure of Australia's 
political institutions can concentrate policy-making authority in the hands 
of a few senior members of government. In this discussion the prime 
minister and his office assume a pivotal position in shaping the nation's 
trade policy. 
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The third section considers the contribution of the trade policy community 
within government and the bureaucracy to the development of the Howard 
government's trade policy. Particular attention is paid here to questions 
about the nature and role of the public service in policy formulation and 
implementation, and the agency of individuals and small groups acting as 
policy entrepreneurs within the bureaucracy (particularly DFAT) and at the 
senior levels of governmentll4. 
6.2 POLICY BRANDING AND THE ONE NATION EFFECT 
6.2.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE ELECTORATE IN THE 
EARLY1990S 
The years leading up to the election of the Howard government, marked 
internationally by the collapse of the Soviet Union and locally by recession, 
were politically and economically tumultuous. Both the major political 
parties changed their leadership and cross-party support for the Labor 
government's economic reform agenda began to fray as the job losses and 
social dislocation associated with the effects of the early 1990s recession 
chipped away at the electorate's acceptance of aspects of economic 
liberalization. It was in this environment that John Howard re-emerged as a 
contender for the Liberal Party leadership on a platform that modified the 
Coalition's embrace of ideas of economic liberalization. 
6.2.1.1 RECESSION 
After eight years of far-reaching economic reform, Australia was plunged 
into recession in 1991. Coming hard on the heels of the economic exuberance 
of the 1980s, the downturn was a scarifying experience for many115. One of 
Paul Keating's closest advisers in the early 1990s noted that when the 
114 In this study a distinction is dnn.vn between the bureaucracy and government as different arms of the 
executive. Bureaucracy is used to denote individuals working in appointed positio11s 'Within government 
departments. The govemment is used to denote govenunent politicians and their personal staff (which may 
include departmental officials working on secondment). This issue is dealt "'W·ith more fully in Chapter 2. 
115 ~.\s Megalogenis (2006: 10-1 '1) notes, Treasurer Paul Kea.ting's presentation of it as the 'recession ~.\.usttalia 
had to have' was particularly jarring for votets, because it so clearly contradicted his repeated promise that the 
economy would emerge from the high-spending 1980s 'Without a recession and '\\'.ith improved economic and 
social structures. 
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Labor government went to the March 1990 federal election concerns about 
the possibility of the country slipping into recession were already being 
aired, with Reserve Bank officials warning the Treasurer by late 1989 of the 
likelihood that the looming economic slowdown, and the debt crisis it might 
trigger, could turn into a long and deep recession (Edwards, 1996: 379). As 
Edwards notes, the Hawke-led Labor Party won re·election despite a 
primary vote below 40 per cent and residential mortgage rates above 15 per 
cent, helped to a considerable degree by preferences from candidates 
advocating environment protection policies. 
Despite the recession, several senior Hawke government ministers including 
Hawke, Keating, Industry l\1inister John Button, Trade .Minister Peter Cook, 
Foreign l\:Hnister Gareth Evans and Deputy Prime Minister Brian Howe 
were anxious not to allow the reformist agenda, including continued 
unilateral trade liberalization, to slip. It was in the environment of an 
economy plunged into recession that the Hawke government Cabinet was 
preparing its industry statement, to be delivered on 12 March, 1991. 
Politically, it was an inauspicious time to be advocating more tariff cuts, 
particularly for those protecting the labour-intensive automotive 
manufacturing and textile, clothing and footwear industries. In 1989 the 
Industry Commission had recommended a 15 per cent tariff for the 
automobile industry, a finding Edwards claims had been brokered by 
Kea ting's office as a compromise between liberalizers and protectionists in 
government that would be accepted by Cabinet (Edwards, 1996: 410). In 
several Cabinet meetings at which the forthcoming industry policy was 
discussed Keating fought against claims for industry assistance. These 
included a plan by the junior Industry M:inister Simon Crean for a 'sectoral' 
industry policy intended to direct assistance to nascent industries (Edwards, 
ibid. 413). Button, with the support of Keating and several other ministers, 
gained Cabinet approval for his industry policy that called for a reduction in 
motor vehicle tariffs to 15 per cent, a cut in tariffs for textile, clothing and 
footwear imports of between 15 and 35 per cent and a drop in all other 
tariffs to 5 per cent, to be implemented by the end of the decade (Snape 
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et.al., 1997: 94·96). Given that it was delivered in the depths of the recession 
the policy was, according to Edwards (with echoes of Sir Humphrey 
Appleby), extraordinarily politically courageous. Driving this liberalizing 
push was the conviction held at the upper levels of the Hawke government 
that the nation's economic development and prosperity lay in liberalizing 
the economy and increasing its exposure to, and integration with, the 
international economyns. 
6.2.1.2 'FIGHTBACK!' 
It was not only the Labor government that maintained a commitment to 
economic reform despite the recession. The John Hewson· led Coalition, in 
its detailed Fightback/policy package, set out measures intended to 
continue and extend the process of economic reform and liberalization 
undertaken by the Hawke and Keating governments. Among the 
commitments was a promise to reduce tariffs, including those on passenger 
motor vehicles and textile, clothing and footwear imports, to 'negligible' 
levels by 2000117 (Hyde, 2002: 284). The policy statement drew together new 
and existing Coalition policies, many of them influenced by the economic 
liberal arguments promoted by members of the Liberal and National parties 
often referred to as 'Dries'. Among their number were John Hewson, elected 
Liberal leader following the 1990 federal election, his deputy Peter Reith, 
former (and future) leader John Howard, National Party leader Tim Fischer, 
John Hyde, former Treasury secretary John Stone and former National 
Farmers' Federation president Ian McLachlan. Fightback/incorporated 
existing Opposition polices such as waterfront reform, privatization of 
government·owned enterprises like Medibank Private and Telstra, and 
opening areas of the economy such as shipping and telecommunications to 
international competition (Hyde, 2002: 282). But Fightback!'s centrepiece 
'"As exemplified in the May 1988 Economic Statement delivered by Treasurer Keating and the Building a 
Competitive )~ustralia an:nouncement made by Prime fd:inister Hawke in ~farch 1991, both of which set out a 
schedule of tariff cuts (Snape et.al., 1998: 29-31; 85-7; 94-6). Separately, in an intert>iew v..'ith the author in 
2004 Gamaut [who was an economic adviser to Hawke} stated that "from day one" Hawke understood and 
embraced the process of globalization and the prospects it offered for developtnent. 
117 This u.ras, according to Hyde, -atl ''appreciable but modest" advance on the tariff reduction timetable 
initiated by Labor (2002: 284). 
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was tax reform, including a 30 per cent cut in income taxes, the abolition or 
reduction of a number of other government charges and levies including 
wholesale sales tax, payroll tax, coal export duty, customs duties and capital 
gains tax, and the introduction of a 15 per cent goods and services tax (GST). 
These tax reforms were viewed by many Coalition Dries as second-order 
issues compared with other aspects of the package detailing industrial 
relations reform, trade policy, family and welfare policy and expenditure 
reduction (Hyde, ibid., 286). But these tax policies, particularly the proposed 
introduction of a GST, became the focus of Labor's political attack on the 
Coalition after the package was launched in November 1991. 
The economic and political prescriptions underpinning Fightback/were not 
without critics within the Coalition, and the authors of the document 
attacked what they thought was the pernicious role of interest groups and 
clientism affecting economic development: 'The powerful have extracted 
benefits and privileges for themselves: special protection and regulations, 
generous subsidies, compulsory memberships. The costs have been higher 
prices and higher taxes, lower economic growth, less innovation, and 
declining international competitiveness,' (Liberal Party of Australia, 1992: 
26). An early test of the Coalition's resolve regarding the Fightback/reform 
agenda came in early 1992 when a party room revolt developed against the 
Coalition's undertaking to support government legislation reducing sugar 
tariffs. Hewson had characterized the demand that the Coalition oppose any 
cut in the tariffs as a return to pork-barrel politics and the National MPs 
who spoke out against the reduction in a party room meeting were subject to 
a 'verbal savaging' (Hyde, 2002: 287). Coalition unity was similarly tested by 
government decisions to reduce the wool reserve price and deregulate the 
wheat market but Hewson was able to forge a strong sense of solidarity and 
unity around the Fightback! program that lastBd until the 1993 federal 
election. 
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6.2.1.3 HOWARD RE-EMERGES 
Keating was elected prime minister in the same year as the Uruguay Round 
GATT negotiations were completed, and he used the Governor-General's 
speech opening Parliament following the election to re-commit his 
government to the tariff reduction policy outlined by his predecessor in 1991 
(Hyde, 2002: 311). This move reflected the political imperative for Labor to 
repair its credibility as an economic manager following the early 1990s 
recession and persistent problems with the external balance (Pokarier, 2000: 
294). The prevailing consensus in the economic policy community, including 
government agencies, peak business organizations, market economists and 
business commentators, was for continued liberalization and 
internationalization of the economy, which helped keep reformist pressure 
on the Keating government (ibid 294). 
Following the 1993 election, Keating told his staff at a Christmas party of 
his intention to reshape Australian society just as fundamentally as he had 
recast the economy. Subsequently he set about putting issues such as the 
republic, Aboriginal reconciliation, multiculturalism and closer links with 
Asia on the national agenda (Manne, 2004: 6). After so many years as 
Treasurer, he hoped to be able to leave economic policy to his successor in 
that position, John Dawkins (Edwards, 1997: 520). Nonetheless, Keating 
was reluctantly drawn into preparations for the 1993 Budget where, under 
the pressure of a ballooning budget deficit, taxes and charges were 
increased, not cut, and a second round of tax cuts was postponed to a future 
date beyond 1996·97 (Edwards, ibid.: 522-3). Keating himself believed the 
budget was his government's biggest mistake Ubid.: 538) but, as discussed 
earlier, polling indicated that it was more than broken promises on tax cuts 
that was driving increasing disenchantment in the electorate with Labor in 
power. 
The Coalition's electoral fortunes improved sharply after Alexander Downer 
was dumped as leader and replaced by Howard. Downer's standing in both 
his party and the electorate had collapsed after several political disasters 
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and Howard told Downer in late January 1995 that he would launch a party 
room challenge against him on January 31 unless he stepped down 
(vVilliams, 1997: 24; Hyde, 2002: 349). By this stage Downer's deputy, Peter 
Costello118, had already confronted Downer over his leadership and 
indicated he would support Howard. Not revealed at the time was a verbal 
undertaking given by Howard to Costello on December 5, 1994 that, if 
elected, he would hand over his position to Costello after serving one and a 
half terms as prime minister (Milne, 2006). Faced with the prospect of a 
damaging and uncertain leadership battle, Downer resigned and Howard 
assumed the leadership uncontested, with Costello as his deputy. 
In the months following the 1993 election the Liberal Party detected 
growing anger and disenchantment with the Keating government. This was 
especially the case among lower-income earners over perceptions that the 
government was more concerned with the interests of 'minority groups' than 
the impact of unemployment and interest rates. Between the 1993 and 1996 
elections about 500,000 of them switched their vote from Labor to the 
Coalition (Manne, 2004: 7). Keating, unsurprisingly, had a different view. 
He interpreted his 1993 election victory primarily as an endorsement of his 
. philosophy of growth with equity and of closer engagement with Asia, rather 
than a rejection of Fightback!(Edwards, 1997: 516). But, by the time of the 
1996 election, Keating had gauged the mood of the electorate for a change of 
government, and tried to inoculate himself from the view he governed for 
'the elites' by cutting back his discussion of Mabo and the republic in his last 
year in office (Edwards, 1997: 538). Despite this, the Coalition was able to 
successfully embroider and exploit the image of Keating as a remote and 
elitist leader. In contrast, they portrayed Howard as an 'ordinary man' who 
understood and identified with everyday concerns, and one who would 
govern, as the official campaign slogan had it, 'For all of us' (Williams, 1997: 
95·6). 
118 ,\. lawyer, Costello had risen swiftly through the ranks of the Liberal Party. He had gained notoriety as 
industrial advocate for his lead role in '\lictoria's Dollar Sweets case {1985-88) in which the confecrionary 
company successfully sued a- union for $175,000 for losses suffered as a result of a 143-day picket at its 
I\lelbourne factory. 
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In pursuit of electoral success, Howard jettisoned his former image as a 
standard bearer of free market reform. Scarred by the loss of the 1993 
election, the Liberal Party had progressively abandoned most of the reform 
agenda contained within Fightback!, a shift that echoed the loss of liberal 
economic reforming zeal in several other countries including the United 
Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand (Hyde, 2002: 353). His 
biographer noted that 'the man of conviction who in 1987 determined to 
implement a free market reform agenda, even if it meant he got only one 
term, now considered he had an obligation to the party that had entrusted 
him with the task of leading it back to government' (Barnett and Goward, 
1997: 719). For many of the reformist Dries in the conservative movement it 
was disappointing, but not surprising, to see one of their major political 
champions disown much of what they stood for. According to Hyde,.by the 
time of the 1996 election the Coalition had abandoned virtually all of the 
policy commitments made in Fightback! except for the introduction of a GST: 
Howard had significantly shifted his mission from enhancing freedom 
to winning office, and his loyalty from the nation to the Liberal Party. 
The Crossroads Group had been wound up and, although the Society 
oflVIodest Members continued to hold periodic meetings and circulate 
copies of relevant short articles, contact with the think tanks and the 
ideas world generally had declined. Austin Holmes was dead and 
\Volfgang Kasper and David Trebeck119 were no longer offering 
regular advice to loosely organized groups of politicians determined to 
improve the quality of government. The change was not only in the 
politicians. Those outside the parliament had had to concede that 
they had set back the cause by demanding of Hewson more than he 
could deliver and everybody had become more cautious. The zeitgeist 
1 ~9 Crossroads :and the Society of Modest Members (named after Bert Kelly's column 'The .1{odest member' 
in 1'he Australian Financial Revieiv) were groups comprising academics, businessmen and politicians tl1:at met to 
discuss and promote f.ree market ideas. Holmes, Kaspar and 1'rebeck were prominent organizers of, and 
contributots to, efforts to promulgate free market ideas through such groups and think-tanks like the Centre 
for Independent Studies and the Institute of Public Affairs \Kelly, 1992: 39-44). 
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had changed to one with less enthusiasm for reform - Hyde, 2002: 
353. 
6.2.1.4 THE ONE NATION EFFECT 
A symptom of reform fatigue (Leigh and Winters, 2005) and the social 
dislocation associated with the economic liberalization undertaken in the 
1980s and early 1990s was the increasing political potency of economic 
nationalism, which became associated with feelings of neglect and 
dispossession among lower income sections of the electorate, particularly in 
Queensland. 
National Party leader Tim Fischer detected early elements of what would 
later become the One Nation phenomenon not long after the onset of the 
early 1990s recession and high interest rates that undermined the value of 
savings: 
People had chronic drought and low commodity prices. The drumbeat 
was there. It manifested itself after the '96 election, but it was very 
much alive around the National Party conferences in 1991 and 1992 -
Fischer (cited in Rees, 2001: 265). 
In his study of the impact of Japanese investment in the Gold Coast in the 
1980s and early 1990s, Hajdu (2005) identifies how policies of economic 
liberalization fed fears about a loss of national identity among sections of 
the Queensland population. The Keating government's emphasis on closer 
ties with Asia, often misinterpreted as saying Australia should consider 
itself part of Asia, was met with apprehension and fear by those critical of 
the growing Japanese presence on the Gold Coast (Hajdu, 2005: 150). 
Pauline Hanson, the dis·endorsed Liberal candidate for Oxley who won the 
seat as an independent candidate at the 2 ~farch, 1996 election, had decided 
to stand for parliament because she felt the views of 'real Australia' were 
being ignored (Hajdu, 2005: 168). Her platform included job security 
through high tariffs protecting Australian industry, a prohibition on the sale 
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of land to overseas investors and an end to roost migration, particularly 
from Asia. Hanson's message resonated with many in Queensland, including 
Gold Coast·based Bruce Whiteside, who had campaigned against Japanese 
property investment in the area during the 1980s and early 1990s. In 
October 1996 Whiteside established the Pauline Hanson Support lVfovement, 
which eventually fed into the foundation of One Nation Party. The One 
Nation Party, reflecting a desire to quarantine and tame the impact of 
economic liberalization and globalization on Australian society, won 11 out 
of 89 seats in the Queensland parliament in June 1998 on a platform that 
included limiting migration to replacement levels, a requirement that all 
migrants pass an English language test before admittance, that foreign 
investment be limited to joint ventures with Australian interests as the 
dominant partner, and a prohibition on foreign ownership ofland freehold 
title except for industry infrastructure development (Hajdu, 2005: 168·69). 
As Pokarier (2000: 30·64) notes, foreign direct investment in land and 
natural resources was likely to be particularly controversial because of the 
intensely territorial characteristic of economic nationalism. Purchases of 
land and resources by Japanese investors in the 1980s and early 1990s was 
a lightning rod for unease about foreign ownership of real estate, heightened 
among some by hostility toward Japan and general anti·Asian prejudice 
(Pokarier, 2000: 221). 
Though the One Nation movement was inchoate in many respects, one of its 
sources of support was the idea that the economic reforms launched by the 
Hawke and Keating governments had left Australia increasingly open and 
vulnerable to predatory economic behaviour from external commercial and 
political interests120. Job losses and acquisitions by overseas investors -
particularly from Asia · were cited as examples of Australia's vulnerability 
to international capital. Heightening this fear was the sense that, while 
120 Many of these sensitivities and concerns were given voice during the late 1980s as Japanese investments itl 
property developments along Queensland's Gold Coast multiplied. For example, on 8 July, 1990, 300 people 
tnarched through the centre of Surfers Paradise to protest against "Tu"h.at they perceived to be a threat to 
national independence aod control (Hajdu, 2005: 157-58). The protestors included some carrying banners 
that read ~Don1t sell Australia' and rNo Jap landlords'. Among the protestors \.Vas Bruce \V'hiteside, whose 
'Heart of the Nation' movement \Vas in late 1996 to become the core of the Pauline Hanson Support 
l\1ovement andt eventually, One Nation (ibid, 167-69). 
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Australian firms were facing increasingly tough competition for domestic 
markets from overseas-based operations, there was no reciprocal access to 
the markets of others - Australian firms continued to face large barriers to 
entry to potential export markets. The view of trade as a zero· sum game 
lent itself to the nationalist and autarkic perspectives embodied in much of 
One Nation's platform and often expressed in the claim that Australian 
producers were not competing on a level international playing field. One 
Nation's emergence was seen to present a particularly awkward and 
difficult political challenge for The National Party, which Tim Fischer -
trade minister from 1996 to 1999 · led. The new movement appeared to 
draw much of its support from regional and rural Australia, particularly in 
non·metropolitan areas of Queensland and New South \Vales. In tackling 
this emerging political threat Fischer and his party were hampered in two 
particular ways. Firstly, because of their close affiliation with the Liberal 
Party and the economic agenda of the Howard-led Coalition government, 
they were seen to be part of the drive to expose the Australian economy to 
even greater international competition, rather than protecting it. Secondly, 
the Howard government's policy to ban civilian ownership of automatic and 
semi·automatic weapons, instituted in the wake of the Port Arthur mass 
shooting, was unpopular among many in rural and regional Australia and 
helped further tarnish the Nationals' image among many attracted to One 
Nation. In addition to his duties as trade minister, Fischer fought a frenetic 
public battle to shore up National Party support against the One Nation 
threat, including on the issue of trade policy: 
We all know that there's no such thing as a level playing field and 
often I'd start my speeches from Cairns to Collee near Perth with that 
phrase: '\Ve begin by recognizing that there is no such thing as a level 
playing field. That said, that agreed, it's what you do about it which 
we debate to this day' Fischer, 2005. 
The robust bilateral approach to trade policy practiced by the energetic 
Fischer, while not constituting a major shift in the implementation of trade 
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policy121, nevertheless served the political purpose of showing the Coalition 
government pushing other nations hard to improve trade access. It helped to 
appease economic nationalists and head·offthe protectionist push by 
reintroducing a sense of specific, rather than diffuse reciprocity122 into trade 
arrangements. Regularly confronted by complaints that Australian exports 
faced substantial trade barriers in other countries despite Australia cutting 
its own tariffs, Fischer replied that although there was not a level 
international playing field Australian producers were winning the 
competition for overseas markets and that the government was supporting 
exporters on both an industry and case·by·case basis at a bilateral level 
(Fischer, 2005). By the time of the October 1998 federal election Fischer and 
other government members had successfully seen off One Nation as a 
political force at the national level. Significantly, this occurred well before 
the government formally embarked on its first PTA negotiations in late 
2000. 
6.2.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR HOWARD IN GOVERNMENT 
The practical effect of the abandonment of Fightback! was the need for the 
Coalition to develop a new policy agenda. But, as Howard's incoming chief of 
staff Nicole Feely discovered in early 1995, the policy work undertaken by 
the Coalition frontbench was patchy and uneven - while in some areas policy 
work was well advanced, in others it had barely begun (Williams, 1997: 90, 
149). The Opposition was under pressure from the government and the 
media over the Coalition's dearth of policies. In late 1995 Howard and one of 
his advisers, :Michael L'Estrange, developed a document setting out the 
Opposition's core commitments. It drew on Downer's 'The Things That 
Matter' manifesto and embellished it with additional elements in areas such 
as family tax and assurances on health care and small business (Williams, 
121 J\ large proportion of the work conducted by trade officials involves the management of bilateral trade 
:relations, regmilless of the stage multilateral trade liberalization negotiations may be at (Harris, 1986: 70; 
Gyngell, 2005). 
122 Specific reciprocity stipulates the simultaneous exchange of equivalent: benefits or obligations between 
partners (as, for example, agreed upon in a bilateral trade agreement) \Vhereas diffuse reciprocity is founded 
upo:n a broad and long-term .relationship and :implies the future .repayment of an obligation without any 
demand for a direct repayment for an antecedent acrion5 and is usually taken to characterize multilateral trade 
undertakings (Keohane, 1986). 
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1997: 149). The Coalition leadership (Howard, Costello, Richard Alston, 
Robert Hill, Fischer, John Anderson, Andrew Robb, Feely, L'Estrange, 
Howard's economic advisor Arthur Sinodinos, and four Costello staffers) met 
for four days from January 3, 1996, to decide on and cost the policies it 
would unveil during the forthcoming federal election campaign. The group 
agreed on a schedule of 62 policies, supported by 70 spending cuts, to be 
announced during the campaign (Williams, 1997: 159·69). 
Trade was not on the list, and in the lead·up to the March, 1996 election a 
Coalition staffer was given the task of pulling together a policy that, while 
reaffirming the Coalition's commitment to trade liberalization, would 
establish a differentiated position for them on trade (Davis, 2005). 
Emphasizing bilateral approaches to trade liberalization was seen as a way 
for the Coalition to differentiate itself from Labor, which in government had 
focused its efforts on the multilateral Uruguay Round negotiations, APEC 
and the Cairns Group. 
During Keating's government, bilateralism had been pushed aside, 
aside from joint ministerial councils and meetings. There might have 
been 20 of those a year and many, apart from those with the US, 
Japan and others, were really little more than meet and greet 
opportunities, nothing substantive - Davis, 2005. 
There was an element of product differentiation from 
Keating/Evans/Hawke and a government that had set great store in 
multilateral approaches. But that was a bit superficial, because the 
Labor government worked just as hard at bilateral relations -
Gyngell, 2005. 
Craig Symon, chief of staff to the freshly installed Trade l\1inister, Tim 
Fischer, said part of the Coalition's strategy on trade policy was to 'play up 
the image, very strong in the community, that Labor did not focus on the 
hard issues of trade' (cited in Rees, 2001: 253). Fischer would later use as a 
justification for the change of emphasis a comment by the·then Industry 
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Minister John Button (recounted in Edwards, 1997: 489), that more than 80 
DFAT officials had been involved in the Uruguay Round negotiations, while 
few were devoted to bilateral trade issues (Rees, 2001: 254). 
Aside from the practical aspect of having a point of policy difference with the 
government, an increased bilateral emphasis in trade squared with a 
broader skepticism about multilateralism wit.bin the Coalition, and a 
wariness about becoming too heavily enmeshed in multilateral 
commitments: 
'Part of that was a preference to tone down some of what they 
regarded as excessive emphasis and reliance on multilateral 
processes in the political sphere, meaning the United Nations and a 
lot of its related bodies that deal with international issues. We 
wanted to reaffirm the fundamental importance of key bilateral 
relationships around the world and the Asia Pacific area. That 
certainly was one theme that the Coalition government brought 
forward when it took office in 1996 - Calvert, 2006. 
Underneath [the rhetorical emphasis on bilateralism] there was a 
deeper conservatism versus internationalism divide. The 
fundamentally conservative view is that we should not put our trust 
in multilateral solutions, and that power does, and should, reside in 
the nation·state - Gyngell, 2005. 
This stance was also of a piece with the Coalition's political strategy to 
enlist the support, or at least minimize the negative impact, of voters 
attracted by One Nation-style economic nationalism and protectionism. 
Howard was, according to Fischer, in tune with a widespread view that 
under the Keating government that Australian producers were not 
competing on a level international playing field for trade, and this view 
entailed criticism of the multilateral system itself: 
Very sharp set of utterances, not so much in Cabinet but around the 
PM's office and interface we had, questioning the multilateral, 
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reflecting the criticism from many parts of the economy wrapped up 
in that process, that there was no such thing as a level playing field. 
The big switch was to pursue bilateral as well as multilateral after 
1996 - in its crudest form, to run and chew gum. When I was Trade 
Minister and now, under Mark Vaile, the PM was absolutely driven 
by it Fischer, 2005. 
As observed by Eisley (2004: 243), the commitment to a GATT·based trade 
policy was increasingly portrayed as an ideological position 123 rather than 
one informed by calculations of the nation's interests. The implication was 
that persistence with a multilateral-only trade policy was driven by a belief 
in the inherent good ofmultilateralism rather than because it served 
Australia's economic interests. 
The policy caution exercised by the Coalition in the lead·up to 1996 election 
was manifest not only in the decision to withhold the release of detailed 
policies until the actual campaign but also in the conscious disowning of 
Fightback! and the eschewing of radical reforms in order to make Labor and 
Keating, rather than the Coalition and Howard, the election issue (Hyde, 
2002: 355; \Villiams, 1997). For disappointed Dries such as Hyde (2002: 362· 
64) Howard's cautious approach to economic reform once in office (Conley, 
2001: 230), combined with his government's decisions to reduce immigration 
and block foreign doctors, owed much to the cowing effect of Pauline Hanson 
and One Nation (Conley, 2001: 233). Apparent mercantilist overtones in 
trade policy, exemplified in the 1997 decision to delay scheduled tariffs cuts 
for imported passenger motor vehicles and textile, clothing and footwear, 
was defended iu terms of changing political dynamics, including the 
emergence of One Nation, the political pressure exerted by the Victorian 
123 In interviews \.vith the author, Fischer (2005) referred to the 'puristic mulcilateral (sic) "-Vhich, for reasons 
not entirely inappropriate at the time of the Uruguay Ronnd, dominated DFA T'; and Kud<el (2005) pointed 
out that discussions about a bilateral approach to trade policy were seen as a subset of broader ideas a.bout 
foreign policy which pitted the bilateral approach against an 'airy fairy faith in the multilateral institutional 
at"chitecture'. Fonner Foreign J\finistet Downer, as quoted earlier in a related but different context1 said that 
although the Ho..,.vard government backed multilateral trade liberalization 'we were open~eyed and realistic 
about what could be achieved', and accused proponents of multilateralism of being committed to 'a bit of an 
ideology, and for someone like me, [I am) much rnore of a national interest pragmatist' (Dov;rner, 2008), 
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and South Australian governments and the lobbying of the major carmakers. 
Howard appointed John Moore as Industry Minister, and lVfoore declared 
publicly in August 1996 that Australia's schedule of tariff cuts and other 
trade reforms should be linked to reciprocal tariff reductions and better 
market access from major trading partners (Hyde, 2002: 362)lZ4. 
The Prime Minister employed the same mercantilist arguments for 
which he had shortly before condemned Pauline Hanson. Justification 
was again being found in mercantilist arguments based upon what 
other nations did Hyde, 2002: 364. 
The incoming Howard government was constrained not so much by the 
budgetary position it inherited, nor by the improving economy, but by the 
political conditions under which it had to fight and win office. The 
disinheritance of the Fightback! reform agenda and the embrace of a more 
mercantilist approach to trade policy were obvious political responses to 
disenchantment with the pace and consequences of economic liberalization 
in sizable sections of the electorate that could be drawn to switch their 
support to the Coalition in 1996125• This was a political strategy that 
reflected the political judgment and experience of Howard and his 
leadership team, informed by intensive polling of the attitudes of the 
electorate and wary of the political costs of economic reform. But it also 
reflected discomfit with the view of trade policy primarily as a means to 
advance domestic economic reform, a wariness of international 
commitments and obligations and skepticism about the prospects for 
multilateral trade liberalization. 
Its policy choices were constrained by the political and economic context in 
which it fought for and won office, and the political institutional structure in 
ti+ This was a point repeated by both Howard and Costello the same year (Conley, 2001: 230·31). 
125 .. -\s Conley (2001: 230) indicates, }loward in government sent out mixed messages about the impact of 
globalization. Fo.r instance, on July 17, 1997) Ho\.vard assured the 'bn.tt1ers of Newcastle and, indeed, the 
battlers of ~-\usttalia - that you have a government that listens and is sympathetic to the human and social 
consequences of industry restructuring\ yet a day later he wamed that 'it's no good being frightened of 
change. Globalization is 'With us and will be with us forever'. 
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which it existed and operated. It is to this structure that the discussion now 
turns. 
6.3 TRADE POLICY AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
There has been limited analysis of Australian trade policy from an 
institutional perspective; that is, one which examines policy preferences in 
the context of institutions that aggregate norms, shape the identities, 
incentives and capabilities of political and economic actors and provide the 
structure for social action (Capling, 1997b: 339). In this section policy 
development is viewed through the prism of institutional analysis, 
particularly the way the structure of Australia's political institutions can 
concentrate policy·making authority in the hands of a few senior members 
of government. It is argued here that under John Howard, the prime 
minister and his office assumed a pivotal position in shaping the nation's 
trade policy. 
6.3.1 AUSTRALIA'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Australia's political system is characterized by 
the unification of the executive and legislative branches of government, a 
bicameral parliament, coherent, disciplined and stable political parties, a 
federalist structure and an independent judiciary (Tsebilis, 1995: 291; 
Maddox, 1985). This structure limits the number of actors (individuals and 
groups) who can initiate, implement or veto policy (Tsebilis, ibid 313). In 
Australia the distribution of power along each dimension - the majoritarian 
form of executive government and the dispersal of power through a 
federalist structure forms what Castles (2000:5) describes as a compound 
republic. 
Under the Australian constitution, the executive has power under section 61 
to enter into treaties, while the power to implement them is vested under 
section 5l(xxix) in the legislature (FADTR, 2003: 21). The practical effect of 
this institutional structure on trade policy has been that the executive, 
which commands majority support in the House of Representatives, faces 
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. few formal domestic impediments to the negotiation and implementation of 
trade agreements (Maddox, 1985: 152-65). The government, ipso facto, 
commands majority support in the House of Representatives and, due to the 
highly disciplined and stable nature of the major political parties12s, can 
almost invariably rely on commanding a majority vote in the chamber 
(Maddox, 1985: 154). 
But the executive's trade policy making capacity is potentially limited by the 
legislature and the judiciary, which both possess veto powers. As well as the 
ability to initiate its own Bills, the Senate has the power to review, delay 
and amend those presented to it by the lower house (JVIaddox, 1985: 175-88). 
It was through the threat of such power t-0 amend or delay enabling 
legislation for the Australia·United States Free Trade Agreement that 
Labor was able to negotiate with the Howard government for the inclusion 
of extra clauses regarding the treatment of intellectual property rights. In 
particular, it demanded measures intended to prevent the 'evergreening' of 
pharmaceutical patents (Weiss, Thurbon and Mathews, 2004a)127• The 
legislature also has the capacity to review treaties, including trade 
agreements, through the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, an all-
party committee comprising both Senators and Members established by the 
Howard government to review treaties negotiated by the executive (FADTR, 
2003: 23). vVhile it has the power to review treaties, it can only make 
recommendations to the legislature and, because government MPs are in 
the majority, in practice the committee's majority reports have rarely 
recommended against a treaty. While state governments can, and do, 
pursue trade opportunities for their own jurisdictions, they do not have the 
126 ?v!Ps alii,med with political parties can and do defy the adopted policy position of the!! party. For example, 
in August 2006 th.ree Liberal MPs voted agfilnst a government Bill requiring that all unauthorized refugees 
arriving in ~.\.ustta.llit by boat v,,-.ou.l.d be automatically sent for processing to an off-shore immigration detention 
centre (Gordon, 2006), Some .MPs have also defected from parties, either to join another party (for example, 
Senator Julian 7\-icGauran in January 2006 resigned from the National Party and joined the l,iberal Party) or to 
become an independent (for example, north Queensland :MP Bob Katter, who left the Nationals and was 
elected as an independent irt 2001). But such cases are relatively rare, with the 1najor parties usually exercising 
a strong degree of self-discipline in parliamentary voting, 
127 According to one Labor frontbertcher, Lathan1 pursued the changes largely as a political gambit not only 
to build the ide:a that L.abor's approach to trade issues ~"as different from that of the government, but also to 
gain or retain the support of opponents of the Fri\ and to cause some political discomfort for the 
government (lv!c.1\.fullan, 2006). 
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power to negotiate trade agreements and treaties. From time to time the 
implementation of particular agreements or clauses of agreements may be 
subject to legal challenge, such as the successful High Court challenge 
mounted by New Zealand television and film producers (acting under the 
name Project Blue Sky Ltd) against a federal court ruling that Australian 
content provisions of the Australian Broadcasting Authority Act overrode 
provisions in the ANZ CER that required each country to treat the citizens 
of the other 'no less favourably' than its own (Australian Broadcasting 
Authority, 1998). 
6.3.1.1 THE EXECUTIVE 
The analysis is sharpened by examining the sub·set of veto players within 
the executive. In Australia's political institutional architecture, executive 
and legislative authority are unified and invested in the majority of the 
House of Representatives. Whichever political party or coalition commands 
a majority also wields this authority. Within these parties or coalitions 
there exists a hierarchy, with ministerial authority invested in a sub-set of 
its members appointed ministers. Ministerial authority is further 
concentrated in a sub-set of ministers who form the Cabinetl28, and such 
authority is ultimately concentrated and embodied in the office of the prime 
minister. Regarding trade policy, such arrangements would appear to make 
the prime minister, trade minister and foreign affairs minister those who 
wield most decision-making authority. But this ostensible distribution of 
authority is qualified and contingent. l'vfuch of the coordinating and decision 
making capacity possessed by prime ministers, cabinets and ministers may 
be segmented and divided, residing with discrete policy communities 
comprising cabinet sub·committees, inter-departmental committees, quasi· 
autonomous agencies arrangement and societal interests, which may have 
their decisions affil'med by the full Cabinet with little attention or 
discussion (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 50; Maddox, 1935: 156-57). Other 
12il The one recent exception to this inner and outer rrinistcy arrangement v;ras the 'Whitlam government, in 
which all :ministers \Vere also members of Cabinet. Governments before and since have fo:r:rned their Cabinets 
from a sub-set of the ministry (lviaddox, 1985: 157; Weller, 2007} 
165 
The Power to Deal 
ministers, such as the Treasurer, Agriculture Minister and Industry 
Minister may seek involvement in trade policy development and 
implementation, particularly on behalf of segments of the economy they feel 
obliged to represent as part of their ministerial duties. It is part of the role 
of cabinet, operating under the discipline of collective responsibility, to 
provide ministers with a decision·making forum in which to propose, amend 
or oppose policies before they are formally adopted by the government. 
lVladdox argues persuasively that there is a complex and dynamic 
relationship between the authority of the prime minister and that of the 
Cabinet. An electorally successful prime minister, particularly one who 
leads the Liberal Party wields, he argues, very great power (1985: 155). The 
institutional structure of the Liberal Party imbues a Liberal prime minister 
with the authority to choose his or her own ministry (unlike a Labor leader, 
who leads a ministry elected by the Labor parliamentary party caucus), and 
retains the right to dismiss ministers (ibid). But this authority is qualified 
in several respects: historically, Liberal prime ministers lead governments 
composed of a coalition of Liberal and National (formerly Country Party) 
MPs. The coalition agreement stipulates that the National Party leader will 
be deputy prime minister, and the prime minister must consult the 
Nationals leader in appointing his or her ministry. To varying degrees 
Liberal prime ministers are also expected to have regard to considerations of 
regional representation in forming their ministries, as well as taking into 
account internal party factors such as the inclusion of senior, respected or 
popular politicians in the ministry. 
The key institution prime ministers have to work with is the Cabinet. It is, 
Maddox argues, the core of the government, even though it is not mentioned 
in the written Constitution (1985: 156·58). Cabinet brings together a 
collection of ministers who are individual, ambitious and often independent· 
minded. Though the prime minister wields considerable authority over the 
Cabinet, including through controlling its procedures, supervising the 
preparation of its agenda and having direct control of its secretariat, the 
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principles of Cabinet solidarity and collective responsibility mean that he or 
she is also bound by the collective decisions of the body (Maddox, 1985: 159). 
Nonetheless, Howard moved soon after his election as prime minister in 
1996 to accentuate his authority within Cabinet and, through that, the 
broader government. He moved the Cabinet Policy Unit from the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to within his own office (Kelly, 
2006: 10). This brought the unit that plans the agenda, lists the items and 
writes up Cabinet decisions within his office and under the authority of his 
chief of staff. As Kelly points out, this meant Howard was superbly 
positioned to both shape the Cabinet agenda and assess the submissions of 
his ministers (ibid.). 
6.3.1.2 THE BUREAUCRACY 
Another site of trade policy agency within the executive is the bureaucrac'Y, 
particularly those departments and individuals required to help devise and 
implement such policy. As was indicated earlier in the discussion129, the 
analytical divide some theories have attempted to draw between policy 
development and implementation does not really exist130, particularly not in 
the area of trade policy. For trade policy, the task of implementation 
involves the development and refinement of policy, such as in the 
negotiation of trade agreements. Trade negotiators are typically given a 
remit by Cabinet to negotiate within certain parameters, but must have 
their charter reviewed and renewed as negotiations proceed, particularly if 
they move outside the specified parameters (Raby, 2005). From one 
perspective, bureaucracies can be viewed as an aggregation of resources and 
capabilities placed at the disposal of the executive in order to execute its 
policy decisions. Allison and Zelikow (1999), in their analysis of bureaucratic 
decision·making and behaviour, provide a number of important insights: 
that organizational capabilities delimit effective policy choices; that there is 
a tension between the need for central coordination of action and the 
1w Chapter 2, pp 39-40. 
130 1\s noted on p40, through his concept of !he street-level bureaucrat, Lipsky (1993) tn:!kes explicit !he 
irreducible nature of policy de"'elopment and impleinentation. There is a perpetual feedback loop between 
devcloptnent and implementation as issues arise in implementation that require policy adjustment as part of a 
contimml learning process (HiU, 1997). 
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practical requirement of decentralized responsibility; and that organizations 
inculcate their members with a group identity, encapsulated in the idea that 
where public servants stand on an issue depends on where they sit (Davis et 
al, 1993: 112). 
But there are several reasons not to expect a perfect congruence between 
institutional norms and the identity they create and the behaviour of 
individual bureaucrats or politicians. First, institutional norms are not 
immutable - they are being constantly recreated and reshaped through 
social interaction. Secondly, in constructivist terms, individuals possess 
multiple identities and hence interests· many of which may be 
contradictory · and their policy choice may not only be influenced by their 
identity as a departmental or party official with a specific role in the 
organization, but by other identities as well, such as ambition to rise to 
another position/identity within the bureaucracy or executive (Hopf, 1998: 
174·75). Thirdly, there is an unresolved tension as explored in Chapter 
Two · inherent between the identity of the public servants as sources of 
'frank and fearless' advice (or the politician as a representative of a 
particular constituency) and their identity as a servant of the government of 
the day. They may counsel strongly against a particular course of action 
that, once a decision has been made, they may be required to implement. A 
similar tension confronts politicians operating under the principle of cabinet 
solidarity or party discipline. 
As Kunkel asserts, trade policy-making remains very much the preserve of 
the executive and the bureaucracy, with ministers and senior public 
servants wielding considerable authority (Kunkel, 2005). But the lines of 
authority are far from immutable. For instance, Prime Minister Howard and 
Foreign Minister Downer did, with varying degrees of frequency and 
intensity, intervene in trade policy in ways that effectively sidelined Cabinet 
and the trade minister of the day. This in part reflects the degree to which 
the Howard Cabinet was, by comparison with the Hawke Cabinet, only 
occasionally interested in trade issues, giving the government's leadership 
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plenty of scope to drive key decisions. A clear demonstration of this was the 
announcement that Australia would pursue an FTA with the USA, an idea 
that had its genesis within the Pl\1's office before being championed by an 
initially-hesitant foreign minister, with Trade Minister Vaile essentially 
given the task of implementation once the policy direction had been decided 
upon (Raby, 2005). Similarly, when the decision had to be made as to 
whether Australia would agree to a PTA with the US that excluded sugar 
and delivered disappointing improvements in market access for many other 
agricultural products, the matter was resolved in a telephone call between 
Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Downer, without 
reference either to Vaile or Cabinet: 
It must have been February [8 February 20041. I remember walking 
along the beach at Victor Harbour and John Howard talking to me on 
my mobile about whether we were going to accept the deal with the 
Americans with no concessions on sugar, or whether not. And that 
was the end of it. That was the deal breaker or maker, so we decided 
to go along with it, to accept it. [The decision] was a cost· benefit thing. 
The sugar industry gets nothing and they will be pissed off. The 
Opposition will make a big thing (of it] because they were inherently 
opposed to the FTA. They will make a big thing about it. All of that on 
the one hand, and on the other, all the other benefits we would get 
from the agreement - better access for all of the sectors that got 
better access, and the potential for building stronger investment flows 
between Australia and the US, which is ... the services gains. What 
journalists will write about and commentators and participants will 
talk about will be the gains in individual sectors like agriculture. But 
not so much manufacturing because manufacturing markets are 
much more open, but the long-term benefits to a country like 
Australia that will come from these FTAs will be in the services 
sector getting more banking licenses and insurance and easier flows 
of capital, sovereign wealth funds. They are the big benefits you get 
from these things · Downer, 2008. 
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6.4 SOURCES OF TRADE POLICY 
6.4.1 TRADE POLICY ACTORS IN THE FIRST HOWARD GOVERNMENT 
The trade policy advanced by the Coalition for the 1996 election, though it 
echoed an increasing disillusion with multilateral trade liberalization in the 
United States and elsewhere, was formed largely to serve domestic political 
goals. A greater emphasis on bilafa:iral approaches to market access and 
trade discrimination, while expressing a continued preference for 
multilateral liberalization, was seen as helping to establish policy 
differences between the Coalition and Labor (Davis, 2005; Kunkel, 2002: 245; 
Capling, 2001: 171). It was designed to appeal to sections of the electorate 
disenchanted with the results of unilateral and multilateral liberalization, 
and to address the discomfort and skepticism felt by many regarding 
multilateral processes and obligations, including in the area of trade 
liberalization (Fischer, 2005; Kunkel, 2002: 245; Capling, 2001: 172·73) . 
. 
But the detail of what this policy would look like in practice was thin, and 
one of the tasks the incoming government set itself was to prepare a policy 
\:V'hite Paper that would provide the intellectual arguments for the new 
policy approach, and detail its implementation. This process involved 
several actors key to trade policy development: the prime minister and his 
office, the trade minister Tim Fischer and his key advisers, the foreign 
minister Alexander Downer and his foreign policy advisers and senior 
officials within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
6.4.1.1 DEPARTMENT Of FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE 
The trade policy and negotiation section of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade inherited by the Howard government had been heavily 
involved with, and had devoted considerable resources to, multilateral and 
plurilateral approaches to trade liberalization. It had been involved from the 
beginning in the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations, and maintained a 
permanent mission in Geneva to represent Australian government interests 
at the talks. The department had also been directly involved in the 
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establishment and coordination of the Cairns Group of agricultural product 
exporting nations, which played a pivotal role during the Uruguay Round in 
breaking the deadlock in negotiations between the United States and the 
European Union and in ensuring that agricultural trade issues were placed 
on the multilateral trade agenda. It played a central role in establishing the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) 131, which was intended to 
support multilateral and regional trade liberalization among member 
countries through a doctrine of open regionalism. 
At the centre of the Australian government's efforts during the Uruguay 
Round was the department's chief negotiator Peter Field, who was also 
responsible for multilateral trade relations (Capling, 2001: 105). He was one 
of a core of trade officials who embraced and supported the Hawke 
government's trade libe1·alization policies, including the unilateral reduction 
of tariffs and supporting multilateral efforts to liberalize trade in 
agricultural products. The trade department, viewed with suspicion by 
Labor as a bastion of McEwenistl32 protectionism, was stripped of many of 
its policy functions in the early years of the Hawke government before it 
was eventually drawn into the merged Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade. Well before the merger many trade officials with economics training, 
backed by a growing body of research providing evidence of the cost of 
protectionism to the economy, were pushing for a change to a more liberal 
trade policy, and found in the Hawke government a willing partner in their 
ambitions. While much of this work had bipartisan support up to the 1993 
election, growing disillusion with the multilateral process, fuelled by 
unfulfilled expectations regarding the outcome of the Uruguay Round, gave 
131 The APEC member countries, after March 2007, were "'"ustralfa, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Miliysia, Mexi<:o, New 
Zeahnd, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United 
States and \Tiet NatrL 
m Sir John 'Black Jack' McEwen was Country Party leader and deputy prime minister under Robert Menzies 
during the 1960s. As !vfinister for Trade and Industry, McEwen vigorously pursued a policy of high tariff 
protection for the manufacturing industry, in :return for which industry would not challenge the co11tinuing 
h:igh tariffs on u:npotted raw materials that benefitted farmers but pushed up industry production costs. The 
policy was dubbed 'I'v1cE-wenist' in recognition of the the Country Party leader's enthusiastic advocacy for it. 
But, leavening his protectionist reputation} :VfcE\ve~ \vas a key architect of the 1957 ~:'igreement on 
C-0nunetce between _,\ustralia and Japan which was negotiat~ in the fJ.ce of bitter protests from 
manufactu;rers, for compelling economic and political reasons (Crawford, 1968: 351-53, 370-75). 
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ammunition to opponents of further moves toward liberalization and re-
invigorated the current of thought hostile to the unilateral reduction or 
abolition of tariffs. The link in trade policy between pursuit of increased 
export market access and domestic economic reform was coming under 
increasing pressure, and was eventually broken by the Howard government 
(Garnaut, 2005). 
Just as the incoming Hawke government had viewed the trade department 
with suspicion, seeing it as peopled with officials who possessed attitudes 
and allegiances inimical to its interests, so too among the newly-elected 
Howard government there were those who felt some in the department had 
an ideological adherence to multilateralism that blinded them on occasion to 
the national interest: 
There are also people who have come through from the old Trade 
Department who are quite happy with this [shift in trade policy 
emphasis toward bilateralisml But there were also certainly people 
who believed in the multilateral system · Kunkel, 2005. 
But the faltering progress of trade liberalization through multilateral (WTO) 
and plurilateral (APEC) forums had already stirred the beginnings of 
reappraisal of trade policy direction from 1994, and the internal debate was 
to some extent ahead of the political shift. According to one senior official, by 
the time of the 1996 election discussion had already been going on for a 
considerable time over the merits of maintaining a focus on non· 
discriminatory trade liberalization over opportunities to improve market 
access on a preferential basis: 
There was a lot of debate, very much so. It [the policy] has been seen 
in the public mind as some sort of huge lurch in policy, but it is like a 
lot of policy things, it was a slow accretion of change building up and 
up, and the policy development was much earlier than the actual 
activity of negotiating an FTA. Officials and ministers had sensed 
that the world was changing and that we needed to be in a position 
where we could change. At least within the policy world the change 
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wasn't a shock. When we suddenly decided to do an FTA with 
Singapore [in 1999) it wasn't a shock - we had been heading in this 
direction for some time ·Raby, 2005. 
Contributing to the. re·shaping of trade policy, according to some observers, 
was the effect of the merger of the departments of foreign affairs and trade. 
Both proponents and critics of the merger share the view that it resulted in 
questions of trade policy being brought within the scope of foreign policy 
considerations, but disagreement has emerged over how positive this 
development has been. Raby (2005), Cook (2005), Fischer (2005) and 
J,foMullan (2006) see that it has helped trade policy in several ways, 
including by ensuring trade issues are represented by two cabinet ministers 
and vastly increasing the resources available for the pursuit of trade policy 
by making it among the responsibilities of Australia's diplomatic 
representatives. But this same process has arguably meant that trade policy 
has become, to use Kunkel's (2002) description, a 'fly-wheel' for foreign 
policyl33 - that is, its purpose is to be a complement to Australia's foreign 
policy objectives, an outcome that some see as having less·than·desirable 
results for the shape of trade policy (Harris, 2005), most obviously in the 
pursuit of PTAs. The merger has also, some have argued, provided a more 
conducive setting for the pursuit of bilateral trade policies because many 
officials come to trade from a background in foreign affairs, which is 
practiced largely on a bilateral basis (McMullan, 2006). A further 
proposition is that many officials had a background in law rather than 
economics, which coloured their approach to trade issues - a point that 
could also be applied to Howard, who was trained as a lawyer134. 
6.4.1.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PTA POLICY WITHIN DFAT 
W'hile the Howard government came to office with a trade policy that 
included a heightened emphasis on bilateral approaches to trade 
133 For example, Raby (2005) describes how, as early as l 993, discussions had begun on ways to ]ink the 
~~ustralia-New Zealand CER agreement urith _.,-\SEAN, partly as a way to enhance and expand .r\ustralia's 
political links with ASEAc'i nations, 
134 This was among the concerns voiced by Peter Field regarding '"\.Ian Oxlefs appointment as Australia's 
GJ\IT ambassador during the Uruguay Round (Field, 1997). 
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liberalization compared with that of its predecessors, the policy change was 
not as dramatic as it would become later when the Coalition explicitly 
embraced preferentialism. In practice trade is conducted largely on a 
bilateral basis, including in the forums of the vVTO (Capling, 2001: 27·8; 
Irwin, 2005: 207·08)135, and the Hawke and Keating governments, though 
committed to trade liberalization at the multilateral and unilateral levels, 
nevertheless tackled trade issues on a bilateral basis in the normal course of 
conducting trade relations136, and initially the Howard government's 
approach was largely confined to increasing this emphasis while 
maintaining the commitment to multilateral trade liberalization. 
Even before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round the Keating government 
had begun to examine other approaches to advancing trade liberalization. 
This was evident in its ambitions for APEC, including the adoption of the 
Bogar goals in 1994, and in early attempts to link the Australian· New 
Zealand CER agreement with ASEAN's FTA (McMullan, 2006). Although, 
as discussed earlier, Bergsten failed in his push to establish APEC as a 
preferential trading area, within Keating's office his economic adviser John 
Edwards argued the need for Australia to consider negotiating PTAs 
(Edwards, 2006; Elek, 2005). In 1993 and 1994 Edwards wrote a series of 
speeches delivered by Keating in which the Australian prime minister aired 
the possibility of negotiating such agreements, and one of the key questions 
grappled with within the PM's office at the time was that, having created 
APEC, what should happen next. According to Edwards, Keating saw a 
preferential APEC trading community as the next obvious development 
'
31 The norm of reciprocity undetpim GATf /ll''TO negotiations, which include bilateral item-by-item 
approacl1es and zero for zero deah that abolish tariffs for a specific pxoduct or sector (Capiing, 2001: 27). In 
the G~..\TT, tariff reductions were negotiated on a bilateral, product-by-product basis) with any agreement 
reached on lowering tariffs to then be applied to all other member nations under the most-favoured naiton 
clause (!rwin, 2005: 207-08). 
136 In 1995 then-trade minister Bob l\fcl\1ullan produced a publication1 tf'lnning ~Markets (prepared by his then 
trade policy adviser Geoff Raby), in which he canvassed a multi-pronged trade policy including bilateral 
approaches to trade issues: 'Certainly we felt we needed to have bilateral dialogue with countries, and we did a 
hell of a lot of that. [For example] 1 remember talking to the Mexicans about some limitations they had on 
wooL .. I recall [talking to them] about being able to export uranium to them as well' (McMullan. 2006). 
Harris (1986: 72) estimated that although export marketing and promotion dominated the -..vork of overseas 
trade representatives, benveen 10 and 15 per cent of their resources \VCre devoted to trade relations tasks, 
most particularly bilateral government-to~govemment relations on specific trade and market access issues. 
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because, as opposed to CER·AFTA, it could allow Australia to play a much 
more prominent regional role than its sheer economic size would suggest 
(Edwards, 2006). But the idea was resisted hard within DFAT (by senior 
officials including Peter Field and Andrew Elek), as well as by officials from 
the Department of Prime l\finister and Cabinet and the Office of National 
Assessments. Following the APEC Bogor meeting in November 1994, at 
which it was agreed all member countries would move to full trade 
liberalization (by 2010 for developed country members and 2020 for 
developing country members), several officials in the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, including its International Division head Michael 
Thawley, began work on how the goals should be implemented. As a result 
of this work an approach, which was later dubbed by USTR Bob Zoellick and 
others as competitive liberalization137, was developed under which APEC 
would be divided into sub·groups, some of which would move more rapidly 
toward full liberalization than others. For Thawley it was of a piece with a 
tradition of trade policy pragmatism in Australia: 
[The approach] came out of the same basic, pragmatic attitude that if 
you can cut a deal which is beneficial then you should do so, whether 
it's bilateral, regional or global - Thawley, 2006. 
The crucial assumption made here was that the benefits pertaining to a 
particular trade deal were self-evident: an assumption that reflected a 
relatively straightforward view of trade policy based upon reciprocity and an 
exchange of"concessions" rather than the more subtle yet economically 
compelling arguments regarding the long·term gains to be had from trade 
liberalization for those countries doing the liberalizing. 
Indicative ofKeating's openness to trade policy approaches other than just 
multilateralism was his positive response in 1994 to a suggestion from 
Thailand's then trade minister Supachai Panitchpakdi to link the CER with 
AFTA, not because he thought it was the best option for Australia but 
!37 Thawley, interview with author, 2006. 
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because he saw it as a viable alternative if 'something went wrong on the 
larger global trade scene' (Keating, 2000: 104)138. 
In addition to regional initiatives such as APEC and AFTA·CER, the 
Keating government also pursued bilateral trade deals, such as Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreements, that were intended to address issues 
in specific trade relationships in an effort to 'unclog the arteries' of trade 
(McMullan, 2006). Despite such bilateral dealings, and the interest of some 
within the Keating government in preferentialism, the idea of negotiating 
bilateral preferential trade agreements did not gain momentum until after 
the 1996 election, and even then its progress was patchy and slow. 
In 1996 the incoming Coalition Trade Minister Tim Fischer, with the 
support of the prime minister, increased the focus within DFATon tackling 
trade issues bilaterally as part of the new government's political strategy of 
trying to paint the Keating government as obsessed with multilateralism to 
the neglect of opportunities to advance the national interest on a bilateral 
basis. One of his major initiatives was to form the Market Development 
Task Force, an interdepartmental body which identified and tackled specific 
difficulties in market access on a bilateral basis (Calvert, 2006; Fischer, 
2005). 
The Market Development Task Force reinvigorated Australia's 
bilateral trade diplomacy in 1997 and will continue to be a key 
element of our bilateral strategy in 1998. It. fills a vacuum which 
existed for too long previously. Wins include better access for 
Australian sugar, rice and citrus in Japan, and financial services 
licences in China and Thailand - Fischer, 1998b. 
138 One official involved int"'-nllttently in talks on a linkage between the iL '\OZ CER and the ASE.A.I'< FTA 
said the primary aim of such a linkage was to buttress political relations between the nations rather than 
purely to develop trade furthet, even though the talks \Vere handled by the trade policy area ofDE-\T (Raby, 
2005), 
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Ashton Calvert, who served as secretary ofDFAT from April 1998 to 
January 2005, said that Fischer 'articulated quite strongly the idea in the 
trade area [that] he wanted to reinvigorate bilateral consultation and 
negotiation so that, in a lot of the nitty·gritty of specific issues of access that 
affect our exporters in particular markets, we might be able to clear away 
some of the obstacles and barriers through bilateral channels'. As Fischer 
himself put it, 'the big switch was to pursue bilateral as well as multilateral 
after 1996 - in crudest form, to run and chew gum [at the same timel' 
(Fischer, 2005). Under this approach Fischer negotiated a non-preferential 
bilateral agreement with the Mexican government for the removal of tariffs 
on imports of Australian semi-processed wool which, because of the North 
America Free Trade Agreement, essentially gave Australian wool processors 
tariff-free access to the giant US market (Fischer, 2005). 
By itself, this increased focus on bilateralism did not constitute a 
substantial break with the non-preferential trade policy approach of the 
Keating government. But, while such work was being undertaken, a formal 
policy that tied bilateralism with preferentialism began to be developed 
within DFAT. In 1997 Cabinet received, discussed and adopted a 
submission prepared by the department detailing a formal policy on PTAs 
(Fischer, 2005; Calvert, 2006; Raby, 2005; Kunkel, 2005). 
The department was there with bells on, always accepted whichever 
ministerial course of action proceeded, but took a while to 
intellectually clad the premise that we could run and chew gum [at 
the same time] - Fischer, 2005. 
Among those involved in this work was a rising cohort of officials who had 
had experience in multilateral trade negotiations but who were willing to 
help develop a trade policy strategy that involved contemplation of a 
broader range of options for market opening at the regional and bilateral 
level including preferential arrangements. There were several motivations 
driving this view, some relating to changes in the international trade policy 
environment and others arising out of views on their role as public servants 
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and their career prospects. As discussed in Chapter Two139, this activity by 
non-elected officials could be seen as of a piece with doctrine of 
responsiveness to the needs and wishes of the government of the day, but 
could also be interpreted as a form of policy entrepreneurship in line with 
the public values principle - developing and promoting a policy schema that 
may advance the national interest (however defined) while at the same time 
serving to enhance the reputation of those officials involved in its 
development. 
Internationally, progress toward further trade liberalization at the 
multilateral level appeared increasingly difficult, and prospects for any 
early agreement for the next round ofVV'TO negotiations were unpromising 
during 1996 and 1997. Professionally, many of these officials saw it as their 
duty to give practical effect to the policies of the government of the day 
despite any misgivings they may have had about the merits or otherwise of 
pursuing PTi\s. Also, it surely would not hurt career prospects to be at the 
forefront of policy development in the area of bilateral approaches to trade 
liberalization given that was the direction the government was seeking to 
lead policy. And, i:n the absence of much action at the multilateral level, it 
gave both officials and their political masters something to do: 
One deputy secretary, Pam[ela] Fayle [head ofDFAT's Trade and 
Economic Analysis Branch in 1996·97 and head ofDFAT's }v:farket 
Development Division between 1997·2000], said there was a need to 
start thinking about actuating the Coalition Government's trade 
policy, and saw that no work had really been done to do that. She 
suggested the whole of idea ofTEFA/TIFAs [Technical and 
Economic/Investment Framework Agreements - later to be known as 
Trade and Economic Framework Agreements], leading on to FTAs. 
TEF As were seen as a way to get something 'announceable' on trade 
up and running. The idea was that we could step them up to FTAs -
Davis, 2005. 
139 Pages 55-8, 
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Underlining this initiative was, in part, the sense that it was the task of 
DFAT, as the government's lead trade policy agency, to give policy shape 
and intellectual cladding to the Howard government's trade policy stance. 
According to one senior DFAT official: 
It wasn't a philosophical shift and yet, there was also in the 
department the development of policy towards FTAs it was our 
responsibility to do this - Raby, 2005. 
According to another senior DFATofficial, the Howard government made 
changes in senior appointments that helped smooth the way for the shift in 
trade policy strategy toward the embrace ofpreferentialism: 
The bilateral push in recent years came from people who were not 
drivers of trade policy in the 1980s. They are driving it because it is 
the political preference of the day. The shift back to bilateralism was 
driven politically after the Howard government came to power and 
they brought in senior bureaucrats with them - Ashton Calvert and 
Phillip Flood - these were people keen to get on with a bilateral 
program but they were never trade people, they were foreign affairs 
people - Kenyon, 2005. 
Among these officials was Geoff Raby, a one·time advisor to Labor's trade 
minister Bob l\.:fclVIullan, Pamela Fayle, who headed DFAT's Market 
Development Division (which was at the core of Fischer's bilateral trade 
policy approach), and a number of deputy secretaries· David Spencer (at the 
time deputy secretary with responsibility for the Office of Trade Negotiation 
and the Trade Development Division), Peter Grey (also APEC ambassador 
between 1996 and 1998) and Joanna Hewitt. From the election of the 
Howard government in March 1996 they worked upon developing and 
refining the ideas and principles that would guide the development of the 
shift in trade policy strategy, including the negotiation of Trade and 
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Economic Framework Agreements as a prelude to the negotiation of 
bilateral PTAs140. This work included the development of a set of criteria to 
be used in selecting potential PTA partners: 
a. The economic importance of a potential partner, including the extent 
of Australian commercial interest involved; 
b. The potential political impact of a particular PTA on Australia's 
relations with other nations; and 
c. The potential for the PTA partner to be able to negotiate and enforce 
a PTA that is genuinely liberalizing and comprehensive. 
That criteria was [sic] developed over some time and that formed the 
basis of our handling of the selection and approval of FTAs. The 
reason was to limit the number of FTAs. There had to be some rigour 
in the process - Raby, 2005. 
It [the Cabinet decision] certainly denoted a readiness in principle to 
look at them but it laid down some fairly tough conditions that they 
should meet before we look at them_ There was a sense, reflected in 
that decision and discussions between departments and between 
Cabinet ministers and the decisions that accompanied it 'Yes, look at 
it but don't kid ourselves that its straight forward, don't kid ourselves 
that the gains are necessarily all that easy to obtain and we need to 
keep a firm focus all along on the \;v'TO process as well - Calvert, 2006. 
In developing the intellectual grounds for the Coalition's bilateral trade 
policy emphasis, the bureaucrats involved gave effect to the views of Foreign 
Minister Downer and Trade Minister Fischer (who jointly presented the 
DFAT submission on the negotiation of PT As to Cabinet) that Australia's 
trade strategy had to be broadened beyond non-preferential approaches to 
trade and market access (Downer, 2008). But despite Cabinet's approval in 
1997 it took almost three years for the first PTA to be negotiated by the 
140 
. r\ustra.lia negotiated Trade and Economic Frame\vork ~.\greements ,,,-ith both Japan and Chio.a as a prelude 
to embarking or1 negoriiitions for bilateral PT.As 'W"ith these -countries. 
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Howard government to appear. This delay in part reflected the effects of the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, which robbed economic development in the 
region of much of its momentum, and created considerable political wariness 
about increasing the exposure of Australia's economy to many of the Asian 
nations. Furthermore, political relations with another potential partner 
country, the United States, were at times difficult. In 1998 and 1999 then 
USTR Charlene Barshevsky approached Fischer with a proposal to establish 
a PTA embracing the US, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile and 
possibly Thailand (Fischer, 2005). In October 1999 Fischer's successor, J\'1ark 
Vaile, had a meeting with ministers from Singapore and Thailand at which 
they proposed a PTA involving Australia, New Zealand and the ASEAN 
group of nations (Kunkel, 2005). But opposition from the Indonesian and 
:Malaysian governments killed off the proposal in early 2000 and by later 
that year the idea of a PTA with Singapore came to the fore (Kunkel, 2005). 
According to the-then Foreign Minister Downer who, as the minister with 
portfolio responsibility, jointly presented the submission on PTAs with 
Trade l'viinister Tim Fischer, one of the significant difficulties in 
implementing the policy was finding suitable partner countries: 
Obviously you had to have a partner who was worthwhile, in two 
ways. One was that they had some capacity to negotiate and enforce 
the terms of an agreement. That rules out quite a lot of countries, 
actually. Secondly, there'd have to be some significant- not minor -
net benefit to Australia. The third thing was there had to be 
consultation with Australian industry to see what their response to 
such an agreement was. Fourthly, it had to fit in with the broader 
framework of our foreign policy. You have quite a list of FTAs that 
have been negotiated or being considered, and they all fit those 
criteria - Downer, 2008. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
By the time the Howard government came to office in 1996 consideration 
was already being given in the upper echelons of government and the 
bureaucracy to the pursuit of preferential trade agreements despite on·going 
efforts at the multilateral level. But the use of trade policy to manage 
international relations and as a tool for domestic political advantage rather 
than as a means to achieve economic reform became much more explicit 
under the Coalition government. Initially, in a domestic political 
environment shaped by the hardships imposed by the recession of the early 
1990s, trade policy became a point of political differentiation - while a 
Coalition government would opportunistically seize opportunities for 
national advancement at the multilateral level, it would place more 
emphasis than its Labor predecessors on developing regional and bilateral 
trade arrangements as a means to satisfy domestic political priorities as 
well as meet strategic and commercial needs. As evidence gathered in this 
chapter shows, under Howard the Liberal Party repudiated the Fightback! 
policy agenda and instead began to tap into the disenchantment with the 
consequences ofincreased trade and economic liberalization felt by 
significant sections of the electorate. 
Through its policies the Howard government both reflected and reinforced a 
shift in the conception of Australia that was in many respects subtle but far-
reaching. There was no undoing the reforms of the 1980s that had opened 
the economy and set it on the path of greater integration with the global 
economy. But the growing unease about the speed and scale of integration, 
evident on the Gold Coast in the late 1980s and which manifested itself in 
the formation of One Nation in late 1996, was a political phenomenon that 
presented the Coalition with both challenges and opportunities. Rather than 
trying to disown the Hawke and Keating government reforms it supported, 
the Coalition appealed to the nationalist impulse underlying much of the 
unease in the electorate by distancing itself from Labor's rhetorical embrace 
of Asia and multilateralism and proposing a trade policy stance it sought to 
characterize as pragmatic - pursuing opportunities at the multilateral level 
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when they arose, but not surrendering 'concessions' such as"tariff cuts 
without reciprocal gains from trading partners. Thawley, who played a key 
role as a foreign policy advisor within the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet and later in the prime minister's office, articulated the 
government's approach this way in an interview with the author: "[A] basic, 
pragmatic attitude that if you can cut a deal which is beneficial then you 
should do so, whether it's bilateral, regional or global". 
This was in many respects embodied in the 'aggressive bilateralism' 
approach to trade issues crafted by Tim Fischer. Fischer argued that 
multilateral liberalization remained the best option, but also publicly 
recognized that "there is no such thing as a level playing field" in 
international trade. As a point of policy differentiation from Labor, it rested 
on an inaccurate caricature of the Hawke-Keating governments as having 
focused their efforts almost entirely on multilateral trade negotiations to the 
virtual exclusion of bilateral trade dealings. But it helped the Coalition in 
its attempts to portray itself as more attuned than Labor to the concerns of 
large sections of the electorate. 
Through aggressive bilateralism, with its inherent recourse to specific 
reciprocity (Keohane, 1986), the government could argue it was attempting 
to level the playing field. In so doing the Howard government gave support 
to a more qualified approach to Australia's economic engagement with the 
rest of the world, one in which trade policy became more a tool of foreign 
policy than of economic reform. As Calvert observed in an interview with the 
author, there was a preference in the Coalition to "tone down some of what 
they regarded as excessive emphasis and reliance on multilateral processes. 
We wanted to reaffirm the fundamental importance of key bilateral 
relationships around the world". 
This shift was facilitated by the political institutional framework, in which 
executive power was concentrated in the hands of an electorally successful 
prime minister and resistance in the trade bureaucracy to the new policy 
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regime was overwhelmed by the ethos that its primary role was to 
implement the policies of the government of the day. As evidence gathered 
in this chapter shows, although some bureaucrats argued for the priority of 
multilateralism, there was an intellectual shift within DFAT during the 
1990s to invigorate bilateralism, and once the Howard government was 
elected this extended into articulation by senior departmental officials of an 
agenda for the negotiation of PT As in what might be seen as simultaneously 
as responsiveness to the needs of government as well as a form of policy 
entrepreneurship. 
It is to the implementation of the government's trade policy· including the 
relationship that developed between the government, the bureaucracy and 
commercial interests in the pursuit of market access · that the discussion 
now turns. 
184 
The Power to Deal 
7. A MATTER OF INTERESTS 
7 .1 INTRODUCTION 
7.1.1 INTERESTS AND PROTECTION 
For much of the period since nationhood, Australia's trade policy has been 
marked by the erection and maintenance of protective tariff barriers to 
international competition. In the early years after Federation the political 
triumph of the Alfred Deakin·led protectionists over advocates of free trade 
in federal parliament saw the establishment of what has been described as 
the Australian Settlement, characterized by a vVhite Australia immigration 
policy, industry protection, wage arbitration, state paternalism and imperial 
benevolence (Kelly, 1992: 1·2). The policy of industry protection, in 
particular, was underpinned by broad consensus among potentially 
conflicting interests. Organized labour backed protection for developing 
manufacturing industries both for the jobs it created and in return for an 
arbitrated wage fixing system (Oatley, 1996: 48), while agricultural 
producers who faced higher production costs from import tariffs -
supported industry protection in exchange for a system of statutory 
marketing bodies, public subsidies, price fixing and industry levies (Kelly, 
1992: 6). In one form or another this compact survived largely unchanged 
through the formation and collapse of the system of imperial preferences of· 
the 1930s to the McEwenist era of'all·round protection' of the 1960s. 
It was in part a measure of the success of industry in lobbying for higher 
tariffs that by 1970 Australia had the most highly protected economy in the 
OECD, after New Zealand (Anderson and Garnaut, 1987: 6). But during the 
1970s mounting evidence of the costs of protectionism to both national 
economic growth and to key industries, particularly agriculture, gave rise to 
ever louder calls for tariff cuts and industry reforms. Much of the 
intellectual case for lower protection was formed in a series of reports and 
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government·commissioned inquiries into the costs ofprotection141 , but 
private interest groups were active on both sides of the argument. During 
the 1970s lobbying by private interest groups both for maintaining 
protectionist policies and for greater liberalization was becoming more 
active and overt. The number and size of lobbying offices maintained by 
firms and industry groups in Canberra expanded sharply in the periOd 
(Anderson and Garnaut, 1987: 73). \Vhile some were aimed at retaining or 
increasing protection or valuable import quotas, other groups seeking 
greater trade liberalization became more active, not least farm industry 
groups. Highly significant was the formation in 1977 of the National 
Farmers' Federation, which had trade liberalization as one of its primary 
goals. The federation's activities in highlighting the costs to farmers and the 
public more generally of the costs of protection put pressure on the Country 
Party (which became the National Party at this time) to shift its policy 
stance supporting protection and helped encourage the development of a 
free trade faction in the Liberal Party (ibid 74). Other industries that 
shared an interest in freer trade - mining and export·oriented 
manufacturing- also increased their lobbying efforts. 
As a political consensus emerged during the 1980s and early 1990s around a 
policy of economic liberalization and freer trade, manufacturing industry 
and its allies in the labour movement increasingly turned their efforts away 
from the maintenance of politically unfashionable tariffs to the negotiation 
of government support and assistance in adjusting to a lower tariff 
environment. For example, in 2005 the Australian Industry Group, 
representing about 10,000 firms in manufacturing, construction, transport, 
telecommunications and the senices, saw little future in fighting on tariffs: 
I have been quite impressed across the board with how accepting 
everyone is about tariff removal. Everybody sees this as an absolutely 
141 Among these was the work of the Tariff Board under me leadership of "-\.If Ratt',gan :ind its successor tl1e 
Industries A_ssistance Commission in measuring and highlighting the costs of protection (Kelly, 1992: 44; 
C"Yflmaut, 1994: 63-·4). ~\series of inquiries commissioned by the Wbitlam and Fraser governments - the 
Jackson report on manufacturing (1975), the Fraser govem1ne11t's \Xlhite Paper on :rnanufacturing (1977) and 
the Crawford report ort the adjustment problems of ,.,\ustralian manufacturing (1979) - each advocated tariff 
reduction (~\nderson and Gamaut, 1987: 71-2). 
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inevitable trend, even the TCF (Textile, Clothing, Footwear) sector, 
which is possibly most surprising [because] they are one of two 
sectors that have traditionally benefited from protection. It's been a 
very long, hard road for them coming out of that basis of operation, 
but the fight's out of them now. At round tables and the like it is 
utterly accepted across the board - Jacky Millership, Manager, Trade 
and Commercial, Australian Industry Group, 2005. 
This consensus at the national level has remained relatively intact, but is 
showing signs of fraying in relation to the automobile industry as the 
combined effects of greater international competition and lower tariffs have 
put pressure on the sector, which has shed more than 7000 jobs since 2002 
(Carr, 2007). An announcement by car manufacturer General .M.otors 
Holden in March 2007 that it would cut 600 jobs from its South Australian 
operations, the latest in a string of such decisions, prompted South 
Australian Labor premier Mike Rann to call for an end to tariff cuts for the 
automobile industry142. At the federal level both of the major political 
parties have indicated they will review the tariff cut program in 2008 
<Anderson, Rollins and Taylor, 2007). And while the peak industry body, the 
Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, has maintained its commitment 
to the government's tariff cut program, individual car companies lobbied for 
reform of the $4.2 billion Automotive Competitive and Investment Scheme 
established to assist adjustment to a lower tariff environment. 
7.1.1.1 THEORIES OF INTEREST GROUP BEHAVIOUR 
l'vfuch theory of private interest group behaviour regarding trade policy has 
focused on the establishment or maintenance of protectionist policies such 
as tariffs, import quotas and industry assistance. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
in the political economy literature considerable effort has been made to 
explain trade policy by recourse to the economic interests of societal actors. 
As early as 1935, Schattschneider was emphasizing the importance of 
interest groups in shaping trade policy, a theme subsequently elaborated on 
142 Under the Howard government's industry plan, announced in 2002, tariffs on passenger motor vehicle 
imports would be reduced from 10 pct cent to 5 per cent from 1 January, 2010. 
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by scholars developing a political economy approach to trade policy, 
including Kindleberger (1951), Krueger (1974) and Gourevitch (1977). In 
one branch of the literature this approach has developed into a demand·side 
model ofpolk'Y·making in which trade policy, particularly industry 
protection, reflects the economic interests of societal actors. This model has 
at its base a society·centred view of the state in which, to varying degrees, 
the state plays a neutral or minor mediating role between interests and 
polk-y (Meier, 1990: 187). Drawing on Olson's (1965) public choice model of 
interest group formation, political economists have used the demand·side 
model to explain protectionist policies as due in large part to the demands of 
domestic economic actors (Milner, 1999: 95: Frey, 1984, 30·2; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1995: 668; Ikenberry, 1986: 57·8; Panagariya and Findlay, 1994). 
Specifically, those who could readily identify and quantify the losses they 
would suffer as a result of a reduction in protection were more likely to 
incur the expense of organising and lobbying against the proposed change 
than the much larger group that would derive marginal benefit from the 
change. Implicit in this approach is a political model of economic pluralism, 
in which policy outcomes are a function of political conflict, shaped by actor 
preferences, weighted by the market power of competing actors and their 
propensity for collective action (Garrett and Lange, 1996: 49). Though 
demand·side theorists differ in the degree of autonomy they envisage for 
state·based actors143, they are alike in ascribing prime causal significance to 
the economic interests of societal actors - policy change occurs because 
different coalitions of interests manage to gain power and impose their 
preferences on society (Meier, 1990: 187). From this viewpoint the policy 
preferences of societal actors are deduced from potential changes in their 
143 For example, Grossman and Helpman (1995) postulated that industty lobby groups offer policy-
contingent funding to politicians, who in tum make policy choices that best serve their interests in being 
elected or re-elected. Another model, advanced by Brock and Magee (1978), holds that politicians would 
commit to a level of tariff protection that maximized their support from protectionist interests while limiting 
their e.xposure to accusations of being 'bought off' and inflicting additional costs on consumers. Mayer (1984: 
301) argued that trade protection would be set at the optimum tariff for the median voter. Ruggie (1982:392) 
envisaged the state as playing a :mediating role between international markets and society in the post-\Vorld 
War Two period. The "embedded liberalism" of the postwar international economic order embodted a 
compromise between tl1e strictutes of free trade a:od the social adjustment costs produced by trade 
liberalization, and govemments pJayed a role in enacting and sustaining this compromise by moderating 
the volatility of cross-border transaction flows and making social investments and provicling safety nets and 
adjustment: assistance (Ruggie1 2003). 
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income arising from different trade policy settings. Policymakers are 
assumed to act in the interests of the dominant social class or group, either 
because they themselves are of that class or group, or because they seek or 
rely upon the support of that class/group to maximize the likelihood of their 
election or re-election (see, for example, Brock and l\:Iagee, 1978: 246-50). 
In Australia, there is a network of policy communities, lobbies and 
consultative mechanisms that feed into the development and 
implementation of trade policy. There are seven formal government-
industry consultative bodies, as well as several export advisory panels, 
industry and trade agreement·specific advisory groups as well as informal 
consultations between ministers, bureaucrats, industry representatives and 
business people. The theories outlined above suggest that the 
preferentialism that has emerged in Australian trade policy is in response to 
the demands of a politically or economically dominant group. But, while the 
negotiation of PTAs has been supported by export-oriented industries, not 
least because they are seen to be a mechanism to improve market access 
and reduce barriers to investment flows, there is little evidence that they or 
other private interests have driven the change. Instead, it is argued here, 
interests have played a much more subordinate, though still important, role 
in trade policy. 
7.1.1.2 THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS 
As the focus of trade policy has shifted away from tariffs and industry 
protection to the negotiation of increased market access - including, since 
the late 1990s, through preferential agreements - the opportunities for 
private interest intervention have narrowed. Government has held to itself 
the choice of potential PTA partners, with interests largely relegated to 
three distinct roles: as sources of detailed industry advice, as participants in 
the negotiation process and as advocates, to both industry and the broader 
public, of trade agreements that are struck. 
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On the few occasions where interests have directly proposed or opposed a 
trade agreement they have met with little success, particularly compared 
with policy entrepreneurs within government who, because of the political 
institutional architecture, have played a pivotal role in proposing and then 
forging PTAs such as the AUSFTA. 
The three PTAs negotiated by the Howard government144 shed light on the 
role private interests have played in framing Australian trade policy. The 
following discussion examines the formal and informal mechanisms that 
have been used by private interests seeking to shape trade policy, and the 
role these interests have played in the shift in trade policy toward the 
negotiation of preferential trade agreements. The argument then proceeds, 
through consideration of the three PTA agreements concluded by the 
Howard government - with Singapore, Thailand and the United States - to 
consider two further issues. The first is an assessment of the extent to which 
private interests have influenced the selection of PTA partners, with 
particular attention given to the role of policy entrepreneurs in this regard. 
The second is the importance of private interests in implementing the 
government's PTAs, not only during the negotiation process but also, 
importantly, as advocates of these agreements to sectional interests and the 
general public. 
7.2 TALKING TRADE 
As discussed in the previous chapter, part of the Coalition's political 
strategy to unseat the Keating government had been to accuse it of an 
ideological attachment to multilateralism that led it to neglect bilateral 
avenues for pursuing trade interests. It pledged during the 1996 election 
that it would "revive and reinvigorate neglected bilateral trading relations" 
in order to improve market access (Snape, et.al. 1997: 450). The Howard 
government came to office without a clearly defined and developed policy of 
trade preferentialism; rather, its focus was on reinvigorating bilateral trade 
: 44 _.\sat February 2008 these were the Singapore-. .t\ustrnlia Free Trade Agreement, '\vhich came into force on 
28 July, 2003; and the ,\ustralia-United States Free Trade Agreement and the Australia-Thailand Free Trade 
~-\greement, both of \vbich came into effect on 1 January, 2005. 
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efforts. By early 1997, after almost a year in office, the broad outlines of the 
Howard government's trade policy of 'aggressive bilateralism'145 were 
apparent. In essence the Howard government's trade policy, as described by 
the·then Trade Minister himself, was to "make sure that we maximize 
Australia's exports. More exports means more growth which means more 
jobs. That is the most important economic equation, as far as I am 
concerned" (Fischer, 1998). To achieve this, the government increased the 
emphasis on targeting specific overseas markets and, through bilateral 
mechanisms and other means such as export promotion, pushing for 
improved access. Much of this work was undertaken under the auspices of 
the Market Development Task Force, appointed by Fischer in August 1996 
and chaired by the secretary ofDFAT, which was formed to coordinate 
government activity to target priority markets for access, trade promotion 
and trade development (Fischer, 1998; Fischer, 1997a; Fischer, 1997b; 
Fischer, 2005). This policy supported the Coalition's political strategy to 
simultaneously buttress its economic reform credentials by publicly backing 
multilateral trade liberalization while highlighting its efforts to 'level the 
playing field' in trade through bilateral negotiations with other governments. 
\Vhile the Coalition government brought with it a change in rhetoric 
surrounding trade policy, particularly in its emphasis on bilateral 
approaches to trade issues, in practice before 2000 it was largely a 
continuation of the conduct of trade policy as implemented by successive 
governments over the preceding decades. As Harris (1986: 72) indicates, the 
vast bulk of trade effort by successive governments has been devoted to 
export promotion and addressing trade issues on a bilateral basis, including 
the negotiation of bilateral agreements within the multilateral framework. 
For instance, the Hawke government reached bilateral agreements affecting 
trade and investment with countries including China, Korea and Papua 
New Guinea during the 1980s and early 1990s, when it was also embroiled 
in efforts to reinvigorate the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations 
(Snape et al., 522-45). Although public debate about the trade policy 
145 The origins of the tetm are obscure, but former Trade Ivlinister Tim Fischer accepts it as a description of 
his policy approach (Fischer, 2005). 
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directions adopted by successive governments has often been characterized 
in terms ofmultilateralism versus bilateralism (FADTR, 2003: 17; Thirlwell, 
2004: 3·4), governments of all persuasions have been simultaneously 
engaged on trade matters at a bilateral, regional and multilateral level 
(Snape et.al. 1997: 449·50). 
As Trade Minister, Fischer energetically spruiked improvements in market 
access and export promotion achieved bilaterally (Fischer, 1997b; Fischer, 
1998). As part of the government's advocacy for its policy approach, it 
published an annual Trade Outcomes and Objectives publication, which 
gave an account of trade relations, identified barriers to exports and 
targeted countries for individual action (Capling, 2001: 172). An example of 
the sort of action taken under this rubric was Fischer's negotiation of zero 
tariff access for semi-processed wool exports to l\/lexico: 
Herminio [Blanco Mendoza; former secretary of commerce and 
industrial development in the l\foxican government of Ernesto Zedillo 
Pone de Leon] and I thought we could create a wilrwin situation by 
creating a zero tariff on semi·processed wool, even though we had no 
FTA, as a one·off deal effectively [linking] Dubbo to Mexico City and 
the surrounding woolen mills. This created the l\tiexico pipeline, 
whereby Australian semi·processed wool went to Mexico at zero tariff, 
was done up into coats, suits and jumpers, and then zero tariff under 
NAFTA into the world's largest economy, in a sense under the radar 
screen but within the rules of origin - Fischer, 2005. 
Similar work was co·ordinated under the auspices of the Market 
Development Task Force. For instance, a DFAT official on the taskforce was 
directed oversee efforts to change Republic of Korea rules regarding ultra 
heat treatment (UHT) milk which had inadvertently blocked market access 
for Australian producers: 
Every three months he had to come back before this market 
development taskforce, often chaired by the Secretary, in front of his 
peers and say why he had nothing to report and we'd made no 
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progress. At least they'd canvas ideas, we'd tried this, we'd tried that, 
we'd gone public and Industry Minister Macfarlane is going up there, 
put it on his brief as well, and we beavered away and beavered away 
and eventually they lifted the regulation that was causing us grief -
Fischer, 2005. 
\Vhile such bilateral efforts to improve market access were essentially non· 
preferential, by early 1997 work was well underway on ideas that would 
mark a clear and crucial break with the policy direction of the preceding two 
decades. During 1996 and early 1997, with an increased political emphasis 
on bilateral approaches to trade, the idea of Technical and 
Economic/Investment Framework Agreements was developed (Davis, 2005; 
Raby, 2005). In time the proposals were formalized into a Cabinet 
submission for the negotiation of preferential trade agreements and criteria 
for the selection of potential PTA partners, which was approved at a Cabinet 
meeting in May-June 1997 (Fischer, 2005; Downer, 2008). According to one 
account, the Cabinet discussion of the move did not involve an exhaustive 
examination of the strategic and technical implications of pursuing PT As, 
but was couched more in terms of the lack of progress towards trade 
liberalization multilaterally and at APEC (Kunkel, 2005). It was with this 
reversion to preferentialism, rather than the pursuit of 'aggressive 
bilateralism', that the Howard government brought about a crucial change 
in trade policy. 
7 .2.1 MECHANISMS OF INDUSTRY CONSULTATION 
This activity did not occur in a vacuum. The federal government sought and 
received industry views on both trade policy and specific trade issues 
through a number of formal and informal mechanisms. Soon after its 
election, the Howard government established the parliamentary Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties [JSCOT] which has as its duty to 'review 
and report on all treaty actions proposed by the government before action 
which binds Australia to the terms of the treaty is taken' (APH, 1996). As 
part of its inquiries the committee invites public submissions and has held 
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several seminars. Industry groups, unions, community groups, firms and 
individuals have made both written and verbal submissions to the 
committee on proposed trade treatiesl46. Trade agreements may also be the 
subject of parliamentary scrutiny through inquiries and hearings held by 
committees from both the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
including the Joint Foreign Affairs. Defence and Trade Committee and the 
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee. 
In its August 1997 foreign and trade policy ~'hite Paper, In the 1Vational 
111terest, the government acknowledged increasing interest among business 
and community groups in trade agreements: 
Governments need to prepare for an even greater interest in 
international negotiations by non-governmental organizations and by 
the private sector. The government has already expanded the treaty-
making process to ensure greater consultation with the community, 
including business and non-governmental organizations. The 
increased range of trade, economic and social issues dealt with 
internationally will make such consultations even more important -
DFAT, 1997: 79. 
In addition to increasing the avenues for parliamentary scrutiny, the 
Howard government established a number of consultative groups intended 
to provide opportunities for the exchange of views and information between 
ministers, bureaucrats, business and community representativesl47• Among 
these were: 
• National Trade Consultations - biannual meetings, chaired by the 
Minister for Trade, with state and territory counterparts, supported 
l4f.i On paper, JSCOT is an important actor in the treaty process, However, through its actions on a number 
of occ-asions> the government has shown that it does :not regard the committee as having-a credible veto 
power. In several reports JSCOT expressed dissatisfaction 'l.V'"ith the goverrunent over t:he introduction and 
passage of legislation enabling treaties before the commfrtee' s tevie-..vs had bee:n completed, including for the 
Thailand-£\ustralia PT..:t Enabling legislation for the agreement was introduced in the House of 
Representatives on 17 November 2004, and '\Vas p{lssed by the Senate the follo-..ving day~ prior to the 
committee being formed in the newly-elected parliament and completing its inquiry (!SCOT, 2004a: 3). 
147 
,,-\s is discussed in f~"iher detail later in the chapter, there was also extensive industry consultation during 
the Uruguay Round negotiations, including through a consultative committee established fot the purpose. 
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and shadowed by consultations between federal, state and territory 
officials; 
" Trade Policy Advisory Council (now disbanded) - a panel of 14 
businesspeople, academics, economists and industry representatives 
drawn from a range of export activities in services, manufactures, 
agricultural products and minerals. The members were appointed by 
the Minister for Trade to provide advice on trade and investment 
issues1 48; 
• \VTO Advisory Group - a 16-member group, created in June 2001, 
drawn from business, unions and the non-government sector to 
provide expertise to the l\1inister for Trade on WTO·related issues 
(Vaile, 2001b) 149; 
• Agricultural Trade Consultative Group - jointly chaired by the 
l'viinister for Trade and the l\1inister for Agricultuxe, Fisheries and 
Forestry, and comprising representatives from 17 agricultural 
industry organizations; 
• the Automotive Council - jointly chaired by the Minister for Trade 
and the lVlinister for Industry, Tourism and Resources and bringing 
together 10 senior executives from vehicle and component 
manufacturers, and; 
• the .L\PEC Australian Business Forum - an annual meeting of senior 
government officials and business executives on ways .L\PEC can help 
lower business costs in the region. 
The Australian Trade Commission (Austrade), the government's export 
development authority, also convenes Export Advisory Panels involving 
senior officials and industry representatives to exchange information and 
views and, through industry-specific Action Agendas, Department of 
"'' Membership ofTPAC in 2003 is listed in Appendix One. 
149 Two people simultaneously served on both TP.AC and the \'FTO Advisory Group - Geoff Allen, of The 
.-\llen Consi.ilting Group, who was chair of both bodies, and A..l\lZ Banking Group chief economist Saul 
Eslake. The composition of the WTO AdvisoJ'.y Gmup changed over time, wirh unionist Bill Mansfield, an 
.Assistant Secretary at the_,\ustralian Coimcil of Trade Unions not replaced when he left the committee, 
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Industry officials meet with business people on industry issues that can 
encompass trade concerns. 
7.2.2 A CHANGE IN VIEW? 
\Vhile members of these advisory groups, including the Australian Industry 
Group's executive director (international) Leigh Purnell, who was a member 
of the vVTO Advisory Group, and Toyota l'vfotor Company senior executive 
John Conomos were, to varying degrees of enthusiasm, advocates of PTAs 
(Millership, 2005; Vaile, 200la), there is little evidence that they drove the 
shift in trade policy emphasis to include consideration of PTAs. Calls made 
in the early and mid·l990s for Australia to negotiate PTAs gained few 
backers. At the time at least one industry body, the Australian Industry 
Group, was advocating the negotiation of PT As. Purnell, had, during much 
of the 1990s, proposed that Australia strike bilateral PTAs with countries 
such as Thailand (Millership, 2005; Vaile, 2001a), but had found little 
support: 
Our group was flagging the idea early on. vVe were a lone voice for 
some period of time. Leigh Purnell was putting forward the idea of 
FTAs long before they were fashionable. In fact, Leigh was sort of 
laughed or booed out of some venues for daring to raise it - Millership, 
2005. 
But as the decade advanced and the number of countries exploring PTAs 
increased- including significant trading partners such as Japan and the 
Republic of Korea - the possibility of negotiating similar agreements came 
more firmly onto the Howard government's policy agenda, initially as a way 
to both improve trade access to particular markets, and ensure that 
Australian exporters were not outflanked by preferential market access for 
their competitors (Downer, 2008). As former Foreign Minister Downer put it: 
We didn't have to do it. \Ve could have just been passive, in which 
case ... Singapore might have pressed for a FTA with Australia all the 
same, so we would have had to weigh up the implications for our 
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bilateral relationship of just knocking them back, which would have 
been a little negative. Nothing is in black and white, it wouldn't have 
been the end of the world. It just seems improbable Australia would 
have done that, actually. It would have been a little eccentric to take 
the view that in no circumstances would we negotiate a FTA. After all, 
we already had one with NZ - Downer, 2008. 
Among export·oriented manufacturers PTAs were increasingly seen as a 
necessary defensive measure to ensure they would not be placed at a 
commercial disadvantage to international competitors. For example, the 
negotiation of Singapore· Australia PTA came at a busy time for the 
Singapore government. On the very day, November 16, 2000, that Prime 
Minister John Howard and his Singapore counterpart Goh Chok Tong 
announced the commencement of negotiations (after a meeting on the 
sidelines of the APEC leaders' summit in Brunei Darussalam), Singapore 
entered into formal PTA negotiations with the US government and was in 
the process of concluding its PTA with New Zealand. It was also almost a 
year into the negotiation of an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan. 
The manufacturing and services industries, in particular, were watching 
this activity warily, concerned that they would be placed at a commercial 
disadvantage if rivals from countries such as the US or Japan gained 
preferential access: 
The growing number of FTAs are [sic] creating a competitive 
complexity for companies. Quite literally, when some of our major 
competitors in a given market are given a preferential trading right, 
that has a clear, commercial bottom-line impact on our companies. 
fi>Ianufacturers have gone through an amazing process of unilateral 
liberalization. All the competition is arriving at full-force here in 
Australia and companies have had to learn to retain their niche in the 
face of that competition and become a lot more innovative and lean 
and mean. They have gone through all of that and to now be told that 
some other countries have got a preferential access into country X 
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and you are not viable there any more is not something that is 
palatable for us. So we have been very vocal about FTAs. As our 
major trading partners have got more interested in FTAs and more 
active in them, what are you going to do? Quite literally, doing 
nothing is going backwards, and that's an untenable situation 
Millership, 2005. 
It was a concern shared in official circles. Former DFAT secretary Ashton 
Calvert150 said one of the key considerations for the government in deciding 
to pursue PTAs was the view that they were: 
Ulncreasingly [seen] as a necessary step for Australia strategically in 
trade policy as a defensive move, because there was a lot of talk 
around this time of an FTA between the Americas and if that got 
going and was formally locked in place there was quite a serious risk 
countries like Brazil, Argentina, Chile would achieve preferential 
access to the US market at the expense of Australian exporters, 
particularly in agriculture and processed food. Ifwe held back and did 
nothing and a number of other significant players including and 
involving key markets for us all got going with their own FTAs we 
would progressively miss out - Calvert, 2006. 
But, while some sections of industry, including some export·oriented 
manufacturers represented by the Australian Industry Group, may have 
favoured bilateral preferential trade deals, the politically-powerful farming 
industry and its peak body, the National Farmers' Federation, was 
suspicious of such a move. Since its founding in 1977 the NFF had been a 
champion of multilateral trade liberalization and there was considerable 
unease about the move to negotiate PTAs: 
A lot of us were fairly restless about that. Australia has a reputation 
as a free trade leader of the world, and we take a highly principled 
position on trade issues. We were worried that by negotiating FTAs 
Australia would lose that authority and find it harder to push things 
: 50 Dr Calvert was DFAT secretary from mid-1998 to December 2004. 
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at the WTO ·Allan Burgess, 2005 [chair of the NFF's Trade Policy 
Committee at the time of the negotiation of the Australia·US PTA]. 
The varying policy responses of industry groups to the proliferation of PTAs 
reflected differing interpretations of interests. As noted earlier, 
manufacturing sector representatives saw them as a defense against 
commercial disadvantage while agricultural producers were skeptical about 
the ability to secure significant improvements in market access for their 
products in Europe, the US and Japan except through multilateral 
negotiation. The Howard government - as indicated by Downer and Fischer 
·was mindful of the commercial implications of the proliferation of PTAs 
and was becoming increasingly doubtful about the prospects for early 
success of moves toward trade liberalization at the multilateral level. But in 
selecting its PTAs partners there is little to suggest private interests played 
a leading role, with geopolitical considerations and the ability and 
willingness of countries to negotiate such agreements weighing heavily on 
the government's decisions (Downer, 2008). 
The first PTA negotiated by the Howard government was with Singapore, 
which had low manufacture tariffs but more problematic behind·the·border 
barriers to the services trade; the second, with the United States, included 
issues of considerable importance to manufacturers, such as the treatment 
of intellectual property, but was dominated by agricultu:ral issues; only the 
third, with Thailand, potentially delivered big gains for manufacturers, 
including eventual zero tariff access for car exports. 
The competing arguments of export-oriented manufacturers and 
agricultural producers regarding the merits of PTAs as against 
multilateralism appear to have been reflected in the deliberations of 
Cabinet in formally adopting a PTA strategy when it met in mid-1997. But 
there is no indication that the concerns of particular or industries or specific 
markets underpinned Cabinet's decision. On the contrary, the decision 
appeared to reflect largely an in-principle view that such agreements should 
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be considered rather than there being a specific market access problem or 
issue that needed to be addressedl5I. As the-then DFAT secretary Ashton 
Calvert noted, Cabinet's decision "denoted a readiness in principle to look at 
them but ... there was a sense [of] .. .'don't kid ourselves that its straight 
forward,"' (Calvert, 2006). As outlined in Chapter 6, many of the 
antecedents of the policy shift can be traced back to domestic political 
considerations, including the need for policy differentiation by the major 
parties and the political opportunity presented to Howard while in 
opposition to play upon the disaffection of significant sections of the 
electorate which conflated the early 1990s recession with the disruption 
caused by economic liberalization. As the government made clear in its 1997 
foreign and trade policy White Paper, commercial interests might form part 
of its policy deliberations but they would not be overriding: 
However, it is the government which is ultimately responsible for 
decisions about Australia's international commitments. These 
decisions must take into account the views of business and 
community groups, but in the end the government must act on the 
basis of what it judges to be the overall national interest- DFAT, 
1997: 79-80. 
In the next section it is argued that while private interests had preferences 
for improving market access in particular markets, the selection of potential 
PTA partners was driven overwhelmingly by political, rather than 
commercial, considerations. That this is so is apparent in the following 
discussion of the selection of Singapore, the United States and Thailand as 
potential PTA partners. 
l5l t\s one observer indicated, when the subje<=t ofPT.-1.s came up iu Cabinet 'people thought it sounded like a 
good idea and thought; Let's do it' (Kunkel, 2005). lhe prime minister had an openness to opportunities a..'ld 
new approaches, .and if there was something in it for ,.\ustraliao exportei::s then he will say 'Let's do it' (ibid), 
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7.3 TAKEYOURPARTNERS 
7 .3.1 SINGAPORE PTA- REGIONAL AND TRADE ISSUES 
The selection by the Howard government of Singapore as its first bilateral 
PTA partner had its origins in regional and trade policy considerations that 
had little to do with the interests of particular sectors of the Australian 
economy. As is argued below, the tiny south·east Asian nation was an 
attractive PTA partner in part because there were so few substantive trade 
issues affecting commerce between the nations. The agreement was not 
aimed so much at resolving outstanding trade issues between the nations, 
though of course this was part of its purpose, but was part of broader 
strategies pursued by both governments aimed partly at establishing their 
PTA negotiation credentials to the international community and, for 
Australia, helping open a pathway through Singapore for greater 
engagement with ASEAN. 
7.3.1.1 THE GENESIS OF SAFT A 
\Vhile other APEC countries including the United States, New Zealand, 
Canada and Chile had been pursuing PTAs since the early 1990s, by late 
1998 there was still no such agreement under negotiation by Australia. 
Then, during an APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur meeting in late 1998, 
USTR Charlene Barshevsky approached Trade Minister Tim Fischer with a 
proposal to establish a PTA encompassing the United States, Australia, 
New Zealand, Singapore and Chile (Fischer, 2005). This so·called P5 
(sometimes denoted as P6 with the potential inclusion of Thailand) was 
proposed in some secrecy. The meeting was held late at night in 
Barshevsky's hotel suite. Fischer insisted that that agriculture be included 
in any such agreement, and this was accepted on the condition that the 
politically sensitive textile, clothing and footwear and passenger motor 
vehicle industries also be included (Fischer, 2005; Rees, 2001: 257). There 
was a further discussion of the proposal at the 11th APEC Ministerial in 
Auckland in September 1999, but by then the \Vhite House was lukewarm, 
not only because of opposition from key agencies such as Treasury and the 
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Department of Agriculture (Rees, 2001: 257) but also because of the 
distraction of the looming presidential election. There were also concerns on 
the Australian side. The Australian government was wary about the country 
composition of the proposed agreement (Thawley, 2006) and Howard was 
skeptical about negotiating a PTA with the Clinton administration and was 
instead content to wait for the outcome of the US Presidential election, 
which he hoped would deliver Republican George W. Bush into the \Vhite 
House (Kunkel, 2005; Downer, 2008). 
Despite the early enthusiasm of some industry groups for the negotiation of 
PTAs, the genesis of the SAFT A, the first PTA negotiated by Australia since 
the CER in 1983, lay in the failure of talks regarding an AFTA·CER FTA 
agreement in the late 1990s (Calvert, 2006). Among the most commonly 
cited reasons for this failure was the hostility of JYialaysia and Indonesia to 
such an agreement (Kunkel, 2005; Oxley, 2005). Singapore and Thailand 
were the main proponents within ASEi\N of an AFTA·CER FTA and on 5 
October 1999 Trade Minister l\1ark Vaile attended the announcement of a 
taskforce to examine the feasibility of an AFTA·CER FTA by 2010. But by 
early 2000 it was becoming clear Malaysia and Indonesia were opposed to 
such an agreement, and consideration turned to bypassing ASEAN and 
negotiating a PTA directly with Singapore (Kunkel, 2005; Davis, 2005; 
Oxley, 2005). 
Among the reasons suggested for the choice of Singapore as a PTA partner 
were: 
a) the relative ease of negotiating such an agreement with Singapore given 
the low tariffs of both countries and the relative complementarities of 
their economies (Australia rich in resources and land while Singapore is 
a financial and logistical hub in south·east Asia) and the prospect of a 
'high quality' PTA (Calvert, 2006); 
b) the deepening of ~elations with a friendly ASEAN nation (Downer, 2008); 
c) the political symbolism of negotiating a PTA with an ABEAN country 
first (before negotiating one with the US - Oxley, 2005); 
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d) the negotiation of a PTA with Singapore as a political proxy for ASEAN 
as a whole <Kenyon, 2005; Davis, 2005); 
e) the possibility of exacerbating trade policy divisions within ASEAN, 
given the stalled efforts to negotiate a trade agreement linking ASEAN 
and the Australia-New Zealand CER; 
J) a demonstration of Australia's capacity to negotiate such agreements; 
and 
g) an opportunity to garner experience about negotiating PTAs. 
There is little to suggest that private interests played a direct role in the 
selection of Singapore as a PTA partner for Australia. According to Don 
Kenyon, who was appointed by the government to lead Australia's 
negotiations with Singapore, the initial impetus for the negotiations came at 
the political level, with commercial interests becoming involved once the 
prospect of a SAFTA had been raised (Kenyon, 2005). While industry 
representatives and business leaders, as part of regular informal contact 
with department officials and government ministers, would raise the issue 
of improved trade access to particular countries (Calvert, 2006), it was 
government, rather than industry, that drove the selection of PTA partners, 
with a key criterion being the willingness and ability of potential partners to 
undertake negotiations: 
At the policy level we would be making our assessment of what 
potential partners would be ready to negotiate with us, because any 
given government will only do a few of these at the one time. They 
take a lot of resources and attention. That's really a policy judgment 
that ministers and officials were making as we went along, based on 
preliminary sounding out of the other party, and some of the other 
parties would sound us out. That sort of screening was always going 
on, and that was a very important process. 
Once we get to the point of thinking it'd be worthwhile doing one with 
Singapore or Thailand, for example, then our department itself would 
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be pro·active in fanning out and checking with the different 
industries we knew potentially might be interested, in what they 
thought of this. That testing of their priorities and their possible 
interests became very much part of the final proposal we put to 
government about whether this was worth doing, what would be the 
areas of potential gain for Australia, what Australian industry 
thought about that, what were the areas of sensitivity, what the other 
side would want from Australia and, if we gave too much ground on it, 
what the resistance might be from other parts of industry. The input 
spontaneously from industry at various points would be part of the 
picture, but it was also partly stimulated by soundings we would 
make after we had made a judgment that Singapore or Thailand, the 
United States, might well be a prospective partner. That's really how 
it goes - Calvert, 2006. 
Because of the low tariffs in both countries, tariff reduction was not the 
focus of negotiations, which instead centred on domestic barriers to trade, 
particularly in services. These included rules governing competition in 
telecommunications and air services, the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications and other labour standards, and investment controls. 
Regarding tariffs, the Australian PMV and TCF industries were keen for a 
good outcome on tariffs to set a precedent for PTAs with other nations in the 
region (in the case of autos, particularly Thailand) (Kenyon, 2005). 
7.4 BONDING WITH THE WHITE HOUSE: THE AUSFTA 
7.4.1 THE ORIGINS OFTHEAUSFTA 
The idea of a bilateral preferential trade agreement between Australia and 
the United States had been mooted as early as the mid·1980s. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, in April 1985 the US government had concluded a PTA with 
Israel, was in discussions with Canada for a similar deal152 and approached 
the Australian government with a comparable proposal (Hawke, 1985 -
152 A Canada-US PT r\ V.'"as finalized in October 1987 and canie into effect in January the follo>w-ing year, It 
formed the platform for the North .America Free I'rade ..c\grcernent. i.vhich included l\{exico, in 1994, 
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cited in Snape et.al. 1997: 450). The·then Minister for Trade, John Dawkins 
turned the idea down after a study he commissioned warned of the possible 
costs in terms of trade diversion, as well as the impact on trade relations 
with other nations and potential detrimental effects for the multilateral 
trade system (Snape, 1986). Similar approaches were made by US trade 
officials in 1992 (Raby, 2005) and, as indicated earlier, from USTR 
Barshevsky in 1998. 
7.4.1.1 POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE AUSFT A 
One measure of political influence is the ability to shape the agenda of 
government. The prime minister, by virtue of his power to determine the 
composition of Cabinet and to chair its meetings, wields substantial power 
in this regard. l.Vlinisters, too, can exert considerable influence by advocating 
policies both in public and among colleagues. But establishing the origins 
and authorship of ideas adopted and pursued by prime ministers and senior 
ministers is difficult, as illustrated by the origins of the AUSFTA. 
In one version, the idea had its genesis in the activities of former USTR Bob 
Zoellick and the relations established and cultivated between him and 
former Foreign Minister Downer from the early 1990s. After a term as 
Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs in Bush 
senior's administration, he joined the 'White House as deputy chief of staff, 
during which time he was part of an unsuccessful push by the US to 
establish a series of bilateral preferential deals or form a regional trading 
bloc which would include Australia (Snape et.al, 1997= 450; Raby, 2005). It 
was during this period that Downer and Zoellick met and struck up a 
friendship that Downer continued to cultivate. Downer invited Zoellick to 
Australia under the DFAT special visitors program before the US 
presidential election in 2000. He saw Zoellick, who was to be appointed 
USTR in February 2001, as a 'key target', and pursuaded Howard that the 
election of the Bush junior administration presented an opportunity to 
pursue freer trade with the US, including the possibility of a PTA· a view 
shared by Howard's foreign policy adviser l\:fichael Thawley: 
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The Prime Minister and I decided when the Bush administration was 
elected - and we had hoped that President Bush would be elected on 
the grounds that that would be a good outcome for Australia - that 
we would have an opportunity to advance some good agendas with 
i\J:nerica with a more free·trading and more ally-supporting president 
in President Bush. \Vhen President Bush did get elected, and after a 
discrete period of time, we started to raise this issue with the 
American administration from time to time, at all levels - the prime 
minister and the president, me and the secretary of state Colin 
Powell, me and Condi as the National Security Advisor, and 
important in all of this Bob Zoellick. He became quite a supporter of 
the idea - Downer, 2008. 
This version is largely supported by a senior Howard government adviser 
who considered that Howard's disposition was to increase market access on 
a case· by case basis rather than to be a great innovator in trade policy. 
Initially, however, he had been very skeptical about negotiating a PTA with 
the US while Clinton was president (Kunkel, 2005). According to Kunkel, 
Downer and Thawley were the key proponents of the AUSFTA within 
government and recruited Howard's support to approach the newly·elected 
Bush administration. 
In another version Thawley, who had worked in the international division of 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet before joining Prime 
Minister John Howard's office in April 1996 as senior adviser (international), 
was instrumental in getting the idea of the PTA with the US onto the 
agenda of both governments. In December 1999 he was appointed to the 
ambassadorial post in Washington, succeeding former Liberal leader 
Andrew Peacock, assuming the position the following February. 
According to this version Thawley, in preparing for his posting, searched for 
ideas and projects to pursue as ambassador and hit upon an AUSFTA. 
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Accounts differ as to why Thawley decided to champion an Australia-US 
PTA during his ambassadorship. Some have argued that Thawley, lacking 
the profile and political connections enjoyed by Peacock, was keen to have a 
bold, signature achievement that would mark his tenure in the prestigious 
post (Cronin, 2005; Fischer, 2005; Gyngell, 2005; Raby, 2005; Oxley, 2005). 
As one interviewee put it: 
The trade policy partly reflects people who have been his [Howard's] 
senior advisers, from a traditional foreign policy background, who are 
ambitious and want t-0 be players in terms of seeing this country 
doing things, and they want to be doing it Kunkel, 2005. 
According to Thawley himself, the idea of pursuing the AUSFTA came as he 
pondered the form and dimensions of Australia's trade and economic 
relationship with the United States: 
The thing which had really hit me - in preparing to go on posting [as 
ambassador] - was the huge amount of investment that Australia had 
in the United States. At that time no-one really had focused on this in 
the government. We just didn't know about it. But when I started 
getting round talking with companies, I began to realize that we were 
big in the US and growing. Having been looking at the US from a 
Canberra perspective and faced suddenly with the lamb issuel53 when 
I was in the PM's office, I just realized that we weren't organized to 
deal with these trade disputes effectively and our tactics with the US 
were all off. I felt we were in a much stronger position than we had 
thought, but for different reasons that people hadn't really 
understood. And so the idea sort of developed in that last year of 
Clinton ... we had a reprise of the leather fight ... I was going round 
meeting all these Australian investors with major operations in the 
US and I began t-0 understand how the politics of this worked in the 
US and the fact that we had no critical constituents Thawley, 2006. 
l53 In July 1999 the Clinton administratio:n imposed punitive tariffs on 1\usttalian lamb exports under 
pressure from domestic lamb producers, who claimed Australian and New Zealand imports were damaging 
local producers. The decision provoked outrage from the _.Austrahan government and the tariff-rate quota was 
eventually removed in November, 2001 (G.arran, 2004: 70; \ 7 aile, 2001c). 
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One senior DFAT official largely credits Thawley with authorship of the 
AUSFTA idea, considering that Downer was initially cooler on the proposal, 
though he backs the importance of the relationship developed between the 
Australian government and USTR Zoellick in driving the AUSFTA, 
particularly in the US (Raby, 2005). It is a view backed by Allan Gyngell, 
executive director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, who has 
worked with Thawley over many years154; 
Jlv1ichael Thawley was a huge element in pushing the idea and getting 
it through. Thawley was more influential than any other official. The 
reason for his effectiveness is that he combined the clout of political 
effectiveness · in the sense that he was a political appointment and 
people knew he had direct access to Howard - with the advantage of 
being an official who knew how things worked and knew how to 
follow up on a decision - knew who would be involved in the 
implementation and knew how to push the right buttons to see things 
happen - Gyngell, 2005. 
V\lnile the precise genesis of the AUS FT A remains unclear, it illustrates the 
ability ofindividuals within the Howard government- either senior 
ministers or senior advisers - to act as policy entrepreneurs in getting ideas 
onto the political agenda and having them backed at the highest levels of 
government. It also highlights the centrality of Prime Minister Howard in 
policy decision·making. As Thawley put it: ""Well, the Prime Minister is 
crucial in everything. V\lnen you're striking out in a new policy area it's 
always the Prime :Minister who ultimately has carriage of it" (Thawley, 
2006). 
In a speech to the America Australia Association on December 13, 2000, 
Ambassador Thawley for the first time publicly floated the idea of an 
~ 54 Before becoming foreign policy adviser to Keating in 1993, Gyngell headed the Intemationai Division hi 
the Department of Prime 1'f.inister and Cabinet, where Thawley worked. A.nd Thawley is on the Lowy 
Institute board~ an organization of v;rhich Gyngell is the founding executive director. 
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Australia-America preferential trade agreement. By this stage he had 
already secured the private endorsement of Howard to pursue the proposal 
with the US government - and Cabinet had approved the idea of putting a 
proposal to the new US administration when it came in· though the 
Australian prime minister remained cautious about its prospects: 
That first speech that I did in December 2000 was the first public 
[utterance] ... ! mean, by that time I already knew that I had the 
Prime Minister on side, although I said I'm just offering a personal 
opinion, so I'm basically doing it with cover as I knew that when Bush 
got in we would put a proposal to him - Thawley, 2006 
In the speech Thawley bemoaned the lack of any institutional arrangements 
that reflected the breadth and significance of the economic relationship 
between the two countries, including political mechanisms to support and 
facilitate it. For Australia, he argued, such an agreement would not only 
improve market access and make it more attractive as an investment 
destination, it would help ensure the US government remained focused on 
the benefits of free trade and engaged with the west Pacific. For the US, it 
would strengthen its economic ties with a financially stable, technologically 
advanced economy that was closely linked in with the Asian economies. For 
both nations, according to Thawley, such an agreement would be an 
important demonstration to the region of the benefits of continued trade 
liberalization and could help generate the momentum needed for the start of 
a global round of multilateral trade negotiations (Thawley, 2000). 
But, even with the private support of Howard, Thawley claims the push for 
an A·US PTA remained delicately poised in late 2000. The Australian prime 
minister was himself wary of publicly endorsing negotiations for such an 
agreement: 
One of the interesting things was that Howard was always publicly 
very cautious about the prospects of actually getting the Americans to 
agree to do it and then actually getting an outcome in the negotiation 
and then getting something which was satisfactory, and getting it 
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through Congress. There [was a] risk of falling flat on your face 
politically, which normally tends to prevent governments from going 
out, getting to far in front - Thawley, 2006. 
Just as the Australian government had privately decided to leave any 
approach to the US about the negotiation of an FTA until after the new 
president was sworn in, in early 2001, out·going president Bill Clinton 
caught it by surprise. On November 16, 2000, he announced the beginning 
of negotiations for a PTA with the Singaporean government. For Thawley in 
Washington and his political masters in Canberra the move immediately 
raised a number of questions, including whether or not to immediately 
approach Clinton with a PTA proposal, on the grounds that, having agreed 
to do that with Singapore he should also agree to one with Australia 
(Thawley, 2006). Thawley discussed the issue with Bob Zoellick, who at the 
time seemed a likely candidate to beccme USTR if George W. Bush became 
president, and the Australian government decided to hold off on any 
approaches on the matter. According to Thawley, the calculation was that 
Bush was likely to be more active on trade policy than his Democrat 
opponents, more inclined to trade liberalization and more interested in Asia. 
The risk was that he would make the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas his priority, which he did. Bush became US president on January 
20, 2001155, and soon after Thawley drafted a letter for Howard proposing a 
PTA between the two nations. The letter was sent little more than four 
weeks after Bush's inauguration and a 'fairly positive' reply was received in 
April. It was at this point that a lack of support and enthusiasm in 
Australia for the proposed agreement from both government and among 
private interests became apparent: 
We had a hell of job getting them [the US government] to agree to 
negotiations. They were really reluctant and one of the problems that 
we had in that period was that what I was saying in 'Washington 
is;; ... -\ccording to Kunkel) it "Was not the election of Bush per se, but the departure of Clinto~ that v;ras 
important from the ..t\usrralian C:rovemmenr's v-iew in setting the right political conditions in the US for the 
negothtion of an AUSPT.'1 (Kunkel, 2005). 
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wasn't reflected in what was being said publicly in Australia. The 
community wasn't particularly interested. The government didn't 
want to expose itself and · this is where the domestic politics does 
have an impact - because we were campaigning in vVashington and I 
was arguing a case very strongly, but there wasn't the domestic 
reflection of this. Even though the government was committed to 
having it, no·one really wanted to ... Howard was the only one who 
really was prepared to get out there and argue for it, but even he was 
very careful what he said because he was skeptical that it could be 
fruitful. And Vaile himself, I mean the Trade Minister and Foreign 
:Minister, were relatively cautious early on. vVbat was interesting was 
that in Howard's case, while publicly lowering expectations about the 
prospects, he was prepared to take the risk of committing to it which 
is a really interesting thing because that's unusual in Australia 
politically-Thawley, 2006. 
But Thawley appears to understate the extent of the government's 
commitment to the negotiation of a PTA with the US, and the degree to 
which other ministers and officials were involved in securing the outcome. 
In late 2000 federal Cabinet had approved a trade strategy that would have 
the negotiation of an AUSPTA as its centerpiece (Leaver, 2008: 101; Walker, 
2004). In December of that year Howard authorized Thawley to put the 
issue of a trade agreement firmly on the agenda, which his former staffer 
did in a speech to the American Australian Association in New York on 
December 13, 2000. The intention was to prepare the political ground 
during the ensuing months leading up to a joint announcement of 
negotiations for an AUSFTA hy Howard and the new US President George 
Bush during 2001. Lobbying by Thawley was part of the planned build-up, 
as were visits to the US during the year by Foreign .l\1inister Downer and 
Trade .l\'1inister Vaile, as well as a letter written by Howard to Bush on 
.March 1 proposing an FTA between the two nations and Bush's reply on 
April 26 that his administration was reviewing the idea (Walker, 2004). 
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While in their recollections both the former Foreign Minister Downer and 
Kunkel (2005) agreed with Thawley's account that former Trade Minister 
Vaile was not an early advocate of the AUSFTA, both are at odds with his 
view that Downer was also cautious and wary early in the process. 
According to Downer himself he, not Thawley, was the key advocate of the 
AUSFTA both through his representations to the prime minister and 
through his close relationship with the·then USTR Zoellick. In Downer's 
account 'l'hawley became an important public advocate once he (Downer) 
had convinced the prime minister to push ahead with the idea: 
We promoted the idea very strongly and obviously l\fichael Thawley 
[as ambassador] was an important part of that. He wasn't the 
architect of the idea but he was a very important player in terms of 
delivering the FTA. First of all, getting the Americans to agree to 
negotiate the FTA, that was a whole negotiation in itself, and then, 
that having been done, the actual negotiation itself - Downer, 2008. 
'\'ii1llie limitations of time and resources mean it is not possible to 
disentangle conflicting accounts of the contributions made by individuals to 
the genesis of the AUSFTA, what is notable is the relatively limited circle of 
people involved-chiefly Howard, Downer and Vaile and some senior 
advisers in. Canberra, and Thawley and Zoellick in Washington. There is no 
indication that business leaders or industry groups were involved in 
advocating the idea within the government or getting it adopted in late 2000. 
7.4.1.2 AUSFTA NEGOTIATIONS 
The idea of an AUSFTA had, over the years, attracted support from sections 
of Australian industry and eventually firms from a wide range of sectors 
including construction, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing and services would 
form a coalition in Australia to publicly advocate for the AUSFTAI56. But at 
15'5 ~fany of these supporters we.re US subsidiaries, and reflected the actions of their parent companies on the 
other side of the Pacific in fo.ttr.ing the ,,~\FT~--\C, Eleven firms were simultaneously members of both the 
.. :\ustr?Jiau-based .c-\.ustrafu-United States Free Trade :\,greement Business Group and the American-£\usttalian 
Free Trade Agteement Coalition, including Alcoa, BHP Billiton Limited, Cargill Incorporated, Caterpillar, 
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the time of Thawley's appointment as ambassador any business support for 
such an agreement was disparate and muted. It was only after the two 
governments publicly threw their support behind the negotiation of a PTA 
that private interests began to play a more prominent role though, in the 
Australian context, it remained fairly limited: 
The US business community was much more focused on what it could 
get out of an FTA with Australia than the Australian business 
community was on what it could get out of one. And I think this is 
something that they've learned from and probably will be a bit better 
in the case of China and Japan but it really took them a long time -
Thawley, 2006 
Even with the official endorsement of the US President (following the 
granting by Congress of trade negotiating authority to the Bush 
Administration) the successful negotiation of an AUSFTA was, for the 
Americans, far from assured. Political support from the White House for the 
agreement was limited - its message to Thawley and the USTR was 'you 
line up business and Congress support and then we'll do it' (Thawley, 2006). 
Running parallel with the official AUSFTA negotiations was a large 
Australian lobbying effort, based in Washington, with the aim of winning 
the necessary business and Congressional support. Business supporters of 
the AUSFTA on both sides of the Pacific spent millions of dollars (mostly in 
the United States) lobbying for the agreement at workplaces, boardrooms, 
Congressional offices and in the media. They appointed lobb:yist Anne 
Wexler, of\.Vashington DC-based lobbying firm Wexler & \Valker Public 
Policy Associates to lead the lobbying effort (Thawley, 2006). In Australia a 
business coalition, called Australia United States Trade Agreement, was 
formed to promote the AUSFTA. The group, comprised of manufacturers, 
peak industry groups, and firms involved in agriculture, mining, 
communications and services, advocated the agreement through newspaper 
articles and advertisements, and its director Alan Oxley made submissions 
EDS, IBM Corporation, PBR Imemational, The Proctor & Gamble Company, Southcorp \Xlines, V1sy 
lnd'IStries and Westfield (AAFTAC, 2004; AUST\, 2004). 
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on its behalf to parliamentary inquiries as well as the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. The group argued that the agreement would 
strengthen the Australian economy by deepening its integration with the 
US economy, including through improved access for agricultural exports, 
the removal of restrictions on the movement of people and the abolition of 
barriers to trade in other goods and services. In its submission to DFAT the 
group argued "the aim ought to be to create an economic integration 
agreement similar to Australia's agreement with New Zealand. As well as 
trade in goods, the agreement ought to cover services, investment, e· 
commerce, intellectual property, customs administration, quarantine rules, 
competition policy and technical standards" (AUSTA, 2004). 
This effort reflected, in part, the political investment made by Howard and 
his government in negotiating the AUSFTA. Despite occasional comments 
by Howard and Vaile emphasizing the difficulty of negotiating an acceptable 
agreement, and the declarations by Vaile that Australia would walk away 
from an agreement ifit did not include substantial agricultural trade 
liberalization, the Australian government appeared from an early stage to 
be locked in to signing an FTA with the United States. Participants in the 
process (including DFAT negotiators, :N'FF officials and representatives of 
other business groups) were in no doubt that the commitment from the 
Prime l\tfinister and his office was that an agreement would be struck, 
whatever the final negotiated terms may have been. According to a senior 
NFF official (who did not want to be identified), by late 2003 it was 
becoming obvious that the agreement's market access provisions for 
agricultural products were going t-0 fall far short of the NFF's initial 
expectations, but 'by then the political investment (of the Howard 
government in the deal] was too great' (NFF official, 2005). 
Much of this imperative arose from the political context in which the 
possibility of an AUSFTA was broached in Australia. Howard announced 
joint Australia·US willingness to consider such an agreement during a visit 
to Washington on 10 September, 2001. Events less than 24 hours later (the 
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attacks on the \Vorld Trade Center in New York and on the Pentagon in 
Washington) fundamentally changed the political context in which such an 
agreement would be considered and negotiated. \Vith the Australian 
government already in campaign mode, and emphasizing security and 
territorial integrity as an election issue (the Tampa episode was still 
frontpage news at the time), the potent political symbolism of an AUSFTA 
lay not so much in its trade and economic effects but in its role as a proxy 
for the intensification of security ties between the allied nations. This 
symbolism was only heightened by the atmosphere of crisis generated by the 
terrorist attacks and the subsequent declaration by the US government of a 
'War on Terror' (sic). 
The negotiation of an AUSFTA became, for Howard and his Government, a 
measure of the strength of the relationship it had with Australia's most 
important security ally. In this political environment of security crisis Labor 
quickly voiced bipartisan support for a strong security alliance with the 
United States and, although retaining concerns about the possible terms of 
such an agreement, also backed the negotiation of the PTA. 
7 .4.2 PUTTING THE PEDAL TO THE METAL- THE THAILAND·AUSTRALIA PT A 
Among the PTAs negotiated by the Howard Government, the Thailand· 
Australia Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) appeared to stand apart from 
both the AUSFTA and SAFTA in the important role played by sectoral 
commercial interests - alongside geopolitical considerations · in initiating 
the agreement. 
Australia's automobile industry, particularly carmakers Holden Australia 
and the Ford Motor Company, were strong advocates for a PTA with 
Thailand for several years before TAFTA discussions were announced in 
l\llay, 2002 (Holden, 2002; Fischer). This was driven primarily by the need to 
expand its export markets, given the industry's view that the domestic 
market was too small to sustain it, as well as to secure the import of parts 
and components from Thailand on as favourable terms as possible. 
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(Robertson, 2001). In 2000, 350,000 vehicles were built by the Australian 
automobile industry, of which less than 90,000 were exported. At least part 
of the reason for the lack of export market penetration was historical. 
Automobile manufacturing in Australia is largely geared toward larger 
passenger motor vehicles - six and eight·cylinder rearwheel·drive cars 
which have so far found a limited market outside Australia and North 
America (though the market in the Middle East has been growing - see 
discussion below regarding the proposed PTA with the United Arab 
Emirates). At the time of the agreement Australian manufacturers were 
exporting just 5000 large passenger motor vehicles a year to Thailand 
(JSOCT, 2004a: 28). 
Australian·made passenger motor vehicles (PJ\1Vs) and auto components 
faced high tariffs in the Thai market, with rates of up to 80 per cent for 
PJ\1V s and 46 per cent for components (Holden, 2002; JSCOTa, 2004). V\'hile 
initial gains from the lowering or elimination of Thailand auto tariffs was 
expected to be modest, the Australian automobile industry anticipated two 
major gains from the negotiation ofTAFTA- an increase in the market for 
Australian automobile component manufacturers, given the importance of 
Thailand as a major automobile manufacturer/assembler in the Asia region, 
and the precedent such an agreement might set for other markets in the 
region (JSCOT, 2004a: 29·31). Of particular note was the expansion of four· 
wheel·drive manufacturing/assembly in Thailand (Fischer, 2005), and the 
relative lack of competitiveness of local component suppliers due to capacity 
constraints in technical skills and research and development investment, 
and problems with quality control. 
By comparison with the automobile industry, generally other industries 
were much more lukewarm about the TAFTA. The horticulture, textile, 
clothing and footwear (TCF) and manufacturing industries, while 
acknowledging the agreement might open up new export opportunities, were 
more concerned about safeguard provisions, particularly anti·dumping 
measures (JSCOT, 2004a). There was considerable concern in Australia's 
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TCF sector about its exposure to competition from cheaper imports as a 
result ofTAFTA, and horticulture producers were disappointed that Thai 
tariffs on many 'agrifoods' - in the range of 30 to 50 per cent at the time of 
the agreement - were not required to be reduced more quickly or 
substantially (JSCOT, 2004a: 19·23) . According to Raby (2005), there was 
considerable work by trade negotiators from both nations to win agreement 
on anti-dumping and rules of origin provisions applying to textiles and 
clothing. The dairy industry was more positive, but expressed concerns 
about the resort by Thailand to the use of special safeguard provisions in 
the agreement. 
7 .4.3 THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
Both the Coalition government and its political opponents attach particular 
political importance to the automobile industry, not only because it 
generates approximately 60,000 jobs in car assembly and component 
production and exports about $5 billion worth of goods annually, but also 
because it is seen as a key driver of workforce skills and technical 
innovation in Australian manufacturing (HR, 2006: Appendix D). The auto 
industry, and the manufacturing and service industries that support it, is 
seen as important in maintaining a modern, broad-based economy. For this 
reason, the enthusiasm of the auto industry for the agreement was viewed 
as significant and the agreement received bipartisan political support 
(JSCOT, 2004a: xv). 
But such industry support does not appear to have been decisive in securing 
government commitment to the negotiation ofTAFTA, which former 
Foreign Minister Downer instead ascribed to strong personal relations 
between political leaders in Australia and Thailand: 
The FTA with Thailand was built entirely on personal relationships 
that we had with a small number of people in Thailand, not least 
Prime Minister Thaksin. I have a ve1'Y soft spot for him - Downer, 
2008. 
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The government's own National Interest Assessment (NIA) of the 
agreement noted that although it could deliver significant gains for some 
sectors, its overall impact on the economy would not be large the net GDP 
gain was estimated to be $2.4 billion over its first 20 years of operation 
(JSCOT, 2004a: 16). Nonetheless, it was seen as an important agreement in 
several political and trade policy aspects. According to the NIA, the 
conclusion ofTAFTA would 'enhance Australia's broader trade, economic 
and security interests in the region. [It will] signal strong support for 
multilateral, regional and bilateral initiatives, help create an open global 
and regional trading environment and promote strength and stability in the 
region. The deal establishes a platform for Australia to work towards 
greater economic integration with the second-largest economy in south·east 
Asia' (JSCOT, 2004a: 14). 
That TAFTA was seen by the Australian Government as a means of 
strengthening political relations with Thailand was made explicit when it 
was announced that a new agreement on bilateral cooperation between the 
countries would be negotiated to stand alongside the proposed TAFTA (NIA, 
2004). According to the NIA for this agreement, it would 'enhance 
cooperation and consultation across political, social, security and economic 
sectors not covered by the TAFTA' (NIA, 2004). The Australian government 
had an interest in affirming its relations with Thailand through TAFTA and 
its associated Agreement on Bilateral Cooperation for reasons that went 
beyond any potential commercial gains for industry. Thailand, along with 
Singapore had, during the 1990s and early 2000s, supported Australia's 
closer involvement in ASEAN forums, particularly the inaugural East Asia 
Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December, 2005. 
A further consideration was that Thailand, with Singapore, had approached 
Trade Minister Mark Vaile in October 1999 with their plans for a CER· 
ASEAN FTA. \Vhen, in early 2000, these plans were stymied in ASEAN by 
Malaysian and Indonesian objections, the idea of circumventing ASEAN by 
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negotiating PTAs directly with Singapore and Thailand came into play 
(Kunkel, 2005). Thailand had been a long-standing strategic partner for 
Australia in the region - it was a founding member, along with Australia, of 
the South East Asia Treaty Organization, a collective defence treaty that 
operated from 1955 to 1977 (DEA, 1955). According to Downer, the 
agreement was viewed by the Howard government as delivering a 
significant enhancement of political relations between the two nations: 
It (the FTA) was certainly a very important development in our 
bilateral relationship and it was concluded when John Howard was in 
Bangkok in rather fraught last-minute negotiations actually. I think 
you can underestimate the significance of these things politically -
Downer, 2008. 
For the Australian government, TAFTA was important not only for what it 
contributed to strengthening relations with a significant ASEAN nation, but 
also for what it might do to help better position Australia for involvement in 
ASEAN forums. In the late 1990s Thailand, along with Singapore, had 
advocated linking the ASEAN FTA with the Australia-New Zealand CER. 
However, the idea foundered within ASEAN on resistance from Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Against this background, it was little coincidence that 
Singapore and Thailand were among the first three PTAs negotiated by the 
Howard government (Calvert, 2006). In a statement welcoming TAFTA in 
October, 2003, Prime Minister Howard said the agreement with the second 
largest economy in south east Asia provided 'a further symbol of Australia's 
close economic integration with the countries of East Asia. The ,.:\greement 
will also strengthen the linkages between Australia and the ASEA.N Free 
Trade Area (AFTA)' (Howard, 2003). 
Howard's satisfaction in negotiating the agreement may have been 
enhanced because it provided a riposte to gibes by Keating in the lead up to 
the 1996 election that Howard would be unable t-0 negotiate with Asian 
nations because he neither understood the or cared about them. 
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7 .5 POLITICS RULES 
In the negotiation of each of the PTAs concluded by the Howard government 
· with Singapore, the United States and Thailand - there were private 
sector interests that welcomed the potential improvement in market access 
offered by such agreements, and they made their interest known to 
government officials and politicians. But any impetus they imparted to the 
process of selecting potential PTA partners appears limited. As the DFAT 
secretary at the time acknowledged: 
Out of industry, people representing different sectors or individual 
business leaders, in their on·going contacts with relevant people in 
the department, and their on·going contacts with relevant cabinet 
ministers, would raise their interest in better access in a particular 
country and in their area. That's always going on and I am sure that 
was an authentic part of the impetus with some of these partners we 
selected. So that was one part of the input, but what you call the 
political judgment ... obviously in the Australian system decisions to 
go ahead or not are made by ministers at the political level. The 
question of which of our potential partners in theory are going to be 
available as a practical option, that's really a policy judgment that 
ministers and officials were making as we went along, based on 
preliminary sounding out of the other party, and some of the other 
parties would sound us out. That sort of screening was always going 
on, and that was a very important process - Calvert, 2006. 
Decisions about with whom to pursue negotiations, and when, were in the 
case of these three agreements, taken at the very top of government. At a 
very general level, private economic interests certainly figured in the 
government's calculations. Part of the raison d'etre underlying these 
agreements was the improvements in market access, investment and 
competitiveness they would provide for Australian industry. But there is 
little evidence that private economic interests drove the selection of PTA 
partners, as is suggested by society·centred theories of the state, in which 
government is conceived of either as a little more than an instrument of 
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dominant private interests or as an arbiter between competing interestsl57. 
There is evidence, both in the case of the AUSFTA and TAFTA that 
politically and economically significant private interests lobbied the 
government to negotiate agreements with those particular countries. But 
there is no indication that such interventions were decisive in initiating the 
negotiations or determining the government's choice of potential PTA 
partners. V\7hen asked about the role played by industry representatives in 
selecting potential PTA partner countries, former Foreign JM.inister Downer 
was quit.e emphatic: 
Not so much them having to tell government. It's pretty obvious. You 
just look at Australia's trade patterns and you can see ... and in the 
size of economies and their geographic location and the strategic 
importance of countries. Take the case of one nearby. Big, 
strategically crucial, economically our twelfth largest trading partner, 
Indonesia. A prime candidate for a FTA, only they're pretty nervous 
about the idea. It's sort of on the agenda, it's being discussed, we have 
talked about it as a long-term ambition - Downer, 2008. 
The criteria approved by Cabinet in 1997 to be used in assessing potential 
PTA agreements, and the utterances of the prime minister, other 
government ministers and senior trade bureaucrats make it clear that the 
economic foundations and impact of any such agreement, while important, 
are far from the sole considerations of government. Political considerations 
about the extent to which an agreement may contribute to or conforms with 
the government's broader trade and foreign relations strategies appear to 
loom large in government deliberations, as well as practical issues about the 
preparedness and ability of potential PTA partners to negotiate and honour 
the terms of any agreement struck. In this context the narrow preferences of 
societal groups organized around material interests do not appear decisive 
in the political process of selecting potential PTA partners. Purely 
157 In political economy literature this approach has spa'WUed theories of trade policy based upon the 
competing preferences of materially-based societal groups (see Chapter T'vo, pp4-5). 
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commercial considerations may be subordinated to broader political aims 
and principles, particularly in the use of trade policy as a way to enhance 
political relations with other nations. It is apparent this was the case in the 
decision to negotiate a PTA with the United States. As Thawley indicates, 
what was decisive in convincing Prime :Minister John Howard to embark on 
such negotiations when he did, was a change in the political leadership of 
the US (Thawley, 2006; Kunkel, 2005; Downer, 2008), with the political 
background to the negotiations heightened by the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center and the subsequent 
invocation of the AL\fZUS alliancel58. The Australian Industry Group, 
representing more than 10,000 manufacturers and service firms, had been 
urging the negotiation of such an agreement since the mid·1990s (Raby, 
2005; Millership, 2005), but it was ultimately other factors that determined 
it going ahead. Former Foreign Minister Downer emphasized the 
importance of broader foreign policy considerations in shaping the Howard 
government's PTA strategy: 
Definitely it is the case. For Australia it is a very important 
component of building our relationship with Asia to negotiate - and 
its how the Asians see it - to negotiate a FTA agreement between 
ASEAN and Australia .. Mind you, no glittering agreement is ever 
going to come out of that. Some very sub-optimal agreement will one 
day be cobbled together. The FTA with Singapore was a very 
important way of consolidating what was already a pretty good 
relationship. The FTA with Thailand was certainly a very important 
development in om· bilateral relationship - Downer, 2008. 
tss \Vb.en legislation to enact the ;\USFI'1\ came before the Australian parliament in mid-2004, Hov;rard 
disavowed the idea the agreement had been embaiked upon to bolster the alliance -u..i.th the US (Ho•vard, 
2004a). Ar the time Labor leader Mark Latham had made the nature of Australia's relationshlp with the Bu.sh 
./~dministration an election issue, and the prime minister V/as sensitive to suggestions that, given 
disappointment and discontent ~-1th some of the terms of the agreement~ the federal goverrunent had put the 
political goal of negotiating the p-r :\ ahead of its economlc merit: "This Free Trade ;\greemenr is not to 
bolster the American alliance - it's got nothing ro do \\i.ili that~ it's got everything to do with the fact that it 
v;iill be good for 1iustralia because the _,--\merican economy is the most powerful economy the world has ever 
seen' (.HOWllrd, 2004a). But he also acknowled!,>ed tlut the AUSFTA was being negotiated because of the 
"remarkable commitment of the Administration to the cause of the alliance between _,-\usttalia and rhe ll:nited 
Sutes" (Howard, 2004b). 
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In the institutional setting of Australian politics, where the set of players 
wielding policy veto power is limited, the opportunities for private interests 
to intervene in trade policy are limited. Collectively and individually they 
can and do make representations to government officials and politicians. 
But, in the decisions made by the Howard government to negotiate SAFTA, 
AUSFTA or TAFTA, the role of private interest appeared to be far from 
decisive. 
The institutional setting does, however, provide scope for action by policy 
entrepreneurs, particularly where, as was the case with the Coalition 
government, political success bestowed on the prime minister enormous veto 
power (Weller, 2003)159. In such an environment astute and well·connected 
policy entrepreneurs ultimately needed to convince just one person of the 
soundness of their policy prescription in order to have it adopted as 
government policy. This was amply demonstrated by Downer's and 
Thawley's successful advocacy of a PTA with the United States. The idea of 
negotiating a PTA with the US was not underpinned by a long and 
sustained campaign or lobbying effort in the way the program to reduce 
industry protection was. But the adoption of policy is only part of the story. 
As highlighted by public policy theory, having a policy adopted is only part 
of the task for a policy entrepreneur. As discussed in Chapter Two160, how a 
policy is implemented is critical. The very task of implementation involves 
policy development and involves a whole additional set of actors in the 
bureaucracy and those they consult with in broader society (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 1995: 175-78), and it is here that private interests can play a 
critical role. 
159 The pow-er the prime minister, bis office and his department am wield in developing and pushing through 
policy was starkly illustrated in eady 2007. Under pressure in the midst of a severe drought to take action to 
improve water security, Prime lVfinister Ho,.vard announced a $10 billion plan 10 address problems in the 
11urray~Darling Bas~ mcluding measures to alleviate \vater loss from evaporation and seepage, and to 
remedy the over-allocation of water rights to irrigatars. The prime minister announced the policy \vithout first 
seeking Cabinet approval. and w-irh little or no input from interested departments, including 1'reasury, as 
noted by Treasury secretary Ken Henry in a speech to staff in March 2007 (Henry, 2007; Toohey, 2007), 
160 Chapter Two, pp39-40, 
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7.6 NOT JUST TALKING TURKEY 
The neat analytical divide often drawn between policy development and 
implementation, where the former is a process of choices about government 
intentions surrounded and influenced by competing claims and needs, while 
the latter describes a technical and essentially neutral administrative task 
(Thomas and Grindle, 1990)161, does not really exist because the very task of 
policy implementation involves policy development, a point emphasized by 
Lipsky in his concept of the street-level bureaucrat (1993). This is 
particularly relevant to this study given the role government trade 
negotiators have in implementing trade policy. Implementation of the 
Howard Government's trade policy includes the negotiation of trade 
agreements with other nations, which in turn involves an identification and 
understanding of the interests162 to be considered in the course of 
negotiations. The identities · implying interests and preferences - trade 
negotiators ascribe to themselves, the government and the nation, and the 
way in which these are manifested at the negotiating table, shape 
agreement outcomes. 
This brings the political contest over the definition of these identities to the 
centre of analysis, highlighting the importance of questions regarding who 
is involved in shaping these identities and the mechanisms for such 
involvement. As policy implementation proceeds the feedback loop between 
policy development and implementation, or policy learning (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 1995: 175·78) takes place, constantly reinvigorating this political 
contest. As implementation proceeds, those involved learn more about the 
:til An important debate in public policy literature is around the issue of whether policy is developed and 
implemented in a top··down, hierarchical manner, or in a 'bottom-up' process (Howlett and Ran1esh) 1995: 
156-58). Encapsulu1ed in tills debate are critical ideas about the perpetual feedback loop between policy 
deveiopment and imp1ementation (that is, in the process of implen1entatio11 issues arise that require policy 
adjustment as part of a continual learning process) and the ability of public servants at all levels of the 
bureaucracy to shape policy through the process of implementation (Hill, 1997). 
162 Neorealism -and neoliberalism share -with the ration-al choice approach an assumption that national interest 
is uncontested and definable: it ls a given. J\s Fro:.nemore argues, this approach had merit during the Cold Wat: 
when it was quite plausible to maintain that state security interests were reasonably obV1ous and non-
controversial (1'1nnemore, 1996). But, taking the \>lew- that international policies is about defining rather than 
defending national interests, Finnemore argues that since ihe end of the Cold War legitimate questions are 
raised about how interests such as power, security and v;realth are to be defined and for what ends. The 
question of how the national inte:test is defined, and whom} is addressed in the follo"'.N":ing section of the 
discussion. 
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policy environment they are operating in, and the policy instruments at 
their disposal. Adjustments or changes in goals and techniques may be 
madel63, and those already involved in the political contest over the 
definition of identities and interests may be joined by new players drawn 
into the contest. Those taking part in this contest may not only be societal 
actors organized around particular economic-based identities and interests, 
but also differing organizations within government (Howlett and Ramesh, 
1995: 155) and differing levels within an organizationsl64. Because trade 
policy has economy-wide implications its implementation concerns not only 
a wide range of societal actors, but involves different bureaucratic 
organizations at varying levels of government, each with its own identity, 
interests and preferences. 
7.7 IDENTIFYING INTERESTS 
7.7.1 INDUSTRY CONSULTATION 
As noted earlier, the government has both formalized and ad hoc 
mechanisms to gauge commercial interests in trade. l\1ost government 
departments have formal consultative bodies that bring together 
bureaucrats and selected stakeholders that may include representative 
organizations, significant private interests, non·government organizations 
and community representatives. The Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade has a number of such bodies, including the \.VTO Advisory Group and 
the Agricultural Trade Consultative Group, which provide direct input on 
trade matters from business representatives as well as individual operators 
to departmental officials. These groups, often with overlapping 
memberships165, display many of the characteristics ascribed to policy 
163 Policy learning is both endogenous (taking place among small~ focused policy networks 'With hrgely 
technical concerns about policy settings or instruments) and exogenous (taking place among broad policy 
communities and involving questions regarding the definition of the policy problem and the policy goals) 
(Howlett"1ldRamesh, 1995: 174)" 
164 Through his theory of 'street-level bureaucracy' I..ipsky (1993) emphasizes that individual bureaucrats are 
not merely cogs in a machine transformin_g policy decisions .into policy practice. Constraints on tu:ne and 
other xesources and bureaucratic procedures mean field workers may exercise cO!lsiderable autonomy in 
policy impiementation, 'Tb.ey are agents 1vith the ability to shape policy development and outcomes, 
l65 For exan1ple, i:t1 2005 busfilessman Geoff "'~Jlen, of the ~~en Consulting Group~ chai1'ed botl1 the Tr.tde 
Policy ~A.dvisory f~oun<.-il (fP AC) :and the \V'TO Advisory Group, and National Farmers' Federation president 
Petet Corish 'MIS a member of both ~['PAC and the Agricultural Trade Consultative Gtoup. 
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communities: a common interest in a particular policy field, and a shared 
belief system, code of conduct and established pattern of behaviour (Davis et 
al, 1993: 144; Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 158). For example, the 16 
government·appointed members ofTPACl66 included individuals who, by 
virtue of their employment in firms and industries that exported goods or 
services, had an interest in government trade policy. Through their 
participation in the government· appointed body they implicitly 
acknowledged the primacy of the government's trade policymaking 
authority and the role ofTPAC as source of trade policy advice. 
In addition to government· appointed policy communities, trade officials may, 
through interdepartmental committees, draw on industry views and 
information gleaned by other departments, including the Department of 
Industry, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and The 
Treasury (Raby, 2005), through their own industry consultative mechanisms. 
Government departments are expected to build consultative relationships 
with key stakeholders within their areas of responsibility. For example, the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries is expected to have good 
channels of communication with agricultural industry groups and the 
Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts is 
expected to consult closely with media organizations. But the degree to 
which such relationships, and the information they provide, are regarded as 
useful for the negotiation of trade agreements can be heavily qualified. 
Those involved in the negotiation of a trade agreement may consider that 
the value of information provided by departments on the basis of thefr close 
relationship with industry may be compromised by such proximity. Thawley 
166 As at 2005 TP .. :\C's membership v.ras chair Geoff _,-\lleni of ~<\llen Consulting Group; Dieter ~-idarosas, 
deputy CEO and CFO Leighton Holdings Ltd; Jane Bennett, director, Ashgrove Cheese Pty Ltd; John 
Conomos, ser.ior executh-~e vice-president, Toyota ~,fotor Corporation) ~..\usttalia Ltd; Peter Corish, President, 
NFF; Saul Eslake, chief economist, .'>NZ Batiking Group; Ron Fisher, MD, Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd; 
David Hawes, Group general manager. Goverometlt and International relations) Qantas xlirurays Ltd; Keith 
Smith_, '\Vine industry consultant; Warwick Smith, chair, tele.-eommunicatious, media, entertainment a:nd 
technology group, Macquarie Bank Ltd; Professor Gerard Sutton,. Vice~chancellort University of Wollongong 
and Meg McDonald, genenll manager corporate affairs, ,Alcoa w·orid ~.\lumina, _..\ustralia. The council's four 
ex-offido rnembers were: Peter 0 1Brme) managing director, -'\ustralian Trade Commission;. lvfark Paterson, 
secretary, Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources; Michael Taylor, secretary, Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and 41.ngus ,;\rmour1 nlanagi:ng director, Export Finance and Insurance 
Corpotation. 
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(2006) suggested that the Australian government is similar to the US 
government in that individual departments look first to the interests of 
their constituencies rather than at overall national economic interests. 
In addition to these anangements, consultative arrangements are 
established for each proposed PTA, involving an invitation for submissions 
from interested groups and individuals. For example, on August 19, 2004, 
DFAT invited public submissions on issues regarding a potential PTA 
between Australia and l'vlalaysia as pa1t of the development of a scoping 
study of the proposed agreement. Sixty submissions were received from 
industry, professional and non·government bodies, companies, unions and 
individuals. Six submissions were made by state and territory governments, 
three came from peak business groups while 22 were made by industry 
organizations from the agriculture, services and manufacturing industry 
sectors. There were 14 submissions from individual firms, five from unions, 
two from community organizations and three from individuals. As noted in 
the discussion of policy communities above, among business there are 
disparate views about the desirability of such a PTA, and the form it should 
take. In its submission to a DFAT feasability study of the agreement, the 
Federal Chamber of Australian Automotive Industries, representing 
manufacturers and importers of passenger cars, motorcycles and light 
commercial vehicles, argued that any such PTA should include substantial 
cuts in Malaysian tariffs on automobile imports, which it said were very 
high by international standards · up to 300 per cent, depending on engine 
capacity (FCAAI, 2004). But the submission from the Council of Textiles and 
Fashion Industries of Australia Limited called into question the 
government's pursuit of PTAs, including with Malaysia, on the grounds that 
such agreements have made conditions tougher for the industry by lowering 
tariff protection without being balanced by a sufficient increase in market 
access for local producers (CTFIA, 2004). 
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7.7.2 INFORMING NEGOTIATIONS 
Trade negotiators derive their negotiating authority from Cabinet, and 
ultimately refer to Cabinet for approval of negotiated outcomes. But in 
preparing for and undertaking trade negotiations, they take part in industry 
consultations in order to understand the structure of particular industries, 
identifying areas of greater and lesser commercial sensitivity and 
significance, and where the greatest potential benefit from a particular PTA 
could be derived. The former secretary ofDFAT, Ashton Calvert, described 
this in the following way: 
Now, once you get to a position where, say, the Australian 
government and the Thai government had made a commitment to 
start negotiations, well ... before then, but in the months immediately 
preceding that, and as the decision was made, then there would be 
very detailed and systematic consultations with relevant parts of 
Australian industry to really get straight, in quite precise terms, 
what areas of liberalization we would put priorities on and what 
would have to be handled carefully because of particular sensitivities 
in Australia. And that would be, all that input, based on consultations 
with Australian industry, would shape in quite a direct way the 
negotiating mandate that Cabinet would give the negotiating team. 
Inevitably, as you go along through those negotiations, the quickest 
ones take a year and the longest ones can take a number of years, you 
keep going back over what you learned from negotiations, you adjust 
your expectations of what you can achieve - some things look easier 
and others things looked harder - and the other side comes up with 
things, you know, you hadn't thought of in precisely the way they are 
asking for, so you have to go back to Cabinet to get a fresh negotiating 
brief. Naturally enough that happens periodically- Calvert, 2006. 
The institutional framework of Australian politics shapes the contest 
between interests attempting to influence trade policy. As described in 
Chapter 6, the formal points of access for interests to the policy process are 
limited. Greatest policymaking authority resides with Cabinet, with the 
228 
The Power to Deal 
potential for politically-successful prime ministers or ministers to secure the 
support or acquiescence of Cabinet colleagues for a particular position they 
may advocate. 'Ministers and backbenchers may provide another avenue for 
interests to advance their views, including lobbying for the appointment of 
particular individual or organization to a consultative group such as TP AC. 
But, as noted above, the degree to which influence may be successful exerted 
through such an appointment is open to question. The bureaucracy may 
serve as another avenue through which interests may seek tD influence the 
policy process, including through representation on standing consultative 
committees or through submissions to inquiries. 
Interests may also seek influence through the parliamentary process of 
treaty review, such as health groups did in mid-2004 when they sought to 
have enabling legislation for the AUSFTA amended to curtail provisions 
affecting the purchasing of medicines under the federal government's 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (,JSCOT, 2004b: 81·93). Interest groups 
can also attempt to achieve policy influence through more informal means, 
including by attempting to mount public campaigns aimed at pressuring 
governments into adopting a particular course of action, such as the 
National Farmers' Federation's efforts to secure reduction in protection for 
the US sugar and beef industries in the AUS FT A, and by seeking to have 
industry members and representatives elected to parliament, among the 
most recent examples being efforts by former N'FF president Peter Corish to 
be pre-selected as a National Party candidate for the federal seat of Parkes. 
Political institutional arrangements, by limiting the avenues interests can 
use to influence government policy, encourage the aggregation of interests, 
and those better able to organize can be at an advantage in seeking to do so. 
The more economically or politically strategic a set ofinterests may be, or 
the more successful they are in garnering support in the community, the 
more likely it is that their views and concerns may be heeded by 
policymakers, including both politicians and bureaucrats. For example, the 
automotive industry, which directly employs about 44,000 workers and 
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accounts for about 6.5 per cent of total manufacturing production, is both a 
significant employer as well as contributor to gross domestic product (HR, 
2006: 28, Appendix D). In addition, because it is geographically concentrated 
in two states, its relative significance for those communities is heightened -
in South Australia in 2005 the automotive industry accounted for 2.4 per 
cent of gross state product, while in 2001 ·02 it contributed 1.4 per cent to 
Victoria's GSP (HR, 2006: 29). \Vhile the industry has been forced to accept 
a phased program of tariff reductions since 1988, it has been able to secure 
generous government support to aid adjustment. Through its Automotive 
Competitive and Investment Scheme the federal government will disburse 
$4.2 billion to the industry, in the form of import tax credits, between 2006 
and 2015. Automobile manufacturers are among those organizations the 
government appoints to consultative bodies on trade policy (for example, 
John Conomos, senior executive vice·president, Toyota lVIotor Corporation, 
Australia Limited was a member of the government·appointed Trade Policy 
Advisory CounciD and the industry's representative organization, Federal 
Chamber of Australian Automotive Industries, is a regular contributor to 
government trade policy inquiries. 
The aggregation of interests into a representative organization at a national 
level necessarily means that some interests can be overshadowed by others. 
For example, the Australian Industry Group, which claims to represent 
10,000 firms in manufacturing and services industries, distills its policies 
from member-elected councils at both the state and national level, and 
organizations better able to support participation on such bodies 
(particularly large enterprises) are more likely t-0 be represented. As one 
official admitted: 
It is very hard to please everyone, and it is very hard to involve 
everyone too. At a high level our own management structure is based 
on state and national councils elected from the membership. There is 
a good representation of the larger companies in our membership on 
those boards, and there's a very good spread of industry coverage 
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among them and they are a highly participatory and vocal element of 
our membership - Millership, 2005. 
Being one of a select few of organizations or individuals appointed by 
government to an advisory role may not only enhance an organization's 
policy influence, but make it more attractive to those seeking to shape 
government policy. For example the National Farmers' Federation, the peak 
body for the politically and economically significant agricultural industry, 
has been represented on both the WTO Advisory Group and TPAC, and also 
has a privileged position of access to other government trade policy forums. 
According to an NFF policy manager, this has implications for how the 
organization is perceived and operates at a ministerial and departmental 
level: 
We have got representation at both. At the formal level there is WTO 
Advisory Group and the Trade Policy Advisory Council. There are 
also several informal mechanisms, particularly technical working 
groups bringing together technical guys from our industry members 
and senior departmental officers (DFAT, DAFF, .'\BARE) on a regular 
basis to talk about trade policy and tactical issues. \Ve have also got 
excellent access to Vaile's1s1 office -1\/Htchell, 2005. 
According to the NFF official, the organization's views are taken seriously 
by government representatives: 
We have had one of our technical working group meetings on 
agriculture with the department and they take very seriously our 
views on priorities. Usually meet with officials from DFAT, DAFF and 
ABARE. I meet with them on a very regular basis, sometimes on a 
weekly basis. I frequently go into interdepartmental brainstorming 
sessions. We meet with senior negotiators before and after each 
negotiation. We meet regularly with other agricultural interest 
groups · Horticulture Australia, the A WB, ports and Meat and 
167 1\t the rime of the interviev.r ~fatk Vaile was National Party leader~ deputy prime mirtlster and Trade 
.Minister. 
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Livestock Australia. We work collectively where we can and then 
industries take up their own particular issues. 
The NFF and the government of the day have always had a pretty 
good relationship on trade policy - have always been pretty pro-
industry reform and bringing down tariffs (Mitchell, 2005). 
But, while interest groups might form very close consultative relationships 
with government departments or ministers, political arrangements within a 
government may mean that the degree to which their interests shape the 
government's negotiating position may be highly qualified or limited, even if 
the department they work closely with is supposedly the lead agency in 
conducting trade negotiations. According to a senior government official 
closely involved in the negotiation of the AUSFTA, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade was too politically weak to effectively co·ordinate 
the various government departments involved in informing the negotiation 
process, and the task fell to the much more influential Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet: 
You need to go the Prime Minister's Department. The Foreign Affairs 
and Trade Department is very weak politically and to some extent 
always has been. It tries to play a co·ordinating role but can't really 
do so. But on the other hand, if it doesn't formulate the intellectual 
case for the government to use, then the case for a good trade policy 
oukome is weakened -Thawley, 2006. 
Around 15 government departments and agencies have trade 
responsibilities, and are expected to contribute to the development or 
implementation of trade policy (\VTO, 1998: 21 ·22), including understanding 
and representing the interests of the industries with which they are 
involved. For instance, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry is expected to understand the trade concerns of agricultural 
producers, the Department of Health and Ageing is expected to understand 
the trade concerns of the health industry, and the Department of 
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Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government is 
expected to be across trade issues affecting aviation, sea and land transport, 
But Australia's largest single industry sector, services, does not have a 
single government agency or department with responsibility for the industry 
(ASR, 2006: 13). The Australian Services Roundtable, which was established 
to represent the interests of the services industry, has participated in trade 
consultations with DFAT and other departments, including 
Communications and the Treasury. The industry organization expressed the 
frustration with the Howard government's multilateral trade liberalization 
strategy, particularly the emphasis on liberalization in agricultural rather 
than services trade (ASR, 2006: 18) and was cautious regarding the Howard 
government's PTA strategy. Such agreements were widely viewed as being 
largely motivated by geopolitical factors (ibid 20), and the ASR was 
skeptical about the ability of Australian negotiators to achieve 'WTO plus' 
outcomes on services trade liberalization in such agreements, particularly 
with developing countries (ibid: 20·1). 
According to Keating (2004: 168-73) the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet is very influential in the policy development process because of its 
role in co·ordinating policy across government departments, through its role 
in providing secretariat support to Cabinet and because, more than any 
other department, it is required to be attuned to the government's political 
needs and considerations. 
Such institutional arrangements - formal consultative councils and informal 
channels of policy access - are imbued with ideas about which interests 
should be heard and the way they should contribute to policy development 
(Goldstein, 1988: 180). In particular, they suggest ways that interests 
should organize themselves and the way they should operate. An 
organizational structure that aggregates interests and distills a policy 
position that has the support or acquiescence of the most financially 
significant, vocal or active members is likely to be perceived as the most 
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useful by policymakers and industry leaders alike. And such organizations 
operate within an institutional structure in which a fine balance has to be 
struck between advocating the interests of members without incurring the 
displeasure of policymakers to such a degree that access to the policy 
process is restricted or withdrawn. As one senior NFF official observed 
regarding suggestions that Australian negotiators should have walked away 
from the AUSFTA on the terms offered by the US: 
We have to remind ourselves that, in my time at the NFF we don't 
use the Telstra approach [to government lobbying]. \Ve don't make 
disputes public, but that does not mean we are a push·over. In 
building our relationship with government we do have very, very 
strong views that we put to government, but we have them privately. 
It is a matter of judgement. You have to be clear about the process 
that is going to give you the outcome you want - Mitchell, 2005. 
The price interest groups pay for access to government policy development 
and implementation is readily apparent in the process of negotiating and 
securing PTAs. 
7.8 THE NEGOTIATIONS 
Trade negotiations themselves involve a process akin to policy learning 
(Howlett and Ramesh, 1995: 175·78) - as policy is implemented (such as the 
negotiation of a PTA) more is learned about the policy environment and 
policy settings and adjustments or changes in goals and techniques may be 
made, and new players may join the contest over the definition of identities 
and interests. 
Trade negotiators do not approach consultations with interest groups with a 
blank sheet. According to Australia's leading official during the first 18 
months of the negotiation of the Singapore· Australia PTA, they use 
consultations with interest groups to build upon their own understanding of 
both the local industry structure and that of the prospective PTA partner: 
234 
The Power to Deal 
They look at the trade, they see where all existing interests are, they 
talk to the participants in trade. They also know what the trade 
policy priorities are more generally for the future of Australian 
exports of goods, services and investments with respect to any trading 
partner in the world, and how this generally applies to the particular 
case. That is the fundamental analysis that trade negotiators do 
when they enter into these things. They also think about what the 
other side will want and the extent to which we might be able to do 
what they want in order to get what we want. For example, we knew 
that Singapore Airlines wanted an open skies agreement with 
Australia, and that Qantas would never live with that - Kenyon, 2005. 
But, according to another senior DFAT official, during the course of 
negotiations the idea of what could and should be negotiated constantly 
evolves: 
It is a massive iterative exercise where you are talking to industry 
and then talking to the negotiating partner and going back and forth. 
DFAT doesn't do this by itself. We rely very, very heavily on the 
Industry Department, Agriculture and DITR, in particular, and 
Treasury for financial services, to be sufficiently across their 
industry's interest to make sure that we are up to the mark. In the 
negotiation you start off trying to get the world and you get pushed 
back, you push forward, and try to find alternative ways [to get what 
you want]; you go forwards and backwards, backwards and forwards, 
until you get to the point where you have distilled all the issues into a 
package and you think '\Vell, its far from perfect but its worth 
something now and its certainly worth enough to go to the minister 
and say "This is it, this is the best we can do for you",' And then they 
have to make a decision on whether or not they want to go forward or 
not and you usually explain what the difficulties are, and the 
limitations and why you got to that point and also point out to the 
minister in particular the losers, if there are any, who might be 
dissatisfied or disgruntled, to make sure that they are aware that 
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there may be some people whose interests they may have to deal with, 
and then make the decision (Raby, 2005). 
As discussed earlier, such close interaction with interests considered 
important, or whose knowledge and expertise are regarded as particularly 
apposite to the negotiations being conducted, helps negotiators inform their 
position. But, by making those interests participants in the negotiations, it 
also recruits them as supporters for the outcome, even where they may have 
strong reservations about the value of the agreement offered. The process 
can be quite subtle, as described by one industry group official: 
We tend to be given an opportunity, and indeed quite frequently used 
to provide analysis. For instance, as the Thai and US FTAs evolved, 
and I have been warned that the same will happen with these [next] 
four in train, as for example it comes time to do offers and requests on 
tariffs phasing or removal we will be going out to industry and 
gathering their input on that. Similarly, with the Thai one, moving 
from the FOB·based Rules of Origin to this change in tariff 
classification methodology evolved and we managed that process of 
going out to industry and explaining and gathering their feedback, 
and then feeding that back into the actual FTA development itself. 
We really do work very closely with them· Millership, 2005. 
In the process of acting as a go· between connecting negotiators and its 
members, an interest group becomes part of the process and develops a 
stake in the outcome: 
I think its an inevitable evolution that if we are involved in the actual 
negotiation process, and we have been that conduit between members 
and government negotiators, that at the end of the process we aren't 
suddenly going to just drop members and not going to be involved 
anymore. It is a very natural progression for us because our whole 
emphasis all the way through is working with member companies, 
and once we start them thinking about a process and committing to a 
process and feeding their input into the process, then whatever we get 
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left with at the end of the process, it is up to us to deal with it, 
particularly with things like, we are an authorized body for 
registering exporters under the Thai FTA, we are actively involved 
with this whether we like it or not - l.Vfillership, 2005. 
The degree of interest group involvement in trade negotiations can be 
substantial. During the final two weeks of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
in Geneva in 1994 the National Farmers' Federation sent a sizeable 
delegation which worked in close co·operation with the Trade l\!Iinister, 
Peter Cook, and his negotiating team: 
When we finally went to Geneva, I upped stakes and took my key 
advisors, most of the department's senior officers, over to.Geneva and 
camped in Geneva for about a fortnight or three weeks, when the 
final round of negotiations were in full sway a key agricultural lobby 
came over as well. An.d I had regular daily, sometimes twice daily, 
contacts with them and we ran a fairly integrated strategy in which 
we'd sit down and I'd say where I thought the pressures needed to go 
on and they would go out and work to the themes we were pursuing 
in government to government negotiations with their private sector 
[counterparts] - Cook, 2005. 
During negotiations for the AUSFTA a similarly close working relationship 
developed between DFAT negotiators and NFF representatives, particularly 
in the charged atmosphere of the final round of negotiations in Washington 
in late January and early February 2004. According to Allan Burgess, who 
was in Washington in his capacity as chair oft.he NFF's trade policy 
committee, the close partnership developed between negotiators and the 
lobby group was critical in finalizing the deal after it was threatened by US 
intransigence on improving market access for Australian farm produce: 
Early in the piece of the last round, the first three or four days of it, 
[the US negotiating position] was absolutely monstrous. The 
negotiators felt that they had been misled and felt enormous grief 
about what they had told industry. At that stage we felt that 
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confronted and pissed off I suspect a lot of us just felt like going home, 
but not ending the process. The first offer on dairy was that low you 
couldn't measure it. There is a point where the offer is so low that it is 
unacceptable, but the final offers were only in the last couple of days. 
They came out industry by industry. 
\\'hen it came down to the last 48 hours, about lam I and another guy 
were told 'This is it. We believe this is the best we can get and we 
want to know your view, Australia wants to know your view, within 
half an hom". At the time it wasn't a hard decision. You ask yourself, 
does this give us a commercial benefit, does this have any long·term 
implications? I wasn't going to be shouting from the rooftops but it 
was a reasonable outcome. The partnership between government and 
industry then was absolutely critical. We had to be confident that the 
negotiators had extracted absolutely the best deal possible - Burgess, 
2005. 
Just as important was the feeling among those industry representatives 
present that, with the government's political investment in the process so 
great, an agreement had to be reached and that abandoning the proposed 
PTA was not an option: 
If you have ever seen Australia's record in international negotiations 
you would see that once a process is started you tend to see them 
come to an end. We would be naive like to think that trade reform 
and foreign affairs are not linked. Walking away from a negotiation is 
a very hard thing to do. Australia is highly principled about trade 
reform but do you walk away from a deal even if there is [only] a 
small benefit? 
You sometimes think 'Are they capturing us?' but, with the AUSITA, 
I believe that that [deal] was all we could get. Some say we should 
have walked away, but we really couldn't- Burgess, 2005. 
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When it became apparent late in the negotiations that the Bush 
administration, under pressure from lobbyists including the president's 
brother, Florida governor Jeb Bush (Walker, 2004), would not include the 
US sugar market in the AUSFTA, there was considerable anger and dismay 
among Australian negotiators and industry negotiators attending the final 
round of talks. A former senior National Farmers' Federation interviewed 
for this study who did not want to be identified said that when US trade 
officials came to Australia for a round of negotiations six months before the 
final talks suggestions began to emerge that the agreement would be much 
less ambitious than originally expected. 
About six months out [from the final round of negotiations in 
February 2004] the bureaucracy and the ministers started to get 
worried about what they would be able to deliver. About six months 
out, when the US negotiators came here, a light seemed to come on 
that they were not going to get what they thought - ]former NFF 
official (name withheld), 2005. 
In late January 2004, as then·Trade Minister Vaile was preparing to leave 
Australia to attend the final round of AUSFTA negotiations in Washington, 
reports emerged that the US government would not increase access to the 
US market for Australian sugar producers, prompting Nationals leader and 
acting Prime :!\1inister John Anderson to declare: "I cannot see how 
Australia can agree to a free trade agreement that did not include a fair and 
reasonable approach to sugar" (Shovelan, 2004). As the final round of talks 
came to a conclusion and it became clear that the US government would not 
change its offer regarding access to the sugar market Australian negotiators 
faced the option. of breaking off the talks and walking away from the 
agreement. According to the senior NFF official there was considerable 
dismay about the final offer, not only because of a lack of increased access to 
the sugar market but also the 18·year timeline for improvement in access to 
the US beef market. 
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We had a teleconference about 4am on the day the FTA was to be 
finalized. It was a very patchy connection between the NFF Board, 
some commodity group leaders and Peter Corish. Peter was asked: "Is 
this as good as it gets for agriculture?" Peter replied: "This is pretty 
good." Somone else then piped up and said "Let's do it then" - NFF 
official, 2005. 
That same morning Foreign Minister Downer was briefed by Trade Minister 
Vaile and senior DFAT negotiators, including Steve Deady, about the 
negotiations: 
I remember walking along the beach at Victor Harbour with my wife, 
just walking from the beach house into the town, to the care, and 
John Howard talking to me on my mobile about whether we were 
going to accept the deal with the Americans with no concessions on 
sugar, or whether not. And that was the end of it. That was the deal 
breaker or maker, so we decided to go along with it, to accept it -
Downer, 2008. 
According to former Trade !vlinister Peter Cook, the intimate inclusion of 
industry groups during trade negotiations was, at least in part, a clear 
strategy to secure their support for the negotiated outcome: 
I thought that [closely involving NFF officials in the negotiation 
process] was a useful thing to do and how much it achieved I'm not 
sure but it certainly shared the ownership of the result168. Because 
part of the political issue here was that there was going to be a 
compromise from absolutist goals at the end of the day, and we all 
knew that, and getting the balance of that right was pretty critical for 
domestic political consumption so that we didn't want a perception to 
emerge that somehow we'd backflipped or backed away or softened. It 
was pretty important to have the industry groups up front so that we 
all had shared responsibility here and I might say that when we got 
10s Intervie'\vee's emphasis. 
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back to Australia they were all very good. They all had a lot of 
positive things to say and they were very useful too in talking to the 
then· Howard-led Opposition about getting the implementing Bills 
through - Cook, 2005. 
7 .9 SELLING THE AUS FT A: MANAGING DISSENT 
Rallying interest groups within the private sector to support an agreement 
is viewed as important to the process of securing acquiescence to it, 
particularly where it faces public hostility. This was particularly the case 
with the AUSFTA which, more than any other PTA negotiated by the 
Howard government, drew substantial public opposition. The agreement 
came under attack not only for the quality of its trade opening provisions 
and the changes to investment and intellectual property laws it entailed, 
but was also a lightning rod for critics of the Howard government's foreign 
policy strategy - particularly the close relationship cultivated with the 
controversial Bush administration and participation in the United States· 
led invasion of Iraq - as well as those who feared the agreement would 
increase Australia's vulnerability to exploitation and domination by United 
States·based multinational firms. 
It is beyond the scope of the study to undertake a detailed examination of all 
the ideas and issues that were raised in the public debate regarding the 
AUSFTA. But a brief survey of the nature and course of the economic debate, 
and its handling by the Howard government, indicates the way in which 
fundamental concerns over the direction of trade policy and its implications 
for economic development were dealt with, and what influence such ideas 
exerted on policy choices. 
The proposed agreement was the subject of three parliamentary inquiries, 
one by JSCOT, one by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee, and a third by the Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade 
Agreement between Australia and the United States. At least four detailed 
economic assessments, by ACIL Consulting, trade economist Philippa Dee, 
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the Centre for International Economicsl69 and the APEC Study Centre, were 
conducted and two monographs ·All the Way with the USA: Australia, the 
US and Free Trade (Capling, 2004) and How to Kill a Country: Australia's 
devastating trade deal with the United States (Weiss et.al., 2004) have been 
written, along with many academic papers and extensive media coverage, 
including on the fundamental issue of the merits of pursuing PTAs at the 
same time as participating in multilateral trade liberalization negotiations 
(JSCF ADT, 2004: 24). 
One strand of the debate centred on the economic costs and benefits of the 
proposed AUSFTA. On June 21, 2001, Trade Minister Vaile released a study, 
prepared by the Centre for International Economics on commission from 
DFAT, which found that a bilateral PTA with the United States that 
eliminated all identified harriers to trade would deliver a $US 9.9 billion 
boost to the Australian economy over 20 years (CIE, 2001: vii·ix). Releasing 
the study, Vaile said the results showed that it was worth pursuing 
discussions with the United States on a possible PTA (Vaile, 200ld). Just 
two months later the APEC Study Centre, headed by Alan Oxley, released a 
report, also commissioned by DFAT, claiming that an Australia· United 
States PTA would not only benefit business through improved access to the 
US market, but would also attract more US investment to Australia, 
bringing with it advanced technologies and business practices (A.SC, 2001= 
ix-xx). The particular significance ofOxley's involvement in the preparation 
of this report is that he later formed, and was director of, the Australia· 
United States Free Trade Agreement Business Group, which became the 
chief business advocacy group for the AUSFTA, and Oxley himself was a 
prominent proponent of the AUS FT A. The findings of these reports, 
particularly the CIE study, were called into question by two subsequent 
economic evaluations. The Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade 
Agreement between Australia and the United States commissioned trade 
economist Philippa Dee, who had worked in the Productivity Commission, to 
169 In early 2004 the Centre for Intemational F...conomi:cs revie'\.ved its 2001 assessment of anr\ustralia-Vnited 
States PT_,.\ follo\\ing the 8 February 2004 agreement on the terms of the AliSFTA. In its rev'ised :assessment 
the CIE confirmed its earlier :finding that there would be significant economic benefits for Austrafut from the 
proposed agreement. 
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provide a separate assessment of the economic impact AUSFTA. According 
to Dee the projected annual welfare gain for Australia from the final 
negotiated form of the agreement170 would be a very modest $53 million 
(Dee, 2004: 35) -well short of the projections in the CIE studyl71. A similar 
finding was made by the ACIL Consulting report, commissioned by the 
Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation. Modelling done 
by the report's author, David Trebeck, indicated that a bilateral deal with 
the US involving a phase-in of complete free trade over 5 years from 2005 
would be 'slightly detrimental' to the Australian economy: 
Our assessment is that the economic benefits of the FTA to Australia 
as a whole are, at best, very finely balanced. The impact on 
Australian farmers is likely to be negative, especially if domestic 
political considerations in the US prevent genuinely free trade in the 
most sensitive industries - sugar, dairy and meat. Trade diversion 
effects, the diversion of government resources away from other trade 
initiatives, and the disaffection of countries that on the whole are 
more important trading partners, all threaten the worth to Australia 
of a special trade agreement with the US. The official view seems to 
be that these problems are illusory (or at least can be readily 
overcome) and that they are small relative to the gains to be had. 
This is not ACIL's view, nor that of several other commentators -
ACIL, 2003. 
Trebeck, Garnaut and Dee called into question the robustness of the CIE's 
findings about the benefits to the economy from the AUSFTA, with Garnaut 
claiming that the study did not pass the 'laugh test': 
Before economists are really satisfied with the results of any piece of 
any econometric modelling, they put it through the laugh test, and 
the laugh test is, can someone who knows the real world, that's meant 
176 Dee's asse;;sment was based on the agreement as negotiated bertveen Australian and United States trade 
representatives before going to P:arliamen4 where it was run.ended. 
171 The initial CIE study was completed before the terms of the *-\USFT~-\. were known and. as noted earlier, 
was based on the assumption that all identified barriers to trade were abolished - an outcorne that was :not 
achteve,d in the actual negoriations. 
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to be described by the modelling exercise look at the results and not 
laugh. And I don't think that ~his exercise passes the laugh test -
Garnaut, cited in Fitzsimmons, 2004. 
Acc01·ding to Trebeck, a key assumption underlying the CIE's findings was 
that the PTA would, of itself, induce a significant productivity increase 
throughout Australia's service sector as a result of greater awareness of US 
managerial methods: 'One reason ACIL's results differ from those of the CIE 
is that ACIL is not at all convinced that this is a plausible assumption to 
make, but it is central to CIE's analysis' CACIL, 2003). 
The findings of the Dee and ACIL Consulting reports, by calling into 
question the veracity of the reseaxch relied upon by the Howard government 
to advance the economic case fox the AUSFTA, posed a threat to its efforts 
to win public support for the agreement. The Labor Opposition accused the 
Howard government of pressuring the Rural Industries Research and 
Development Corporation, which is a statutory body that receives a large 
part of its funding from the Commonwealth goverriment, to order ACIL 
Consulting to undertake further analysis, delaying publication of the report 
from September 2002 to February 2003 (Woldring, 2007). According to 
Trebeck, this was part of attempts by the Howard government to manage 
and limit debate about its trade policy: 
My main criticism in all this has been the limited public debate 
encouraged by the government. Unlike the US, where public hearings 
involving the main parties have been extensive, here one has almost 
been made to feel unpatriotic merely by questioning the robustness of 
the received wisdom. I don't think this is healthy and ultimately it 
could be counter-productive if the high expectations that have been 
created turn out not to be justified - Trebeck, 2003. 
Weiss et.al(2004: 150·51) claim supporters of the Howard government and 
its trade policy resorted to public ridicule and intimidation in an effort to 
silence critics of the AUSFTA, citing a statement by international editor of 
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The Age, Tony Parkinson (who went on to become Foreign Minister 
Downer's press secretary), that 'much of the protest comes from the angry 
left and globaphobes, with their undying paranoia about American 
imperialism and global business' (Weiss et.al., 2004: 151). Senior mining 
industry executive and head of the peak business lobby group the Business 
Council of Australia, Hugh Morgan, accused critics of the AUSFTA of 
attempting to re-instate protectionism: 
This campaign has all the hallmarks of what were ultimately failed 
attempts to stall or wind back reductions in high tariffs, all to protect 
the vested interests of a comparative few at the expense of Australia's 
economic development - Morgan, 2004. 
The response of the government and supporters of the AUSFTA to critics is 
characteristic, according to Head (2008: 5) of the way some policy positions 
are essentially data·proofbecause they are viewed by politicians, organized 
interests and others through the lens of political know ledge: 
This knowledge is diffuse, highly fluid and heavily contested owing to 
its partisan and adversarial context. Policy, seen through the political 
lens, is about persuasion and support rather than about objective 
veracity. These commitments are no longer (if they ever were) open to 
further debates about the nature of the problem, the best policy 
solution and the range of evidence relevant to assessing policy 
effectiveness. The official framing of a problem is crucial in regard to 
what research is commissioned and its terms of reference - Head, 
2003: 5. 
Indeed, the negotiation of the agreement did raise for some questions about 
in whose interests it was framed. Typical of such analyses were those 
undertaken by Weiss et.al.(2004) and Ranald (2006), with the latter arguing 
that corporate interests (particularly United States· based transnational 
corporations and United States pharmaceutical companies) were key 
players in promoting the idea of an AUSFTA. 
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But the effectiveness of critics of the AUSFTA in seeking to have the 
agreement amended or rejected by the government or parliament was 
severely constrained by several factors, not least the widely varying motives 
of those protesting against the agreement. The Australian Fair Trade and 
Investment Network, composed of 59 church, union, environment, human 
rights and development groups, developed as part of global opposition to the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1997 and drew its support from 
many of those organizations - particularly trade unions · that had become 
increasingly politically marginalized during the term of the Howard 
government. \Vhile not explicitly opposing the process of trade liberalization 
the group, which came together under the banner of fair rather than free 
trade, viewed the agreement as an instance of a broader global development 
in which smaller nations were being exploited by economically powerful 
nations in the interests oflarge multinational corporations (Ranald and 
Southalan, 2004). The AUSFTA became a lightning rod for a mix of causes, 
as embodied in the membership of AFTINET ranging from anti· 
globalisation and environmental concerns through to protectionist impulses 
and general opposition to the policies of the Howard government, including 
participation in the Iraq War; the relationship cultivated with the Bush 
Administration and the treatment of refugees. 
Opposition of a different sort came from several industries that, while not 
opposed to an AUSFTA per se, were unhappy with the terms of the 
agreement struck. Within some industries the proposed agreement came 
under intense criticism, including in parts of agriculture, health and the 
arts. As noted earlier, sections of the farming industry were dismayed by a 
lack of increased access for sugar products and the protracted and limited 
nature of US commitments to reduce barriers to imports of beef. Meat and 
Livestock Australia, the peak industry group for beef producers, expressed 
"bitter disappointment" with the negotiated outcome (MLA, 2004), and the 
representative organization for sugar cane farmers described the exclusion 
of sugar from the agreement as a "bitter pill" (Merino, 2004). But the terms 
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of the agreement, which provided much better outcomes for some sectors, 
such as dairy, than others, combined with the support the deal received 
from NFF president Corish and the organization's lead trade negotiator 
Alan Burgess (who was also head of the dairy industry's peak national body) 
helped undermine the unity of opposition to the AUSFTA within the NFF. 
Provisions in the negotiated agreement affecting copy:right protection and 
intellectual property laws drew warnings that they could hamper the access 
of Australian patients to medication th:rough the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme and could undermine local production of books, films, music and 
television programs (Drahos and Henry, 2004; Legge, 2003; Ranald and 
Southalan, 2004). These concerns were aired both publicly and privately, 
with representations made to portfolio ministers such as Health Minister 
Tony Abbott and Communications Minister Daryl Williams, who consulted 
regularly with Ambassador Thawley and trade officials during the 
agreement negotiations (Thawley, 2006). 
\Vithin the trade policy community, debate about the AUSFTA took place 
within the context of a broader discussion about the shift in policy to 
embrace preferentialism. As discussed in Chapter 2, policy communities are 
built upon a common interest in a particular policy field or functional 
activity and a shared belief system, code of conduct and established pattern 
of behaviour (Davis et al, 1993: 144; Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 158), and 
can be either formed by government or self-organized. In the trade policy 
arena during the period when the Howard government negotiated SAFTA, 
TAFTA and AUSFTA, both forms of policy community existed. The former 
was embodied in the Trade Policy Advisory Committee, WTO Advisory 
Group and the Agricultural Trade Consultative Group (which, as noted 
earlier, had overlapping memberships), while the latter was more broadly 
composed of academics, economists, lobbyists, bureaucrats, industry officials 
and journalists interested in and engaged with issues of trade policy. 
There is evidence that within TPAC at the time of the negotiation of the 
AUSFTA there was considerable ambivalence among some members 
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regarding the desirability of the shift toward preferential trade agreements. 
As one member put it in an interview with the author, there was a risk in 
adhering to a strictly multilateral approach, while the outcomes of PTAs 
could be disappointing: 
"Investing all your eggs in the multilateral basket is very risky and 
terribly frustrating. People have just busted out of that and are doing 
bilateral negotiations. It is a matter of a bird in the hand is worth two 
in the bush. In the process [of PTAs] the quality of the result becomes 
questionable in terms of what it GATT compliant, their 
comprehensiveness and depth. Some of the results are pretty patchy, 
but if you don't do them it becomes a competitiveness issue [of rival 
nations getting preferential access to your markets] - Hawes, 2005. 
Within the broader policy community there was considerable debate -
publicly and within sections of government about both the AUSFTA and 
the overall shift in policy to embrace preferentialism. The economic merits 
of particular agreements and the risks and benefits of preferentialism were 
contested in academic journals, through the pages of newspapers, in public 
forums such as parliamentary inquiries and through meetings with 
government ministers and officials. As noted earlier, estimates of the 
economic effects of the AUSFTA were hotly and publicly contested. And 
members of the broader policy community spoke about and debated the shift 
to preferentialism, both among themselves and with government ministers 
and officials, as evident in books, papers and speeches by Capling (2005), 
Dee (2005), Findlay (2002), Garnaut (2002, 2003a, 2003b), Kunkel (2002) 
and Ravenhill (2004). Constraints of time and resources mean that a 
fulsome account of this contest of ideas is beyond the scope of this study, 
though it should be noted that it took place in the context of a broader 
international debate about the proliferation of PTAs and implications for 
trade liberalization (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996; Drysdale, 2003; Irwin, 
2005; Levy, 1997; Park, Urata and Cheong, 2005). Instead, attention is 
directed to what practical effect they had in shaping trade policy for, as 
Atkinson and Coleman note, the existence of policy communities alone does 
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not necessarily indicate influence (1992: 161). JuBt as significant are the 
links they have to the institutional decis:ion·making apparatus of 
government. 
Critics of the AUSFTA found an audience within parliament, where 
members of the Labor Party, the Australian Democrats and the Australian 
Greens voiced opposition to all or part of the AUSFTA. On August 3, 2004, 
members of the ALP's Left faction argued strongly against ratification of the 
agreement, arguing that it would hurt key sectors of the economy (ABC, 
2004). After considerable debate the ALP's parliamentary caucus voted to 
approve the AUSFTA, subject to amendments to protect access to subsidized 
medicines through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and to ensure a 
minimum quota for locally-made programs on television. The decision 
effectively neutered opposition to the agreement from the Greens and the 
Democrats, who the following day issued a dissenting Senate committee 
report on the AUSFTA in which they pledged to oppose the ratification of 
the agreement. Legislation to implement the agreement, incorporating a 
Labor amendment intended to prevent 'ever·greening' of patents by 
pharmaceutical companies, was passed by parliament on August 13, 2004. 
The agreement's chief advocate, Australia's ambassador to the US Michael 
Thawley, claimed that securing and maintaining support for the deal within 
government, business and the community in Australia became a major task: 
I always used to say privately that I had a bigger job of persuasion ... 
well I had at least as big a job of persuasion in Australia as I did in 
the United States. I spent at least as much time writing and arguing 
the case ... strengthening the attitude of people in government, both at 
a political level and in the bureaucracy, to stand up and argue the 
case publicly in Australia as I did, sort of campaigning in the United 
States to get them to agree to even think of negotiating an agreement. 
Traditionally it's been very difficult to get the Australian business 
community excited about trade issues. Particularly in the case of the 
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FT.A people were very nervous because I think they thought we were 
going to be mown down in the negotiations. \Veil, a), the first 
response when I started to raise it and campaign for it was oh well, 
they'll never negotiate, right they won't do it, you'll never get them to 
agree to do it, b), once they had started to do it that you won't get 
anything out of it, we are just ... we're a small economy, you'll just 
expose us to rampaging competition, we won't survive and you won't 
get anything i.11 return. So, lack of interest plus lack of confidence. But 
then, as time went on we had more interest. What is interesting is 
that the US business community was much more focused on what it 
could get out of an FT.A with Australia than the Australian business 
community was on what it could get out of one · Thawley, 2006. 
But the evidence gathered for this study indicates that once the prime 
minister decided to throw the weight of his office behind the deal and 
committed himself to the negotiation of the AUSFTA there was little 
likelihood of any other outcome but that an agreement would be struck. By 
claiming the agreement would deliver economic benefits, while framing it in 
the context of Australia's political and security ties with the US, the prime 
minister was able to virtually nullify opposition within parliament. These 
arguments hit at the core vulnerabilities of Labor which, under Mark 
Latham, was forced to combat perceptions of anti· Americanism (at a time 
when perceptions of the threat of terrorism meant a high premium was 
attached to security ties with the United States) while trying to establish its 
credentials as a competent economic manager. In this environment, 
conflicting economic assessments of the impact of the agreement helped sow 
doubt and confusion in the public debate about the agreement in a way that 
enabled the government to effectively sideline informed dissent. 
7 .10 CONCLUSION 
For much of the period between the end of the Second \Vorld \Var and the 
early 1980s there was a tension in Australian trade policy between a 
commitment to trade liberalization on one hand and the pursuit of industry 
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protection. During the 1980s and early 1990s the Hawke government 
maintained the focus on multilateral liberalization while simultaneously 
reducing high tariff barriers as part of efforts to restructure the economy 
and boost productivity. Subsequently, the Howard government subordinated 
the pursuit of trade liberalization to the negotiation of export market access 
on a preferential basis. In the process, the role of societal groups organized 
around material interests has changed. 
Demand·side models of policymaking, in which interest groups are formed 
and compete politically tc exert influence over government policy - with 
some arguing that dominant interests can work through a compliant 
government to establish the primacy of its preferences (Meier, 1990: 187) -
appeared to explain the behaviour of interest groups in securing and 
maintaining government protection (Anderson and Garnaut, 1987: 35-9). 
But interest groups have been forced to adapt the way they operate as the 
political consensus has shifted from protection to trade liberalization and 
securing market access. While interest groups continue tc figure in trade 
policy debates, and are closely integrated into the consultative processes 
that inform government decisions regarding the negotiation of preferential 
trade agreements, there is little evidence that they have driven government 
decisions. 
This is particularly the case in the origins of the Singapore, United States 
and Thailand PTAs examined in this chapter. Senior government ministers 
and officials interviewed for this study made it clear that in selecting PTA 
partners, economic benefits and commercial interests were just two of the 
criteria that were applied. For instance, Calvert said that industry input 
was sought only once the choice of a potential PTA partner had been made. 
The selection criteria for potential PTA partners approved by Cabinet 
stipulated that assessment should be made taking into account not only 
commercial benefits but the relative importance of the partner country to 
Australia and its capacity to negotiate an agreement. In the case of 
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Singapore and Thailand, Downer made it plain that PTAs were seen as a 
way to help cement political relations with the two ASRA.N nations most 
favorably disposed to Australia. 
The genesis of the AUSFTA, in particular, highlighted the ability of policy 
entrepreneurs within the top echelons of government to guide the selection 
of PTA partners quite separately from any lobbying by private interests. 
Instead, the role of interest groups has evolved to one in which many assist 
government in the implementation of trade policy - they provide expert 
advice to government in preparations for and during trade negotiations, and 
they act as public advocates for PTAs. They are part of the formal and 
informal consultative mechanisms, including government-appointed policy 
communities, that are used by politicians and bureaucrats to guide PTA 
negotiations. Through such mechanisms they are co·opted into the execution 
of government trade policy and are recruited as advocates of PTA outcomes. 
This was most obviously the case vvith the AUSFTA, where an alliance of 
companies was formed to publicly spruik the benefits of an AUSFTA and the 
leadership of industry groups closely involved in the negotiations, such as 
the NFF, became advocates of the deal to their members. 
The way in which the Howard government devised and implemented its 
trade strategy to pursue PTAs underlined the degree to which private 
interests played an important but subordinate role in the development of 
trade policy. 
As Anderson and Garnaut (1987: 47 ·9) indicate, widesprnad belief in the 
post·war period that protectionism was in the national interest encouraged 
industries to seek ever-greater protection from international competition, 
and enabled political parties to respond by raising tariff rates with little 
political cost. But the inherently discriminatory nature of PTAs, implying as 
they do preferences between trading partners, mean that foreign policy 
considerations are central to the implementation of trade policy and are 
likely to trump commercial interests where the two are perceived to be in 
conflict. Such an environment is conducive for policy entrepreneurs who give 
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priority to the foreign policy rather than economic dimensions of trade policy, 
as evidenced by the success ofThawley in advocating an AUSFTA. 
Such an environment also increases the likelihood that a PTA negotiation, 
once embarked upon, will be concluded in agreement no matter what the 
actual terms of the deal may be. The final terms of the AUSFTA failed to 
meet the standards set by the Nationals, who until near the end threatened 
to withdraw support unless it included access to the US sugar market, and 
it disappointed agricultural groups looking for much more liberal access for 
meat, horticultural and dairy products. But such failures were not enough to 
derail the agreement because its political significance, and the commitment 
of Prime Minister Howard to an outcome, meant that failure was simply not 
an option. The Howard government had invested much political capital in 
the AUSFTA as a symbol of the strong political ties it had forged with the 
US government, the significance of which was heightened by the sense of 
insecurity arising from the devastating terrorist attacks in New York, Bali 
and Jakarta earlier in the decade. 'With so much at stake it was inevitable, 
once negotiations on the AUSFTA had commenced, that they would be 
concluded with an agreement, however unsatisfactory its terms might have 
been for some. This applied just as much to the interest groups that were 
involved in the negotiations. As the NFF's Burgess put it: "Once a process is 
started you tend to see them come to an end. \Ve would be naive to think 
that trade reform and foreign affairs are not linked". Cook, who worked 
closely with NFF officials in concluding the Uruguay Round agreement, put 
it even more succinctly, saying that such close co·operation meant that such 
groups "certainly shared the ownership of the result". 
Australia's political institutional structure, which shapes the identities, 
incentives and capabilities of political and economic actors, limits the scope 
of private interests to influence the trade policy process. Combined with an 
international trade policy environment in which PTAs have proliferated in 
the absence of substantial progress toward multilateral liberalization, this 
has forced upon many interest groups the calculation that although PTAs 
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may in many instances be of limited commercial benefit, they are better 
than no gain at all. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
The central question this study has been framed to address is why and how 
the negotiation of preferential trade agreements became a key element of 
Australia's trade policy under the Howard government. \\'hen federal 
Cabinet in mid· 1997 gave approval to the pursuit of such deals it ended a 
bipartisan consensus that had developed over the preceding 55 years around 
non·discrimination in trade. 
The purpose of this study was to assess how and why this policy shift, with 
its far·reaching implications for economic development, occurred. The 
assessment was conducted taking into account two key theoretical 
propositions on trade policy formation: that for a middle·power nation such 
as Australia trade policy is essentially dictated by international 
circumstances. or alternatively, that it is driven by the demands of 
politically influential domestic economic interests. While it was found that 
international conditions, particularly the proliferation of PT As and the 
election of the Bush administration, were important considerations for the 
Howard government in deciding to pursue PTAs, by themselves they were 
not decisive in explaining the shift. But nor was the change in trade policy 
driven domestically by the demands of groups organized around shared 
economic interests. This study has found that interest groups played an 
important but ancillary role on trade policy. They did not drive the shift in 
trade policy, and were only brought by the government into the process once 
it had reached the stage of policy implementation, being used to help inform 
negotiations and act as advocates for individual PTAs. 
The findings of this study are that the Howard government's decision to 
embark upon the negotiation of PTAs, though influenced by international 
developments, was driven by political considerations and the preferences of 
senior government ministers, not least the prime minister. Internationally, 
PTAs were seen by Howard and other senior ministers such as Downer as a 
way to confer favor on other nations and buttress relations, while 
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domestically they were viewed as a way to burnish the government's 
economic credentials and help it portray itself as an active and effective 
guardian of the nation's economic interests. In driving this policy shift 
Howard was aided by a political institutional architecture in which there 
were few effective veto players and a politically-successful prime minister 
was able to centralize much policy·making authority in his office. As 
illustrated by the evolution of the AUSFTA, this centralization simplified 
the task of policy entreprenem·s proposing specific PTAs. 
8.1 ARGUMENT IN OUTLINE 
8.1.1 TRADE POLICY ANTECEDENTS 
Australia's trade policy since Federation has been marked by an unresolved 
tension between competing views of the purpose it should serve. During 
much of last century there was an influential school of thought that 
advocated trade policy should be directed to fostering industry development 
behind high tariff walls and supporting strategic political relationships, 
including by taking part in discriminato1y trade arrangements such as the 
imperial system of preferences. Such policies fostered the development of 
influential economic interests focused on the preservation and 
intensification of industry protection and support and, under their sway, 
Australia had by 1970 one of the most heavily protected manufacturing 
sectors in the developed world. But from 1942 and the signing of the Mutual 
Aid Agreement another influential consensus gradually emerged that 
advocated moving away from preferential and protedionist policies and 
their replacement with trade liberalization. 
The persistence of protectionism through the 1960s indicated, in part, the 
degree of influence coalitions of private interests, buttressed by political 
institutional arrangements, could exert over trade policy. But during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s the pressures generated by globalizing financial 
markets and, in the realm of ideas, the attendant growing ascendancy of 
market· based theories of economics as against arguments supporting 
protection, provided an environment conducive for a reform·minded 
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government to introduce sweeping policy changes that undermined the 
position of protectionist coalitions. These changes had as their central aim 
productivity gains, which were seen as vital to long·term prosperity. 
Crucially the reforms, particularly unilateral tariff cuts, were underpinned 
by at least two decades of accumulated research and argument regarding 
the detrimental economic impact of protectionism. By the late 1980s the 
reformist position enjoyed largely bipartisan political support. Ideas 
generated both domestically and internationally provided the intellectual 
basis for policies which at their core encapsulated the view that trade policy 
was a vital instrument of domestic economic reform, the goals of which 
would be endangered by the development ofpreferentialism in trade. 
Although anti·protectionist ideas were ascendant in the 1980s and early 
1990s, their domination was far from complete, and even before the 
Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT had concluded in 1994, there was, 
among some in government, including in the office of Prime Minister Paul 
Keating, growing interest in opportunities for trade openings through both 
regional and bilateral agreements (Edwards, 2006). 
8.1.2 WHY THE EMBRACE OF PT As? 
At least part of the explanation for the shift to preferentialism in Australia's 
trade policy is to be found in changes in the international policy 
environment. Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT, 
political momentum for further multilateral trade liberalization faded ·the 
United States, which had been a champion of multilateralism in the post· 
war period, was preoccupied with bedding down the North America Free 
Trade Agreement and formulating a similar pact encompassing the entire 
western hemisphere, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. At the 
same time, countries of the European Union were in the throes of expanding 
and consolidating their own customs union, and in Asia there was growing 
interest in PTAs. 
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System-centred theories of international relations172 suggest that changes in 
the global policy environment - such as the difficulties in launching a new 
round of multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the WTO, a loss of 
momentum in APEC and the proliferation of PTAs - are crucial to 
understanding why trade policy shifted under the Howard government. 
According to this view Australia, as a middle-ranking power, is essentially a 
policy-taker. As the states around it moved to negotiate discriminatory 
trade agreements with one another it had little option but to follow suit or 
risk leaving its exporters at a competitive disadvantage. This is the 
argument that.the Howard government consistently wielded to justify its 
embrace of PTAs. In its foreign and trade policy White Paper the Coalition 
warned that "inaction as others negotiate free trade agreements could risk 
an erosion of our competitive position" (DFAT, 2003: 59), while Foreign 
Minister Downer said it would have been "eccentric" to have ignored the 
possibility of negotiating PTAs while many other countries were doing so 
(Downer, 2008). According to Downer, it was merely a matter of being a 
"natioµal interest pragmatist" to negotiate PTAs (ibid.) 
Certainly international conditions are significant. It is difficult to conceive 
that the Australian government would have pursued PTAs but in an 
international context in which trading partners were willing to do the same. 
However, by themselves such conditions provide a necessary yet insufficient 
explanation of why, how and when Australia's PTA policy developed in the 
way that it did. They shed only limited light on the timing of the policy shift 
and the way it was implemented. They also paper over key questions about 
motives and goals for the government in bringing about this policy change. 
To accept that the Howard government was merely reacting to changes in 
the international policy environment to maximize the national interest not 
only leaves unexplained how and what it judged to be in the national 
172 Neorealists consider states to be unitary~ rational actors operating in an anarchic environment in vrhich 
they seek, above all, to maximize security {see Waltz, 1979) while neoliberals qualify this view to encompass 
the role of non-state actors in constraining the international behaviour of the states and specify that states 
have multiple objectives, of which security is just one (see Keohane and Nye, 1989), 
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interest, it also essentially absolves that government of responsibility for its 
policy choices by suggesting that it had none. 
Economic Interests 
One possible explanation examined in this study comes from the field of 
political economy and the suggestion that government polk'Y is shaped by 
the political contest between societal actors with differing economic 
interests. Such demand-side models (Milner, 1999: 95; Frey, 1984: 30·2; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1995: 668; Ikenberry, 1986: 57·8) helped explain 
the development and maintenance of Australia's protectionist edifice over 
several decades (Anderson and Garnaut, 1987) and its subsequent 
substantial dismantlement beginning in the early 1970s and accelerated 
during the 1980s. 
The ability of proponents of trade liberalization to convince key sectors such 
as agriculture and mining of the burden they carried to support and protect 
manufacturing from international competition helped establish an effective 
political coalition to bring protection down (Rattigan and Carmichael, 1996; 
Anderson and Garnaut, 1987). But there is little evidence that a similar 
coalition of economic interests formed around, and advocated the embrace of, 
preferentialism in trade policy. Although members of the Keating 
government considered PTAs (Edwards, 2006; Elek, 2005) and one or two 
industry representatives raised the idea at different times (Millership, 2005; 
Vaile, 200la), there is no evidence that sectoral groups or other coalitions of 
economic interests were instrumental in the Howard government's adoption 
of a PTA strategy. The Coalition government was mindful of what it saw as 
the potential for Australian exporters to be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage if rivals from other nations gained preferential access to 
markets (Calvert, 2006), and by the late 1990s some sect-0rs, particularly 
manufacturing, were becoming increasingly nervous about the proliferation 
of PTAs (J\;fillership, 2005). But other industries, such as agriculture, were 
equally "restless" about the pursuit of PTAs and a possible dilution of 
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government effoTt regaTding the negotiation of the WTO's Doha Round 
(Burgess, 2005). 
The competing arguments of export·oriented manufacturers and 
agricultural producers regarding the merits of PT As as against 
multilateralism appear to have been reflected, in broad terms, in the 
deliberations of Cabinet in formally adopting a PTA strategy when it met in 
mid·1997. DowneT and Fischer argued in their joint submission to Cabinet 
of the need to broaden the nation's trade strategy beyond non· 
preferentialism (Downer, 2008) and embrace PTAs for both offensive and 
defensive reasons: essentially to try and obtain preferential market access 
over market rivals and/or nullify any such advantage negotiated by 
competitors (Calvert, 2006). But there is no indication that the concerns of 
particular industries or specific markets underpinned Cabinet's decision. On 
the contrary, the decision appeared to reflect largely an in·principle view 
that such agreements should be considered rather than there being a 
specific market access problem or issue that needed to be addressed173. 
As the·then DFAT secretary Ashton Calvert noted, Cabinet's decision 
"denoted a readiness in principle to look at them but ... there was a sense 
[of] .. .'don't kid ourselves that it's straight forward'," (Calvert, 2006). As one 
observer remarked, when the subject of PTAs came up in Cabinet the 
discussion was largely confined to the general principle, rather than specific 
implications (Kunkel, 2005). In its 1997 foreign and trade policy White 
Paper the government stated that although the views of business would be 
taken into account, "in the end the government must act on the basis of 
what it judges to be the overall national interest" (DFAT, 1997: 79·80). The 
limited role of economic interests in driving the policy change was admitted 
by Downer when describing the process by which potential PTA partners 
were selected "Not so much them having to tell government. It's pretty 
173 /\s one observer indicated, when the subject of PTJ\s came up in Cabinet 'people thought it sounded like a 
good idea and thought I,et's do rt' (Kunkel, 2005), The prirne tninister had an opei'.lness to opportunities and 
new approaches, and if there was something in it for Australian exporters then he Will say 'l,et's do it' (ibid). 
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obvious. You just look at Australia's trade patterns and you can see" 
(Downer, 2008). 
Ideas and Political Interests 
Rather than being the product of specific economic interests, the shift in 
trade policy appears to have arisen because of a change in thinking within 
government about the purposes and goals of trade policy. 
Developments in international trade policy in the late 1990s · the difficulties 
in launching a new round of multilateral negotiations under the auspices of 
the \VTO, a loss of momentum in APEC and the proliferation of PTAs · all 
resonated with a government wary about multilateral undertakings, 
increasingly skeptical about prospects for a breakthrough in multilateral 
trade liberalization negotiations any time soon and which perceived a need 
to 're·balance' what was seen to have been an over-reliance on 
multilateralism by the preceding Labor government. These attitudes 
reflected a greater comfort with managing international relations on a 
bilateral rather than multilateral basis. It also reflected, and was manifest 
in, the idea that trade policy was as much, or more, an arm of foreign policy 
and the management of international relations than as a tool of domestic 
economic reform and development. 
The heightened political focus on bilateral trade issues adopted by the 
Howard government in its first term (1996 to 1998) helped build some policy 
differentiation between it and its Labor predecessor, but did not in itself 
constitute a significant innovation in the practice of Australian trade 
diplomacy. 
The innovation came during its second term with the decision to begin 
negotiating explicitly preferential trade agreements. This development, 
approved in 1997 but not acted upon until 2000, reflected a trade policy 
approach-much less engaged with domestic economic reform and more 
closely linked to foreign policy objectives, particularly the strengthening of 
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security alliances and conferring trade preferment on those nations 
considered to be more well disposed to the Howard government's foreign 
policy goals (Kunkel, 2002). This was apparent in the process of selecting 
the three countries with which the Howard government concluded PTAs. 
Downer saw the successful negotiation of PTAs with Singapore and 
Thailand as ways to reward these countries for their support for Australia 
in regional forums, and as an important means by which to enhance 
Australia's relationship with both these nations as well as with the broader 
Asian region (Downer, 2008). The primacy of political considerations was 
also evident in the negotiation of a PTA with the United States. In 1998 and 
1999 the Howard government rebuffed approaches by the Clinton 
administration t-0 begin work on such an agreement, but this reluctance 
changed to interest with the election of the Bush administration. The 
change in United States leadership was seen as decisive in convincing 
Howard to embark upon negotiations for the AUSFTA (Thawley, 2006; 
Kunkel, 2005;Downer, 2008). 
Domestically, PTAs served the Howard government's political interests in 
two ways. They contributed to its stature as a competent economic manager 
by inferring it was active in securing favourable access for Australian 
exporters in international markets, thereby protecting jobs. They also, 
particularly in the case of the AlJSFTA, helped construct the image of the 
government as strong on security. The agreement underlined Howard's 
claims to strong ties with the US government, which it presented as a 
strong security asset amid heightened fears regarding terrorist threats in 
the early years of the new century. 
8.1.3 How THE POLICY SHIFT OCCURRED 
Institutions 
Political institutions aggregate societal norms and, through the rules backed 
by sanctions they embody, form the political architecture of a nation. In 
particular, they effect who is involved in policy decision-making and how, 
particularly through the distribution of veto·power. 
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For the Howard government, the nature of Australia's political institutional 
structure made its task of executing what was a fundamental shift in trade 
policy a relatively straightforward one. Once the Howard government 
decided to change the emphasis of trade policy to include the negotiation of 
PTAs, there were few institutional constraints. The trade bureaucracy, 
which had become imbued with a multilateral·first orthodoxy under the 
Hawke and Keating governments (Capling, 2001: 105), quickly adapted to 
the policy goals of its new masters. While the shift provoked some heated 
discussion and debate within DFAT (Kunkel, 2005), an ethos of serving the 
government of the day, together with the ambitions of senior officials, 
helped ensure bureaucratic compliance in developing the intellectual 
framework to support the policy shift (Davis, 2005) and ensure its 
implementation. As Fischer put it, "the department was there with bells on, 
always accepted whichever ministerial course of action proceeded" {2005). 
In parliament the government faced few practical constraints. Although 
trade agreements had to be reviewed by the Joint Standing Committee on 
Treaties and to be approved by both houses of Parliament before becoming 
law, in practice neither process presented major hurdles. JSCOT, with a 
majority of government members, did not reject any of the PTAs proposed 
by the Howard government and Parliament, while amending the AUSFTA, 
did not refuse its assent (Weiss, Thurbon and Mathews, 2004a). As one 
Labor MP noted, the·then Labor leader lV!ark Latham pursued several 
amendments largely as a political gambit to differentiate Labor from the 
government on trade policy, to secure the support of opponents of the 
AUSFTA and to discomfit the government (McMullan, 2006). These 
processes, by giving the appearance of accountability and scrutiny, helped 
confer legitimacy on the PTAs pursued by the executive and thereby tended 
to reinforce the authority of the executive, particularly the prime minister, 
in determining policy. 
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The major determinant in effecting the trade policy shift appeared to be 
political authority. Although Cabinet approved the pursuit of PTAs in 1997, 
negotiations for the first such agreement were not embarked upon until 
2000. While international circumstances, not least the Asian financial crisis 
and its ramifications for relations between Australia and the key ASEAN 
countries Indonesia and JV[alaysia, were not favourable to the negotiation of 
PTAs in the region, neither were domestic circumstances auspicious. In its 
first term the Howard government was rocked by the forced resignations of 
a number of ministers and in 1998 came close to losing office over its plans 
to introduce a goods and services tax. Furthermore, some industry groups -
most notably the NFF - viewed multilateral trade liberalization as an 
absolute priority and for a government enduring a shaky first term the 
prospect of becoming embroiled in a clash with a significant lobby group was 
unappealing. It was not until late in 2000, after the GST's introduction, that 
the Howard government began its first PTA negotiations, with Singapore. 
By then Howard's political authority within the government was well 
established, the position of the Coalition in office appeared increasingly 
sound, and international circumstances appeared t-0 be more favourable. 
Howard was able to break the political consensus that had developed 
around multilateralism without encountering serious political resistance. 
Policy Entrepreneurship 
While the ability of interest groups to intervene in policy and shape 
outcomes was qualified, the development and implementation of Australia's 
PTA policy highlighted the capacity of individuals and groups, acting as 
policy entrepreneurs, to shape trade policy. Soon after the election of the 
Howard government several trade bureaucrats were already working on 
ways to give effect to the shift in trade policy emphasis outlined by the 
government in its pre-election manifesto (Davis, 2005). While Trade 
Minister Tim Fischer pursued a policy of'aggressive bilateralism', within 
DFAT several officials174 were developing the parameters of a policy that 
'"Among the officllils involved in this work were Geoff Raby, Pameh Fayle, Brent Davis and Joanna 
Ifi!\\'itt "'>\ccording to Davis, Fayle (who was then a deputy secretary in DFAT) sa'\v a need to thirtk about 
developing the Coalition's trade policy mto a policy plan. According to Davis (2005), Fayle suggested the 
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encompassed not only multilateral approaches to trade liberalization, but 
also the negotiation of PT As. This work resulted in a submission to Cabinet 
in mid·1997 outlining criteria for the negotiation of PTAs, which was 
subsequently adopted as government policy. Another demonstration of the 
success of policy entrepreneurship was the genesis of the AUSFTA. The 
agreement had been contemplated, in various guises, since the mid·1980s, 
but it was the policy entrepreneurship of figures such as Australia's 
ambassador to the US, Michael Thawley, that brought it to fruition. 
Thawley saw the opportunity for the negotiation of the AUSFTA in the 
conjunction of political circumstances with the election of the Bush 
Administration in the US and the willingness of the Australian government 
to negotiate such an agreement with such an important ally and economy. 
They set the political groundwork for the eventual agreement by winning 
the tat.'it support of the Australian prime minister and securing the backing 
of the US Trade Representative. 
The policy predominance of the PM, his office and the Department of Prime 
l'vlininster and Cabinet was underlined by the successful policy 
entrepreneurship of advocates for the AUSFTA, primarily Howard's senior 
foreign policy adviser l'vlichael Thawley. Thawley focused much of his 
lobbying efforts for the agreement within Australia on the Howard 
government leadership, particularly the prime minister (Thawley, 2006). In 
the absence of any clear opposition within government, the key task 
Thawley faced in order to ensure Australian interest in a PTA with the US 
was to secure and maintain the support of the prime minister: 
Howard was the only one who really was prepared to get out there 
and argue for it, but even he was very careful what he said because 
he was skeptical that it could be fruitful. What was interesting was 
that in Howard's case, [while] publicly lowering expectations about 
the prospects, he was prepared to take the risk of committing to it. 
development ofTEF,,-\/TIFAs (feci1llica1 and Economic/Jnvestment I"'.rame\vork~r\..greements) as a stepping 
stone toward the eventual development of a policy on PTAs. 
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[To push the idea] you need to go the Prime Minister's Department 
too ... to some extent the Foreign Affairs and Trade Department, 
[though it] is very weak politically - Thawley, 2006 
Private Interests 
The political institutional structure has encouraged the development of 
sophisticated, well-resourced private interest lobby groups. The success of 
such industry groups in lobbying for and retaining high tariffs during the 
1960s and 1970s lent support to demand-side theories of policymaking, 
according to which trade policy, particularly industry protection, reflects the 
economic interests of societal actors. But the ability of such interest groups 
to shape government policy regarding the negotiation of PTAs was much 
less evident. As the focus of trade policy under the Howard government 
shifted away from domestic economic reform such as the reduction of tariffs 
and industry protection to support the achievement of broader foreign policy 
and domestic political goals, the opportunities for private interest 
intervention narrowed. \Vorking within a political institutional structure 
that has few policy veto players and which enabled a politically-successful 
prime minister to aggregate great policy-making authority to himself and 
his office, interest groups met with little success in lobbying government 
regarding the selection of PTA partners. 
In part this was because in public discussions of the government's trade 
policy, economic issues became increasingly entangled with political and 
strategic175 objectives. In its public advocacy of preferential trade 
agreements the Howard government focused not only on economic 
considerations but also the role such agreements could play in 
strengthening bilateral ties between nationsI 76• Criticisms of the PTA policy 
or of individual agreements were at times suppressed or disregarded, and 
rr:. Strategic issues are defined as those dealing urith defence matters, .including military alliances and 
dispositions, and security considerations such as counter-terrorism strategies, 
176 For mstance, in talking about the ~Australia~Thailand Free Trade 1\greement. Prime 1vfin.ister John f:Ioward 
said the agreement would •''bring us (the two countries) even closer together in the years ahead" (.H.oward, 
2004c)- Similarly, Trade Minister Mark Vaile told the Australia-lvWaysia Free Trade Agreemem Conferc'llce 
on March 10, 2005, that a free trade agreement would help "build and strengthen" bilateral linkages between 
the two countries (Vaile, 2005a). 
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critics found themselves accused of being idealogues or unpatriotic for 
questioning the desirability of particular agreements. (Downer, 2008; 
Morgan, 2004; Weiss et.al.2004: 151). And, underlining the politicized 
aspect of these agreements, the government has held to itself the choice of 
potential PTA partners. 
But interest groups were able to shape trade policy in other ways. They 
became important participants in the implementation of trade policy 
through heavy engagement in preparations for PTA negotiations, and in the 
negotiations themselves. This was most apparent in the AUSFTA 
negotiations, where the National Farmers' Federation had a substantial 
delegation that advised government trade negotiators on a daily, and 
sometimes hourly, basis (Burgess, 2005). Such involvement was seen as 
making it more likely that market access outcomes for the agricultural 
industry would be substantive. It also meant that lobby groups were more 
likely to support the PTA eventually reached, and to become public 
advocates for the agreement as it went through the process of winning 
parliamentary approval (Burgess, 2005; Millership, 2005). 
Within the broader policy community there was considerable debate -
publicly and within sections of government~ about both the AUSFTA and 
the overall shift in policy to embrace preferentialism. The economic merits 
of particular ag1:eements and the risks and benefits ofpreferentialism were 
contested in academic journals, through the pages of newspapers, in public 
forums such as parliamentary inquiries and through meetings with 
government ministers and officials. Estimates of the economic effects of the 
AUSFTA were hotly and publicly contested, and members of the policy 
community spoke about and debated the shift to preferentialism, both 
among themselves, with government ministers and officials and with non-
government l\1Ps. Critics of the AUSFTA found an audience both within and 
outside parliament. Groups and individuals with disparate motives and 
interests questioned the merit of the agreement on economic, political and 
cultural grounds through public rallies, newspaper opinion pieces and 
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letters, in monographs and petitions. Such dissent gained a platform within 
parliament, where members of the Labor Party, the Australian Democrats 
and the Australian Greens voiced opposition to all or part of the AUSFTA 
and successfully amended some provisions of the agreement. 
But the political commitment of Howard to concluding the AUSFTA meant 
such criticisms, and broader concerns about the political and economic costs 
of discriminatory trade agreements, meant there was little or no prospect of 
such deals being derailed. The political imperatives of concluding PTAs -
enhancing bilateral political relations while at the same time helping to 
politically discomfit and undermine domestic political opponents - overrode 
such considerations. 
This thesis is an inquiry into the shift of Australia's trade policy from non· 
discrimination to the embrace of preferentialism. It has shown that 
international factors alone are unable to explain this shift. \Vhile the 
Australian government and many observers argue that the policy is merely 
a pragmatic response to changes in international circumstances, 
particularly the proliferation of PT As and the faltering progress of 
multilateral liberalization at the WTO, a close examination of the domestic 
factors affecting trade policy formation indicates that much more was 
involved. In formulating and implementing its policy to negotiate PTAs, the 
Howard government moulded a response to international and domestic 
circumstances that heightened its prospects of re·election by reaffirming key 
themes in its political discourse. These underlying political messages 
included: the proposition that the government adopted a pragmatic, 
outcomes·based approach (as opposed, by implication, the more 
ideologically· driven agenda of its predecessor and critics) to multilateralism; 
that the government cultivated and strengthened relations with important 
global and regional allies (feeding into the security·first paradigm developed 
through participation in US military adventurism under the War on 
Terrorism rubric); and that it was a superior economic manager to its Labor 
rival. In developing these themes the Howard government was able, by 
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virtue of the political institutional structure, to recruit private interests as 
advocates for its policy outcomes. 
8.2 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
This argument has three main strands: 
• An assessment of the relative significance of international and 
domestic factors in shaping trade policy formation; 
• The effect of political institutional architecture on the distribution of 
trade policymaking authority; and 
• The role of material-based societal interests in shaping trade policy 
within such institutional arrangements. 
The argument contributes to academic literature in three distinct areas. 
To theories regarding the interplay of international and domestic factors in 
trade policy formation, this thesis contributes the following findings: 
• At the most elementary level, it suggests that factors operating at the 
international level, such as the proliferation of PTAs, provide the 
grounds for changes in domestic policy but are, of themselves, not 
sufficient determinants of the policy choice of domestic governments. 
• The analysis indicates that although Australia faced a trade policy 
environment in the late 1990s characterized by a rush to negotiate 
PTAs by some of its major trading partners, this development formed 
only part of the grounds upon which the Howard government decided 
to pursue PTAs itself. 
• The intentions of governments of middle·level powers such as 
Australia to use the negotiation of PTAs to help achieve geopolitical 
objectives, such as buttressing bilateral relations, as a reward for 
support and as a mechanism to retard unity among trade partners. 
In the area of political institutional architecture, the thesis contributes the 
following: 
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• It explicates how, given the characteristics of Australia's political 
institutional architecture, an electorally·successful prime minister is 
able to accrue overriding trade policymaking authority to her/himself 
and his/her office, with implications for the ability of those in line 
agencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to 
influence trade policy. 
• The thesis has identified how the centralization of trade policymaking 
authority in the Howard government within the prime minister's 
office heightened the ability of ministerial advisers and bureaucrats 
to act as policy entrepreneurs in shaping trade policy. 
Regarding interest group behaviour, the study has contributed the following: 
• It provides grounds to question the extent to which demand· side 
theories of policymaking help to explain the development of 
Australia's trade policy, particularly between 1999 and 2007. 
• The argument indicates how the ability of an electorally·successful 
prime minister to accrue extensive policymaking authority has 
affected the influence ofmaterial·based societal interests on trade 
policy. Rather than being able to command or block the adoption of 
certain policies, interest groups have become participants in the 
implementation of policy, tacitly accepting the obligation to support 
trade policy outcomes in exchange for involvement in shaping trade 
agreements. 
8.3 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
One of the most interesting questions arising from this research is the 
extent to which the aggregation of policymaking power in the prime 
minister, his/her office and his/her department is part of a broader process 
of the centralization of authority within government. The particular 
circumstances of the Howard government, led by a politically·successful 
prime minister, had, through the prism of the political institutional 
architecture, abetted this process. But it is unclear to what areas of 
government activity this condition extends, or to what it extent it may 
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persist when there is a change of government or leadership. It is an area 
that warrants further examination. 
The thesis shed some light on the behaviour of interest groups within such a 
political structure. In particular, it established some signposts regarding the 
way in which the institutional architecture, and the political environment it 
has shaped, has served to constrain the ability of coalitions of interests to 
influence trade policy. Constraints of time and resources have meant that 
that much of the work undertaken in this regard is necessarily preliminary 
in nature, but it indicates where further research could be fruitfully 
undertaken, including through comparison of the behaviour of interest 
groups in trade with their actions in other areas of policy such as industrial 
relations, health and education. 
One of the most interesting findings of the thesis is the capacity within 
Australia's political institutional structure for policy entrepreneurs to 
successfully propose policies and have them adopted by the government. 
This finding suggests that well·connected, resourceful and politically adept 
individuals and groups can be agents, in certain circumstances, of policy 
change or refinement. This has implications for institutional analyses of 
politics, particularly in respect of the stability of government policy in 
Australia in an environment where policymaking authority may be 
aggregated in relatively few hands. Again, a comparative study with other 
areas of government policy outside the ambit of this study could shed more 
light on this phenomenon. 
Finally, the thesis was prepared while the Australian government was 
engaged in preparation for, or the negotiation of, more than seven bilateral 
and regional PTAs. For reasons of space and timing, the scope of this study 
was limited to those agreements negotiated by the Howard government up 
to and including the AUSFTA. As further agreements are negotiated and 
ratified there will be opportunity to reappraise the conclusions of this study, 
particularly regarding the interplay of domestic and international factors in 
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selecting PTA partners and the role of the bureaucracy and interest groups 
in negotiating and advocating such agreements. 
8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The thesis has examined the interplay of factors driving the shift in the 
emphasis of Australia's trade policy from non-discrimination to the embrace 
of preferentialism, with particular attention to the negotiation of three 
bilateral preferential trade agreements in the early 2000s. It shed light on 
the importance of the political institutional architecture in determining the 
ability of various actors - government ministers, senior public officials, the 
parliament and interest groups - to influence policy. 
The study also highlighted a shift in views about the role of trade policy, 
from its use as an important lever of domestic economic reform during the 
1980s and early 1990s to wielding it as an explicit tool for helping manage 
geopolitical relations as well as satisfying domestic political objectives. 
The confusing and contradictory trade policy pursued by the Howard 
government - seeking to simultaneously claim allegiance to both 
multilateralism and preferentialism - dogged the early months of the Rudd 
Labor government as it tried to engineer a more WTO-compliant approach 
while flagging its intentions to pursue an interventionist industry policy. 
If policymaking authority continues to be concentrated in the prime 
minister and his or her office and department, these contradictory goals 
may become more pronounced, with important implications for policy 
formation and stability. 
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APPENDIX 1 
TRADE POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP, 2003 
Chair: Geoff Allen, chairman, Allen Consulting Group 
Dieter Adamsas, deputy CEO and CFO, Leighton Holdings Ltd 
Jane Bennett, director, Ashgrove Cheese Pty Ltd 
John Conomos, senior executive vice·president, Toyota Motor Corporation, 
Australia Ltd. 
Peter Corish, President, National Farmers' Federation 
Saul Eslake, chief economist, ANZ Banking Group 
Ron Fisher, managing director, Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd 
David Hawes, Group general manager, Government and International 
Relations, Qantas Airways Ltd 
Keith Smith, wine industry consultant 
Warwick Smith, chair, Telecommunications, Media, Entertainment and 
Technology group, Macquarie Bank Ltd 
Prof Gerard Sutton, Vice· Chancellor, University ofvYollongong 
Meg McDonald, general manager, Corporate Affairs, Alcoa World Alumina 
Australia 
EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS 
Peter O'Byrne, managing director, Australian Trade Commission 
Mark Paterson, secretary, Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
·Michael Taylor, secretary, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry 
Angus Armour, managing director, Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation 
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APPENDIX 2 
INTERVIEWS ·conducted between January 2004 and October 2008 
Politicians 
Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1996·2007 
Tim Fischer, Minister for Trade, 1996·99 
Bob :tvlcMullan, Minister for Trade, 1994·96 
Peter Cook, l'vlinister for Trade, 1993·94 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials - former and current 
A.shton Calvert (former DFAT secretary) 
Stuart Harris (former DFAT secretary) 
Geoff Raby 
Don Kenyon 
David Hawes 
Alan Oxley 
Graeme Thomson 
Andrew Elek 
Ministerial advisers 
Michael Thawley 
Ross Garnaut 
John Edwards 
John Kunkel 
Alan Gyngell 
Industry group representatives/lobbyists 
Former executive director, National Farmers Federation (name withheld by 
request) 
Scott l'viitchell, trade policy manager, National Farmers Federation 
Jacky Millership, manager, trade, Australian Industry Group 
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Director, Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (name withheld by 
request) 
Alan Burgess, former Chair, National Farmet·s Federation trade policy 
committee 
Former director, Australian Industry Group (name withheld by request) 
Anne \Vexler, Wexler and \Val11.~r, Washington DC 
Other 
Gary Banks, chairman, Productivity Commission 
Robert Garran, former foreign affairs journalist, The Austrahan 
Tracy Sutherland, former trade journalist, The Australian Financial Review 
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